The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; Religion, A Dialogue, Etc. - Arthur Schopenhauer
Perhaps I go too far in saying _all_ religions. For the sake of truth, I
must add that the fanatical enormities perpetrated in the name of
religion are only to be put down to the adherents of monotheistic
creeds, that is, the Jewish faith and its two branches, Christianity and
Islamism. We hear of nothing of the kind in the case of Hindoos and
Buddhists. Although it is a matter of common knowledge that about the
fifth century of our era Buddhism was driven out by the Brahmans from
its ancient home in the southernmost part of the Indian peninsula, and
afterwards spread over the whole of the rest of Asia, as far as I know,
we have no definite account of any crimes of violence, or wars, or
cruelties, perpetrated in the course of it.
That may, of course, be attributable to the obscurity which veils the
history of those countries; but the exceedingly mild character of their
religion, together with their unceasing inculcation of forbearance
towards all living things, and the fact that Brahmanism by its caste
system properly admits no proselytes, allows one to hope that their
adherents may be acquitted of shedding blood on a large scale, and of
cruelty in any form. Spence Hardy, in his excellent book on _Eastern
Monachism_, praises the extraordinary tolerance of the Buddhists, and
adds his assurance that the annals of Buddhism will furnish fewer
instances of religious persecution than those of any other religion.
As a matter of fact, it is only to monotheism that intolerance is
essential; an only god is by his nature a jealous god, who can allow no
other god to exist. Polytheistic gods, on the other hand, are naturally
tolerant; they live and let live; their own colleagues are the chief
objects of their sufferance, as being gods of the same religion. This
toleration is afterwards extended to foreign gods, who are, accordingly,
hospitably received, and later on admitted, in some cases, to an
equality of rights; the chief example of which is shown by the fact,
that the Romans willingly admitted and venerated Phrygian, Egyptian and
other gods. Hence it is that monotheistic religions alone furnish the
spectacle of religious wars, religious persecutions, heretical
tribunals, that breaking of idols and destruction of images of the gods,
that razing of Indian temples, and Egyptian colossi, which had looked on
the sun three thousand years, just because a jealous god had said, _Thou
shalt make no graven image_.
But to return to the chief point. You are certainly right in insisting
on the strong metaphysical needs of mankind; but religion appears to me
to be not so much a satisfaction as an abuse of those needs. At any rate
we have seen that in regard to the furtherance of morality, its utility
is, for the most part, problematical, its disadvantages, and especially
the atrocities which have followed in its train, are patent to the light
of day. Of course it is quite a different matter if we consider the
utility of religion as a prop of thrones; for where these are held "by
the grace of God," throne and altar are intimately associated; and every
wise prince who loves his throne and his family will appear at the head
of his people as an exemplar of true religion. Even Machiavelli, in the
eighteenth chapter of his book, most earnestly recommended religion to
princes. Beyond this, one may say that revealed religions stand to
philosophy exactly in the relation of "sovereigns by the grace of God,"
to "the sovereignty of the people"; so that the two former terms of the
parallel are in natural alliance.
_Demopheles_. Oh, don't take that tone! You're going hand in hand with
ochlocracy and anarchy, the arch enemy of all legislative order, all
civilization and all humanity.
_Philalethes_. You are right. It was only a sophism of mine, what the
fencing master calls a feint. I retract it. But see how disputing
sometimes makes an honest man unjust and malicious. Let us stop.
_Demopheles_. I can't help regretting that, after all the trouble I've
taken, I haven't altered your disposition in regard to religion. On the
other hand, I can assure you that everything you have said hasn't shaken
my conviction of its high value and necessity.
_Philalethes_. I fully believe you; for, as we may read in Hudibras--
A man convinced against his will
Is of the same opinion still.
My consolation is that, alike in controversies and in taking mineral
waters, the after effects are the true ones.
_Demopheles_. Well, I hope it'll be beneficial in your case.
_Philalethes_. It might be so, if I could digest a certain Spanish
proverb.
_Demopheles_. Which is?
_Philalethes. Behind the cross stands the devil_.
_Demopheles_. Come, don't let us part with sarcasms. Let us rather admit
that religion, like Janus, or better still, like the Brahman god of
death, Yama, has two faces, and like him, one friendly, the other
sullen. Each of us has kept his eye fixed on one alone.
_Philalethes_. You are right, old fellow.
A FEW WORDS ON PANTHEISM.
The controversy between Theism and Pantheism might be presented in an
allegorical or dramatic form by supposing a dialogue between two persons
in the pit of a theatre at Milan during the performance of a piece. One
of them, convinced that he is in Girolamo's renowned marionette-theatre,
admires the art by which the director gets up the dolls and guides their
movements. "Oh, you are quite mistaken," says the other, "we're in the
Teatro della Scala; it is the manager and his troupe who are on the
stage; they are the persons you see before you; the poet too is taking a
part."
The chief objection I have to Pantheism is that it says nothing. To call
the world "God" is not to explain it; it is only to enrich our language
with a superfluous synonym for the word "world." It comes to the same
thing whether you say "the world is God," or "God is the world." But if
you start from "God" as something that is given in experience, and has
to be explained, and they say, "God is the world," you are affording
what is to some extent an explanation, in so far as you are reducing
what is unknown to what is partly known (_ignotum per notius_); but it
is only a verbal explanation. If, however, you start from what is really
given, that is to say, from the world, and say, "the world is God," it
is clear that you say nothing, or at least you are explaining what is
unknown by what is more unknown.
Hence, Pantheism presupposes Theism; only in so far as you start from a
god, that is, in so far as you possess him as something with which you
are already familiar, can you end by identifying him with the world; and
your purpose in doing so is to put him out of the way in a decent
fashion. In other words, you do not start clear from the world as
something that requires explanation; you start from God as something
that is given, and not knowing what to do with him, you make the world
take over his role. This is the origin of Pantheism. Taking an
unprejudiced view of the world as it is, no one would dream of regarding
it as a god. It must be a very ill-advised god who knows no better way
of diverting himself than by turning into such a world as ours, such a
mean, shabby world, there to take the form of innumerable millions who
live indeed, but are fretted and tormented, and who manage to exist a
while together, only by preying on one another; to bear misery, need and
death, without measure and without object, in the form, for instance, of
millions of negro slaves, or of the three million weavers in Europe who,
in hunger and care, lead a miserable existence in damp rooms or the
cheerless halls of a factory. What a pastime this for a god, who must,
as such, be used to another mode of existence!
We find accordingly that what is described as the great advance from
Theism to Pantheism, if looked at seriously, and not simply as a masked
negation of the sort indicated above, is a transition from what is
unproved and hardly conceivable to what is absolutely absurd. For
however obscure, however loose or confused may be the idea which we
connect with the word "God," there are two predicates which are
inseparable from it, the highest power and the highest wisdom. It is
absolutely absurd to think that a being endowed with these qualities
should have put himself into the position described above. Theism, on
the other hand, is something which is merely unproved; and if it is
difficult to look upon the infinite world as the work of a personal, and
therefore individual, Being, the like of which we know only from our
experience of the animal world, it is nevertheless not an absolutely
absurd idea. That a Being, at once almighty and all-good, should create
a world of torment is always conceivable; even though we do not know why
he does so; and accordingly we find that when people ascribe the height
of goodness to this Being, they set up the inscrutable nature of his
wisdom as the refuge by which the doctrine escapes the charge of
absurdity. Pantheism, however, assumes that the creative God is himself
the world of infinite torment, and, in this little world alone, dies
every second, and that entirely of his own will; which is absurd. It
would be much more correct to identify the world with the devil, as the
venerable author of the _Deutsche Theologie_ has, in fact, done in a
passage of his immortal work, where he says, "_Wherefore the evil spirit
and nature are one, and where nature is not overcome, neither is the
evil adversary overcome_."
It is manifest that the Pantheists give the Sansara the name of God. The
same name is given by the Mystics to the Nirvana. The latter, however,
state more about the Nirvana than they know, which is not done by the
Buddhists, whose Nirvana is accordingly a relative nothing. It is only
Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans who give its proper and correct
meaning to the word "God."
The expression, often heard now-a-days, "the world is an end-in-itself,"
leaves it uncertain whether Pantheism or a simple Fatalism is to be
taken as the explanation of it. But, whichever it be, the expression
looks upon the world from a physical point of view only, and leaves out
of sight its moral significance, because you cannot assume a moral
significance without presenting the world as means to a higher end. The
notion that the world has a physical but not a moral meaning, is the
most mischievous error sprung from the greatest mental perversity.
ON BOOKS AND READING.
Ignorance is degrading only when found in company with riches. The poor
man is restrained by poverty and need: labor occupies his thoughts, and
takes the place of knowledge. But rich men who are ignorant live for
their lusts only, and are like the beasts of the field; as may be seen
every day: and they can also be reproached for not having used wealth
and leisure for that which gives them their greatest value.
When we read, another person thinks for us: we merely repeat his mental
process. In learning to write, the pupil goes over with his pen what the
teacher has outlined in pencil: so in reading; the greater part of the
work of thought is already done for us. This is why it relieves us to
take up a book after being occupied with our own thoughts. And in
reading, the mind is, in fact, only the playground of another's
thoughts. So it comes about that if anyone spends almost the whole day
in reading, and by way of relaxation devotes the intervals to some
thoughtless pastime, he gradually loses the capacity for thinking; just
as the man who always rides, at last forgets how to walk. This is the
case with many learned persons: they have read themselves stupid. For to
occupy every spare moment in reading, and to do nothing but read, is
even more paralyzing to the mind than constant manual labor, which at
least allows those engaged in it to follow their own thoughts. A spring
never free from the pressure of some foreign body at last loses its
elasticity; and so does the mind if other people's thoughts are
constantly forced upon it. Just as you can ruin the stomach and impair
the whole body by taking too much nourishment, so you can overfill and
choke the mind by feeding it too much. The more you read, the fewer are
the traces left by what you have read: the mind becomes like a tablet
crossed over and over with writing. There is no time for ruminating, and
in no other way can you assimilate what you have read. If you read on
and on without setting your own thoughts to work, what you have read can
not strike root, and is generally lost. It is, in fact, just the same
with mental as with bodily food: hardly the fifth part of what one takes
is assimilated. The rest passes off in evaporation, respiration and the
like.
The result of all this is that thoughts put on paper are nothing more
than footsteps in the sand: you see the way the man has gone, but to
know what he saw on his walk, you want his eyes.
There is no quality of style that can be gained by reading writers who
possess it; whether it be persuasiveness, imagination, the gift of
drawing comparisons, boldness, bitterness, brevity, grace, ease of
expression or wit, unexpected contrasts, a laconic or naive manner, and
the like. But if these qualities are already in us, exist, that is to
say, potentially, we can call them forth and bring them to
consciousness; we can learn the purposes to which they can be put; we
can be strengthened in our inclination to use them, or get courage to do
so; we can judge by examples the effect of applying them, and so acquire
the correct use of them; and of course it is only when we have arrived
at that point that we actually possess these qualities. The only way in
which reading can form style is by teaching us the use to which we can
put our own natural gifts. We must have these gifts before we begin to
learn the use of them. Without them, reading teaches us nothing but
cold, dead mannerisms and makes us shallow imitators.
The strata of the earth preserve in rows the creatures which lived in
former ages; and the array of books on the shelves of a library stores
up in like manner the errors of the past and the way in which they have
been exposed. Like those creatures, they too were full of life in their
time, and made a great deal of noise; but now they are stiff and
fossilized, and an object of curiosity to the literary palaeontologist
alone.
Herodotus relates that Xerxes wept at the sight of his army, which
stretched further than the eye could reach, in the thought that of all
these, after a hundred years, not one would be alive. And in looking
over a huge catalogue of new books, one might weep at thinking that,
when ten years have passed, not one of them will be heard of.
It is in literature as in life: wherever you turn, you stumble at once
upon the incorrigible mob of humanity, swarming in all directions,
crowding and soiling everything, like flies in summer. Hence the number,
which no man can count, of bad books, those rank weeds of literature,
which draw nourishment from the corn and choke it. The time, money and
attention of the public, which rightfully belong to good books and their
noble aims, they take for themselves: they are written for the mere
purpose of making money or procuring places. So they are not only
useless; they do positive mischief. Nine-tenths of the whole of our
present literature has no other aim than to get a few shillings out of
the pockets of the public; and to this end author, publisher and
reviewer are in league.
Let me mention a crafty and wicked trick, albeit a profitable and
successful one, practised by litterateurs, hack writers, and voluminous
authors. In complete disregard of good taste and the true culture of the
period, they have succeeded in getting the whole of the world of fashion
into leading strings, so that they are all trained to read in time, and
all the same thing, viz., _the newest books_; and that for the purpose
of getting food for conversation in the circles in which they move. This
is the aim served by bad novels, produced by writers who were once
celebrated, as Spindler, Bulwer Lytton, Eugene Sue. What can be more
miserable than the lot of a reading public like this, always bound to
peruse the latest works of extremely commonplace persons who write for
money only, and who are therefore never few in number? and for this
advantage they are content to know by name only the works of the few
superior minds of all ages and all countries. Literary newspapers, too,
are a singularly cunning device for robbing the reading public of the
time which, if culture is to be attained, should be devoted to the
genuine productions of literature, instead of being occupied by the
daily bungling commonplace persons.
Hence, in regard to reading, it is a very important thing to be able to
refrain. Skill in doing so consists in not taking into one's hands any
book merely because at the time it happens to be extensively read; such
as political or religious pamphlets, novels, poetry, and the like, which
make a noise, and may even attain to several editions in the first and
last year of their existence. Consider, rather, that the man who writes
for fools is always sure of a large audience; be careful to limit your
time for reading, and devote it exclusively to the works of those great
minds of all times and countries, who o'ertop the rest of humanity,
those whom the voice of fame points to as such. These alone really
educate and instruct. You can never read bad literature too little, nor
good literature too much. Bad books are intellectual poison; they
destroy the mind. Because people always read what is new instead of the
best of all ages, writers remain in the narrow circle of the ideas which
happen to prevail in their time; and so the period sinks deeper and
deeper into its own mire.
There are at all times two literatures in progress, running side by
side, but little known to each other; the one real, the other only
apparent. The former grows into permanent literature; it is pursued by
those who live _for_ science or poetry; its course is sober and quiet,
but extremely slow; and it produces in Europe scarcely a dozen works in
a century; these, however, are permanent. The other kind is pursued by
persons who live _on_ science or poetry; it goes at a gallop with much
noise and shouting of partisans; and every twelve-month puts a thousand
works on the market. But after a few years one asks, Where are they?
where is the glory which came so soon and made so much clamor? This kind
may be called fleeting, and the other, permanent literature.
In the history of politics, half a century is always a considerable
time; the matter which goes to form them is ever on the move; there is
always something going on. But in the history of literature there is
often a complete standstill for the same period; nothing has happened,
for clumsy attempts don't count. You are just where you were fifty years
previously.
To explain what I mean, let me compare the advance of knowledge among
mankind to the course taken by a planet. The false paths on which
humanity usually enters after every important advance are like the
epicycles in the Ptolemaic system, and after passing through one of
them, the world is just where it was before it entered it. But the great
minds, who really bring the race further on its course do not accompany
it on the epicycles it makes from time to time. This explains why
posthumous fame is often bought at the expense of contemporary praise,
and _vice versa_. An instance of such an epicycle is the philosophy
started by Fichte and Schelling, and crowned by Hegel's caricature of
it. This epicycle was a deviation from the limit to which philosophy had
been ultimately brought by Kant; and at that point I took it up again
afterwards, to carry it further. In the intervening period the sham
philosophers I have mentioned and some others went through their
epicycle, which had just come to an end; so that those who went with
them on their course are conscious of the fact that they are exactly at
the point from which they started.
This circumstance explains why it is that, every thirty years or so,
science, literature, and art, as expressed in the spirit of the time,
are declared bankrupt. The errors which appear from time to time amount
to such a height in that period that the mere weight of their absurdity
makes the fabric fall; whilst the opposition to them has been gathering
force at the same time. So an upset takes place, often followed by an
error in the opposite direction. To exhibit these movements in their
periodical return would be the true practical aim of the history of
literature: little attention, however, is paid to it. And besides, the
comparatively short duration of these periods makes it difficult to
collect the data of epochs long gone by, so that it is most convenient
to observe how the matter stands in one's own generation. An instance of
this tendency, drawn from physical science, is supplied in the Neptunian
geology of Werter.
But let me keep strictly to the example cited above, the nearest we can
take. In German philosophy, the brilliant epoch of Kant was immediately
followed by a period which aimed rather at being imposing than at
convincing. Instead of being thorough and clear, it tried to be
dazzling, hyperbolical, and, in a special degree, unintelligible:
instead of seeking truth, it intrigued. Philosophy could make no
progress in this fashion; and at last the whole school and its method
became bankrupt. For the effrontery of Hegel and his fellows came to
such a pass,--whether because they talked such sophisticated nonsense,
or were so unscrupulously puffed, or because the entire aim of this
pretty piece of work was quite obvious,--that in the end there was
nothing to prevent charlatanry of the whole business from becoming
manifest to everybody: and when, in consequence of certain disclosures,
the favor it had enjoyed in high quarters was withdrawn, the system was
openly ridiculed. This most miserable of all the meagre philosophies
that have ever existed came to grief, and dragged down with it into the
abysm of discredit, the systems of Fichte and Schelling which had
preceded it. And so, as far as Germany is concerned, the total
philosophical incompetence of the first half of the century following
upon Kant is quite plain: and still the Germans boast of their talent
for philosophy in comparison with foreigners, especially since an
English writer has been so maliciously ironical as to call them "a
nation of thinkers."
For an example of the general system of epicycles drawn from the history
of art, look at the school of sculpture which flourished in the last
century and took its name from Bernini, more especially at the
development of it which prevailed in France. The ideal of this school
was not antique beauty, but commonplace nature: instead of the
simplicity and grace of ancient art, it represented the manners of a
French minuet.
This tendency became bankrupt when, under Winkelman's direction, a
return was made to the antique school. The history of painting furnishes
an illustration in the first quarter of the century, when art was looked
upon merely as a means and instrument of mediaeval religious sentiment,
and its themes consequently drawn from ecclesiastical subjects alone:
these, however, were treated by painters who had none of the true
earnestness of faith, and in their delusion they followed Francesco
Francia, Pietro Perugino, Angelico da Fiesole and others like them,
rating them higher even than the really great masters who followed. It
was in view of this terror, and because in poetry an analogous aim had
at the same time found favor, that Goethe wrote his parable
_Pfaffenspiel_. This school, too, got the reputation of being whimsical,
became bankrupt, and was followed by a return to nature, which
proclaimed itself in _genre_ pictures and scenes of life of every kind,
even though it now and then strayed into what was vulgar.
The progress of the human mind in literature is similar. The history of
literature is for the most part like the catalogue of a museum of
deformities; the spirit in which they keep best is pigskin. The few
creatures that have been born in goodly shape need not be looked for
there. They are still alive, and are everywhere to be met with in the
world, immortal, and with their years ever green. They alone form what I
have called real literature; the history of which, poor as it is in
persons, we learn from our youth up out of the mouths of all educated
people, before compilations recount it for us.
As an antidote to the prevailing monomania for reading literary
histories, in order to be able to chatter about everything, without
having any real knowledge at all, let me refer to a passage in
Lichtenberg's works (vol. II., p. 302), which is well worth perusal.
I believe that the over-minute acquaintance with the history of science
and learning, which is such a prevalent feature of our day, is very
prejudicial to the advance of knowledge itself. There is pleasure in
following up this history; but as a matter of fact, it leaves the mind,
not empty indeed, but without any power of its own, just because it
makes it so full. Whoever has felt the desire, not to fill up his mind,
but to strengthen it, to develop his faculties and aptitudes, and
generally, to enlarge his powers, will have found that there is nothing
so weakening as intercourse with a so-called litterateur, on a matter of
knowledge on which he has not thought at all, though he knows a thousand
little facts appertaining to its history and literature. It is like
reading a cookery-book when you are hungry. I believe that so-called
literary history will never thrive amongst thoughtful people, who are
conscious of their own worth and the worth of real knowledge. These
people are more given to employing their own reason than to troubling
themselves to know how others have employed theirs. The worst of it is
that, as you will find, the more knowledge takes the direction of
literary research, the less the power of promoting knowledge becomes;
the only thing that increases is pride in the possession of it. Such
persons believe that they possess knowledge in a greater degree than
those who really possess it. It is surely a well-founded remark, that
knowledge never makes its possessor proud. Those alone let themselves be
blown out with pride, who incapable of extending knowledge in their own
persons, occupy themselves with clearing up dark points in its history,
or are able to recount what others have done. They are proud, because
they consider this occupation, which is mostly of a mechanical nature,
the practice of knowledge. I could illustrate what I mean by examples,
but it would be an odious task.