De Bello Gallico and Other Commentaries - Caius Julius Caesar
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LXXXIV.--Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a
sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when
Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his
troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention
or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of
the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own
ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards for
several days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led them
up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct
inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to
his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees
inferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of the
advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and
they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By
these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would
dare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's,
if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number.
For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and
killed one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as we
before observed, and several others.
LXXXV.--Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at
the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that
Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar,
seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged
it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that
post, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his
camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently
supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some
opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches
harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters
being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents
struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily
practice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from his
entrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on
equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they
were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says
he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has
been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We
shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity." He immediately
marched out at the head of his troops.
LXXXVI.--Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous
solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle.
For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the
battalions came to battle, Caesar's army would be put to the rout. When
most people expressed their surprise at it, "I know," says he, "that I
promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed,
that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have
persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as
the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and
enclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them
to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this
means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions,
and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far
outnumber them in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be
ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which
they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the
opinion generally entertained of their experience and valour.
LXXXVII.--After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of
Caesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums.
"Think not, Pompey," says he, "that this is the army which conquered
Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak at
random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that
army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily
happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence
in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the
continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are
composed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been
recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part
from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces
perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium." Having so said, he took
an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he
encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and
took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it.
After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and
joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that
in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by
a general of such experience.
LXXXVIII.--When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observed
that his army was drawn up in the following manner:--On the left wing
were the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the
disputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was called
the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio
with the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion in
conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by
Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his
steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre and
the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted
to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers,
who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to his
standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven
remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the
neighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep
banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and
slingers, on his left wing.
LXXXIX.--Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth
legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much
weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so
close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them
to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a
total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp.
He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P.
Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post
opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the
enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be
surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort
from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a
fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them
with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended
on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the
entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the
signal whenever he wished them to do so.
XC.--When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military
custom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantly
received from him, he took especial care to remind them "that he could
call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought
peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference
[with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what
manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to
send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of
his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other
of her armies." After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the
signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very
impatient for the onset.
XCI.--There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus,
who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man
of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me,
my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as
you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be
won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time
he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a
manner to-day, that you will feel grateful tome living or dead." After
uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one
hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.
XCII.--There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed
for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers
to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or
suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done
this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge
of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that
Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in
disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if
the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their
course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after
running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted
by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient
reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity
implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a
desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress,
but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that
the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised;
by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their
own army inspired with courage.
XCIII.--But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with
their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men
did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom,
and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord
repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not
come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a
short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins,
and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did
Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood
our charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched their
javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse,
according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and
his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not
withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's
horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and
flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his
fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly
rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man
of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but
galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their
retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless,
were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled
about upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued to
make battle, and attacked them in the rear.
XCIV.--At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which
till then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new and
fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others
having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to
maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his
opinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his
soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he had
placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry
were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by
them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be
the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part
of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into
confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated
straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions,
whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that
the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with
diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other
gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he
retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.
XCV.--Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their
entrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite
to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of
fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by
the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being
prepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The
camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard
it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries.
For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle,
affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and
military standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further
escape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who were
posted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of our
darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the
conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the
high mountains which joined the camp.
XCVI.--In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid,
a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with
fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and
many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a
confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they
had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged
themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury
Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in
want of common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the
trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit,
went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all
speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatch
collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor
night, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, and
went on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have been
told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was
almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had
expected victory, as they began the flight.
XCVII.--Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his
soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of
completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to
draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position,
as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to
retreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops,
and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a
part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a
shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew
up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain
whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops,
though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day,
and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the
communication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might
not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent
ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had
espoused that party, made their escape by night.
XCVIII.--At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on
the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and
pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with
outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears,
implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having
spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he
pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury should
be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this
diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and
those which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to
the camp; and the same day went to Larissa.
XCIX.--In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing,
but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus,
also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, lost
his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which
he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest
opinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highly
deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen
thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for
even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to
Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. One
hundred and eighty stands of colours, and nine eagles, were brought to
Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his
strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.
C.--About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at
Brundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessed
himself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner,
Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques,
endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galley
and two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into a
narrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along the
shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But
Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his
expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from
Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till
he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced
either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of
necessaries, to quit the port and islands.
CI.--Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of
Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided
into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division at
Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got into
Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and
having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind
being high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch,
and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's
fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of
which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, that
though there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with
difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been
brought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it was
generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was
maintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sail
from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being
moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same
manner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port about
forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both
sides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spread
wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions,
who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids,
could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships
and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two
five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made
his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken
besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in
Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave
credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's
lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with
his fleet from that coast.
CII.--Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue
Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to
provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every
day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion
to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey
at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and
Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it
with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as
possible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keep
possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is
impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together
his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his
necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that
place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two
days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia,
and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of all
the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the
castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers
had been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge
in the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that
if they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to their
lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been
consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and
to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight,
and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and
having received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail much
against their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reached
those states.
CIII.--Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his
design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the
farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and
having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military
purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the
slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and
such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he
sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there
with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom
a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he
had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from
his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria,
and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in
consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between
his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their
commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's
troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to
think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of
Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria,
and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the
war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.
CIV.--The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the
minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as
they afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army,
and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in
adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a
favourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;
but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captain
of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a
military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and
deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the
pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a
small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and
Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's
order, and put to death in prison.