A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus With the Encheiridion - Epictetus
A SELECTION
FROM THE
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
WITH
THE ENCHEIRIDION
TRANSLATED BY
GEORGE LONG
CONTENTS.
EPICTETUS (BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE)
A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL
EPICTETUS.
Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a
native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a
branch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the
epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv., 13); from which
it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis in
the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown.
The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome,
and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the Emperor
Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg by
torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius,
the commentator on the Encheiridion, or Manual, who says that Epictetus
was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he
became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times that the
parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for
this statement.
It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his
master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius
Rufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a
master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher; but
Garnier, the author of a "Memoire sur les Ouvrages d'Epictete," explains
this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. Garnier
says: "Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, was
indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education to the whim,
which was common at the end of the Republic and under the first
emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slaves
grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same way as
rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great
cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which
can explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, had
received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of
Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot
suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and for
his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of
Nero would have desired to possess such a slave."
Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but I
can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero
when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable
tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton., Domit. 14), afterwards put
Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude that
Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach
at Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by
Domitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by
Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a school
or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man.
The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as we
learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii., ed. Hemsterh., p. 393).
When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him to take
a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a
philosopher's duty, to leave in place of himself another in the
universe, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then,
Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment., c. 46,
p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last
he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of
Epictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but
Epictetus took the child and brought it up.
Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was written
by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander
the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher's
discourses ("Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius," p. i). These
Discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title
of [Greek: Epichtaeton diatribai]. Simplicius, in his commentary on the
[Greek: Egcheiridion] or Manual, states that this work also was put
together by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus what
he considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted to
move men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the
Encheiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words in
various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life
and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious life
were probably not many nor remarkable; but we should have been glad if
this work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kind
of man Epictetus was.
Photius (Biblioth., 58) mentions among Arrian's works "Conversations
with Epictetus," [Greek: Homiliai Epichtaeton], in twelve books. Upton
thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that
Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a
different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight
books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations.
Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian
on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works
by Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read these
books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books which he
enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are not certain
that there was a work of Arrian entitled "The Conversations of
Epictetus."
Upton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that "there are
many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather
confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is
not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes."
The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and
so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker
(Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his edition)
that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the
omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection of
the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand
Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages
more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the
meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man
must judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book, if I
had not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kind
require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all.
G.L.
A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.
OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER.--Of all the
faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not
one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not
capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic
art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about
what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about
melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But
when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what
words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar
will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but
whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do
neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That
which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this
faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have
received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and
what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for
what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for
they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is
capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar,
and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions
for using them? Nothing else.
What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What
else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is
permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I
then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I
must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles
and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess.
I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man,
what are you talking about? Me, in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my
will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison.
My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told
you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which
philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which
they should exercise themselves.
What then did Agrippinus say? He said, "I am not a hindrance to myself."
When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate,
he said: "I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the
day"--this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then
take the cold bath,--"let us go and take our exercise." After he had
taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, "You have been condemned."
"To banishment," he replies, "or to death?" "To banishment." "What about
my property?" "It is not taken from you." "Let us go to Aricia then," he
said, "and dine."
* * * * *
HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER.--To the
rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is
rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that?
See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned that
whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable.
When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang
yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is
pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the
contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.
Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other
reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But
that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as
are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great
number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift,
that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am
naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not.
Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this
is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect
my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property;
nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair
of reaching the highest degree.
* * * * *
HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF
ALL MEN TO THE REST.--If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine
as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and
that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would
never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the
emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if
you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do
not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man,
body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common
with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and
mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is
of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion
which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed
for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or
ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is quite the
contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, with my
wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess something
better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is
better, and why do you attach yourself to this?
Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become
like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous; some become like
lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us become
foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and
malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal?
See then and take care that you do not become some one of these
miserable things.
* * * * *
OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT.--He who is making progress, having learned
from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and
aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that
happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by
not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which
he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and
confers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are
dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent
of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something
which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises
good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress
towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is
always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us,
progress is an approach towards this point.
How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek
progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product
of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has
read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having
understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else
than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue
produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is
another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one,
is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are
making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the
man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own
misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may
learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your
work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you
may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into
that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you
commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not
deceived. The first things, and the most necessary are those which I
have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall
into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving.
Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking
to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might
say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should
reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take
the treatise on the active powers ([Greek: hormea]), and see how I have
studied it, I reply: Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you
exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and
purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If
conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making
progress; but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your
books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do
you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the
expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for
the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another.
Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from
externals, turns to his own will ([Greek: proairesis]) to exercise it
and to improve it by labor, so as to make it conformable to nature,
elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he has
learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in his
power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change
with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of
necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure
or prevent what lie desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in
the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of
fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that
occurs he works out his chief principles ([Greek: ta proaegoumena]) as
the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice
with reference to the voice--this is the man who truly makes progress,
and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has
strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labors only
at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home
immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which he
has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how
a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe to
me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and
disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and
poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, if
it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to say,
Wretched am I, an old man: have I kept my gray hairs for this? Who is it
that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute
and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus say
this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the
perturbations ([Greek: pathae]) of men who value externals exhibited in
this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external
things which are independent of the will concern us, for my part I
should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and
undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you wish.
What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these
things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity
arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to
nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great
good fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! To
Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave us
food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to
light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to
live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an
altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for
this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to
them; but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by
which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness,
shall we not thank God for this?
* * * * *
AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.--If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident
truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him
change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man's
strength or the teacher's weakness; for when the man, though he has been
confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal
with him by argument?
Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the
other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to
what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are
afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to
avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And
indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to
apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad
condition; but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we
call even power (or strength).
* * * * *
OF PROVIDENCE.--From everything, which is or happens in the world, it is
easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities: the
faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things,
and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities,
one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen:
another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God
had made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would
have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if he had made the
faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the
faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at
all. Well, suppose that he had made both, but had not made light? In
that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has
fitted this to that and that to this?
What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only,
of which the rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find many
common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is
done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another;
God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us
to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to
eat and to drink, and to copulate, and to do all the other things which
they severally do. But for us, to whom he has given also the
intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we act
in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and
constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For
where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the
acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose
constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough; but in an
animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless
there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his
proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten,
another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another
for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand
appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced
man to be a spectator of God and of his works; and not only a spectator
of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to
begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to
begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life
conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been
spectators of these things.
But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of
you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But
when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he
has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and
understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you
were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty
of sight? But you may say, There are some things disagreeable and
troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not
scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without
comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you
not abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things? But I
suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of
the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received
faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you
not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have
you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything
that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my
mind, or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for
the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over
what happens?
Come, then, do you also having observed these things look to the
faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring
now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given
to me by thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which
happen. You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that some
things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what
does happen; and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of
such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us
these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that
happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king
and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance,
subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our
own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of
hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as
your own, use them not; you do not even see what you have received, and
from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even
acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit,
betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet
I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul
and manliness; but what powers you have for finding fault making
accusations, do you show me.