A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus With the Encheiridion - Epictetus
Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his
trial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my
life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in
my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my
private or in my public life.
But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little
property, and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this
moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of
your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees,
embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you
have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not
resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not
choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a
slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well-bred cock or a
mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; and
let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But
if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of
evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where nature is,
there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is.
For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me
(tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind
so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as
if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write
when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion,
and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but
that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you have
practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) anything
that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For if
circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what will
you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no
suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity
ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is
the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain
or try to avoid.
* * * * *
HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE.--Things themselves (materials)
are indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall
a man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be
careful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play at
dice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do I
know what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the
cast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chief
business is this: distinguish and separate things, and say: Externals
are not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good
and the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does
not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage
or anything of the kind.
What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In no way: for this on
the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently
against nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not
indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from
perturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the
material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me or compel me.
Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is
not in my power, nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad or
good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to
bring together these two things--the carefulness of him who is affected
by the matter (or things about him), and the firmness of him who has no
regard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness is
impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can
I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the
opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for my
part is done. The business belongs to another, the master. But the ship
is sinking--what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not
to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing
that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an immortal
being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day:
I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference
then does it make to me how I pass away, whether by being suffocated or
by a fever, for I must pass through some such means.
How then is it said that some external things are according to nature
and others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we were
separated from union (or society): for to the foot I shall say that it
is according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it as a foot
and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step
into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the
good of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should
think in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A man. If you
consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature
to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider
yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of
that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a
voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some
cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, that
as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you
are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a
man? A part of a state, of that first which consists of gods and of men;
then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the
universal state. What then must I be brought to trial; must another have
a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned?
Yes, for it is impossible in such a universe of things, among so many
living together, that such things should not happen, some to one and
others to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to say
what you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit. Then some one
says, "I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much good may it do you:
I have done my part; but whether you also have done yours, you must look
to that; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape your
notice.
* * * * *
OF INDIFFERENCE.--The hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the
judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or
opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent.
When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do
not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about
such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of
material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and
power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may
keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For
you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; and if
others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, "I have
learned them, and you have not." Thus also where there is need of any
practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such
practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and
be yourself content with firmness of mind.
Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. But I have been shut
out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when
I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the
window. But still speak to him. In what way? Not meanly. But suppose
that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not
his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always
remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you will not
be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things
are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more adapted to the
conservation of that which is according to nature; for God himself has
given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in
the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it;
for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the
mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may become
dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? for they are
not separated from communion with other things. If then they had
perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curse
upon ears of corn to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case
of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened
and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that
we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are nor
have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses
know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he was going to strike
the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat:
so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to follow
his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity
summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what we
do suffer, and we call them "circumstances." What kind of circumstances,
man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are
around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by
this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been
produced? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the
sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down
to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, the
way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man
in six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these things
are only sound and the noise of empty names.
* * * * *
HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION.--Through an unreasonable regard to
divination many of us omit many duties. For what more can the diviner
see than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind?
If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my
duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have I
not within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil,
and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have I
then to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why
do I submit when he says, It is for your interest? For does he know what
is for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has learned the
signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good and evil?
For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both of the
beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do you
tell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me: is it life or
death, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my interest
or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don't you give
your opinion on matters of grammar, and why do you give it here about
things on which we are all in error and disputing with one another?
What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread
of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners.
Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see:
let us sacrifice on the occasion. Yes, master, as fortune chooses. When
he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we
received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play
upon us.
Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for if
it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other
thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also the
works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts
of the gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separated
from the Deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then
are you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you not know whence
you came? will you not remember when you are eating who you are who eat
and whom you feed? When you are in social intercourse, when you are
exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not
that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch,
you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not. Do you think
that I mean some god of silver or of gold, and external? You carry him
within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him by
impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present,
you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing; but when
God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not
ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you
are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we
fear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life,
lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improper
intercourse with women; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should
debase him, lest fine garments should make him proud. This youth (if he
acts thus) does not know his own God; he knows not with whom he sets out
(into the world). But can we endure when he says, "I wish I had you
(God) with me." Have you not God with you? and do you seek for any other
when you have him? or will God tell you anything else than this? If you
were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of
yourself and of the artist, and if you had any understanding (power of
perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or
of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to
those who look upon you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this
reason do you care not how you shall appear? And yet is the artist (in
the one case) like the artist in the other? or the work in the one case
like the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself
the faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or
bronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias, when she has once
extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory, stands in
that attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they
breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things and
the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you
dishonor him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also
entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you
not think of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardianship? But
if God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He
has delivered yourself to your own care, and says: "I had no one fitter
to entrust him to than yourself; keep him for me such as he is by
nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and
perturbation." And then you do not keep him such.
But some will say, Whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he
displays and these supercilious looks? I have not yet so much gravity as
befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have
learned and in what I have assented to. I still fear my own weakness.
Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I
ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have; then I will show
to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What do
you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up
his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say:
Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail.--Iliad, i., 526.
Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from
perturbation. What, and immortal, too, except from old age, and from
sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god.
This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor
can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What
nerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which never
falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit ([Greek: hormaen]),
a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see.
* * * * *
THAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES,
WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER.--It is no common (easy) thing
to do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man's nature. For what is a
man? The answer is, A rational and mortal being. Then by the rational
faculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what
others? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a
wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you
have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep;
but if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do as
sheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly,
filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. What have
we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully
and passionately and violently, to what have we declined? To wild
beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others little
beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be
eaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a
man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) proposition
maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so that the
preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction of
truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it
promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (When they
severally keep their promise.) What is the wonder then if man also in
like manner is preserved, and in like manner is lost? Each man is
improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of
carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accustoms
himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corrupted
and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest
actions destroy him; and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man,
and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand contrary
actions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens the
shameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words the
abusive man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving and
giving make the avaricious man more avaricious.
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with
learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have
long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice
opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also
put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the
expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able
to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things
(in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and
some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which
participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the
indifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of our
talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those
who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where
are the things which you were talking about? Whence did you produce and
utter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt the
aids provided by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if
you were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing to lay up bread and
wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been
eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones,
blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you
choose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantage
from it except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is the
difference between explaining these doctrines and those of men who have
different opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of
art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions
in a more useful manner than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call
yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act the part
of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is called
a Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining to
two sides, we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he acts
as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbued
with Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and
he is named a Jew.
* * * * *
HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES.--Consider who you
are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing
superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to
it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from
subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by
reason. You have been separated from wild beasts; you have been
separated from domestic animals ([Greek: probaton]). Further, you are a
citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient
(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable
of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the
connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise
(profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about
nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the
hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the
constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion
nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole.
Therefore, the philosophers say well, that if the good man had
foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own
sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are
assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the
whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now
because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things
which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made
among other things for this.
After this, remember that you are a son. What does this character
promise? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to the
father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to
say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all things
and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After this know
that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to
make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your brother,
never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are
independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may have
the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing
it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to gain
for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage.
Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are a
senator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you are
an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks
out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to
you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the next
place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would
have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother and
instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have
changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, who
is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast,
treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But (I suppose) you must
lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And does the loss of
nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or
music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you shall lose
modesty, moderation ([Greek: chtastolaen]) and gentleness, do you think
the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some
cause external and independent of the will, and the second by our own
fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is
shameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is
shameful and matter of reproach and a misfortune.