Cetywayo and his White Neighbours - H. Rider Haggard
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CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS
OR, REMARKS ON RECENT EVENTS IN ZULULAND, NATAL, AND THE TRANSVAAL.
By H. Rider Haggard
First Published 1882.
PREPARER'S NOTE
This text was prepared from an 1882 edition published by
Trubner & Co., Ludgate Hill, London.
"I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to keep on agitating in
this way, for a change of Government in England may give them again
the old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of English
politics than such an idea. I tell you there is no Government--Whig
or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical--who would dare, under any
circumstances, to give back this country (the Transvaal). They would not
dare, because the English people would not allow them."--(_Extract
from Speech of Sir Garnet Wolseley, delivered at a Public Banquet in
Pretoria, on the 17th December 1879._)
"There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding (from
the Transvaal); it was impossible to say what calamities such a step
as receding might not cause. . . . For such a risk he could not make
himself responsible. . . . Difficulties with the Zulu and the frontier
tribes would again arise, and looking as they must to South Africa as
a whole, the Government, after a careful consideration of the
question, came to the conclusion that we could not relinquish the
Transvaal."--(_Extract from Speech of Lord Kimberley in the House of
Lords, 24th May 1880. H. P. D., vol. cclii., p. 208._)
INTRODUCTION
The writer on Colonial Affairs is naturally, to some extent, discouraged
by the knowledge that the subject is an unattractive one to a large
proportion of the reading public. It is difficult to get up anything
beyond a transient interest in the affairs of our Colonial dependencies;
indeed, I believe that the mind of the British public was more
profoundly moved by the exodus of Jumbo, than it would be were one of
them to become the scene of some startling catastrophe. This is the
more curious, inasmuch as, putting aside all sentimental considerations,
which indeed seem to be out of harmony with the age we live in: the
trade done, even with such comparatively insignificant colonies as our
South African possessions, amounts to a value of many millions of pounds
sterling per annum. Now, as the preachers of the new gospel that hails
from Birmingham and Northampton have frequently told us, trade is
the life-blood of England, and must be fostered at any price. It is
therefore surprising that, looking on them in the light of a commercial
speculation, in which aspect (saith the preacher) they are alone
worthy of notice, a keener interest is not taken in the well-being and
development of the Colonies. We have only to reflect to see how great
are the advantages that the Mother Country derives from the possession
of her Colonial Empire; including, as they do, a home for her surplus
children, a vast and varied market for her productions, and a wealth of
old-fashioned loyalty and deep attachment to the Old Country--"home,"
as it is always called--which, even if it is out of date, might prove
useful on emergency. It seems therefore, almost a pity that some Right
Honourable Gentlemen and their followers should adopt the tone they do
with reference to the Colonies. After all, there is an odd shuffling of
the cards going on now in England; and great as she is, her future looks
by no means sunny. Events in these latter days develop themselves very
quickly; and though the idea may, at the present moment, seem absurd,
surely it is possible that, what between the rapid spread of Radical
ideas, the enmity of Ireland, the importation of foreign produce, and
the competition of foreign trade, to say nothing of all the unforeseen
accidents and risks of the future, the Englishmen of, say, two
generations hence, may not find their country in her present proud
position. Perhaps, and stranger things have happened in the history of
the world, she may by that time be under the protection of those very
Colonies for which their forefathers had such small affection.
The position of South Africa with reference to the Mother Country
is somewhat different to that of her sister Colonies, in that she is
regarded, not so much with apathy tinged with dislike, as with downright
disgust. This feeling has its foundation in the many troubles and
expenses in which this country has been recently involved, through local
complications in the Cape, Zululand, and the Transvaal: and indeed is
little to be wondered at. But, whilst a large portion of the press has
united with a powerful party of politicians in directing a continuous
stream of abuse on to the heads of the white inhabitants of South
Africa, whom they do not scruple to accuse of having created the recent
disturbances in order to reap a money profit from them: it does not
appear to have struck anybody that the real root of this crop of
troubles might, after all, be growing nearer home. The truth of the
matter is, that native and other problems in South Africa have, till
quite lately, been left to take their chance, and solve themselves as
best they might; except when they have, in a casual manner, been made
the _corpus vile_ of some political experiment. It was during this long
period of inaction, when each difficulty--such as the native question in
Natal--was staved off to be dealt with by the next Government, that the
seed was sown of which we are at present reaping the fruit. In addition
to this, matters have recently been complicated by the elevation of
South African affairs to the dignity of an English party question.
Thus, the Transvaal Annexation was made use of as a war-cry in the
last general election, a Boer rebellion was thereby encouraged, which
resulted in a complete reversal of our previous policy.
Now, if there is any country dependent on England that requires the
application to the conduct of its affairs of a firm, considered, and
consistent policy, that country is South Africa. Boers and Natives are
quite incapable of realising the political necessities of any of
our parties, or of understanding why their true interests should be
sacrificed in order to minister to those necessities. It is our wavering
and uncertain policy, as applied to peoples, who look upon every
hesitating step as a sign of fear and failing dominion, that, in
conjunction with previous postponement and neglect, has really caused
our troubles in South Africa. For so long as the affairs of that
country are influenced by amateurs and sentimentalists, who have no real
interest in it, and whose knowledge of its circumstances and conditions
of life is gleaned from a few blue-books, superficially got up to enable
the reader to indite theoretical articles to the "Nineteenth Century,"
or deliver inaccurate speeches in the House of Commons--for so long will
those troubles continue.
If I may venture to make a suggestion, the affairs of South Africa
should be controlled by a Board or Council, like that which formerly
governed India, composed of moderate members of both parties, with an
admixture of men possessing practical knowledge of the country. I do not
know if any such arrangement would be possible under our constitution,
but the present system of government, by which the control of savage
races fluctuates in obedience of every variation of English party
politics, is most mischievous in its results.
The public, however, is somewhat tired of South Africa, and the reader
may, perhaps, wonder why he should be troubled with more literature on
the subject. I can assure him that these pages are not written in order
to give me an opportunity of airing my individual experiences or ideas.
Their object is shortly--(1.) To give a true history of the events
attendant on the Annexation of the Transvaal, which act has so
frequently been assigned to the most unworthy motives, and has never
yet been fairly described by any one who was in a position to know
the facts; (2.) To throw as much publicity as possible on the present
disgraceful state of Zululand, resulting from our recent settlement in
that country; (3.) To show all interested in the Kafir races what has
been the character of our recent surrender in the Transvaal, and what
its effect will be on our abandoned native subjects living in that
country.
It may, perhaps, seem an odd statement, considering that I have lived
in various parts of South Africa for about six years, and have, perhaps,
enjoyed exceptional advantage in forming my opinions, when I say that my
chief fear in publishing the present volume, is lest my knowledge of my
subject in all its bearings should not be really equal to the task. It
is, I know, the fashion to treat South African difficulties as being
simple of solution. Thus it only took Sir Garnet Wolseley a few weeks
to understand the whole position of Zulu affairs, and to execute his
memorable settlement of that country: whilst eminent writers appear to
be able, in scampering from Durban _via_ Kimberley to Cape Town in a
post-cart, to form decided opinions upon every important question
in South Africa. The power of thus rapidly assimilating intricate
knowledge, and of seeing straight through a wall whilst ordinary
individuals are still criticising the bricks, is no doubt one of the
peculiar privileges of genius--which is, perhaps fortunately for South
Africa--rare. To the common run of mind, however, the difficulty of
forming a sound and accurate judgment on the interlacing problems that
disclose themselves to the student of the politics of South-Eastern
Africa, is exceedingly great and the work of years.
But although it is by no means perfect, I think that my knowledge of
these problems and of their imminent issues is sufficiently intimate
to justify me in making a prophecy--namely, that unless the native and
other questions of South-Eastern Africa are treated with more honest
intelligence, and on a more settled plan than it has hitherto been
thought necessary to apply to them, the British taxpayer will find that
he has _by no means_ heard the last of that country and its wars.
There is one more point to which, although it hardly comes within the
scope of this volume, I have made some allusion, and which I venture to
suggest deserves the consideration of thinking Englishmen. I refer to
the question of the desirability of allowing the Dutch in South Africa,
who are already numerically the strongest, to continue to advance with
such rapid strides towards political supremacy. That the object of
this party is to reduce Englishmen and English ideas to a subordinate
position in the State, if not actually to rid itself of our rule and
establish a republic, there is no manner of doubt. Indeed, there exists
a powerful organisation, the Africander Bond, which has its headquarters
in the Cape, and openly devotes its energies to forwarding these ends,
by offering a sturdy opposition to the introduction of English emigrants
and the use of the English language, whilst striving in every way to
excite class prejudices and embitter the already strained relations
between Englishman and Boer. In considering this question, it is as well
not to lose sight of the fact that the Dutch are as a body, at heart
hostile to our rule, chiefly because they cannot tolerate our lenient
behaviour to the native races. Should they by any chance cease to be the
subjects of England, they will, I believe, become her open enemies. This
of itself would be comparatively unimportant, were it not for the fact
that, in the event of the blocking of the Suez Canal, it would be, to
say the least, inconvenient that the Cape should be in the hands of a
hostile population.
In conclusion, I wish to state that this book is not written for any
party purpose. I have tried to describe a state of affairs which has for
the most part come under my own observation, and events in which I have
been interested, and at times engaged. That the naked truths of such
a business as the Transvaal surrender, or of the present condition of
Zululand, are unpleasant reading for an Englishman, there is no doubt;
but, so far as these pages are concerned, they owe none of their
ugliness to undue colouring or political bias.
Windham Club, St. James' Square, June 1882.
CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS
CETYWAYO AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT
_Claims of affairs of Zululand to attention--Proposed visit of
Cetywayo to England--Chaka--His method of government--His death--
Dingaan--Panda--Battle of the Tugela--John Dunn--Nomination of
Cetywayo--His coronation--His lady advocates--Their attacks on
officials--Was Cetywayo bloodthirsty?--Cause of the Zulu war--Zulu
military system--States of feeling amongst the Zulus previous to
the war--Cetywayo's position--His enemies--His intentions on the
Transvaal--Their frustration by Sir T. Shepstone--Cetywayo's interview
with Mr. Fynney--His opinion of the Boers--The annexation in connection
with the Zulu war--The Natal colonists and the Zulu war--Sir Bartle
Frere--The Zulu war--Cetywayo's half-heartedness--Sir Garnet Wolseley's
settlement--Careless selection of chiefs--The Sitimela plot--Chief
John Dunn--Appointment of Mr. Osborn as British Resident--His difficult
position--Folly and cruelty of our settlement--Disappointment of
the Zulus--Object and result of settlement--Slaughter in
Zululand--Cetywayo's son--Necessity of proper settlement of
Zululand--Should Cetywayo be restored?_
Zululand and the Zulu settlement still continue to receive some
attention from the home public, partly because those responsible for the
conduct of affairs are not quite at ease about it, and partly because of
the agitation in this country for the restoration of Cetywayo.
There is no doubt that the present state of affairs in Zululand is a
subject worthy of close consideration, not only by those officially
connected with them, but by the public at large. Nobody, either at
home or in the colonies, wishes to see another Zulu war, or anything
approaching to it. Unless, however, the affairs of Zululand receive a
little more attention, and are superintended with a little more humanity
and intelligence than they are at present, the public will sooner or
later be startled by some fresh catastrophe. Then will follow the usual
outcry, and the disturbance will be attributed to every cause under the
sun except the right one--want of common precautions.
The Zulu question is a very large one, and I only propose discussing
so much of it as necessary to the proper consideration of the proposed
restoration of Cetywayo to his throne.
The king is now coming to England,[*] where he will doubtless make
a very good impression, since his appearance is dignified, and
his manners, as is common among Zulus of high rank, are those of
a gentleman. It is probable that his visit will lead to a popular
agitation in his favour, and very possibly to an attempt on the part
of the English Government to reinstate him in his kingdom. Already Lady
Florence Dixie waves his banner, and informs the public through the
columns of the newspapers how good, how big, and how beautiful he is,
and "F. W. G. X." describes in enthusiastic terms his pearl-like teeth.
But as there are interests involved in the question of his reinstatement
which are, I think, more important than Cetywayo's personal proportions
of mind or body, and as the results of such a step would necessarily be
very marked and far-reaching, it is as well to try and understand the
matter in all its bearing before anything is done.
[*] Since the above was written the Government have at the
last moment decided to postpone Cetywayo's visit to this
country, chiefly on account of the political capital which
was being made out of the event by agitators in Zululand.
The project of bringing the king to England does not,
however, appear to have been abandoned.
There has been a great deal of special pleading about Cetywayo. Some
writers, swayed by sentiment, and that spirit of partisanship that the
sight of royalty in distress always excites, whitewash him in such a
persistent manner that their readers are left under the impression that
the ex-king is a model of injured innocence and virtue. Others again,
for political reasons, paint him very black, and predict that
his restoration would result in the destruction, or at the least,
disorganisation, of our South African empire. The truth in this, as in
the majority of political controversies, lies somewhere between these
two extremes, though it is difficult to say exactly where.
To understand the position of Cetywayo both with reference to his
subjects and the English Government, it will be necessary to touch,
though briefly, on the history of Zululand since it became a nation, and
also on the principal events of the ex-king's reign.
Chaka, Cetywayo's great uncle, was the first Zulu king, and doubtless
one of the most remarkable men that has ever filled a throne since the
days of the Pharaohs. When he came to his chieftainship, about 1813, the
Zulu people consisted of a single small tribe; when his throne became
vacant in 1828, their name had become a living terror, and they were
the greatest Black power in South Africa. The invincible armies of this
African Attila had swept north and south, east and west, had slaughtered
more than a million human beings, and added vast tracts of country to
his dominions. Wherever his warriors went, the blood of men, women, and
children was poured out without stay or stint; indeed he reigned like a
visible Death, the presiding genius of a saturnalia of slaughter.
His methods of government and warfare were peculiar and somewhat
drastic, but most effective. As he conquered a tribe, he enrolled its
remnants in his army, so that they might in their turn help to conquer
others. He armed his regiments with the short stabbing assegai, instead
of the throwing assegai which they had been accustomed to use, and kept
them subject to an iron discipline. If a man was observed to show the
slightest hesitation about coming to close quarters with the enemy,
he was executed as soon as the fight was over. If a regiment had the
misfortune to be defeated, whether by its own fault or not, it would on
its return to headquarters find that a goodly proportion of the wives
and children belonging to it had been beaten to death by Chaka's orders,
and that he was waiting their arrival to complete his vengeance by
dashing out their brains. The result was, that though Chaka's armies
were occasionally annihilated, they were rarely defeated, and they never
ran away. I will not enter in the history of his numerous cruelties, and
indeed they are not edifying. Amongst other things, like Nero, he killed
his own mother, and then caused several persons to be executed because
they did not show sufficient sorrow at her death.
At length, in 1828, he too suffered the fate he had meted out to so
many, and was killed by his brothers, Dingaan and Umhlangan, by the
hands of one Umbopa. He was murdered in his hut, and as his life passed
out of him he is reported to have addressed these words to his brothers,
who were watching his end: "What! do you stab me, my brothers, dogs of
mine own house, whom I have fed? You hope to be kings; but though you do
kill me, think not that your line shall reign for long. I tell you that
I hear the sound of the feet of the great white people, and that this
land shall be trodden by them." He then expired, but his last words have
always been looked upon as a prophecy by the Zulus, and indeed they have
been partly fulfilled.
Having in his turn killed Umhlangan, his brother by blood and in crime,
Dingaan took possession of the throne. He was less pronounced than
Chaka in his foreign policy, though he seems to have kept up the family
reputation as regards domestic affairs. It was he who, influenced,
perhaps, by Chaka's dying prophecy about white men, massacred Retief,
the Boer leader, and his fifty followers, in the most treacherous
manner, and then falling on the emigrant Boers in Natal, murdered men,
women, and children to the number of nearly six hundred. There seems,
however, to have been but little love lost between any of the sons of
Usengangacona (the father of Chaka, Dingaan, Umhlangan, and Panda),
for in due course Panda, his brother, conspired with the Boers against
Dingaan, and overthrew him with their assistance. Dingaan fled, and was
shortly afterwards murdered in Swaziland, and Panda ascended the throne
in 1840.
Panda was a man of different character to the remainder of his race, and
seems to have been well content to reign in peace, only killing enough
people to keep up his authority. Two of his sons, Umbelazi and Cetywayo,
of whom Umbelazi was the elder and Panda's favourite, began, as their
father grew old, to quarrel about the succession to the crown. On the
question being referred to Panda, he is reported to have remarked that
when two young cocks quarrelled the best thing they could do was to
fight it out. Acting on this hint, each prince collected his forces,
Panda sending down one of his favourite regiments to help Umbelazi. The
fight took place in 1856 on the banks of the Tugela. A friend of the
writer, happening to be on the Natal side of the river the day before
the battle, and knowing it was going to take place, swam his horse
across in the darkness, taking his chance of the alligators, and hid in
some bush on a hillock commanding the battlefield. It was a hazardous
proceeding, but the sight repaid the risk, though he describes it as
very awful, more especially when the regiment of veterans sent by Panda
joined in the fray. It came up at the charge, between two and three
thousand strong, and was met near his hiding-place by one of Cetywayo's
young regiments. The noise of the clash of their shields was like the
roar of the sea, but the old regiment, after a struggle in which men
fell thick and fast, annihilated the other, and passed on with thinned
ranks. Another of Cetywayo's regiments took the place of the one that
had been destroyed, and this time the combat was fierce and long, till
victory again declared for the veterans' spears. But they had brought it
dear, and were in no position to continue their charge; so the leaders
of that brave battalion formed its remnants into a ring, and, like the
Scotch at Flodden--
"The stubborn spearmen still made good
The dark, impenetrable wood;
Each stepping where his comrade stood
The instant that he fell,"
till there were none left to fall. The ground around them was piled with
dead.
But this gallant charge availed Umbelazi but little, and by degrees
Cetywayo's forces pressed his men back to the banks of the Tugela, and
finally into it. Thousands fell upon the field and thousands perished in
the river. When my friend swam back that night, he had nothing to
fear from the alligators: they were too well fed. Umbelazi died on the
battlefield of a broken heart, at least it is said that no wound could
be found on his person. He probably expired in a fit brought on by
anxiety of mind and fatigue. A curious story is told of Cetywayo with
reference to his brother's death. After the battle was over a Zulu
from one of his own regiments presented himself before him with many
salutations, saying, "O prince! now canst thou sleep in peace, for
Umbelazi is dead." "How knowest thou that he is dead?" said Cetywayo.
"Because I slew him with my own hand," replied the Zulu. "Thou dog!"
said the prince, "thou hast dared to lift thy hand against the blood
royal, and now thou makest it a matter of boasting. Wast thou not
afraid? By Chaka's head thou shalt have thy reward. Lead him away." And
the Zulu, who was but lying after all, having possessed himself of
the bracelets off the dead prince's body, was instantly executed. The
probability is that Cetywayo acted thus more from motives of policy than
from affection to his brother, whom indeed he hoped to destroy. It did
not do to make too light of the death of an important prince: Umbelazi's
fate to-day might be Cetywayo's fate to-morrow. This story bears a
really remarkable resemblance to that of the young man who slew Saul,
the Lord's anointed, and suffered death on account thereof at the hands
of David.
This battle is also memorable as being the occasion of the first public
appearance of Mr. John Dunn, now the most important chief in Zululand,
and, be it understood, the unknown quantity in all future transactions
in that country. At that time Dunn was a retainer of Umbelazi's, and
fought on his side in the Tugela battle. After the fight, however,
he went over to Cetywayo and became his man. From that time till the
outbreak of the Zulu war he remained in Zululand as adviser to Cetywayo,
agent for the Natal Government, and purveyor of firearms to the nation
at large. As soon as Cetywayo got into trouble with the Imperial
Government, Dunn, like a prudent man, deserted him and came over to
us. In reward Sir Garnet Wolseley advanced him to the most important
chieftainship in Zululand, which he hopes to make a stepping-stone to
the vacant throne. His advice was largely followed by Sir Garnet in
the bestowal of the other chieftainships, and was naturally not quite
disinterested. He has already publicly announced his intention of
resisting the return of the king, his old master, by force of arms,
should the Government attempt to reinstate him.