A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents - James D. Richardson
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An attempt to seize New Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi
will be made only by a great power or a combination of several powers,
with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought
in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defenses around
New Orleans are well posted and of sufficient strength to repel any
attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a
land force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between
the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of
high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt as would
defeat it should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defense
of posts, to prevent the approach to cities and the passage of rivers;
but as works their effect can not be felt beyond the reach of their
cannon. They are formidable in other respects by the body of men
within them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.
Between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile there is a chain of islands,
at the extremity of which is Dauphine Island, which forms, with Mobile
Point, from which it is distant about 3-1/4 miles, the entrance into the
bay of Mobile, which leads through that part of the State of Alabama to
the towns of Mobile and Blakeley. The distance between Dauphine Island
and the Rigolets is 90 miles. The principal islands between them are
Massacre, Horn, Ship, and Cat islands, near to which there is anchorage
for large ships of war. The first object is to prevent the landing of
any force for the purposes above stated between the Rigolets and the bay
of Mobile; the second, to defeat that force in case it should be landed.
When the distance from one point to the other is considered, it is
believed that it would be impossible to establish works so near to each
other as to prevent the landing of such a force. Its defeat, therefore,
should be effectually provided for. If the arrangement should be such as
to make that result evident, it ought to be fairly concluded that the
attempt would not be made, and thus we should accomplish in the best
mode possible and with the least expense the complete security of this
important part of our Union, the great object of our system of defense
for the whole.
There are some other views of this subject which it is thought will
merit particular attention in deciding the point in question. Not being
able to establish a chain of posts, at least for the present, along the
whole coast from the Rigolets to Dauphine Island, or on all the islands
between them, at which point shall we begin? Should an attack on the
city be anticipated, it can not be doubted that an adequate force would
immediately be ordered there for its defense. If the enemy should
despair of making an impression on the works near the town, it may be
presumed that they would promptly decide to make the attempt in the
manner and in the line above suggested between the Rigolets and the
bay of Mobile. It will be obvious that the nearer the fortification is
erected to the Rigolets with a view to this object, should it be on Cat
or Ship Island, for example, the wider would the passage be left open
between that work and the bay of Mobile for such an enterprise. The main
army, being drawn to New Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt
near the Rigolets or at any other point not distant from the city. It
is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would
make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object
from that point, and at the bay of Mobile should there not be works
there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong
works be erected there, such as were sufficient not only for their own
defense against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a
force connected with that which might be drawn from the neighboring
country, capable of cooperating with the force at the city, and which
would doubtless be ordered to those works in the event of war, it
would be dangerous for the invading force to land anywhere between the
Rigolets and the bay of Mobile and to pass toward the Mississippi above
the city, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear as to cut off its
retreat. These considerations show the great advantage of establishing
at the mouth of the bay of Mobile very strong works, such as would be
adequate to all the purposes suggested.
If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities
against the entry of large ships of war into our bays and rivers, they
would be of little use for the defense of New Orleans, since that city
can not be approached so near, either by the Mississippi or in any other
direction, by such vessels for them to make an attack on it. In the
Gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which had been acquired since
these works were decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river into
which large ships of war can enter. As a defense, therefore, against an
attack from such vessels extensive works would be altogether unnecessary
either at Mobile Point or at Dauphine Island, since sloops of war only
can navigate the deepest channel. But it is not for that purpose
alone that these works are intended. It is to provide also against a
formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to
shake the foundation of our system. Should such small works be erected,
and such an invasion take place, they would be sure to fall at once into
the hands of the invaders and to be turned against us.
Whether the acquisition of Florida may be considered as affording an
inducement to make any change in the position or strength of these works
is a circumstance which also merits attention. From the view which
I have taken of the subject I am of opinion that it should not. The
defense of New Orleans and of the river Mississippi against a powerful
invasion being one of the great objects of such extensive works, that
object would be essentially abandoned if they should be established
eastward of the bay of Mobile, since the force to be collected in
them would be placed at too great a distance to allow the cooperation
necessary for those purposes between it and that at the city; in
addition to which, it may be observed that by carrying them to Pensacola
or farther to the east that bay would fall immediately, in case of such
invasion, into the hands of the enemy, whereby such cooperation would be
rendered utterly impossible, and the State of Alabama would also be left
wholly unprotected.
With a view to such formidable invasion, of which we should never lose
sight, and of the great objects to which it would be directed, I think
that very strong works at some point within the Gulf of Mexico will
be found indispensable. I think also that those works ought to be
established at the bay of Mobile--one at Mobile Point and the other on
Dauphine Island--whereby the enemy would be excluded and the complete
command of that bay, with all the advantages attending it, be secured
to ourselves. In the case of such invasion, it will, it is presumed,
be deemed necessary to collect at some point other than at New Orleans
a strong force, capable of moving in any direction and affording aid
to any part which may be attacked; and, in my judgment, no position
presents so many advantages as a point of rendezvous for such force as
the mouth of that bay. The fortification at the Rigolets will defend the
entrance by one passage into Lake Pontchartrain, and also into Pearl
River, which empties into the Gulf at that point. Between the Rigolets
and Mobile Bay there are but two inlets which deserve the name, those of
St. Louis and Pascagola, the entrance into which is too shallow even
for the smallest vessels; and from the Rigolets to Mobile Bay the whole
coast is equally shallow, affording the depth of a few feet of water
only. Cat Island, which is nearest the Rigolets, is about 7-1/2 miles
distant from the coast and 30 from the Rigolets. Ship Island is distant
about 10 miles from Cat Island and 12 from the coast. Between these
islands and the coast the water is very shallow.
As to the precise depth of water in approaching those islands from the
Gulf, the report of the topographical engineers not having yet been
received, it is impossible to speak with precision; but admitting it
to be such as for frigates and even ships of the line to enter, the
anchorage at both is unsafe, being much exposed to northwest winds.
Along the coast, therefore, there is no motive for such strong works on
our part--no town to guard, no inlet into the country to defend--and if
placed on the islands and the entrance to them is such as to admit large
ships of war, distant as they are from the coast, it would be more easy
for the enemy to assail them with effect.
The position, however, at Mobile Bay is essentially different. That bay
takes its name from the Mobile River, which is formed by the junction of
the Alabama and Tombigbee, which extend each about 300 miles into the
interior, approaching at their head waters near the Tennessee River.
If the enemy possessed its mouth, and fortified Mobile Point and
Dauphine Island, being superior at sea it would be very difficult for
us to dispossess him of either, even of Mobile Point; and holding that
position, Pensacola would soon fall, as without incurring great expense
in the construction of works there it would present but a feeble
resistance to a strong force in its rear. If we had a work at Mobile
Point only, the enemy might take Dauphine Island, which would afford
him great aid in attacking the point, and enable him, even should we
succeed in repelling the attack, to render us great mischief there and
throughout the whole Gulf. In every view which can be taken of the
subject it appears indispensable for us to command the entrance into
Mobile Bay, and that decision being taken, I think the considerations
which favor the occupation of Dauphine Island by a strong work are
conclusive. It is proper to observe that after the repulse before New
Orleans in the late war the British forces took possession of Dauphine
Island and held it till the peace. Under neither of the reports of the
Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners could any but sloops of war
enter the bay or the anchorage between Dauphine and Pelican islands.
Both reports give to that anchorage 18 feet at low water and 20-1/2 at
high. The only difference between them consists in this, that in the
first a bar leading to the anchorage, reducing the depth of water to
12 feet at low tide, was omitted. In neither case could frigates enter,
though sloops of war of larger size might. The whole scope, however, of
this reasoning turns on a different principle--on the works necessary to
defend that bay and, by means thereof, New Orleans, the Mississippi, and
all the surrounding country against a powerful invasion both by land and
sea, and not on the precise depth of water in any of the approaches to
the bay or to the island.
The reasoning which is applicable to the works near New Orleans and at
the bay of Mobile is equally so in certain respects to those which are
to be erected for the defense of all the bays and rivers along the other
parts of the coast. All those works are also erected on a greater scale
than would be necessary for the sole purpose of preventing the passage
of our inlets by large ships of war. They are in most instances formed
for defense against a more powerful invasion, both by land and sea.
There are, however, some differences between the works which are deemed
necessary in the Gulf and those in other parts of our Union, founded on
the peculiar situation of that part of the coast. The vast extent of
the Mississippi, the great outlet and channel of commerce for so many
States, all of which may be affected by the seizure of that city, or
of any part of the river to a great extent above it, is one of those
striking peculiarities which require particular provision. The thinness
of the population near the city, making it necessary that the force
requisite for its defense should be called from distant parts and
States, is another. The danger which the army assembled at New Orleans
would be exposed to of being cut off in case the enemy should throw a
force on the river above it, from the difficulty of ascending the river
to attack it and of making a retreat in any other direction, is a third.
For an attack on the city of New Orleans, Mobile Bay, or any part of the
intermediate coast ships of war would be necessary only as a convoy to
protect the transports against a naval force on their passage, and on
their approach to the shore for the landing of the men, and on their
return home in case they should be repulsed.
On the important subject of our defenses generally I think proper to
observe that the system was adopted immediately after the late war by
Congress, on great consideration and a thorough knowledge of the effects
of that war--by the enormous expense attending it, by the waste of life,
of property, and by the general distress of the country. The amount of
debt incurred in that war and due at its conclusion, without taking into
the estimate other losses, having been heretofore communicated, need
not now be repeated. The interest of the debt thus incurred is four
times more than the sum necessary, by annual appropriations, for the
completion of our whole system of defense, land and naval, to the extent
provided for and within the time specified. When that system shall be
completed the expense of construction will cease, and our expenditures
be proportionally diminished. Should another war occur before it is
completed, the experience of the last marks in characters too strong
to be mistaken its inevitable consequences; and should such war occur
and find us unprepared for it, what will be our justification to the
enlightened body whom we represent for not having completed these
defenses? That this system should not have been adopted before the late
war can not be a cause of surprise to anyone, because all might wish
to avoid every expense the necessity of which might be in any degree
doubtful. But with the experience of that war before us it is thought
there is no cause for hesitation. Will the completion of these works and
the augmentation of our Navy to the point contemplated by law require
the imposition of onerous burthens on our fellow-citizens such as they
can not or will not bear? Have such, or any, burthens been imposed to
advance the system to its present state? It is known that no burthens
whatever have been imposed; on the contrary, that all the direct or
internal taxes have been long repealed, and none paid but those which
are indirect and voluntary, such as are imposed on articles imported
from foreign countries, most of which are luxuries, and on the vessels
employed in the transportation--taxes which some of our most enlightened
citizens think ought to be imposed on many of the articles for the
encouragement of our manufactures, even if the revenue derived from them
could be dispensed with. It is known also that in all other respects
our condition as a nation is in the highest degree prosperous and
flourishing, nearly half the debt incurred in the late war having
already been discharged, and considerable progress having also been made
in the completion of this system of defense and in the construction of
other works of great extent and utility, by the revenue derived from
these sources and from the sale of the public lands. I may add also
that a very generous provision has been made from the same sources for
the surviving officers and soldiers of our Revolutionary army. These
important facts show that this system has been so far executed, and may
be completed without any real inconvenience to the public. Were it,
however, otherwise, I have full confidence that any burthens which
might be found necessary for the completion of this system in both
its branches within the term contemplated, or much sooner should any
emergency require it, would be called for rather than complained of
by our fellow-citizens.
From these views, applicable to the very important subject of our
defenses generally as well as to the work at Dauphine Island, I think
it my duty to recommend to Congress an appropriation for the latter.
I considered the withholding it at the last session as the expression
only of a doubt by Congress of the propriety of the position, and not
as a definitive opinion. Supposing that that question would be decided
at the present session, I caused the position and such parts of the
coast as are particularly connected with it to be reexamined, that all
the light on which the decision as to the appropriation could depend
might be fully before you. In the first survey, the report of which
was that on which the works intended for the defense of New Orleans,
the Mississippi, the bay of Mobile, and all the country dependent on
those waters were sanctioned by the Executive, the commissioners were
industriously engaged about six months. I should have communicated that
very able and interesting document then but from a doubt how far the
interest of our country would justify its publication, a circumstance
which I now mention that the attention of Congress may be drawn to it.
JAMES MONROE.
MARCH 26, 1822.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
Having executed the act entitled "An act to reduce and fix the military
peace establishment of the United States" on great consideration and
according to my best judgment, and inferring from the rejection of
the nomination of Colonel Towson and Colonel Gadsden, officers of very
distinguished merit, that the view which I took of that law has not been
well understood, I hereby withdraw all the nominations on which the
Senate has not decided until I can make a more full communication and
explanation of that view and of the principles on which I have acted
in the discharge of that very delicate and important duty.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _March 27, 1822_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the
1st instant, requesting "the President to communicate such information
as he may possess relative to any private claim against the piece of
land in the Delaware River known by the name of the Peapatch, and to
state if any, and what, process has been instituted in behalf of such
claim," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War,
furnishing the information required.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _March 28, 1822_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
I transmit the original reports on the subject of the fortifications on
Dauphin Island and Mobile Point, being those on which the works were
undertaken and have been in part executed. The doubt expressed as to the
propriety of publication is applicable to this document, which would
have accompanied the message of the 26th had it been prepared in time.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _March 29, 1822_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit to Congress the translation of two letters from the minister
of France to the Secretary of State, relating to the claim of the heirs
of Caron de Beaumarchais upon this Government, with the documents
therewith inclosed, recommending them to the favorable consideration
of Congress.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _April 5, 1822_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate herewith to the House a report from the Secretary of War,
containing the information requested by their resolution of the 5th
ultimo.
It may be proper further to add that the secretaries of both the
Territories have occasionally required and received the aid of the
military force of the United States stationed within them, respectively,
to carry into effect the acts of their authority.
The government of East and West Florida was under the Spanish dominion
almost exclusively military. The governors of both were military
officers and united in their persons the chief authority, both civil
and military.
The principle upon which the act of Congress of the last session
providing for the temporary government of the newly ceded Provinces was
carried into execution has been communicated to Congress in my message
at the opening of the session. It was to leave the authorities of the
country as they were found existing at the time of the cession, to be
exercised until the meeting of Congress, when it was known that the
introduction of a system more congenial to our own institutions would be
one of the earliest and most important subjects of their deliberations.
From this, among other obvious considerations, military officers were
appointed to take possession of both Provinces. But as the military
command of General Jackson was to cease on the 1st of June, General
Gaines, the officer next in command, then here, who was first designated
to take possession of East Florida, received from me a verbal direction
to give such effect to any requisition from the governor for military
aid to enforce his authority as the circumstances might require. It was
not foreseen that the command in both the Provinces would before further
legislation by Congress on that subject devolve upon the secretaries of
the Territories, but had it been foreseen the same direction would have
been given as applicable to them.
No authority has been given to either of the secretaries to issue
commands to that portion of the Army which is in Florida, and whenever
the aid of _the military_ has been required by them it has been by
written requisitions to the officers commanding the troops, who have
yielded compliance thereto doubtless under the directions received
from General Gaines as understood by him to be authorized.
Shortly before the meeting of Congress a letter was received at the War
Department from Colonel Brooke, the officer commanding at Pensacola,
requesting instructions how far he was to consider these requisitions
as authoritative, but the assurance that a new organization of the
government was immediately to be authorized by Congress was a motive
for superseding any specific decision upon the inquiry.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _April 6, 1822_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives
requesting the President of the United States to cause to be furnished
to that House certain information relating to the amount of the public
money paid to the Attorney-General over and above his salary fixed by
law since the 1st of January, 1817, specifying the time when paid and
the fund out of which such payments have been made, I transmit a paper,
marked A, containing the information desired. I transmit also a paper,
marked B, containing a statement of sums paid to Attorney General of the
United States prior to the 1st of January, 1817, and in the paper marked
C a like statement of sums advanced to district attorneys for services
not required of them by law. These latter documents being necessary to
a full view of the subject, it is thought proper to comprise them in
this communication.
By the act of 24th September, 1789, instituting the office of Attorney
General, it was made his duty to prosecute and conduct all suits in the
Supreme Court in which the United States should be concerned, and to
give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the
President of the United States, or when requested by the head of any
of the Departments, touching any matters that might concern their
Departments. It will be seen, therefore, by the statement communicated
that no money whatever has been paid to the Attorney General for his
services in that character, nor for any duty belonging to his office,
beyond his salary as fixed by law.
It will also be shewn by the documents communicated that the
construction given of the laws imposing duties on the Attorney General
and district attorneys have been invariably the same since the
institution of the Government. On the same authority it was thought
that the compensation allowed to the present Attorney General for
certain services, considering their importance and the time employed
in rendering them, did not exceed, regarding precedents, what might
fairly be claimed.
JAMES MONROE.
APRIL, 13, 1822.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
Having cause to infer that the reasons which led to the construction
which I gave to the act of the last session entitled "An act to reduce
and fix the peace establishment of the United States" have not been well
understood, I consider it my duty to explain more fully the view which
I took of that act and of the principles on which I executed the very
difficult and important duty enjoined on me by it.
To do justice to the subject it is thought proper to show the actual
state of the Army before the passage of the late act, the force in
service, the several corps of which it was composed, and the grades
and number of officers commanding it. By seeing distinctly the body
in all its parts on which the law operated, viewing also with a just
discrimination the spirit, policy, and positive injunctions of that law
with reference to precedents established in a former analogous case,
we shall be enabled to ascertain with great precision whether these
injunctions have or have not been strictly complied with.