A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents - James D. Richardson
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By Article I, section 9, clause 1, it is provided that the migration
or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the
year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not
exceeding $10 for each person.
By Article III, section 3, clause 1, new States may be admitted by
Congress into the Union, but that no new State shall be formed within
the jurisdiction of another State, nor any State be formed by the
junction of two or more States or parts of States without the consent of
the legislature of the States concerned as well as of the United States.
And by the next clause of the same article and section power is vested
in Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United.
States, with a proviso that nothing in the Constitution shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any
particular State.
By Article IV, section 4, the United States guarantee to every State a
republican form of government and engage to protect each of them against
invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive
when the legislature can not be convened, against domestic violence.
Of the other parts of the Constitution relating to power, some form
restraints on the exercise of the powers granted to Congress and others
on the exercise of the powers remaining to the States. The object in
both instances is to draw more completely the line between the two
governments and also to prevent abuses by either. Other parts operate
like conventional stipulations between the States, abolishing between
them all distinctions applicable to foreign powers and securing to the
inhabitants of each State all the rights and immunities of citizens in
the several States.
By the fifth article it is provided that Congress, whenever two-thirds
of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments, or, on
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case
shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions
in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode may be proposed
by Congress: _Provided_, That no State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal vote in the Senate, and that no amendment which
may be made prior to the year 1808 shall affect the first and fourth
clauses in the ninth section of the first article.
By the second section of the sixth article it is declared that the
Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and that the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This right in the
National Government to execute its powers was indispensable to its
existence. If the State governments had not been restrained from
encroaching on the powers vested in the National Government, the
Constitution, like the Confederation, would soon have been set at
naught; and it was not within the limit of the human mind to devise
any plan for the accomplishment of the object other than by making a
national constitution which should be to the extent of its powers the
supreme law of the land. This right in the National Government would
have existed under the Constitution to the full extent provided for by
this declaration had it not been made. To prevent the possibility of
a doubt, however, on so important a subject it was proper to make the
declaration.
Having presented above a full view of all the powers granted to the
United States, it will be proper to look to those remaining to the
States. It is by fixing the great powers which are admitted to belong
to each government that we may hope to come to a right conclusion
respecting those in controversy between them. In regard to the National
Government, this task was easy because its powers were to be found in
specific grants in the Constitution; but it is more difficult to give a
detail of the powers of the State governments, as their constitutions,
containing all powers granted by the people not specifically taken
from them by grants to the United States, can not well be enumerated.
Fortunately, a precise detail of all the powers remaining to the State
governments is not necessary in the present instance. A knowledge of
their great powers only will answer every purpose contemplated, and
respecting these there can be no diversity in opinion. They are
sufficiently recognized and established by the Constitution of the
United States itself. In designating the important powers of the
State governments it is proper to observe, first, that the territory
contemplated by the Constitution belongs to each State in its separate
character and not to the United States in their aggregate character.
Bach State holds territory according to its original charter, except in
cases where cessions have been made to the United States by individual
States. The United States had none when the Constitution was adopted
which had not been thus ceded to them and which they held on the
conditions on which such cession had been made. Within the individual
States it is believed that they held not a single acre; but if they did
it was as citizens held it, merely as private property. The territory
acquired by cession lying without the individual States rests on a
different principle, and is provided for by a separate and distinct part
of the Constitution. It is the territory within the individual States to
which the Constitution in its great principles applies, and it applies
to such territory as the territory of a State and not as that of the
United States. The next circumstance to be attended to is that the
people composing this Union are the people of the several States, and
not of the United States in the full sense of a consolidated government.
The militia are the militia of the several States; lands are held under
the laws of the States; descents, contracts, and all the concerns of
private property, the administration of justice, and the whole criminal
code, except in the cases of breaches of the laws of the United States
made under and in conformity with the powers vested in Congress and of
the laws of nations, are regulated by State laws. This enumeration shows
the great extent of the powers of the State governments. The territory
and the people form the basis on which all governments are founded.
The militia constitutes their effective force. The regulation and
protection of property and of personal liberty are also among the
highest attributes of sovereignty. This, without other evidence, is
sufficient to show that the great office of the Constitution of the
United States is to unite the States together under a Government
endowed with powers adequate to the purposes of its institution,
relating, directly or indirectly, to foreign concerns, to the discharge
of which a National Government thus formed alone could be competent.
This view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the several States over the
territory within their respective limits, except in cases otherwise
specially provided for, is supported by the obvious intent of the
several powers granted to Congress, to which a more particular attention
is now due. Of these the right to declare war is perhaps the most
important, as well by the consequences attending war as by the other
powers granted in aid of it. The right to lay taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, though necessary for the support of the civil government,
is equally necessary to sustain the charges of war; the right to raise
and support armies and a navy and to call forth and govern the militia
when in the service of the United States are altogether of the latter
kind. They are granted in aid of the power to make war and intended to
give effect to it. These several powers are of great force and extent,
and operate more directly within the limits and upon the resources of
the States than any of the other powers. But still they are means only
for given ends. War is declared and must be maintained, an army and a
navy must be raised, fortifications must be erected for the common
defense, debts must be paid, For these purposes duties, imposts, and
excises are levied, taxes are laid, the lands, merchandise, and other
property of the citizens are liable for them; if the money is not paid,
seizures are made and the lands are sold. The transaction is terminated;
the lands pass into other hands, who hold them, as the former
proprietors did, under the laws of the individual States. They were
means only to certain ends; the United States have nothing further to
do with them. The same view is applicable to the power of the General
Government over persons. The militia is called into the service of the
United States; the service is performed; the corps returns to the State
to which it belongs; it is the militia of such State, and not of the
United States. Soldiers are required for the Army, who may be obtained
by voluntary enlistment or by some other process founded in the
principles of equality. In either case the citizen after the tour of
duty is performed is restored to his former station in society, with his
equal share in the common sovereignty of the nation. In all these cases,
which are the strongest which can be given, we see that the right of
the General Government is nothing more than what it is called in the
Constitution, a power to perform certain acts, and that the subject on
which it operates is a means only to that end; that it was both before
and after that act under the protection and subject to the laws of the
individual State within which it was.
To the other powers of the General Government the same remarks are
applicable and with greater force. The right to regulate commerce with
foreign powers was necessary as well to enable Congress to lay and
collect duties and imposts as to support the rights of the nation in
the intercourse with foreign powers. It is executed at the ports of
the several States and operates almost altogether externally. The right
to borrow and coin money and to fix its value and that of foreign
coin are important to the establishment of a National Government, and
particularly necessary in support of the right to declare war, as,
indeed, may be considered the right to punish piracy and felonies on
the high seas and offenses against the laws of nations. The right to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws respecting
bankruptcies seems to be essentially connected with the right to
regulate commerce. The first branch of it relates to foreigners entering
the country; the second to merchants who have failed. The right to
promote the progress of useful arts and sciences may be executed without
touching any of the individual States. It is accomplished by granting
patents to inventors and preserving models, which may be done
exclusively within the Federal district. The right to constitute courts
inferior to the Supreme Court was a necessary consequence of the
judiciary existing as a separate branch of the General Government.
Without such inferior court in every State it would be difficult and
might even be impossible to carry into effect the laws of the General
Government. The right to establish post-offices and post-roads is
essentially of the same character. For political, commercial, and social
purposes it was important that it should be vested in the General
Government. As a mere matter of regulation, and nothing more, I presume,
was intended by it, it is a power easily executed and involving little
authority within the States individually. The right to exercise
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the Federal district
and over forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings with the consent of the State within which the same may be is
a power of a peculiar character, and is sufficient in itself to confirm
what has been said of all the other powers of the General Government.
Of this particular grant further notice will hereafter be taken.
I shall conclude my remarks on this part of the subject by observing
that the view which has been presented of the powers and character of
the two Governments is supported by the marked difference which is
observable in the manner of their endowment. The State governments
are divided into three branches--a legislative, executive, and
judiciary--and the appropriate duties of each assigned to it without
any limitation of power except such as is-necessary to guard against
abuse, in the form of bills of right. But in instituting the National
Government an entirely different principle was adopted and pursued. The
Government itself is organized, like the State governments, into three
branches, but its powers are enumerated and defined in the most precise
form. The subject has already been too fully explained to require
illustration by a general view of the whole Constitution, every part
of which affords proof of what is here advanced. It will be sufficient
to advert to the eighth section of the first article, being that more
particularly which defines the powers and fixes the character of the
Government of the United States. By this section it is declared that
Congress shall have power, first, to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, etc.
Having shown the origin of the State governments and their endowments
when first formed; having also shown the origin of the National
Government and the powers vested in it, and having shown, lastly, the
powers which are admitted to have remained to the State governments
after those which were taken from them by the National Government,
I will now proceed to examine whether the power to adopt and execute
a system of internal improvement by roads and canals has been vested
in the United States.
Before we can determine whether this power has been granted to the
General Government it will be necessary to ascertain distinctly the
nature and extent of the power requisite to make such improvements.
When that is done we shall be able to decide whether such power is
vested in the National Government.
If the power existed it would, it is presumed, be executed by a board of
skillful engineers, on a view of the whole Union, on a plan which would
secure complete effect to all the great purposes of our Constitution.
It is not my intention, however, to take up the subject here on this
scale. I shall state a case for the purpose of illustration only. Let
it be supposed that Congress intended to run a road from the city of
Washington to Baltimore and to connect the Chesapeake Bay with the
Delaware and the Delaware with the Raritan by a canal, what must be
done to carry the project into effect? I make here no question of the
existing power. I speak only of the power necessary for the purpose.
Commissioners would be appointed to trace a route in the most direct
line, paying due regard to heights, water courses, and other obstacles,
and to acquire the right to the ground over which the road and canal
would pass, with sufficient breadth for each. This must be done by
voluntary grants, or by purchases from individuals, or, in case they
would not sell or should ask an exorbitant price, by condemning the
property and fixing its value by a jury of the vicinage. The next object
to be attended to after the road and canal are laid out and made is to
keep them in repair. We know that there are people in every community
capable of committing voluntary injuries, of pulling down walls that are
made to sustain the road, of breaking the bridges over water courses,
and breaking the road itself. Some living near it might be disappointed
that it did not pass through their lands and commit these acts of
violence and waste from revenge or in the hope of giving it that
direction, though for a short time. Injuries of this kind have been
committed and are still complained of on the road from Cumberland to the
Ohio. To accomplish this object Congress should have a right to pass
laws to punish offenders wherever they may be found. Jurisdiction over
the road would not be sufficient, though it were exclusive. It would
seldom happen that the parties would be detected in the act. They would
generally commit it in the night and fly far off before the sun
appeared. The power to punish these culprits must therefore reach them
wherever they go. They must also be amenable to competent tribunals,
Federal or State. The power must likewise extend to another object not
less essential or important than those already mentioned. Experience
has shown that the establishment of turnpikes, with gates and tolls and
persons to collect the tolls, is the best expedient that can be adopted
to defray the expense of these improvements and the repairs which they
necessarily require. Congress must therefore have power to make such
an establishment and to support it by such regulations, with fines and
penalties in the case of injuries, as may be competent to the purpose.
The right must extend to all those objects, or it will be utterly
incompetent. It is possessed and exercised by the States individually,
and it must be possessed by the United States or the pretension must be
abandoned.
Let it be further supposed that Congress, believing that they do
possess the power, have passed an act for those purposes, under which
commissioners have been appointed, who have begun the work. They are met
at the first farm on which they enter by the owner, who forbids them
to trespass on his land. They offer to buy it at a fair price or at
twice or thrice its value. He persists in his refusal. Can they, on the
principle recognized and acted on by all the State governments that in
cases of this kind the obstinacy and perverseness of an individual must
yield to the public welfare, summon a jury of upright and discreet men
to condemn the land, value it, and compel the owner to receive the
amount and to deliver it up to them? I believe that very few would
concur in the opinion that such a power exists.
The next object is to preserve these improvements from injury. The locks
of the canal are broken, the walls which sustained the road are pulled
down, the bridges are broken, the road itself is plowed up, toll is
refused to be paid, the gates of the canal or turnpike are forced.
The offenders are pursued, caught, and brought to trial. Can they
be punished? The question of right must be decided on principle. The
culprits will avail themselves of every barrier that may serve to screen
them from punishment. They will plead that the law under which they
stand arraigned is unconstitutional, and that question must be decided
by the court, whether Federal or State, on a fair investigation of the
powers vested in the General Government by the Constitution. If the
judges find that these powers have not been granted to Congress, the
prisoners must be acquitted, and by their acquittal all claim to the
right to establish such a system is at an end.
I have supposed an opposition to be made to the right in Congress by the
owner of the land and other individuals charged with breaches of laws
made to protect the works from injury, because it is the mildest form in
which it can present itself. It is not, however, the only one. A State,
also, may contest the right, and then the controversy assumes another
character. Government might contend against government, for to a certain
extent both the Governments are sovereign and independent of each other,
and in that form it is possible, though not probable, that opposition
might be made. To each limitations are prescribed, and should a contest
rise between them respecting their rights and the people sustain it with
anything like an equal division of numbers the worst consequences might
ensue.
It may be urged that the opposition suggested by the owner of the
land or by the States individually may be avoided by a satisfactory
arrangement with the parties. But a suppression of opposition in that
way is no proof of a right in Congress, nor could it, if confined to
that limit, remove all the impediments to the exercise of the power.
It is not sufficient that Congress may by the command and application
of the public revenue purchase the soil, and thus silence that class of
individuals, or by the accommodation afforded to individual States put
down opposition on their part. Congress must be able rightfully to
control all opposition or they can not carry the system into effect.
Cases would inevitably occur to put the right to the test. The work must
be preserved from injury, tolls must be collected, offenders must be
punished. With these culprits no bargain can be made. When brought
to trial they must deny the validity of the law, and that plea being
sustained all claim to the right ceases.
If the United States possess this power, it must be either because it
has been specifically granted or that it is incidental and necessary
to carry into effect some specific grant. The advocates for the power
derive it from the following sources: First, the right to establish
post-offices and post-roads; second, to declare war; third, to regulate
commerce among the several States; fourth, from the power to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; fifth, from the power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department
or officer thereof; sixth and lastly, from the power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and
other property of the United States. It is to be observed that there
is but little accord among the advocates for this power as to the
particular source from whence it is derived. They all agree, however,
in ascribing it to some one or more of those above mentioned. I will
examine the ground of the claim in each instance.
The first of these grants is in the following words: "Congress shall
have power to establish post-offices and post-roads." What is the just
import of these words and the extent of the grant? The word "establish"
is the ruling term; "post-offices and post-roads" are the subjects on
which it acts. The question therefore is, What power is granted by that
word? The sense in which words are commonly used is that in which they
are to be understood in all transactions between public bodies and
individuals. The intention of the parties is to prevail, and there is
no better way of ascertaining it than by giving to the terms used their
ordinary import. If we were to ask any number of our most enlightened
citizens, who had no connection with public affairs and whose minds were
unprejudiced, what was the import of the word "establish" and the extent
of the grant which it controls, we do not think there would be any
difference of opinion among them. We are satisfied that all of them
would answer that a power was thereby given to Congress to fix on the
towns, court-houses, and other places throughout our Union at which
there should be post-offices, the routes by which the mails should be
carried from one post-office to another, so as to diffuse intelligence
as extensively and to make the institution as useful as possible, to
fix the postage to be paid on every letter and packet thus carried, to
support the establishment, and to protect the post-office and mails from
robbery by punishing those who should commit the offense. The idea of a
right to lay off the roads of the United States on a general scale of
improvement, to take the soil from the proprietor by force, to establish
turnpikes and tolls, and to punish offenders in the manner stated above
would never occur to any such person. The use of the existing road by
the stage, mail carrier, or postboy in passing over it as others do is
all that would be thought of, the jurisdiction and soil remaining to the
State, with a right in the State or those authorized by its legislature
to change the road at pleasure.
The intention of the parties is supported by other proof, which ought
to place it beyond all doubt. In the former act of Government, the
Confederation, we find a grant for the same purpose expressed in the
following words: "The United States in Congress assembled shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of establishing and regulating
post-offices from one State to another throughout all the United States,
and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as
may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office." The term
"establish" was likewise the ruling one in that instrument, and was
evidently intended and understood to give a power simply and solely to
fix where there should be post-offices. By transferring this term from
the Confederation into the Constitution it was doubtless intended that
it should be understood in the same sense in the latter that it was
in the former instrument, and to be applied alike to post-offices and
post-roads. In whatever sense it is applied to post-offices it must
be applied in the same sense to post-roads. But it may be asked, If
such was the intention, why were not all the other terms of the grant
transferred with it? The reason is obvious. The Confederation being a
bond of union between independent States, it was necessary in granting
the powers which were to be exercised over them to be very explicit
and minute in defining the powers granted. But the Constitution to the
extent of its powers having incorporated the States into one Government
like the government of the States individually, fewer words in defining
the powers granted by it were not only adequate, but perhaps better
adapted to the purpose. We find that brevity is a characteristic of the
instrument. Had it been intended to convey a more enlarged power in the
Constitution than had been granted in the Confederation, surely the same
controlling term would not have been used, or other words would have
been added, to show such intention and to mark the extent to which the
power should be carried. It is a liberal construction of the powers
granted in the Constitution by this term to include in it all the powers
that were granted in the Confederation by terms which specifically
defined and, as was supposed, extended their limits. It would be absurd
to say that by omitting from the Constitution any portion of the
phraseology which was deemed important in the Confederation the import
of that term was enlarged, and with it the powers of the Constitution,
in a proportional degree, beyond what they were in the Confederation.
The right to exact postage and to protect the post-offices and mails
from robbery by punishing the offenders may fairly be considered as
incidents to the grant, since without it the object of the grant might
be defeated. Whatever is absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of
the object of the grant, though not specified, may fairly be considered
as included in it. Beyond this the doctrine of incidental power can not
be carried.