A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents - James D. Richardson
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The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still
unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than
that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle
satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal
concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on
the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose
governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote,
and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard
to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have
so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the
same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of
its powers; to consider the government _de facto_ as the legitimate
government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to
preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting
in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries
from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently
and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers
should extend their political system to any portion of either continent
without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that
our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their
own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold
such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the
comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments,
and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can
never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States
to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will
pursue the same course.
If we compare the present condition of our Union with its actual state
at the close of our Revolution, the history of the world furnishes no
example of a progress in improvement in all the important circumstances
which constitute the happiness of a nation which bears any resemblance
to it. At the first epoch our population did not exceed 3,000,000.
By the last census it amounted to about 10,000,000, and, what is more
extraordinary, it is almost altogether native, for the immigration
from other countries has been inconsiderable At the first epoch half
the territory within our acknowledged limits was uninhabited and a
wilderness. Since then new territory has been acquired of vast extent,
comprising within it many rivers, particularly the Mississippi, the
navigation of which to the ocean was of the highest importance to the
original States. Over this territory our population has expanded in
every direction, and new States have been established almost equal in
number to those which formed the first bond of our Union. This expansion
of our population and accession of new States to our Union have had the
happiest effect on all its highest interests. That it has eminently
augmented our resources and added to our strength and respectability
as a power is admitted by all. But it is not in these important
circumstances only that this happy effect is felt. It is manifest that
by enlarging the basis of our system and increasing the number of
States the system itself has been greatly strengthened in both its
branches. Consolidation and disunion have thereby been rendered equally
impracticable. Each Government, confiding in its own strength, has less
to apprehend from the other, and in consequence each, enjoying a greater
freedom of action, is rendered more efficient for all the purposes
for which it was instituted. It is unnecessary to treat here of the
vast improvement made in the system itself by the adoption of this
Constitution and of its happy effect in elevating the character and in
protecting the rights of the nation as well as of individuals. To what,
then, do we owe these blessings? It is known to all that we derive them
from the excellence of our institutions. Ought we not, then, to adopt
every measure which may be necessary to perpetuate them?
JAMES MONROE.
SPECIAL MESSAGES.
WASHINGTON CITY, _December 7, 1823_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
By an act of the last session of Congress it was made the duty of
the accounting officers of the Treasury to adjust and settle the
accounts of Daniel D. Tompkins, late governor of the State of New
York, on principles of equity and justice, subject to the revision and
final decision of the President of the United States. The accounting
officers have, in compliance with this act, reported to me a balance of
$35,190 in favor of Governor Tompkins, which report I have had under
consideration, together with his claim to an additional allowance,
and should have decided on the same before the present time had I not
delayed my decision at his request. From the view which I have taken
of the subject I am satisfied, considering all the circumstances of
the case, that a larger sum ought to be allowed him than that reported
by the accounting officers of the Treasury. No appropriation, however,
having been made by the act, and it appearing by recent information from
him that the sum reported would afford him an essential accommodation
at this time, the subject is submitted to the consideration of Congress
with a view to that object.
JAMES MONROE.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit to the Senate, for its advice and consent as to the
ratification, a treaty lately concluded with the Seminole Indians in
Florida, whereby a cession of territory is made to the United States.
JAMES MONROE.
DECEMBER 15, 1823.
WASHINGTON, _December 23, 1823_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I herewith transmit to Congress a statement by William Lambert,
explanatory of his astronomical calculations with a view to establish
the longitude of the Capitol.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _December 31, 1823_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary
of State, with accompanying documents, containing the information
requested by the resolution of the House of the 19th instant, relating
to the condition and future prospects of the Greeks.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _January 5, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the
18th of December last, requesting copies of contracts for cannon, cannon
shot, muskets, and other small arms which have been entered into since
the 1st of January, 1820, and for other detailed information therein
specified, I herewith transmit a report, with accompanying documents,
from the Department of War,
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _January 9, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
Agreeably to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th
of December, 1823, requesting copies of all contracts for cannon,
cannon shot, muskets, and other small arms entered into since the
1st of January, 1820, I herewith transmit a report from the Department
of the Navy, with other documents relating thereto.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _January 12, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of December
24, requesting the President of the United States to lay before the
House such information as he may possess, and which may be disclosed
without injury to the public good, relative to the determination of
any sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, to assist Spain in the
subjugation of her late colonies on the American continent, and whether
any Government of Europe is disposed or determined to oppose any aid or
assistance which such sovereign or combination of sovereigns may afford
to Spain for the subjugation of her late colonies above mentioned,
I have to state that I possess no information on that subject not known
to Congress which can be disclosed without injury to the public good.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _January 30, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the
15th of December last, requesting the President of the United States "to
communicate a plan for a peace establishment of the Navy of the United
States," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of the Navy,
which contains the plan required.
In presenting this plan to the consideration of Congress, I avail myself
of the occasion to make some remarks on it which the importance of the
subject requires and experience justifies.
If a system of universal and permanent peace could be established, or
if in war the belligerent parties would respect the rights of neutral
powers, we should have no occasion for a navy or an army. The expense
and dangers of such establishments might be avoided. The history of all
ages proves that this can not be presumed; on the contrary, that at
least one-half of every century, in ancient as well as modern times,
has been consumed in wars, and often of the most general and desolating
character. Nor is there any cause to infer, if we examine the condition
of the nations with which we have the most intercourse and strongest
political relations, that we shall in future be exempt from that
calamity within any period to which a rational calculation may be
extended. And as to the rights of neutral powers, it is sufficient to
appeal to our own experience to demonstrate how little regard will be
paid to them whenever they come in conflict with the interests of the
powers at war while we rely on the justice of our cause and on argument
alone. The amount of the property of our fellow-citizens which was
seized and confiscated or destroyed by the belligerent parties in the
wars of the French Revolution, and of those which followed before we
became a party to the war, is almost incalculable.
The whole movement of our Government from the establishment of our
independence has been guided by a sacred regard for peace. Situated as
we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with
its affairs, blessed with the happiest Government on earth, and having
no objects of ambition to gratify, the United States have steadily
cultivated the relations of amity with every power; and if in any
European wars a respect for our rights might be relied on, it was
undoubtedly in those to which I have adverted. The conflict being vital,
the force being nearly equally balanced, and the result uncertain, each
party had the strongest motives of interest to cultivate our good will,
lest we might be thrown into the opposite scale. Powerful as this
consideration usually is, it was nevertheless utterly disregarded
in almost every stage of and by every party to those wars. To these
encroachments and injuries our regard for peace was finally forced
to yield.
In the war to which at length we became a party our whole coast from St.
Croix to the Mississippi was either invaded or menaced with invasion,
and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval.
In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was
comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any
of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and
Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being
sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a
certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the
condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which
mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy
signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet
their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with
a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of
their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In
whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to
land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but
little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty.
Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only,
but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering
those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was
disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on
each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there.
The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of
the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived.
The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were
alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those
which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of
other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral
rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any
war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the
expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast
extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended
by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond
with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects
are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval
force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the
second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. Hence the
subject of defense becomes intimately connected in all its parts in war
and in peace, for the land and at sea. No government will be disposed in
its wars with other powers to violate our rights if it knows we have the
means, are prepared and resolved to defend them. The motive will also be
diminished if it knows that our defenses by land are so well planned and
executed that an invasion of our coast can not be productive of the
evils to which we have heretofore been exposed.
It was under a thorough conviction of these truths, derived from the
admonitions of the late war, that Congress, as early as the year 1816,
during the term of my enlightened and virtuous predecessor, under whom
the war had been declared, prosecuted, and terminated, digested and made
provision for the defense of our country and support of its rights,
in peace as well as in war, by acts which authorized and enjoined the
augmentation of our Navy to a prescribed limit, and the construction
of suitable fortifications throughout the whole extent of our maritime
frontier and wherever else they might be deemed necessary. It is to the
execution of these works, both land and naval, and under a thorough
conviction that by hastening their completion I should render the best
service to my country and give the most effectual support to our free
republican system of government that my humble faculties would admit of,
that I have devoted so much of my time and labor to this great system of
national policy since I came into this office, and shall continue to do
it until my retirement from it at the end of your next session.
The Navy is the arm from which our Government will always derive most
aid in support of our neutral rights. Every power engaged in war will
know the strength of our naval force, the number of our ships of each
class, their condition, and the promptitude with which we may bring them
into service, and will pay due consideration to that argument. Justice
will always have great weight in the cabinets of Europe; but in long and
destructive wars exigencies often occur which press so vitally on them
that unless the argument of force is brought to its aid it will be
disregarded. Our land forces will always perform their duty in the event
of war, but they must perform it on the land. Our Navy is the arm which
must be principally relied on for the annoyance of the commerce of the
enemy and for the protection of our own, and also, by cooperation with
the land forces, for the defense of the country. Capable of moving in
any and every direction, it possesses the faculty, even when remote from
our coast, of extending its aid to every interest on which the security
and welfare of our Union depend. Annoying the commerce of the enemy and
menacing in turn its coast, provided the force on each side is nearly
equally balanced, it will draw its squadrons from our own; and in case
of invasion by a powerful adversary by a land and naval force, which is
always to be anticipated and ought to be provided against, our Navy may,
by like cooperation with our land forces, render essential aid in
protecting our interior from incursion and depredation.
The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast.
If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the
accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally
relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets
in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done
in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships
to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of
steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other
powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it
can not be doubted that this defense would be adequate to the purpose
intended by it, nor can it be doubted that the knowledge that such works
existed would form a strong motive with any power not to invade our
rights, and thereby contribute essentially to prevent war. There are,
it is admitted, some entrances into our interior which are of such
vast extent that it would be utterly impossible for any works, however
extensive or well posted, to command them. Of this class the Chesapeake
Bay, which is an arm of the sea, may be given as an example. But, in my
judgment, even this bay may be defended against any power with whom we
may be involved in war as a third party in the defense of our neutral
rights. By erecting strong works at the mouth of James River, on both
sides, near the capes, as we are now doing, and at Old Point Comfort and
the Rip Raps, and connecting those works together by chains whenever the
enemy's force appeared, placing in the rear some large ships and steam
batteries, the passage up the river would be rendered impracticable.
This guard would also tend to protect the whole country bordering on the
bay and rivers emptying into it, as the hazard would be too great for
the enemy, however strong his naval force, to ascend the bay and leave
such a naval force behind; since, in the event of a storm, whereby his
vessels might be separated, or of a calm, the ships and steam batteries
behind the works might rush forth and destroy them. It could only be in
the event of an invasion by a great power or a combination of several
powers, and by land as well as by naval forces, that those works could
be carried; and even then they could not fail to retard the movement of
the enemy into the country and to give time for the collection of our
regular troops, militia, and volunteers to that point, and thereby
contribute essentially to his ultimate defeat and expulsion from our
territory.
Under a strong impression that a peace establishment of our Navy is
connected with the possible event of war, and that the naval force
intended for either state, however small it may be, is connected with
the general system of public defense, I have thought it proper in
communicating this report to submit these remarks on the whole subject.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _February 2, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the
11th of December last, requesting the President of the United States to
communicate to the House all such parts of the correspondence with the
Government of Spain relating to the Florida treaty to the period of its
final ratification, not heretofore communicated, which, in his opinion,
it might not be inconsistent with the public interest to communicate,
I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with copies
of the correspondence requested.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
The House of Representatives on the 12th instant having "resolved that
the President of the United States be requested to inform this House
whether the rules and regulations compiled by General Scott for the
government of the Army are now in force in the Army, or any part
thereof, and by what authority the same has been adopted and enforced,"
I herewith transmit a report from the Department of War, which contains
the information required.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
Agreeably to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th
instant, requesting the President of the United States "to inform this
House if the line intended to constitute the western boundary of the
Territory of Arkansas has been run in conformity with the provisions
of the third section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1823,
entitled 'An act making appropriation for the military service of the
United States for the year 1823, and for other purposes,' and, if said
line has not been run, that he inform this House what instructions have
been given or measures adopted in relation to the execution of the
provision of the law, and what causes have prevented said line from
being run," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War,
which contains the information required.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
The House of Representatives on the 26th ultimo having "resolved that
the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid
before the House an estimate of the expense which would be incurred by
transporting 200 of the troops now at the Council Bluffs to the mouth
of the Columbia or Oregon River," I herewith transmit a report of the
Secretary of War, which contains the information required.
JAMES MONROE.
WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I herewith transmit to Congress certain documents relating to a claim
of Massachusetts for services rendered by the militia of that State
in the late war, and for which payment was made by the State. From the
particular circumstances attending this claim I have thought it proper
to submit the subject to the consideration of Congress.
In forming a just estimate of this claim it will be necessary to recur
to the cause which prevented its admission, or the admission of any part
thereof, at an earlier day. It will be recollected that when a call was
made on the militia of that State for service in the late war, under
an arrangement which was alike applicable to the militia of all the
States and in conformity with the acts of Congress, the executive of
Massachusetts refused to comply with the call, on the principle that
the power vested in Congress by the Constitution to provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions was not a complete power for
those purposes, but conditional, and dependent on the consent of the
executives of the several States, and, also, that when called into
service, such consent being given, they could not be commanded by a
regular officer of the United States, or other officer than of the
militia, except by the President in person. That this decision of
the executive of Massachusetts was repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States, and of dangerous tendency, especially when it is
considered that we were then engaged in a war with a powerful nation
for the defense of our common rights, was the decided opinion of this
Government; and when the period at which that decision was formed was
considered, it being as early as the 5th of August, 1812, immediately
after the war was declared, and that it was not relinquished during the
war, it was inferred by the Executive of the United States that the
decision of the executive of that State was alike applicable to all the
services that were rendered by the militia of the State during the war.
In the correspondence with the governor of Massachusetts at that
important epoch, and on that very interesting subject, it was announced
to him by the Secretary of War that if the militia of the State were
called into service by the executive of the State, and not put under the
command of the Major-General of the United States, as the militia of
the other States were, the expense attending their service would be
chargeable to the State, and not to the United States. It was also
stated to him at the same time that any claim which the State might
have for the reimbursement of such expenses could not be allowed by the
Executive of the United States, since it would involve principles on
which that branch of the Government could not decide.