A Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee - John Esten Cooke
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He was in his tent, at Rectortown, at the moment when the dispatch was
handed to him--brought by an officer from Washington through a heavy
snow-storm then falling. General Ambrose E. Burnside was in the tent.
McClellan read the dispatch calmly, and, handing it indifferently to
his visitor, said, "Well, Burnside, you are to command the army."
Such was the abrupt termination of the military career of a commander
who fills a large space in the history of the war in Virginia. The
design of this volume is not such as to justify an extended notice of
him, or a detailed examination of his abilities as a soldier. That he
possessed military endowments of a very high order is conceded by most
persons, but his critics add that he was dangerously prone to caution
and inactivity. Such was the criticism of his enemies at Washington
and throughout the North, and his pronounced political opinions had
gained him a large number. It may, however, be permitted one who can
have no reason to unduly commend him, to say that the retreat to
James River, and the arrest of Lee in his march of invasion toward
Pennsylvania, seem to indicate the possession of something more than
"inactivity," and of that species of "caution" which achieves success.
It will probably, however, be claimed by few, even among the
personal friends of this general, that he was a soldier of the first
ability--one competent to oppose Lee.
As to the personal qualities of General McClellan, there seems to be
no difference of opinion. He was a gentleman of high breeding, and
detested all oppression of the weak and non-combatants. Somewhat prone
to _hauteur_, in presence of the importunities of the Executive and
other civilians unskilled in military affairs, he was patient, mild,
and cordial with his men. These qualities, with others which he
possessed, seem to have rendered him peculiarly acceptable to the
private soldier, and it is certain that he was, beyond comparison, the
most popular of all the generals who, one after another, commanded the
"Army of the Potomac."
IX.
LEE CONCENTRATES AT FREDERICKSBURG.
In returning from the Valley, General Lee had exhibited that
combination of boldness and caution which indicates in a commander the
possession of excellent generalship.
One of two courses was necessary: either to make a rapid march with
his entire army, in order to interpose himself between General
McClellan and what seemed to be his objective point, Gordonsville; or,
to so manoeuvre his forces as to retard and embarrass his adversary.
Of these, Lee chose the latter course, exposing himself to what seemed
very great danger. Jackson was left in the Valley, and Longstreet sent
to Culpepper; under these circumstances, General McClellan might have
cut off one of the two detached bodies; but Lee seems to have read
the character of his adversary accurately, and to have felt that a
movement of such boldness would not probably be undertaken by him.
Provision had nevertheless been made for this possible contingency.
Jackson was directed by Lee, in case of an attack by General
McClellan, to retire, by way of Strasburg, up the Valley, and so
rejoin the main body. That this movement would become necessary,
however, was not, as we have said, contemplated. It was not supposed
by Lee that his adversary would adopt the bold plan of crossing the
Blue Ridge to assail Jackson; thus, to leave that commander in
the Valley, instead of being a military blunder, was a stroke of
generalship, a source of embarrassment to General McClellan, and a
standing threat against the Federal communications, calculated to clog
the movements of their army. That Lee aimed at this is obvious from
his order to Jackson to cross a division to the eastern side of the
Blue Ridge, in General McClellan's rear. When this was done, the
Federal commander abandoned, if he had ever resolved upon, the design
of striking in between the Confederate detachments, as is claimed
by his admirers to have been his determination; gave up all idea of
"moving into the Valley and endeavoring to gain their rear;" and from
that moment directed his whole attention to the concentration of his
army near Warrenton, with the obvious view of establishing a new
base, and operating southward on the line of the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad.
Lee's object in these manoeuvres, besides the general one of
embarrassing his adversary, seems to have been to gain time, and thus
to render impossible, from the lateness of the season, a Federal
advance upon Richmond. Had General McClellan remained in command, it
is probable that this object would have been attained, and the battle
of Fredericksburg would not have taken place. The two armies would
have lain opposite each other in Culpepper and Fauquier respectively,
with the Upper Rappahannock between them throughout the winter; and
the Confederate forces, weary and worn by the long marches and hard
combats of 1862, would have had the opportunity to rest and recover
their energies for the coming spring.
The change of commanders defeated these views, if they were
entertained by General Lee. On assuming command, General Burnside
conceived the project, in spite of the near approach of winter, of
crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and marching on Richmond.
This he now proceeded to attempt, by steadily moving from Warrenton
toward the Lower Rappahannock, and the result, as will be seen, was a
Federal disaster to wind up this "year of battles."
We have spoken with some particularity of the character and military
abilities of General McClellan, the first able commander of the
Federal forces in Virginia. Of General Burnside, who appears but
once, and for a brief space only, on that great theatre, it will be
necessary to say only a few words. A modest and honorable soldier,
cherishing for General McClellan a cordial friendship, he was
unwilling to supersede that commander, both from personal regard and
distrust of his own abilities. He had not sought the position, which
had rather been thrust upon him. He was "surprised" and "shocked," he
said, at his assignment to the command; he "did not want it, it had
been offered to him twice before, and he did not feel that he could
take it; he had told them that he was not competent to command such
an army as this; he had said the same over and over again to the
President and the Secretary of War." He was, however, directed to
assume command, accepted the responsibility, and proceeded to
carry out the unexpected plan of advancing upon Richmond by way of
Fredericksburg.
To cover this movement, General Burnside made a heavy feint as though
designing to cross into Culpepper. This does not seem to have deceived
Lee, who, on the 17th of November, knew that his adversary was moving.
No sooner had the fact been discovered that General Burnside was
making for Fredericksburg, than the Confederate commander, by a
corresponding movement, passed the Rapidan and hastened in the same
direction. As early as the 17th, two divisions of infantry, with
cavalry and artillery, were in motion. On the morning of the 19th,
Longstreet's corps was sent in the same direction; and when, on
November 20th, General Burnside arrived with his army, the Federal
forces drawn up on the hills north of Fredericksburg saw, on the
highlands south of the city, the red flags and gray lines of their old
adversaries.
As General Jackson had been promptly directed to join the main body,
and was already moving to do so, Lee would soon be able to oppose
General Burnside with his whole force.
Such were the movements of the opposing armies which brought them face
to face at Fredericksburg. Lee had acted promptly, and, it would seem,
with good judgment; but the question has been asked, why he did not
repeat against General Burnside the strategic movement which
had embarrassed General McClellan, and arrest the march upon
Fredericksburg by threatening, with the detachment under Jackson,
the Federal rear. The reasons for not adopting this course will be
perceived by a glance at the map. General Burnside was taking up a
new base--Aquia Creek on the Potomac--and, from the character of the
country, it was wholly impossible for Lee to prevent him from doing
so. He had only to fall back before Jackson, or any force moving
against his flank or rear; the Potomac was at hand, and it was not
in the power of Lee to further annoy him. The latter accordingly
abandoned all thought of repeating his old manoeuvre, moved Longstreet
and the other troops in Culpepper toward Fredericksburg, and,
directing Jackson to join him there, thus concentrated his forces
directly in the Federal front with the view of fighting a pitched
battle, army against army.
This detailed account of Lee's movements may appear tedious to some
readers, but it was rather in grand tactics than in fighting battles
that he displayed his highest abilities as a soldier. He uniformly
adopted the broadest and most judicious plan to bring on battle, and
personally directed, as far as was possible, every detail of his
movements. When the hour came, it may be said of him that he felt he
had done his best--the actual fighting was left largely in the hands
of his corps commanders.
The feints and slight encounters preceding the battle of
Fredericksburg are not of much interest or importance. General
Burnside sent a force to Port Royal, about twenty-five miles below the
city, but Lee promptly detached a portion of his army to meet it, if
it attempted to cross, and that project was abandoned. No attempt was
made by General Burnside to cross above, and it became obvious that he
must pass the river in face of Lee or not at all.
Such was the condition of affairs at Fredericksburg in the first days
of December.
X.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
To a correct understanding of the interesting battle of
Fredericksburg, a brief description of the ground is essential.
The city lies on the south bank of the Rappahannock, which here makes
a considerable bend nearly southward; and along the northern bank,
opposite, extends a range of hills which command the city and the
level ground around it. South of the river the land is low, but from
the depth of the channel forms a line of bluffs, affording good
shelter to troops after crossing to assail a force beyond. The only
good position for such a force, standing on the defensive, is a range
of hills hemming in the level ground. This range begins near the
western suburbs of the city, where it is called "Marye's Hill," and
sweeps round to the southward, gradually receding from the stream,
until, at Hamilton's Crossing, on the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, a
mile or more from the river, it suddenly subsides into the plain. This
plain extends to the right, and is bounded by the deep and difficult
channel of Massaponnax Creek. As Marye's Hill is the natural position
for the left of an army posted to defend Fredericksburg, the crest
above Hamilton's Crossing is the natural position for the right
of such a line, care being taken to cover the extreme right with
artillery, to obstruct the passage of the ground between the crest and
the Massaponnax.
[Illustration: Map--Battle of Fredericksburg.]
Behind the hills on the north side General Burnside's army was posted,
having the railroad to Aquia Creek for the transportation of their
supplies. On the range of hills which we have described south of the
city, General Lee was stationed, the same railroad connecting him with
Richmond. Longstreet's corps composed his left wing, and extended
from Marye's Hill to about the middle of the range of hills. There
Jackson's line began, forming the right wing, and extending to the
termination of the range at Hamilton's Crossing. On Jackson's right,
to guard the plain reaching to the Massaponnax, Stuart was posted with
cavalry and artillery.
The numbers of the adversaries at Fredericksburg can be stated with
accuracy upon one side, but not upon the other. General Lee's force
may be said to have been, in round numbers, about fifty thousand of
all arms. It could scarcely have exceeded that, unless he received
heavy reenforcements after Sharpsburg; and the present writer
has never heard or read that he received reenforcements of any
description. The number, fifty thousand, thus seems to have been the
full amount of the army. That of General Burnside's forces seems to
have been considerably larger. The Federal army consisted of the
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Corps; the
latter a corps of reserve and large. If these had been recruited to
the full number reported by General McClellan at Sharpsburg, and the
additional troops (Fifth and Eleventh Corps) be estimated, the Federal
army must have exceeded one hundred thousand men. This estimate is
borne out by Federal authorities. "General Franklin," says a Northern
writer, "had now with him about one-half the whole army;" and General
Meade says that Franklin's force "amounted to from fifty-five thousand
to sixty thousand men," which would seem to indicate that the whole
army numbered from one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and
twenty thousand men.
A strong position was obviously essential to render it possible for
the Southern army, of about fifty thousand men, to successfully oppose
the advance of this force of above one hundred thousand. Lee had found
this position, and constructed earthworks for artillery, with the view
of receiving the attack of the enemy after their crossing. He was
unable to obstruct this crossing in any material degree; and he states
clearly the grounds of this inability. "The plain of Fredericksburg,"
he says, "is so completely commanded by the Stafford heights, that no
effectual opposition could be made to the construction of bridges,
or the passage of the river, without exposing our troops to the
destructive fire of the numerous batteries of the enemy.... Our
position was, therefore, selected with a view to resist the enemy's
advance after crossing, and the river was guarded only by a
force sufficient to impede his movements until the army could be
concentrated."
The brief description we have presented of the character of the ground
around Fredericksburg, and the position of the adversaries, will
sufficiently indicate the conditions under which the battle was
fought. Both armies seem to have been in excellent spirits. That of
General Burnside had made a successful march, during which they had
scarcely seen an enemy, and now looked forward, probably, to certain
if not easy victory. General Lee's army, in like manner, had undergone
recently no peculiar hardships in marching or fighting; and, to
whatever cause the fact may be attributed, was in a condition of the
highest efficiency. The men seemed to be confident of the result of
the coming conflict, and, in their bivouacs on the line of battle, in
the woods fringing the ridge which they occupied, laughed, jested,
cheered, on the slightest provocation, and, instead of shrinking from,
looked forward with eagerness to, the moment when General Burnside
would advance to attack them. This buoyant and elastic spirit in the
Southern troops was observable on the eve of nearly every battle of
the war. Whether it was due to the peculiar characteristics of the
race, or to other causes, we shall not pause here to inquire; but the
fact was plain to the most casual observation, and was never more
striking than just before Fredericksburg, unless just preceding the
battle of Gettysburg.
Nothing of any importance occurred, from the 20th of November, when
General Burnside's army was concentrated on the heights north of
Fredericksburg, until the 11th of December, when the Federal army
began crossing the Rappahannock to deliver battle. Lee's reasons for
not attempting to resist the passage of the river have been given
above. The plain on which it would have been necessary to draw up
his army, in order to do so, was too much exposed to the numerous
artillery of the enemy on the northern bank. Lee resolved, therefore,
not to oppose the crossing of the Federal troops, but to await their
assault on the commanding ground west and south of the city.
On the morning of December 11th, before dawn, the dull boom of Lee's
signal-guns indicated that the enemy were moving, and the Southern
troops formed line of battle to meet the coming attack. General
Burnside had made arrangements to cross the river on pontoon bridges,
one opposite the city, and another a mile or two lower down the
stream. General Franklin, commanding the two corps of the left Grand
Division, succeeded, without trouble, in laying the lower bridge, as
the ground did not permit Lee to offer material obstruction; and this
large portion of the army was now ready to cross. The passage of the
stream at Fredericksburg was more difficult. Although determined not
to make a serious effort to prevent the enemy from crossing, General
Lee had placed two regiments of Barksdale's Mississippians along the
bank of the river, in the city, to act as sharp-shooters, and impede
the construction of the pontoon bridges, with the view, doubtless, of
thus giving time to marshal his troops. The success of this device
was considerable. The workmen, busily engaged in laying the Federal
pontoons, were so much interrupted by the fire of the Confederate
marksmen--who directed their aim through the heavy fog by the noise
made in putting together the boats--that, after losing a number of
men, the Federal commander discontinued his attempt. It was renewed
again and again, without success, as before, when, provoked apparently
by the presence of this hornet's nest, which reversed all his plans,
General Burnside, about ten o'clock, opened a furious fire of
artillery upon the city. The extent of this bombardment will be
understood from the statement that one hundred and forty-seven pieces
of artillery were employed, which fired seven thousand three hundred
and fifty rounds of ammunition, in one instance piercing a single
small house with fifty round-shot. An eye-witness of this scene says:
"The enemy had planted more than a hundred pieces of artillery on the
hills to the northern and eastern sides of the town, and, from an
early hour in the forenoon, swept the streets with round-shot, shell,
and case-shot, firing frequently a hundred guns a minute. The quick
puffs of smoke, touched in the centre with tongues of flame, ran
incessantly along the lines of their batteries on the slopes, and,
as the smoke slowly drifted away, the bellowing roar came up in one
continuous roll. The town was soon fired, and a dense cloud of smoke
enveloped its roofs and steeples. The white church-spires still rose
serenely aloft, defying shot or shell, though a portion of one of them
was torn off. The smoke was succeeded by lurid flame, and the crimson
mass brought to mind the pictures of Moscow burning." The same writer
says: "Men, women, and children, were driven from the town, and
hundreds of ladies and children were seen wandering, homeless, and
without shelter, over the frozen highway, in thin clothing, knowing
not where to find a place of refuge."
[Illustration: FREDERICKSBURG]
General Lee watched this painful spectacle from a redoubt to the right
of the telegraph road, not far from his centre, where a shoulder
jutting out from the ridge, and now called "Lee's Hill," afforded
him a clear view of the city. The destruction of the place, and the
suffering of the inhabitants, aroused in him a deep melancholy,
mingled with exasperation, and his comment on the scene was probably
as bitter as any speech which he uttered during the whole war.
Standing, wrapped in his cape, with only a few officers near, he
looked fixedly at the flames rising from the city, and, after
remaining for a long time silent, said, in his grave, deep voice:
"These people delight to destroy the weak, and those who can make no
defence; it just suits them."
General Burnside continued the bombardment for some hours, the
Mississippians still holding the river-bank and preventing the laying
of the pontoons, which was again begun and again discontinued. At
about four in the afternoon, however, a force was sent across in
barges, and by nightfall the city was evacuated by Lee, and General
Burnside proceeded rapidly to lay his pontoon bridge, upon which his
army then began to pass over. The crossing continued throughout the
next day, not materially obstructed by the fire of Lee's artillery,
as a dense fog rendered the aim of the cannoneers unreliable. By
nightfall (of the 12th) the Federal army was over, with the exception
of General Hooker's Centre Grand Division, which was held in reserve
on the north bank. General Burnside then proceeded to form his line of
battle. It stretched from the western suburbs of Fredericksburg down
the river, along what is called the River road, for a distance of
about four miles, and consisted of the Right Grand Division, under
General Sumner, at the city, and the Left Grand Division, under
General Franklin, lower down, and opposite Lee's right. General
Franklin's Grand Division numbered, according to General Meade, from
fifty-five to sixty thousand men; the numbers of Generals Sumner and
Hooker are not known to the present writer, but are said by Federal
authorities, as we have stated, to have amounted together to about the
same.
At daybreak, on the morning of December 13th, a muffled sound, issuing
from the dense fog covering the low ground, indicated that the Federal
lines were preparing to advance.
To enable the reader to understand General Burnside's plan of attack,
it is necessary that brief extracts should be presented from his
orders on the occasion, and from his subsequent testimony before the
committee on the conduct of the war. Despite the length of time since
his arrival at Fredericksburg--a period of more than three weeks--the
Federal commander had, it appears, been unable to obtain full and
accurate information of the character of the ground occupied by Lee,
and thus moved very much in the dark. He seems to have formed his plan
of attack in consequence of information from "a colored man." His
words are: "The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of
heights where we made our attack.... I obtained, from a colored man
at the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road
which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that
new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme
left." It is difficult for those familiar with the ground referred to,
to understand how this "new road," a mere country bridle-path, as it
were, extending along in the rear of Lee's right wing, could have been
regarded as a topographical feature of any importance. The road,
which remains unchanged, and may be seen by any one to-day, was
insignificant in a military point of view, and, in attaching such
importance to seizing it, the Federal commander committed a grave
error.
What seems to have been really judicious in his plan, was the turning
movement determined on against Lee's right, along the old Richmond
road, running from the direction of the river past the end of the
ridge occupied by the Confederates, and so southward. To break through
at this point was the only hope of success, and General Burnside had
accordingly resolved, he declared, upon "a rapid movement down the old
Richmond road" with Franklin's large command. Unfortunately, however,
this wise design was complicated with another, most unwise, to send
forward _a division_, first, to seize the crest of the ridge near the
point where it sinks into the plain. On this crest were posted the
veterans of Jackson, commanded in person by that skilful soldier.
Three lines of infantry, supported by artillery, were ready to receive
the Federal attack, and, to force back this stubborn obstacle, General
Burnside sent a division. The proof is found in his order to General
Franklin at about six o'clock on the morning of the battle: "Send
out a division at least ... to seize, if possible, the heights near
Captain Hamilton's," which was the ground whereon Jackson's right
rested.
An attack on the formidable position known as Marye's Hill, on Lee's
left, west of Fredericksburg, was also directed to be made by the same
small force. The order to General Sumner was to "form a column of
_a division_, for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the
Telegraph and Plank roads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in
the rear of the town;" or, according to another version, "up the Plank
road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will
divide, with the object of seizing the heights on both sides of those
roads."
The point of "intersection" here referred to was the locality of what
has been called "that sombre, fatal, terrible stone wall," just under
Marye's Hill, where the most fearful slaughter of the Federal forces
took place. Marye's Hill is a strong position, and its importance was
well understood by Lee. Longstreet's infantry was in heavy line of
battle behind it, and the crest bristled with artillery. There was
still less hope here of effecting any thing with "a division" than on
the Confederate right held by Jackson.