A Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee - John Esten Cooke
Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41
No choice, however, was now left General Lee. The head of his
advancing column had come into collision with the enemy, and it was
impossible to retire without a battle. Lee accordingly ordered Hill's
corps to be closed up, and reenforcements to be sent forward rapidly
to the point of action. He then mounted his horse and rode in the
direction of the firing, guided by the sound, and the smoke which rose
above the tranquil landscape.
It was a beautiful day and a beautiful season of the year. The fields
were green with grass, or golden with ripening grain, over which
passed a gentle breeze, raising waves upon the brilliant surface. The
landscape was broken here and there by woods; in the west rose the
blue range of the South Mountain; the sun was shining through showery
clouds, and in the east the sky was spanned by a rainbow. This
peaceful scene was now disturbed by the thundering of artillery and
the rattle of musketry. The sky was darkened, here and there, by
clouds of smoke rising from barns or dwelling-houses set on fire by
shell; and beneath rose red tongues of flame, roaring in response to
the guns.
Each side had now sent forward reinforcements to support the
vanguards, and an obstinate struggle ensued, the proportions of the
fight gradually increasing, until the action became a regular battle.
Hill, although suffering from indisposition, which the pallor of his
face indicated, met the Federal attack with his habitual resolution.
He was hard pressed, however, when fortunately one of General Ewell's
divisions, under Rodes, debouched from the Carlisle road, running
northward from Gettysburg, and came to his assistance. Ewell had just
begun to move from Carlisle toward Harrisburg--his second division,
under Early, being at York--when a dispatch from Lee reached him,
directing him to return, and "proceed to Gettysburg or Cashtown, as
his circumstances might direct." He promptly obeyed, encamped within
about eight miles of Gettysburg on the evening of the 30th, and was
now moving toward Cashtown, where Johnson's division of his corps then
was, when Hill sent him word that he needed his assistance. Rodes was
promptly sent forward to the field of action. Early was ordered to
hurry back, and Rodes soon reached the battle-field, where he formed
his line on high ground, opposite the Federal right.
The appearance of this important reenforcement relieved Hill, and
caused the enemy to extend his right to face Rodes. The Federal line
thus resembled a crescent, the left half, fronting Hill, toward the
northwest; and the right, half-fronting Rodes, toward the north--the
town of Gettysburg being in rear of the curve. An obstinate attack was
made by the enemy and by Rodes at nearly the same moment. The loss
on both sides was heavy, but Rodes succeeded in shaking the Federal
right, when Early made his appearance from the direction of York. This
compelled the Federal force to still farther extend its right, to meet
the new attack. The movement greatly weakened them. Rodes charged
their centre with impetuosity; Early came in on their right, with
Gordon's brigade in front, and under this combined attack the Federal
troops gave way, and retreated in great disorder to and through
Gettysburg, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded to
the number of about five thousand, and the same number of prisoners in
the hands of the Confederates.
The first collision of the two armies had thus resulted in a clear
Southern victory, and it is to be regretted that this important
success was not followed up by the seizure of the Cemetery Range,
south of the town, which it was in the power of the Southern forces
at that time to do. To whom the blame--if blame there be--of this
failure, is justly chargeable, the writer of these pages is unable to
state. All that he has been able to ascertain with certainty is the
following: As soon as the Federal forces gave way, General Lee rode
forward, and at about four o'clock in the afternoon was posted on an
elevated point of Seminary Ridge, from which he could see the broken
lines of the enemy rapidly retreating up the slope of Cemetery Range,
in his front. The propriety of pursuit, with a view to seizing this
strong position, was obvious, and General Lee sent an officer of his
staff with a message to General Ewell, to the effect that "he could
see the enemy flying, that they were disorganized, and that it was
only necessary to push on vigorously, and the Cemetery heights were
ours." [Footnote: The officer who carried the order is our authority
for this statement.] Just about the moment, it would seem, when this
order was dispatched--about half-past four--General Hill, who had
joined Lee on the ridge, "received a message from General Ewell,
requesting him (Hill) to press the enemy in front, while he performed
the same operation on his right." This statement is taken from the
journal of Colonel Freemantle, who was present and noted the hour. He
adds: "The pressure was accordingly applied, in a mild degree, but the
enemy were too strongly posted, and it was too late in the evening
for a regular attack." General Ewell, an officer of great courage and
energy, is said to have awaited the arrival of his third division
(Johnson's) before making a decisive assault. Upon the arrival of
Johnson, about sunset, General Ewell prepared to advance and seize
upon the eastern terminus of the Cemetery Range, which commanded the
subsequent Federal position. At this moment General Lee sent him word
to "proceed with his troops to the [Confederate] right, in case he
could do nothing where he was;" he proceeded to General Lee's tent
thereupon to confer with him, and the result was that it was agreed
to first assault the hill on the right. It was now, however, after
midnight, and the attack was directed by Lee to be deferred until the
next morning.
It was certainly unfortunate that the advance was not then made; but
Lee, in his report, attributes no blame to any one. "The attack,"
he says, "was not pressed that afternoon, _the enemy's force being
unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the
rest of our troops._"
The failure to press the enemy immediately after their retreat, with
the view of driving them from and occupying Cemetery Heights, is
susceptible of an explanation which seems to retrieve the Southern
commander and his subordinates from serious criticism. The Federal
forces had been driven from the ground north and west of Gettysburg,
but it was seen now that the troops thus defeated constituted only
a small portion of General Meade's army, and Lee had no means of
ascertaining, with any degree of certainty, that the main body was not
near at hand. The fact was not improbable, and it was not known that
Cemetery Hill was not then in their possession. The wooded character
of the ground rendered it difficult for General Lee, even from his
elevated position on Seminary Ridge, to discover whether the heights
opposite were, or were not, held by a strong force. Infantry were
visible there; and in the plain in front the cavalry of General Buford
were drawn up, as though ready to accept battle. It was not until
after the battle that it was known that the heights might have been
seized upon--General Hancock, who had succeeded Reynolds, having, to
defend them, but a single brigade. This fact was not known to Lee; the
sun was now declining, and the advance upon Cemetery Hill was deferred
until the next day.
When on the next morning, between daybreak and sunrise, General Lee,
accompanied by Hill, Longstreet, and Hood, ascended to the same point
on Seminary Ridge, and reconnoitred the opposite heights through his
field-glass, they were seen to be occupied by heavy lines of infantry
and numerous artillery. The moment had passed; the rampart in his
front bristled with bayonets and cannon. General Hancock, in command
of the Federal advance, had hastened back at nightfall to General
Meade, who was still some distance in rear, and reported the position
to be an excellent one for receiving the Southern attack. Upon this
information General Meade had at once acted; by one o'clock in the
morning his headquarters were established upon the ridge; and when
Lee, on Seminary Hill opposite, was reconnoitring the heights, the
great bulk of the Federal army was in position to receive his assault.
The adversaries were thus face to face, and a battle could not well
be avoided. Lee and his troops were in high spirits and confident of
victory, but every advantage of position was seen to be on the side of
the enemy.
XVI.
THE TWO ARMIES IN POSITION.
The morning of the 2d of July had arrived, and the two armies were in
presence of each other and ready for battle. The question was, which
of the great adversaries would make the attack.
General Meade was as averse to assuming the offensive as his opponent.
Lee's statement on this subject has been given, but is here repeated:
"It had not been intended to fight a general battle," he wrote, "at
such a distance from our base, _unless attacked by the enemy_."
General Meade said before the war committee afterward, "It was my
desire to fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle," and he
adds the obvious explanation, that he was "satisfied his chances of
success were greater in a defensive battle than an offensive one."
There was this great advantage, however, on the Federal side, that
the troops were on their own soil, with their communications
uninterrupted, and could wait, while General Lee was in hostile
territory, a considerable distance from his base of supplies, and
must, for that reason, either attack his adversary or retreat.
He decided to attack. To this decision he seems to have been impelled,
in large measure, by the extraordinary spirit of his troops, whose
demeanor in the subsequent struggle was said by a Federal officer
to resemble that of men "drunk on champagne." General Longstreet
described the army at this moment as able, from the singular afflatus
which bore it up, to undertake "any thing," and this sanguine spirit
was the natural result of a nearly unbroken series of victories. At
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and in the preliminary struggle of
Gettysburg, they had driven the enemy before them in disorder, and, on
the night succeeding this last victory, both officers and men spoke of
the coming battle "as a certainty, and the universal feeling in the
army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so
constantly, and under so many disadvantages."[1]
[Footnote 1: Colonel Freemantle. He was present, and speaks from
observation.] Contempt of an adversary is dangerous, and pride goes
before a fall. The truth of these pithy adages was now about to be
shown.
General Lee, it is said, shared the general confidence of his troops,
and was carried away by it. He says in his report "Finding ourselves
unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of
difficulty to withdraw through the mountain with our large trains; at
the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies
while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to
restrain our foraging-parties by occupying the passes of the mountains
with regular and local troops. A battle thus became in a measure
unavoidable." But, even after the battle, when the Southern army
was much weaker, it was found possible, without much difficulty, to
"withdraw through the mountains" with the trains. A stronger motive
than this is stated in the next sentence of General Lee's report:"
_Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first
day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the
defeat of the army of General Meade_, it was thought advisable to
renew the attack." The meaning of the writer of these words is plain.
The Federal troops had been defeated with little difficulty in the
first day's fight; it seemed probable that a more serious conflict
would have similar results; and a decisive victory promised to end the
war.
General Meade, it seems, scarcely expected to be attacked. He
anticipated a movement on Lee's part, over the Emmetsburg road
southward. [Footnote: Testimony of General Meade before the war
committee.] By giving that direction to his army, General Lee would
have forced his adversary to retire from his strong position on
Cemetery Hill, or come out and attack him; whether, however, it was
desirable on General Lee's part to run the risk of such an attack on
the Southern column _in transitu_, it is left to others better able
than the present writer to determine.
This unskilled comment must pass for what it is worth. It is easy,
after the event, for the smallest to criticise the greatest. Under
whatever influences, General Lee determined not to retreat, either
through the South Mountain or toward Emmetsburg, but marshalled his
army for an attack on the position held by General Meade.
The Southern lines were drawn up on Seminary Ridge, and on the ground
near Gettysburg. Longstreet's corps was posted on the right, opposite
the Federal left, near the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Next came
Hill's corps, extending along the crest nearly to Gettysburg. There
it was joined by Ewell's line, which, passing through the town, bent
round, adapting itself to the position of the Federal right which held
the high ground, curving round in the shape of a hook, at the north
end of the ridge.
The Federal lines thus occupied the whole Cemetery Range--which, being
higher, commanded Seminary Ridge--and consisted, counting from right
to left, of the troops of Generals Howard, Hancock, Sickles, Sykes,
and Sedgwick; the two latter forming a strong reserve to guard the
Federal left. The position was powerful, as both flanks rested upon
high ground, which gave every advantage to the assailed party; but on
the Federal left an accidental error, it seems, had been committed by
General Sickles. He had advanced his line to a ridge in front of the
main range, which appeared to afford him a better position; but this
made it necessary to retire the left wing of his corps, to cover the
opening in that direction. The result was, an angle--the effect
of which is to expose troops to serious danger--and this faulty
disposition of the Federal left seems to have induced General Lee to
direct his main attack at the point in question, with the view of
breaking the Federal line, and seizing upon the main ridge in rear.
"In front of General Longstreet," he says, "the enemy held a position
from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could
be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond." In
order to cooeperate in this, the main attack, Ewell was ordered at the
same time to assail the Federal right toward Gettysburg, and Hill
directed to threaten their centre, and, if there were an opening, make
a real attack. These demonstrations against the enemy's right and
centre, Lee anticipated, would prevent him from reenforcing his left.
Longstreet would thus, he hoped, be "enabled to reach the west of the
ridge" in rear of the Federal line; and General Meade afterward said,
"If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented
me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held at the
last"--that is to say, that he would have been driven from the entire
Cemetery Range.
Such was the position of the two adversaries, and such the design of
Lee, on the 2d of July, when the real struggle was about to begin.
XVII.
THE SECOND DAY.
Throughout the forenoon of the day about to witness one of those great
passages of arms which throw so bloody a glare upon the pages of
history, scarcely a sound disturbed the silence, and it was difficult
to believe that nearly two hundred thousand men were watching each
other across the narrow valley, ready at the word to advance and do
their best to tear each other to pieces.
During all these long hours, when expectation and suspense were
sufficient to try the stoutest nerves, the two commanders were
marshalling their lines for the obstinate struggle which was plainly
at hand. General Meade, who knew well the ability of his opponent, was
seeing, in person, to every thing, and satisfying himself that
his lines were in order to receive the attack. Lee was making his
preparations to commence the assault, upon which, there could be
little doubt, the event of the whole war depended.
From the gallantry which the Federal troops displayed in this battle,
they must have been in good heart for the encounter. It is certain
that the Southern army had never been in better condition for a
decisive conflict. We have spoken of the extraordinary confidence
of the men, in themselves and in their commander. This feeling now
exhibited itself either in joyous laughter and the spirit of jesting
among the troops, or in an air of utter indifference, as of men sure
of the result, and giving it scarcely a thought. The swarthy gunners,
still begrimed with powder from the work of the day before, lay down
around the cannon in position along the crest, and passed the moments
in uttering witticisms, or in slumber; and the lines of infantry,
seated or lying, musket in hand, were as careless. The army was
plainly ready, and would respond with alacrity to Lee's signal. Of the
result, no human being in this force of more than seventy thousand men
seemed to have the least doubt.
Lee was engaged during the whole morning and until past noon in
maturing his preparations for the assault which he designed making
against the enemy's left in front of Longstreet. All was not ready
until about four in the afternoon; then he gave the word, and
Longstreet suddenly opened a heavy artillery-fire on the position
opposite him. At this signal the guns of Hill opened from the ridge
on his left, and Ewell's artillery on the Southern left in front of
Gettysburg thundered in response. Under cover of his cannon-fire,
Longstreet then advanced his lines, consisting of Hood's division on
the right, and McLawe's division on the left, and made a headlong
assault upon the Federal forces directly in his front.
The point aimed at was the salient, formed by the projection of
General Sickles's line forward to the high ground known as "The Peach
Orchard." Here, as we have already said, the Federal line of battle
formed an angle, with the left wing of Sickles's corps bending
backward so as to cover the opening between his line and the main
crest in his rear. Hood's division swung round to assail the portion
of the line thus retired, and so rapid was the movement of this
energetic soldier, that in a short space of time he pushed his right
beyond the Federal left flank, had pierced the exposed point, and was
in direct proximity to the much-coveted "crest of the ridge," upon the
possession of which depended the fate of the battle. Hood was fully
aware of its importance, and lost not a moment in advancing to seize
it. His troops, largely composed of those famous Texas regiments which
Lee had said "fought grandly and nobly," and upon whom he relied "in
all tight places," responded to his ardent orders: a small run was
crossed, the men rushed up the slope, and the crest was almost in
their very grasp.
Success at this moment would have decided the event of the battle
of Gettysburg, and in all probability that of the war. All that was
needed was a single brigade upon either side--a force sufficient to
seize the crest, for neither side held it--and with this brigade a
rare good fortune, or rather the prompt energy of a single officer,
according to Northern historians, supplied the Federal commander.
Hood's line was rushing up with cheers to occupy the crest, which here
takes the form of a separate peak, and is known as "Little Round Top,"
when General Warren, chief-engineer of the army, who was passing, saw
the importance of the position, and determined, at all hazards, to
defend it. He accordingly ordered the Federal signal-party, which had
used the peak as a signal-station, but were hastily folding up their
flags, to remain where they were, laid violent hands upon a brigade
which was passing, and ordered it to occupy the crest; and, when
Hood's men rushed up the rocky slope with yells of triumph, they were
suddenly met by a fusillade from the newly-arrived brigade, delivered
full in their faces. A violent struggle ensued for the possession of
the heights. The men fought hand to hand on the summit, and the issue
remained for some time doubtful. At last it was decided in favor of
the Federal troops, who succeeded in driving Hood's men from the hill,
the summit of which was speedily crowned with artillery, which opened
a destructive fire upon the retreating Southerners. They fell back
sullenly, leaving the ground strewed with their dead and wounded. Hood
had been wounded, and many of his best officers had fallen. For an
instant he had grasped in his strong hand the prize which would have
been worth ten times the amount of blood shed; but he had been unable
to retain his hold; he was falling back from the coveted crest,
pursued by that roar of the enemy's cannon which seemed to rejoice in
his discomfiture.
An obstinate struggle was meanwhile taking place in the vicinity of
the Peach Orchard, where the left of Hood and the division of McLaws
had struck the front of General Sickles, and were now pressing his
line back steadily toward the ridge in his rear. In spite of resolute
resistance the Federal troops at this point were pushed back to a
wheat-field in the rear of the Peach Orchard, and, following up this
advantage, Longstreet charged them and broke their line, which fell
back in disorder toward the high ground in rear. In this attack McLaws
was assisted by Hill's right division--that of Anderson. With this
force Longstreet continued to press forward, and, piercing the Federal
line, seemed about to inflict upon them a great disaster by seizing
the commanding position occupied by the Federal left. Nothing appears
to have saved them at this moment from decisive defeat but the
masterly concentration of reenforcements after reenforcements at the
point of danger. The heavy reserves under Generals Sykes and Sedgwick
were opposite this point, and other troops were hastened forward to
oppose Longstreet. This reenforcement was continuous throughout the
entire afternoon. In spite of Lee's demonstrations in other quarters
to direct attention, General Meade--driven by necessity--continued to
move fresh troops incessantly to protect his left; and success finally
came as the reward of his energy and soldiership. Longstreet found his
weary troops met at every new step in advance by fresh lines, and, as
night had now come, he discontinued the attack. The Federal lines had
been driven considerably beyond the point which they had held before
the assault, and were now east of the wheat-field, where some of the
hardest fighting of the day had taken place, but, in spite of this
loss of ground, they had suffered no serious disaster, and, above
all, Lee had not seized upon that "crest of the ridge," which was the
keystone of the position.
Thus Longstreet's attack had been neither a success nor a failure. He
had not accomplished all that was expected, but he had driven back the
enemy from their advanced position, and held strong ground in their
front. A continuance of the assault was therefore deferred until the
next day--night having now come--and General Longstreet ordered the
advance to cease, and the firing to be discontinued.
During the action on the right, Hill had continued to make heavy
demonstrations on the Federal centre, and Ewell had met with excellent
success in the attack, directed by Lee, to be made against the enemy's
right. This was posted upon the semicircular eminence, a little
southeast of Gettysburg, and the Federal works were attacked by Ewell
about sunset. With Early's division on his right, and Johnson's on
his left, Ewell advanced across the open ground in face of a heavy
artillery-fire, the men rushed up the slope, and in a brief space of
time the Federal artillerists and infantry were driven from the works,
which at nightfall remained in Ewell's hands.
Such had been the fate of the second struggle around Gettysburg. The
moon, which rose just as the fighting terminated, threw its ghastly
glare upon a field where neither side had achieved full success.
Lee had not failed, and he had not succeeded. He had aimed to drive
the Federal forces from the Cemetery Range, and had not been able to
effect that object; but they had been forced back upon both their
right and left, and a substantial advantage seemed thus to have been
gained. That the Confederate success was not complete, seems to have
resulted from the failure to seize the Round-Top Hill. The crisis
of the battle had undoubtedly been the moment when Hood was so near
capturing this position--in reference to the importance of which we
quoted General Meade's own words. It was saved to the Federal army by
the presence of mind, it seems, of a single officer, and the gallantry
of a single brigade. Such are the singular chances of battle, in which
the smallest causes so often effect the greatest results.