Select Speeches of Kossuth - Kossuth
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SELECT SPEECHES
OF
KOSSUTH.
Condensed and abridged,
_with Kossuth's express sanction_,
by
Francis W. Newman.
PREFACE TO KOSSUTH'S SPEECHES.
Nothing appears in history similar to the enthusiasm roused by Kossuth
in nations foreign to him, except perhaps the kindling for the First
Crusade by the voice of Peter the Hermit. Then bishops, princes, and
people alike understood the danger which overshadowed Europe from the
Mohammedan powers; and by soundly directed, though fanatical instinct,
all Christendom rushed eastward, till the chivalry of the Seljuk Turks
was crippled on the fields of Palestine. Now also the multitudes of
Europe, uncorrupted by ambition, envy, or filthy lucre, forebode the
deadly struggle impending over us all from the conspiracy of crowned
heads. Seeing the apathy of their own rulers, and knowing, perhaps by
dim report, the deeds of Kossuth, they look to him as the Great Prophet
and Leader, by whom Policy is at length to be moulded into Justice; and
are ready to catch his inspiration before he has uttered a word. Kossuth
undoubtedly is a mighty Orator; but no one is better aware than he, that
the cogency of his arguments is due to the atrocity of our common
enemies, and the enthusiasm which he kindles to the preparations of the
people's heart.
His orations are a tropical forest, full of strength and majesty,
tangled in luxuriance, a wilderness of self-repetition. Utterly
unsuited to form a book without immense abridgment, they contain
materials adapted equally for immediate political service and for
permanence as a work of wisdom and of genius. To prepare them for the
press is an arduous and responsible duty: the best excuse which I can
give for having assumed it, is, that it has been to me a labour of love.
My task I have felt to be that of a judicious reporter, who cuts short
what is of temporary interest, condenses what is too amplified for his
limits and for written style, severely prunes down the repetitions which
are inevitable where numerous[*] audiences are addressed by the same man
on the same subject, yet amid all these necessary liberties retains not
only the true sentiments and arguments of the speaker, but his forms of
thought and all that is characteristic of his genius. Such an operation,
rightly performed, may, like a diminishing mirror, concentrate the
brilliancy of diffuse orations, and assist their efficacy on minds which
would faint under the effort of grasping the original.
[Footnote *: The number of speeches, great and small, spoken in his
American half-year, is reckoned to be above 500.]
It is true, the exuberance of Kossuth is often too Asiatic for English
taste, and that excision of words, which needful abridgment suggests,
will often seem to us a gain. Moreover, remembering that he is a
foreigner, and though marvellous in his mastery of our language, still
naturally often unable to seize the word, or select the construction
which he desired, I have not thought I should show honour to him by
retaining anything verbally unskilful. To a certain cautious extent, I
account myself to be a _translator_, as well as a _reporter_,
and in undertaking so delicate a duty, I am happy to announce that I
have received Kossuth's written approval and thanks. Mere quaintness of
expression I have by no means desired entirely to remove, where it
involved nothing grotesque, obscure, or monotonous. In several passages
where I imperfectly understood the thought, I have had the advantage of
Kossuth's personal explanations, which have enabled me to clear up the
defective report, or real obscurities of his words.
Nevertheless I have to confess my conviction, that nothing can wholly
compensate for the want of systematic revision by the author himself;
which his great occupations have made impossible. The mistakes in the
reports of the speeches are sometimes rather subtle, and have not roused
my suspicion. Of this I have been, made disagreeably sensible, by
several errata communicated to me by Kossuth in the first great speech
at New York, here marked as No. VII. (which have been corrected in this
edition.)
Nearly all the points on which attempts have been made to misrepresent
in England the cause of Hungary are cleared up in these speeches. On two
subjects only does it seem needful here to make any remark:
_first_, on the Republicanism of Kossuth; _secondly_, on the
Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.
1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds: Szemere
despises him for not becoming a republican early enough, Count Casimir
Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all. The facts are
these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical royalist,
not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become treacherous and
lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession, and make the
Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become universally detested
and actually expelled, he approved most heartily[*] the deposition of
the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to the future of
the constitution. By his influence instructions were sent to his
representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a dynasty
from the British government. Meanwhile Szemere, his Home Secretary, took
on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was REPUBLICAN, and
no voice of protest was raised in either house. Indeed, Mr. Vucovics,
who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth, states (see Appendix I.) that
the government and both houses responded unanimously to the republican
avowal, and that the government removed the symbol of the Crown from the
public arms and seal. The press of all shades assented. After this, it
was clear (I presume) to Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that
all sympathy with royal power was gone out of the nation's heart.
Hungarians may settle that amongst themselves: but as for
Englishmen,--when for seven or eight months together the English
ministry and English peerage would not stir, or speak, or whisper, to
save constitutional royalty and ancient peerage for Hungary and for
Europe while it was yet possible; with what face, with what decency, can
Englishmen censure Kossuth for despairing of a cause, which was
abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the greatest power interested to
maintain it,--which the monarchs have waded through blood and perjury to
destroy,-and which the millions of Hungary will not (in his belief)
peril life and fortune to restore?
[Footnote *: How unanimous was the whole country, is clear by the facts
stated. How spontaneous was the movement, and free from all government
intrigue, see in Appendix I. This is entirely confirmed by our envoy,
Mr. Blackwell: Blue Book, March--Ap. 1848.]
2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on
opposite grounds,--because they _did_, and because they did
_not_, attempt to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts
are rather complicated, but deserve here to be stated concisely.
When the ministry was appointed, there were _already_ Hungarians in
Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese
ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without
encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making them
inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced to
content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that
the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight
against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not be
trusted, the Hungarian ministry _desired_ to get back their men
from Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet
has been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the
Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the
Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by
conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with which
the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on July 2d. A
part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II., and indeed it is a
loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry were
pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy by
the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards; and
that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if
assailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the
_principle_, that they were bound to assist, if able; but they
replied that Hungary itself must first be secured against marauders, and
no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same
time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to
the Lombards, and constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to
the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they
would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms
to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the
Italians had rejected them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret
orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to
Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their
liberality,)--then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians
unreasonable; yet they did not go beyond their abstract principle, that
Hungary ought to grant troops for Austrian defence in Italy, provided,
1st, that rebellion in Hungary itself were repressed; 2d, that the
troops should not act against the Italians, unless the Italians had
rejected the offer of national liberties and a constitution coordinate
to those of Hungary, under the Austrian crown.
The protocol on this subject was drawn on July 5th; the public speech of
Kossuth concerning it was not until July 22d; and in this short interval
the treachery of the dynasty had been so displayed, that Kossuth could
no longer speak in the same tone as a few weeks earlier. For a fuller
development of this, I refer the reader to Appendix III. The real object
of the Austrian ministry, was, to ruin the popularity of Bathyanyi and
Kossuth, if they could induce them to sacrifice Italian freedom; or
else, to accuse them to all the European diplomatists as conspirators
against the integrity of the Austrian empire, if they refused to oppress
the liberties of Italy.
Finally, the reader has even here proof enough how false is the
statement which has been current in English newspapers, that Kossuth's
visit to America was "a failure." This was an attempt to practise on our
prevalent disgraceful tendency to judge of a cause by its success.
However, the end is not yet seen: America has still to act decisively,
if she would win the lasting glory which we have despised, of rescuing
Law and Right from lawless force, and establishing the future of Europe.
CONTENTS.
1. Secrecy of Diplomacy
London, Oct. 30th, 1851.
2. Monarchy and Republicanism
Copenhagen House, London, Nov. 3d.
3. Communism and the Sibylline Books
Manchester, Nov. 12th.
4. Legitimacy of Hungarian Independence
Staten Island, Dec. 5th, 1851.
Declaration of Independence by the Hungarian Nation
5. Statement of Principles and Aims
New York, Dec. 6th.
6. Reply to the Baltimore Address
Dec. 10th.
7. Hereditary Policy of America
New York, to the Corporation, Dec. 11th.
8. On Nationalities
New York, to the Press.
9. On Military Institutions
New York, to the Militia, Dec. 16th.
10. Conditions essential for Democracy and Peace
New York, Tammany Hall, Dec. 17th.
11. Hungary and Austria in Religious Contrast
In a Brooklyn Church, New York, Dec. 18th.
12. Public Piracy of Russia
New York, to the Bar, Dec. 19th.
13. Claims of Hungary on the Female Sex
New York, to the Ladies, Dec. 21st.
14. Results of the Overthrow of the French Republic
Philadelphia, Dec. 26th.
15. Interest of America in Hungarian liberty
Baltimore, Dec. 27th.
16. Novelties in American Republicanism
Washington, Legislative Banquet, Jan. 15th, 1852.
17. On the Merits of Turkey
18. Aspects of America toward England
Washington, Jan. 8th, day of battle of New Orleans.
19. Meaning of Recognizing Hungarian Independence
Washington, last speech.
20. Contrast of the American to the Hungarian Crisis
Annapolis, Maryland, Jan. 13th, to the Senate.
21. Thanks for his great Success
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Jan. 14th, to the Legislature.
22. On the present Weakness of Despotism
Harrisburg, Legislative Banquet.
23. Agencies of Russian Ascendancy and Supremacy
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, Jan. 26th.
24. Reply to the Pittsburg Clergy
Jan. 26th.
25. Hungarian Loan
Cleveland, Ohio, Feb. 3d.
Address to Kossuth from the State Committee of Ohio
26. Panegyric of Ohio
Columbus, Ohio, Feb. 5th.
27. Democracy the Spirit of the Age
Columbus, Feb. 6th, to the Legislature.
28. The Miseries and the Strength of Hungary
Columbus, Feb. 7th.
29. Ohio and France Contrasted as Republics
Cincinnati, Ohio.
30. War a Providential Necessity against Oppression
Cincinnati.
31. On Washington's Policy
Cincinnati, Washington's Birthday, Feb. 24th.
32. Kossuth's Credentials
Cincinnati, Feb. 25th.
33. Harmony of the Executive and of the People in America
Indianapolis, at the State House, Feb 27th.
34. Importance of Foreign Policy and of strengthening England
Louisville, March 6th, at the Court House.
35. Catholicism _versus_ Jesuitism
St. Louis, Missouri.
36. The Ides of March
St. Louis, March 15th.
37. History of Kossuth's Liberation
Jackson, Mississippi, April 1st, address to the Governor.
38. Pronouncement of the South
Mobile, Alabama, April 3d.
39. Kossuth's Defence against certain Mean Imputations
Jersey City, April 20th.
40. The Brotherhood of Nations
Newark, New Jersey, April 22d.
41. The History and Heart of Massachusetts
Worcester, Massachusetts, April 25th.
42. Panegyric of Massachusetts
Faneuil Hall, Boston, April 29th.
43. Self-Government of Hungary
Faneuil Hall, Legislative Banquet. April 30th.
44. Russia the Antagonist of the U. S.
Salem, May 6th.
45. The Martyrs of the American Revolution
Lexington, May 11th.
46. Condition of Europe
Faneuil Hall, Boston, May 14th.
47. Pronouncement of all the States
Albany, May 20th.
48. Sound and Unsound Commerce
Buffalo, May 27th.
49. Russia and the Balance of Power
Syracuse, June 4th.
50. Retrospect and Prospect
Utica, June 9th.
51. The Triple Bond
New York, June 22d.
52. The Future of Nations
New York.
APPENDICES
KOSSUTH'S SPEECHES.
[The speeches of Kossuth in England, though masterly in themselves, are
in great measure superseded by those which he delivered in America,
where the same subjects were treated at far greater length, and viewed
from many different aspects. From the speeches in England I here present
only three topics, in a rather fragmentary form.]
I.--SECRECY OF DIPLOMACY.
[_First Extract: from Kossuth's Speech at the Guildhall, London, Oct.
30th_, 1851.]
The time draws near, when a radical change must take place for the whole
world in the management of diplomacy. Its basis has been secrecy:
therein is the triumph of absolutism, and the misfortune of a free
people. This has won its way not in England only, but throughout the
whole world, even where not a penny of the national property can be
disposed of without public consent. It surely is dangerous to the
interests of the country and to constitutional liberty, to allow such a
secrecy, that the people not only should not know how its interests are
being dealt with, but that after the crisis is passed, the minister
should inform them: "The dinner has been prepared,--and eaten; and the
people has nothing to do, but digest the consequences." What is the
principle of all evil in Europe? The encroaching spirit of Russia.--And
by what power has Russia become so mighty? By its arms?--No: the arms
of Russia are below those of many Powers. It has become almost
omnipotent,--at least very dangerous to liberty,--by diplomatic
intrigues. Now against the secret intrigues of diplomacy there is no
surer safeguard, or more powerful counteraction, than public discussion.
This must be opposed to intrigues, and intrigues are then of no weight
in the destinies of humanity.
* * * * *
[_Second Extract from a Short Speech in London, May 25th, 1858_.]
I must ask leave to make a remark on the system pursued by your
Government in their Foreign relations. You consider yourselves a
constitutional nation: I fear that in some respects you are not so.
There is a Latin proverb [current in Hungary], _Nil de nobis sine
nobis_,--"nothing that concerns us, without us." This in many things
you make your maxim. You say that none of your money shall be spent
without your knowledge and approval; and in your internal affairs you
carry this out; but I think that the secrecy in which the transactions
of your diplomacy are involved is hardly constitutional. Of that most
important portion of your affairs which concerns your country in its
relations with the rest of Europe, what knowledge have you? If any
interpellation is made about any affair not yet concluded, my Lord the
Secretary of the Foreign Office will reply that _he cannot give any
answer, for the negotiations are still pending_. A little later he
will be able to answer, that _as all is now concluded, all comment
will be superfluous_.
One little fact I will just mention. By the last treaty with Denmark, to
which you became a party, the crown of that kingdom was so settled that
only three lives stand between it and the Czar of Russia. Three lives!
but a fragile barrier, when high political aims are concerned. It is
therefore an allowed fact, that the country which commands entrance to
the Baltic, and which, in the hands of an unfriendly power, would
effectually exclude your commerce from that sea, may pass into the hands
of Russia, whose pretensions in the south of Europe you take so much
pains to check. This your government have done quietly. How many are
there of your people that know and approve it? I hope you will not be
offended, if I say, that I cannot understand how yours can be called in
this respect a constitutional country.
* * * * *
II.--MONARCHY AND REPUBLICANISM.
[_From Kossuth's Speech at Copenhagen House, Nov. 3d, 1851_.]
In my opinion, the form of Government may be different in different
countries, according to their circumstances, their wishes, their wants.
England loves her Queen, and has full motive to do so. England feels
great, glorious and free, and has full reason to feel so. But the fact
of England being a monarchy cannot be sufficient reason for her to hate
and discredit republican forms of government in other countries
differing in circumstances, in wishes, and in wants. On the other side,
to the United States of America, which under republican government are
likewise great, glorious, and free, their republicanism gives no
sufficient reason to hate and discredit monarchical government in
England. It entirely belongs to the right of every nation to dispose of
its domestic concerns. Therefore I claim for my own country also, that
England, seeing from our past that our cause is just, should profess the
sovereign right of every nation to dispose of itself, and should allow
no power whatever to interfere with our domestic matters. Since I thus
regard the internal affairs of every nation to be its own separate
concern, I did not think it became me here in England to speak about the
future organization of our country.
But my behavior has not been everywhere appreciated as I hoped. I have
met in certain quarters the remark that I "am slippery, and evade the
question." Now on the point of sincerity I am particularly susceptible.
I have the sentiment of being a straightforward man, and I would not be
charged with having stolen into the sympathies of England without
displaying my true colours. Therefore I must clearly state, that in our
past struggle it was NOT _we_ who made a revolution. We began
peacefully and legislatively to transform the monarchico-aristocratical
constitution of Hungary into a monarchico-democratical constitution. We
preserved our municipal institutions, as our most valuable treasure; but
to them, as well as to the legislative power, we gave, as basis, the
common liberty of the people, instead of the class-privileges of old.
Moreover, in place of the old Board of Council,--which, being a
corporate body, was of course a mockery in regard to that responsibility
of the Executive, which was our chartered right on paper,--we
established the real and personal responsibility of ministers. In this,
we merely[*] upheld what was due to us by constitution, by treaties, by
the coronation-oath of every king,--the right to be "governed as a
self-consistent, independent country, by our native institutions,
according to our own laws." This and all our other reforms we effected
peacefully by careful legislation, which the King sanctioned and swore
to maintain.
[Footnote *: Many Englishmen have unjustly accused the Hungarians as
having by the laws of March, 1848, effected a SEPARATION of Hungary from
Austria. _Even if this were true_, it could not justify the cause
of the Hapsburgs. The dynasty yielded, under the pressure of
circumstances (as alone will dynasties ever yield), while Hungary did
but petition legally, and was in fact unarmed. The dynasty swore to the
new laws; and then conspired with Croatians, Serbians, and Russians to
overthrow the laws by marauding and force of arms. In fact, if in
January, 1849, Austria would have negotiated, instead of arresting all
Hungarian ambassadors, Hungary would have consented to modify the laws
of March: but the Austrians had already in October ordered the overthrow
of the whole Hungarian constitution, and had no wish to do anything by
legal methods.
At the same time, the original objection is fundamentally _false_.
No separation of the two countries was effected by the laws of March,
1848; for no legal union ever existed. Only the crowns were united, not
the countries. Kossuth rightly compares the union to that which was
between England and Hanover. At any time in the past, Hungary might have
made _peace_ with a power with which Austria was at _war_, if
the Kings had not falsified their oath by not assembling the Diet: for
the Diet always had the lawful right of War and Peace. Any mode
whatsoever of enforcing the Coronation oath, might, according to this
logic, be condemned as a "separating" of Austria and Hungary.]
Nevertheless, this very dynasty, in the most perjurious manner, attacked
these laws, this freedom, this constitution, by arms. We defended
ourselves by arms victoriously. When upon this the perjurious dynasty
called in the Russian armies to beat us down, we of course declared the
Hapsburgs to be no longer our sovereigns. We avowed ourselves to be a
free and independent nation, but fixed as yet no definite form of
government,--neither monarchical nor republican. These are plain facts.
Hungary is not now under lawful government, but is being trampled down
by a foreign intruder who is _not_ King of Hungary, being
_neither acknowledged by the nation, nor sanctioned by law_.
Hungary is, in a word, in a state of WAR against the Hapsburg dynasty, a
war of legitimate defence, by which alone it can ever regain
independence and freedom. By such war alone has any nation ever won its
freedom from oppressors; as you see in Switzerland, Belgium, Spain,
Portugal, France, Sweden, Norway, Greece, the United States, and England
itself.
I can state it, as known to me, with the certainty of matter of fact,
that Hungary will never accept the Hapsburgs as legitimate sovereigns in
the future, nor ever enter into any new moral relations with that
perjurious family. Nor only so; but their perjury has so entirely
plucked out of my nation's heart all faith in monarchy and all
attachment to it, that there is no power on earth to knit the broken tie
again: and therefore Hungary wishes and wills to be a free and
independent republic,--a republic founded on the rule of law, securing
social order, guaranteeing person, property, the moral development as
well as material welfare of the people,--in a word, a republic like that
of the United States, founded on institutions inherited from England
itself. This is the conviction of my people, which I share in the very
heart of my heart.
* * * * *
III.--COMMUNISM AND THE SIBYLLINE BOOKS.
[_From Kossuth's Second Speech at Manchester, Nov. 12th_, 1851.]
I can understand Communism, but not Socialism. I have read many books on
the subject, I have consulted many doctors; but they differ so much that
I never could understand what they really mean. However, the only sense
which I can see in socialism, is inconsistent with social order and the
security of property.