Freedom's Battle - Mahatma Gandhi
Non-co-operation is not a movement of brag, bluster, or bluff. It is a
test of our sincerity. It requires solid and silent self-sacrifice. It
challenges our honesty and our capacity for national work. It is a
movement that aims at translating ideas into action. And the more we do,
the more we find that much more must be done than we have expected. And
this thought of our imperfection must make us humble.
A non-co-operationist strives to compel attention and to set an example
not by his violence but by his unobtrusive humility. He allows his solid
action to speak for his creed. His strength lies in his reliance upon
the correctness of his position. And the conviction of it grows most in
his opponent when he least interposes his speech between his action and
his opponent. Speech, especially when it is haughty, betrays want of
confidence and it makes one's opponent sceptical about the reality of
the act itself. Humility therefore is the key to quick success. I hope
that every non-co-operationist will recognise the necessity of being
humble and self-restrained. It is because so little is really required
to be done because all of that little depends entirely upon ourselves
that I have ventured the belief that Swaraj is attainable in less
than one year.
SOME QUESTIONS ANSWERED
"I write to thank you for yours of the 7th instant and especially for
your request that I should after reading your writings in "Young India"
on non-co-operation, give a full and frank criticism of them. I know
that your sole desire is to find out the truth and to act accordingly,
and hence I venture to make the following remarks. In the issue of May
5th you say that non-co-operation is "not even anti-Government." But
surely to refuse to have anything to do with the Government to the
extent of not serving it and of not paying its taxes is actually, if not
theoretically anti-Government; and such a course must ultimately make
all Government impossible. Again, you say, "It is the inherent right of
a subject to refuse to assist a government that will not listen to him."
Leaving aside the question of the ethical soundness of this
proposition, may I ask which Government, in the present case? Has not
the Indian Government done all it possibly can in the matter? Then if
its attempts to voice the request of India should fail, would it be fair
and just to do anything against it? Would not the proper course be
non-co-operation with the Supreme Council of the Allies, including Great
Britain, if it be found that the latter has failed properly to support
the demand of the Indian Government and people? It seems to me that in
all your writings and speeches you forget that in the present question
both Government and people are as one, and if they fail to get what they
justly want, how does the question of non-co-operation arise? Hindus
and Englishmen and the Government are all at present "shouldering in a
full-hearted manner the burden that Muhomedans of India are carrying
etc. etc." But supposing we fail of our object--what then? Are we all to
refuse to co-operate and with whom?
Might I recommend the consideration of the following course of conduct?
(1) "Wait and see" what the actual terms of the Treaty with Turkey are?
(2) If they are not in accordance with the aspirations and
recommendations of the Government and the people of India, the every
legitimate effort should be made to have the terms revised.
(3) To the bitter end, co-operate with a Government that co-operates
with us, and only when it refuses co-operation, go in for
non-co-operation.
So far I personally see no reason whatsoever for non-co-operation with
the Indian Government, and till it fails to voice the needs and demands
of India as a whole there can be no reason. The Indian Government does
some times make mistakes, but in the Khilafat matter it is sound and
therefore deserves or ought to have the sympathetic and whole-hearted
co-operation of every one in India. I hope that you will kindly consider
the above and perhaps you will be able to find time for a reply in
_Young India_."
I gladly make room for the above letter and respond to the suggestion
to give a public reply as no doubt the difficulty experienced by the
English friend is experienced by many. Causes are generally lost, not
owing to the determined opposition of men who will not see the truth as
they want to perpetuate an injustice but because they are able to enlist
in their favour the allegiance of those who are anxious to understand a
particular cause and take sides after mature judgment. It is only by
patient argument with such honest men that one is able to check oneself,
correct one's own errors of judgment and at times to wean them from
their error and bring them over to one's side. This Khilafat question is
specially difficult because there are so many side-issues. It is
therefore no wonder that many have more or less difficulty in making up
their minds. It is further complicated because the painful necessity for
some direct action has arisen in connection with it. But whatever the
difficulty, I am convinced that there is no question so important as
this one if we want harmony and peace in India.
My friend objects to my statement that non-co-operation is not
anti-Government, because he considers that refusal to serve it and pay
its taxes is actually anti-Government. I respectfully dissent from the
view. If a brother has fundamental differences with his brother, and
association with the latter involves his partaking of what in his
opinion is an injustice. I hold that it is brotherly duty to refrain
from serving his brother and sharing his earnings with him. This happens
in everyday life. Prahalad did not act against his father, when he
declined to associate himself with the latter's blasphemies. Nor was
Jesus anti-Jewish when he declaimed against the Pharisees and the
hypocrites, and would have none of them. In such matters, is it not
intention that determines the character of a particular act? It is
hardly correct as the friend suggests that withdrawal of association
under general circumstances would make all government impossible. But it
is true that such withdrawal would make all injustice impossible.
My correspondent considers that the Government of India having done all
it possibly could, non-co-operation could not be applicable to that
Government. In my opinion, whilst it is true that the Government of
India has done a great deal, it has not done half as much as it might
have done, and might even now do. No Government can absolve itself from
further action beyond protesting, when it realises that the people whom
it represents feel as keenly as do lakhs of Indian Mussalmans in the
Khilafat question. No amount of sympathy with a starving man can possibly
avail. He must have bread or he dies, and what is wanted at that
critical moment is some exertion to fetch the wherewithal to feed the
dying man. The Government of India can to-day heed the agitation and
ask, to the point of insistence for full vindication of the pledged word
of a British Minister. Has the Government of India resigned by way of
protest against the threatened, shameful betrayal of trust on the part
of Mr. Lloyd George? Why does the Government of India hide itself behind
secret despatches? At a less critical moment Lord Hardiage committed a
constitutional indiscretion, openly sympathised with South African
Passive Resistance movement and stemmed the surging tide of public
indignation in India, though at the same time he incurred the wrath of
the then South African Cabinet and some public men in Great Britain.
After all, the utmost that the Government of India has done is on its
own showing to transmit and press the Mahomedan claim. Was that not the
least it could have done? Could it have done anything less without
covering itself with disgrace? What Indian Mahomedans and the Indian
public expect the Government of India to do at this critical juncture is
not the least, but the utmost that it could do. Viceroys have been known
to tender resignations for much smaller causes. Wounded pride brought
forth not very long ago the resignation of a Lieutenant Governor. On the
Khilafat question, a sacred cause dear to the hearts of several million
Mahomedans is in danger of being wounded. I would therefore invite the
English friend, and every Englishman in India, and every Hindu, be he
moderate or extremist, to make common cause with the Mahomedans and
thereby compel the Government of India to do its duty, and thereby
compel His Majesty's Ministers to do theirs.
There has been much talk of violence ensuing from active
non-co-operation. I venture to suggest that the Mussalmans of India, if
they had nothing in the shape of non-co-operation in view, would have
long ago yielded to counsels of despair. I admit that non-co-operation
is not unattended with danger. But violence is a certainty without,
violence is only a possibility with non-co-operation. And it will he a
greater possibility if all the important men, English, Hindu and others
of the country discountenance it.
I think, that the recommendation made by the friend is being literally
followed by the Mahomedans. Although they practically know the fate,
they are waiting for the actual terms of the treaty with Turkey. They
are certainly going to try every means at their disposal to have the
terms revised before beginning non-co-operation. And there will
certainly be no non-co-operation commenced so long as there is even hope
of active co-operation on the part of the Government of India with the
Mahomedans, that is, co-operation strong enough to secure a revision of
the terms should they be found to be in conflict with the pledges of
British statesmen. But if all these things fail, can Mahomedans as men
of honour who hold their religion dearer than their lives do anything
less than wash their hands clean of the guilt of British Ministers and
the Government of India by refusing to co-operate with them? And can
Hindus and Englishmen, if they value Mahomedan friendship, and if they
admit then full justice of the Mahomaden friendship and if they admit
the full justice of the Mahomedan claim do otherwise than heartily
support the Mahomedans by word and deed.
PLEDGES BROKEN
After the forgoing was printed the long-expected peace terms regarding
Turkey were received. In my humble opinion they are humiliating to the
Supreme Council, to the British ministers, and if as a Hindu with deep
reverence for Christianity I may say so, a denial of Christ's teachings.
Turkey broken down and torn with dissentions within may submit to the
arrogant disposal of herself, and Indian Mahomedans may out of fear do
likewise. Hindus out of fear, apathy or want of appreciation of the
situation, may refuse to help their Mahomedan brethren in their hour of
peril. The fact remains that a solemn promise of the Prime Minister of
England has been wantonly broken. I will say nothing about President
Wilson's fourteen points, for they seem now to be entirely forgotten as
a day's wonder. It is a matter of deep sorrow that the Government of
India _communique_ offers a defence of the terms, calls them a
fulfilment of Mr. Lloyd George's pledge of 5th January 1918 and yet
apologises for their defective nature and appeals to the Mahomedans of
India as if to mock them that they would accept the terms with quiet
resignation. The mask that veils the hypocrisy is too thin to deceive
anybody. It would have been dignified if the _communique_ had boldly
admitted Mr. Lloyd George's mistake in having made the promise referred
to. As it is, the claim of fulfilment of the promise only adds to the
irritation caused by its glaring breach. What is the use of the Viceroy
saying, "The question of the Khilafat is one for the Mahomedans and
Mahomedans only and that with their free choice in the matter Government
have no desire to interfere," while the Khalif's dominions are
ruthlessly dismembered, his control of the Holy places of Islam
shamelessly taken away from him and he himself reduced to utter
impotence in his own palace which can no longer be called a palace but
which can he more fitly described us a prison? No wonder, His Excellency
fears that the peace includes "terms which must be painful to all
Moslems." Why should he insult Muslim intelligence by sending the
Mussalmans of India a of encouragement and sympathy? Are they expected
to find encouragement in the cruel recital of the arrogant terms or in a
remembrance of 'the splendid response' made by them to the call of the
King 'in the day of the Empire's need.' It ill becomes His Excellency to
talk of the triumph of those ideals of justice and humanity for which
the Allies fought. Indeed, the terms of the so called peace with Turkey
if they are to last, will be a monument of human arrogance and man-made
injustice. To attempt to crush the spirit of a brave and gallant race,
because it has lost in the fortunes of war, is a triumph not of humanity
but a demonstration of inhumanity. And if Turkey enjoyed the closest
ties of friendship with Great Britain before the war, Great Britain has
certainly made ample reparation for her mistake by having made the
largest contribution to the humiliation of Turkey. It is insufferable
therefore when the Viceroy feels confident that with the conclusion of
this new treaty that friendship will quickly take life again and a
Turkey regenerate full of hope and strength, will stand forth in the
future as in the past a pillar of the Islamic faith. The Viceregal
message audaciously concludes, "This thought will I trust strengthen you
to accept the peace terms with resignation, courage and fortitude and to
keep your loyalty towards the Crown bright and untarnished as it has
been for so many generations." If Muslim loyalty remains untarnished it
will certainly not be for want of effort on the part of the Government
of India to put the heaviest strain upon it, but it will remain so
because the Mahomedans realise their own strength--the strength in the
knowledge that their cause is just and that they have got the power to
vindicate justice in spite of the aberration suffered by Great Britain
under a Prime Minister whom continued power has made as reckless in
making promises as in breaking them.
Whilst therefore I admit that there is nothing either in the peace terms
or in the Viceregal message covering them to inspire the Mahomedans and
Indians in general with confidence or hope, I venture to suggest that
there is no cause for despair and anger. Now is the time for Mahomedans
to retain absolute self-control, to unite their forces and, weak though
they are, with firm faith in God to carry on the struggle with redoubled
vigour till justice is done. If India--both Hindu and Mahomedan--can act
as one man and can withdraw her partnership in this crime against
humanity which the peace terms represent, she will soon secure a
revision of the treaty and give herself and the Empire at least, if not
the world, a lasting peace. There is no doubt that the struggle would be
bitter sharp and possibly prolonged, but it is worth all the sacrifice
that it is likely to call forth. Both the Mussalmans and the Hindus are
on their trial. Is the humiliation of the Khilafat a matter of concern
to the former? And if it is, are they prepared to exercise restraint,
religiously refrain from violence and practise non-co-operation without
counting the material loss it may entail upon the community? Do the
Hindus honestly feel for their Mahomedan brethren to the extent of
sharing their sufferings to the fullest extent? The answer to these
questions and not the peace terms, will finally decide the fate of
the Khilafat.
MORE OBJECTIONS ANSWERED
_Swadeshmitran_ is one of the most influential Tamil dailies of Madras.
It is widely read. Everything appearing in its columns is entitled to
respect. The Editor has suggested some practical difficulty in the way
of non-co-operation. I would therefore like, to the best of my ability,
to deal with them.
I do not know where the information has been derived from that I have
given up the last two stages of non-co-operation. What I have said is
that they are a distant goal. I abide by it. I admit that all the stages
are fraught with some danger, but the last two are fraught with the
greatest--the last most of all. The stages have been fixed with a view
to running the least possible risk. The last two stages will not be
taken up unless the committee has attained sufficient control over the
people to warrant the beliefs that the laying down of arms or suspension
of taxes will, humanly speaking, be free from an outbreak of violence on
the part of the people. I do entertain the belief that it is possible
for the people to attain the discipline necessary for taking the two
steps. When once they realise that violence is totally unnecessary to
bend an unwilling government to their will and that the result can be
obtained with certainty by dignified non-co-operation, they will cease
to think of violence even by way of retaliation. The fact is that
hitherto we have not attempted to take concerted and disciplined action
from the masses. Some day, if we are to become truly a self-governing
nation, that attempt has to be made. The present, in my opinion, is a
propitious movement. Every Indian feels the insult to the Punjab as a
personal wrong, every Mussalman resents the wrong done to the Khilafat.
There is therefore a favourable atmosphere for expecting cohesive and
restrained movement on the part of the masses.
So far as response is concerned, I agree with the Editor that the
quickest and the largest response is to be expected in the matter of
suspension of payment of taxes, but as I have said so long as the masses
are not educated to appreciate the value of non-violence even whilst
their holding are being sold, so long must it be difficult to take up
the last stage into any appreciable extent.
I agree too that a sudden withdrawal of the military and the police will
be a disaster if we have not acquired the ability to protect ourselves
against robbers and thieves. But I suggest that when we are ready to
call out the military and the police on an extensive scale we would find
ourselves in a position to defend ourselves. If the police and the
military resign from patriotic motives, I would certainly expect them to
perform the same duty as national volunteers, not has hirelings but as
willing protectors of the life and liberty of their countrymen. The
movement of non-co-operation is one of automatic adjustment. If the
Government schools are emptied, I would certainly expect national
schools to come into being. If the lawyers as a whole suspended
practice, they would devise arbitration courts and the nation will have
expeditions and cheaper method of setting private disputes and awarding
punishment to the wrong-doer. I may add that the Khilafat Committee is
fully alive to the difficulty of the task and is taking all the
necessary steps to meet the contingencies as they arise.
Regarding the leaving of civil employment, no danger is feared, because
no one will leave his employment, unless he is in a position to find
support for himself and family either through friends or otherwise.
Disapproval of the proposed withdrawal of students betrays, in my
humble opinion, lack of appreciation of the true nature of
non-co-operation. It is true enough that we pay the money wherewith our
children are educated. But, when the agency imparting the education has
become corrupt, we may not employ it without partaking of the agents,
corruption. When students leave schools or colleges I hardly imagine
that the teachers will fail to perceive the advisability of themselves
resigning. But even if they do not, money can hardly be allowed to count
where honour or religion are at the stake.
As to the boycott of the councils, it is not the entry of the Moderates
or any other persons that matters so much as the entry of those who
believe in non-co-operation. You may not co-operate at the top and
non-co-operate at the bottom. A councillor cannot remain in the council
and ask the _gumasta_ who cleans the council-table to resign.
MR. PENNINGTON'S OBJECTIONS ANSWERED
I gladly publish Mr. Pennington's letter with its enclosure just as I
have received them. Evidently Mr. Pennington is not a regular reader of
'Young India,' or he would have noticed that no one has condemned mob
outrages more than I have. He seems to think that the article he has
objected to was the only thing I have ever written on General Dyer. He
does not seem to know that I have endeavoured with the utmost
impartiality to examine the Jallianwala massacre. And he can see any day
all the proof adduced by my fellow-commissioners and myself in support
of our findings on the massacre. The ordinary readers of 'Young India'
knew all the facts and therefore it was unnecessary for me to support my
assertion otherwise. But unfortunately Mr. Pennington represents the
typical Englishman. He does not want to be unjust, nevertheless he is
rarely just in his appreciation of world events because he has no time
to study them except cursorily and that through a press whose business
is to air only party views. The average Englishman therefore except in
parochial matters is perhaps the least informed though he claims to be
well-informed about every variety of interest. Mr. Pennington's
ignorance is thus typical of the others and affords the best reason for
securing control of our own affairs in our own hands. Ability will come
with use and not by waiting to be trained by those whose natural
interest is to prolong the period of tutelage as much as possible.
But to return to Mr. Pennington's letter he complains that there has
been no 'proper trial of any one.' The fault is not ours. India has
consistently and insistently demanded a trial of all the officers
concerned in the crimes against the Punjab.
He next objects to be 'violence' of my language. If truth is violent, I
plead guilty to the charge of violence of language. But I could not,
without doing violence to truth, refrain from using the language, I
have, regarding General Dyer's action. It has been proved out of his own
mouth or hostile witnesses:
(1) That the crowd was unarmed.
(2) That it contained children.
(3) That the 13th was the day of Vaisakhi fair.
(4) That thousands had come to the fair.
(5) That there was no rebellion.
(6) That during the intervening two days before the 'massacre' there was
peace in Amritsar.
(7) That the proclamation of the meeting was made the same day as
General Dyer's proclamation.
(8) That General Dyer's proclamation prohibited not meetings but
processions or gatherings of four men on the streets and not in private
or public places.
(9) That General Dyer ran no risk whether outside or inside the city.
(10) That he admitted himself that many in the crowd did not know
anything of his proclamation.
(11) That he fired without warning the crowd and even after it had
begun to disperse. He fired on the backs of the people who were
in flight.
(12) That the men were practically penned in an enclosure.
In the face of these admitted facts I do call the deed a 'massacre.' The
action amounted not to 'an error of judgment' but its 'paralysis in the
face of fancied danger.'
I am sorry to have to say that Mr. Pennington's notes, which too the
reader will find published elsewhere, betray as much ignorance as
his letter.
Whatever was adopted on paper in the days of Canning was certainly not
translated into action in its full sense. 'Promises made to the ear were
broken to the hope,' was said by a reactionary Viceroy. Military
expenditure has grown enormously since the days of Canning.
The demonstration in favour of General Dyer is practically a myth.
No trace was found of the so-called Danda Fauj dignified by the name of
bludgeon-army by Mr. Pennington. There was no rebel army in Amritsar.
The crown that committed the horrible murders and incendiarism contained
no one community exclusively. The sheet was found posted only in Lahore
and not in Amritsar. Mr. Pennington should moreover have known by this
time that the meeting held on the 13th was held, among other things, for
the purpose of condemning mob excesses. This was brought out at the
Amritsar trial. Those who surrounded him could not stop General Dyer. He
says he made up his mind to shoot in a moment. He consulted nobody. When
the correspondent says that the troops would have objected to being
concerned in 'what might in that case be not unfairly called a
'massacre,' he writes as if he had never lived in India. I wish the
Indian troops had the moral courage to refuse to shoot innocent, unarmed
men in full flight. But the Indian troops have been brought in too
slavish an atmosphere to dare do any such correct act.
I hope Mr. Pennington will not accuse me again of making unverified
assertions because I have not quoted from the books. The evidence is
there for him to use. I can only assure him that the assertions are
based on positive proofs mostly obtained from official sources.