Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and
aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the
English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these
endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in
the Austro-Servian disagreement.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]
The Russian Government submitted an official communique on July 24th,
according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the
Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count
Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared
again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary
had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After
the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not
claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of
the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]
The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in
the evening.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]
The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were
instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian
mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also
directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:
"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
"But mobilization means war.
"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We
cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.
Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian
kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an
attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of
Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does
not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further
development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]
On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the
German military attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had
been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse
mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian
frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev,
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those
situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw.
Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against
Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his
shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then
pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as
extremely menacing also for Germany.
In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a
rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the
German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state
of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the
strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.
On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory
measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and
returned to its garrison.
In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most
emphatic steps.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]
On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the
differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the
Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We
declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we
approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not
call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered
upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]
Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the
Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely
Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between
Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an
understanding between these two powers.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]
We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference
idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in
which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian
reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further
negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full
appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities
having already been opened.
In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised
Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the
monarchy.
Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military
preparations of Russia and France.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in
Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time
further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military
preparations of France, both on water and on land.
On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an
interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he
reported by telegraph, as follows:
"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government
to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce
Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the
sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the
conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided
upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas
appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia
now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same
which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia,
i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised
to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial
aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in
war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with
Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return
to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian
affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European
conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the
magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia
could not now be deserted by Russia".
On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the
following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff
of the Russian army:
"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he
has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been
requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that
everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days
ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of
honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a
mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the
present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a
guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts
directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the
calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in
Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed
me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that
such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm
might have been given.
"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to
the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant
and positive information about the calling in of reserves."
In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening
attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that
Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed
on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with
Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister
the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and
to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss
with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian
relations.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]
Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported
every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of
a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of
July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for
negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in
Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would
accept this basis.
During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed
and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization.
Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration
of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west
frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in
full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were
denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.
Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German
mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St.
Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered
a general mobilization.
[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]
During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser,
and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called
the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian
mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.
On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty
the Kaiser:
"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope
that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible
to discontinue our military preparations which have been made
necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want
war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia
continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You
my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of
God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the
welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
"Your cordially devoted
"Nicolas."
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the
Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:
"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I
have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government
of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops
were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I
have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive
reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my
eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country
forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit
of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of
the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the
misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests
in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of
Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my
grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I
have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction,
especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be
preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military
preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."
Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all
the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered
during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing.
Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that
same afternoon.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]
After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the
Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of
July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the
state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the
Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia
did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary
within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to
demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether
it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.
The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the
security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the
European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness
of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a
doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that
Russia wanted war.
The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M.
Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.
The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.
Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to
H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:
"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to
mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which
I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and
that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two
countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.
With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship
to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your
urgent reply."
To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:
"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your
Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my
Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I
therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear
and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid
endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great
grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit,
under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a
reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the
entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the
event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within
the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a
state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a
confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is
to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon
on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops
crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.
Thus Russia began the war against us.
Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the
French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]
The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on
August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of
France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do
that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the
mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.
On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.
THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.
Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.
"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna
made the following statement, by order of his Government:
"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation
established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the
decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art.
25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Servia
binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which she
has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies
towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in
friendly and neighborly relations.
"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of
June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in
Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes
of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the
territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of
assassinations and murders.
"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration
of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to
suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various
societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled
language of the press, the glorification of the originators of
assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in
subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public
education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead
the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its
institutions.
"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself
guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th
demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such
sufferance.
"_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal
authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was
conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs
with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who
belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of
the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by
leading Servian frontier officials._
"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and
Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it
has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre
in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the
monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and
Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a
permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.
"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is
forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it
condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the
entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the
monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with
all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal
Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ
of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:
"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against
Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is
to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging
thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these
criminal actions.
"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have
thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal
Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March
31st, 1909.
"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or
every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any
part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically
to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire
population of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with the
utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to
prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."
"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of
the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be
published in the official organ of the Army.
"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:
"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt
for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is
directed against the latters territorial integrity;
"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna
Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed
in the same manner against the other societies and associations in
Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures,
so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under
another name or in another form;
"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so
far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are
concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda
against Austria-Hungary;
"4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all
officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material
which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the
Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the
Royal Government;
"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal
Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against
the territorial integrity of the monarchy;
"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the
conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials,
delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the
examinations;
"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic
and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been
compromised through the result of the investigation;
"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the
Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the
frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who
assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the
frontier;
"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard
to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and
abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to
express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against
Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;
"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal
Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir
concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they
concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note."
ENCLOSURE.
The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in
the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has,
so far, yielded the following results: