Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly
indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary
has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete
isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest
therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all
possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support
by ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of the
conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried
out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the
preservation of the peace of Europe.
Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia
the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as
allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. We
shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear
consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will
bring upon the peoples of Europe.
EXHIBIT 3.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
24th 1914.
Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge d'affaires in
order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point
of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical
development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy
entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would
not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant
as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of
circumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued
amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring
about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge
d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took
the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to
submit it immediately to Sasonow.
EXHIBIT 4.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
on July 24th 1914.
I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview
with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusations
toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most
positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the
Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties
concerned.
EXHIBIT 5.
The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of
July 26th 1914.
The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow
this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told
me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had
no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers,
greatly pacified the Secretary.
EXHIBIT 6.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
on July 25th 1914.
Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp
to the Czar).
The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The
manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day
to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there
obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the
impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria
are being made.
EXHIBIT 7.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
on July 26th 1914.
The military attache requests the following message to be sent to the
general staff:
I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and
Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.
EXHIBIT 8.
Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July
27th 1914.
Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.
(Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_.)
EXHIBIT 9.
Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July
27th 1914.
Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued
manoeuvres.
EXHIBIT 10.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent.
July 26th 1914.
Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly
that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not
touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish
peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for
several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is
equivalent to mobilization.[186] If this news proves correct, we shall
be forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire
to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains
unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all
possible emphasis.
[Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i.e. also
against us.]
EXHIBIT 10a.
Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris.
July 26th 1914.
After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no
intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the
Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely
with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon
France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of
the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St.
Petersburg in favour of peace.
EXHIBIT 10b.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
on July 26th, 1914.
After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial
dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the
peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia.
We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten
seriously the peace of Europe.
EXHIBIT 11.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
on July 27th, 1914.
Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:
Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The
Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order to
mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being
made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed
the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward
Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under
no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St.
Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry
into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his
shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we
appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even
against Austria as very menacing.
EXHIBIT 12.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
27th, 1914.
We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a
quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our
ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our
mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.
EXHIBIT 13.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
25th, 1914.
The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an
Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to
interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take
the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all
powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that
Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and
the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an
Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies,
to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.
EXHIBIT 14.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
on July 28th, 1914.
We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a
manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of
war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.
EXHIBIT 15.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July
27th, 1914.
We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as
desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count
Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna.
EXHIBIT 16.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
28th, 1914.
Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for
the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however,
that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent
declaration of war, the step appears belated.
EXHIBIT 17.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July
29th, 1914.
News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from
hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French
Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth
counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening
state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a
call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be
aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.
EXHIBIT 18.
Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser
on July 30th, 1914.
Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's
telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a
telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has
made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against
Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty
that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he
could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the
measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization
against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local
war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility
rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had
no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized
against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an
immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany
one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not
desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I
told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be
mobilized.
EXHIBIT 19.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July
31st, 1914.
We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary
through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser
and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward
Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been
greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of
pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against
us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.
EXHIBIT 20.
I. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 28th, 10.45 p.m.
I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused
by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous
agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the
revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim.
The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his
consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me
that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a
common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this
horrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment.
On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by
You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of
the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with
firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to
obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all
difficulties which may yet arise.
Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 21.
II. The Czar to His Majesty.
Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.
I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You
earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a
weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is
tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the
pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures
which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would
be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power
to restrain Your ally from going too far.
signed: Nicolas.
EXHIBIT 22.
III. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 29th, 6.30 p.m.
I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
conservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my first
telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious
war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia
as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.
According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of
Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am
strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that
Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I
am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into
the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct
understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and
Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my
Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military
measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by
Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to
avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your
appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 23.
IV. His Majesty to the Czar.
July 30th, 1 a.m.
My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I
have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has
mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia,
as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your
Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator
with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I
have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made
impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders,
You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.
signed: Wilhelm.
EXHIBIT 23a.
V. The Czar to His Majesty.
Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.
I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night
Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The
military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and
for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope
with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner
Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your
strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at
with us.
Nicolas.
EXHIBIT 24.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.
In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this
hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her
entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian
measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim
the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization.
Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every
measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours
and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at
once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.
EXHIBIT 25.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July
31st, 1914. Urgent.
Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore
also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have
therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be
followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all
measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies
war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral
in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour
of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.
EXHIBIT 26.
Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg
on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.
If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand,
Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock
(mid-European time) the following statement:
"Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la
mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avail
ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur
d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un
role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg,
lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la
mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer.
"A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun preparatif
militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva
vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut
manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite et
l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand
se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de
toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes
militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et
ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait dirigee contre
l'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir
a Votre Excellence ce qui suit:
"Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire releve
le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie."
Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by
Russian time.
Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to
the American Embassy.
EXHIBIT 27.
Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August
1st 1.05 p. m.
Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in
the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France
would do that which her interests dictated.
APPENDIX II
EXTRACTS FROM
SIR EDWARD GREY'S
CORRESPONDENCE
RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN
CRISIS
_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6
(1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
His Majesty, August 1914_
No. 13.
_Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25._
(Translation.)
M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna on the
11th (24th) July, 1914:
"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after
the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the
Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps
which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to
all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by
the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all
essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be
extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal
Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient
time to study them.
"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian
demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice
to the Servian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory
the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and
would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.
"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet
at Vienna.
"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to
the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will
see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at
Vienna."
No. 17.
_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.)
(Telegraphic.) _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914.
I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do
as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that
no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands
which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought,
from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday,
that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian
Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the
interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help
them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would
like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the
obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the
Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to
stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France,
Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might
propose to submit the question to arbitration.
On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war
by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of
peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive
intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.
Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at
overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing
her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted
war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly
with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,
rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.
I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna
to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were
disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were
to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that
unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our
neutrality.
I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be
content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers,
but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that
Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the
predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the
support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me
once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that
unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as
desperate.
No. 18.
_Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 25.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July 25, 1914._
Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a
telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he
immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension
of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it
appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of
State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and
difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that
he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he
admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give
the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He
also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the
Austro-Hungarian demands.