Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had
gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals
that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest
that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very
diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great
mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we
should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not
submit his question to the Cabinet again.
I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was
some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could
give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 122.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914.
Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir
F. Bertie.
I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the
Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered
from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not
but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of
war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would
return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of
your request.
It appears from what he said that German Government consider that
certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an
instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had
been placed under an embargo already.
I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter
further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me
remote.
In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would
in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French
Government.
No. 123.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German
Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very
great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this
country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that
which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve
anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected
it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet
meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a
memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian
neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we
were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that
our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and
that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public
opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality
on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions
on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity
of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain
neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our
hands free.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
[Footnote 189: See No. 122.]
No. 133.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from
M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:--
"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his
Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.
M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was
desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the
participation of the Great Powers.
"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction
of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It
would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop
provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."
(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)
No. 134.
_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Paris, August_ 1, 1914.
President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were
trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after
a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the
Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the
measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a
general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general
mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is
already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military
preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the
German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds
for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on
the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made
incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of
Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with
the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French
Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the
preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being
possible to avoid war.
No. 148.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914.
After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following
memorandum:--
"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes
into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will
give all the protection in its power.
"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as
binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above
contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."
I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues
to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind
themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out
between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French
Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean,
to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the
German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to
France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own
Mediterranean fleet.
M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the
doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in
1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the
neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we
were considering what statement we should make in Parliament
to-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian
neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the
German Ambassador on this point.
No. 153.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914.
The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for
diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:--
"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that
of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and
the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme
appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to
safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government
has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and
promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and
its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of
refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within
twelve hours.
We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a
flagrant violation of the law of nations.
His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of
a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must
request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be
proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You
should ask for an immediate reply.
APPENDIX III
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German
Government.
(Cd. 7445.)
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_.
Sir, _London, August_ 8, 1914.
In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and
enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial
Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von
Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be
"No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.
Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government
had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance
into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive
blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them,
as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have
hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing
great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by
the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that
this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered,
as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I
asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid
possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied
that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to
draw back.
During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,
and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again
proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of
State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12
o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their
violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been
instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government
that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their
power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty
to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the
Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a
written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had
mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would
expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at
the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my
passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short
conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret
at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which
had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great
Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work
in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but
that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our
engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted
otherwise than they had done.
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might
be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him.
He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes.
He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to
a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so
often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was
going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered
useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew,
he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down
like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like
striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against
two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement,
and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to
understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and
death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's
neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak,
a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she
should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or
what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain
in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact
have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to
his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could
hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his
Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from
adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said
that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the
greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been
working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between
Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between
them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between
Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face
with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not
possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our
late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted
this more than I.
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew
up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in
at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted
by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190]
[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.]
APPENDIX IV
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME
The following document is contained in the German Version of the German
White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of
the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is
omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German
White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the
appearance of an extract from a German newspaper.
Aus dem oesterreich-ungarischen Material.
Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an
die auswaertigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts
erwaehnte Dossier wird heute veroeffentlicht.
In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien
ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die suedlichen
Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit
Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurueckgreist.
Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln
und an Intensitaet wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der
Unnerionskrise ihren Hoehepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen
hervor. Waehrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen
die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln
abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kaempfe vorbereiteten, unter denen
die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionaeren
Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader
Auswaertigen Amte voellig abhaengige Organisation unter Leitung von
Staatsmaennern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem
ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan
Pribicevic gehoeren zu diesen Gruendern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die
Bildung und Ausruestung von Freischaren fuer den bevorstehenden Krieg
gegen die oefterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In
einer dem Memoire angefuegten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom
Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane
gleichen Namens veroeffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Taetigfelt
und Ziele dieses Vereins ausfuehrlich dargelegt werden. Es heisst darin,
dass zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren
nahen und ferneren Bruedern jenseits der Grenze und unseren uebrigen
Freunden in der Welt gehoeren.
_Oesterreich ist als erster und groesster Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die
Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt,
predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das
Schlusskapitel enthaelt einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk
Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln fuer den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die
Annexion vorangezeigt hat.
Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana
angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Taetigkeit der Narodna Odbrana,
die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur
Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic
und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmaessig inspiziert wurden. Weiter
wurden die Komitatschis im _Schiessen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen,
Sprengen von Eisenbahnbruecken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen
Erklaerung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende
dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber
nicht nur nicht erfuellt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die
serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire fuehrt als Beispiel die Art und
Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin
publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentaeter als serbischer
Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blaetter
wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf
wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.
Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gruendung wurde die Narodna
Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der
_Schuetzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und
verschiedene andere Vereine angehoerten_.
Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die
fueoerperliche Entwickelung der Bevoelkerung Serbiens sowie deren
materielle Kraeftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr
wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem
Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es
eine unerlaessliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten
groessten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu fuehren,
und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur
Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen
unterjochter Brueder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und
Reden aehnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswaertige
Taetigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in
Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei
denen offen Mitglieder fuer die erwaehnte serbische Vereinigung geworben
wurden, besteht. Gegenwaertig ist noch die Untersuchung darueber im Zuge,
dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie
bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu
vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmaenner und Missionaere wurde die Aufwiegelung
in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So
wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein
Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie
unter bedenklichen Umstaenden verleitet. In den Schulen der
Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der
gewuenschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militaerisch auch insofern
vorbereitet, als serbische Emissaere im Falle des Ausbruchs der
Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstoerung von Transportmitteln usw., der
Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in
einer besonderen Beilage belegt.
Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Taetigkeit
der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den
Attentaten gegen den Koeniglichen Kommissaer in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912,
dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem
missglueckten Attentat Schaefers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es
verbreitet sich hierauf ueber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den
Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, ueber die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon
in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie
sich die Attentaeter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu
dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors
Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle
eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen
Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als
Zoegling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte.
Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach
Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darueber laesst, dass
dies ein wohl voerberiteter und fuer die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der
Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.
Eine Beilage enthaelt einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in
Serajewo ueber die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz
Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez,
Crupilovic und Papovic gestaendig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fluechtigen
Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm
zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gestaendig, die
Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole
ausgefuehrt zu haben. Beide Taeter gaben zu, bei der Veruebung der Tat die
Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage
enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter
ueber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmaessig
hergestellt wurden, fuer millitaerische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer
Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac
stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft ueber den Transport der drei
Attentaeter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren
Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehoeriger der Monarchie einige
Tage vor dem Attentat dem oesterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad
Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Veruebung
des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog waehrend dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien
bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn
unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gruenden
verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein.
Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden
Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt haetten. Da
diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprueft sind, kann ueber deren
Stichhaltigkeit vorlaeufig noch kein Urteil gefaellt werden. In der
Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen
Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder,
von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, waehrend das
vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens
versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien),
teils Ebene (Suedungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenroete der
serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete
Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden
Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw.
stehen.