Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
APPENDIX V
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna
respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian
Government.
(Cd. 7596)
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.
_London, September_ 1, 1914.
Sir,
The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the
outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more
than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few
comments.
The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia
was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except
Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the
actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see
through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French
Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the
Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left
under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to
speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and
that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing
with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the
second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at
that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be
published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other
Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me
on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its
presentation about the time we were speaking.
So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was
preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence
about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events
compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna,
Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so
closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been
taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical
time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark.
As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the
impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the
15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed
to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue
Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language
which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official
"Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was
published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria
would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European
complications.
On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common
consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by
Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following
afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been
unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The
mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the
evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl
had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of
delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs
till the small hours of the morning.
The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part
of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the
Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations
against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of
police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those
days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in
many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the
popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt
that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this
momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be
said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of
the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia
during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the
recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little
sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the
entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign
punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed
that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of
submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful
solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that
the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must
inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause
of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that
any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere
policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the
necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of
Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German
Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling,
which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of
events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to
secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia
and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian
question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue
might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course
the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable
consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation
and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation
against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own
mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed
into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's
Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper
on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and
urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in
your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be
accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the
question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic
report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria
was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the
conference which you had suggested should take place between the less
interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter
which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately
concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that
hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to
European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and
pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting
point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the
question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the
peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the
question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right
to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no
territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course
of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards
bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial
conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much
belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a
highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought
to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency
maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left
no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the
endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest
of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or
that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his
instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response
he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however,
kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own
direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the
28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count
Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful
conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and
M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later
(30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly
manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at
St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany
was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter
an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was
informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main
point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to
submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed
incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,
M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria
would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had
finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a
peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st
August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither
"banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M.
Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most
conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the
latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit.
Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold
back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by
negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to
accept any reasonable compromise.
Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut
short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a
direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the
31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and
Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is
possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on
France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability
have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been
instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared
against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on
the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at
Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been
instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the
menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact
that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary
considered herself also at war with Russia."
M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the
Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently
requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be
able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss
frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the
previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground
that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was
not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine
had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no
Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement
was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's
assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to
the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a
westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace
German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by
Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's
departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by
the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps
of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the
throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been
assassinated.
The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by
special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An
abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the
German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared
the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium.
Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The
"Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The
"Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the
columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian
neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take
part in the war.
The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but
scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the
previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with
Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that
date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my
passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian
Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of
course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without
the notice required by diplomatic usage.
On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your
telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform
Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a
complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground
that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the
side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier
under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having
been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my
passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed
Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two
countries from midnight of the 12th August.
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted
immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency
would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary
during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr.
Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz.
Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which
his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a
long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been
brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the
courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications
which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In
point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war
with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been
broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this
unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument...
[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
APPENDIX VI
EXTRACTS FROM
THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_:
_Negociations ayant precede la guerre_
_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914_
PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI
This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since
the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we
had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp.
66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any
proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the
willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and
Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis
took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors
accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when
friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)
The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to
mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This
threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all
precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the only
course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume
that war is probably inevitable.' (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will
also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the
German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn;
and that the German Government explained that the publication had been
premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the
British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E.
Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in
her attitude to Russia.
It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not
officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared
war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.)
In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods
employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the
Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.
RECUEIL
DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.
Negociations ayant precede la guerre.
10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914.
Petrograde,
Imprimerie de l'Etat.
1914.
No. 1.
Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_).
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, an
Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note
ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un delai de 48 heures pour
l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement que
pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee integralement dans un
delai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le
personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se
trouvent en tournee electorale ont ete rappeles et sont attendus a
Belgrade demain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a
communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et
declare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de
l'Autriche.
(Signe) Strandtman.
No. 2.
Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Texte de la note qui a ete transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre
d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...
(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix
I._))
Un memoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo a
l'egard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a
cette note'.[193]
(Signe) Strandtman.
[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3
(_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.]
No. 3.
Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur
d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
le 11/24 Juillet 1914 a 10 heures du matin.
Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la necessite de
remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de
Serbie:
(Suit le texte de la note).
Voir document No. 2.
No. 4.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'affaires en
Autriche-Hongrie.
_(Telegramme)._
St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....
(This communication is printed in the British White Book
(_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.)
Communique a Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 5.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de Sa Majeste
l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.
_(Telegramme)._
St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Me refere a mon telegramme a Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous esperons que
le Gouvernement aupres duquel. Vous etes accredite partagera notre point
de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Representant a Vienne de se
prononcer dans le meme sens.
Communique a Belgrade.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 6.
Telegramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de Serbie a Sa Majeste
l'Empereur.
Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe
une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs
internationaux, la Serbie des les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a
declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait prete a ouvrir une
enquete sur son territoire si la complicite de certains de ses sujets
etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites
Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note
Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et
incompatibles avec sa dignite comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous
demande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans
l'officiel et un ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous reprimerions
l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant a nous memes des
reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.--On
nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en
Serbie pour participer avec les notres a l'instruction et pour
surveiller l'execution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note.
Nous avons recu un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de
quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets
a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la
situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous
sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes les personnes dont la
participation a l'attentat sera demontree seront severement punis par
nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient etre executees sans des
changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne
un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration du
delai par l'armee austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere.
Il nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste
de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse
de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous
fait esperer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu
par Son genereux coeur slave.
En ces moments difficiles l'interprete les sentiments du peuple serbe
qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du
Royaume de Serbie.
(Signe) Alexandre.
No. 7.
Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._
Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Tous les journaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent
l'impossibilite pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posees,
accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton energique adopte par
l'Autriche. L'officieux "Local-Anzeiger" est particulierement agressif;
il qualifie de superflus les recours eventuels de la Serbie a St.
Petersbourg, a Paris, a Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que
le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la
situation dans la peninsule Balcanique va enfin s'eclaircir.