Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
II
Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all
practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour;
and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5]
of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less
power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the
defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary
Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of
Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are
involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following
narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the
interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection
against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it
might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that
on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a _casus belli_.
England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently
adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the
reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the
case of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England
holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller
states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful
neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls
first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a
protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of
Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for
protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the
French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise
our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be
impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our
power to help the states within our reach.
* * * * *
The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which had
lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placed
under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of its
former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retained
its own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke
of Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some ways
anomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, and
possessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength
some competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar
among the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable
link in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not
being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the
French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all land
between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on
behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus Luxemburg was
held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign confederation, and
over this garrison the only right allowed to the Grand Duke, the
sovereign of the country, was that of nominating the governor.
This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolution
of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with
Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand
Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortress
with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, under
these circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian _Zollverein_,
and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character of
its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption
into Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the
small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented
itself for reopening the question until 1866.
In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussia
and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on the
other would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposing
peace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage to
herself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted only
seven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by
the absorption of several German states and by the formation of the
North German Confederation under her leadership. This, the first
shattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had
received, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian
power, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.
This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the
question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held
Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been
destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrison
owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrison
should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice
of the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow that
the French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. At
the same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weak
Power as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The
question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congress
held in London in the following May.
Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable.
Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortress
no longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raised
no objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in the
Congress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy
should be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'.[6]
A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the second
article ran as follows:--
'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the
Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the
Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.
'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other
States.
'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of
Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.
'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the
collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present
Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral
State'.[7]
The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of
Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its
evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the
restoration of the fortifications.
Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which
was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the
treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality,
only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely,
the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count
Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors,
calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers
had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving
facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were
taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses
occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of
Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were
satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the
end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as
compensation for the loss of Metz.
In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on
the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on
whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne.
There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special
comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the
collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally
proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee of
the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign
Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the
Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by
Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear that
England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg
single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In
other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of
dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and
France. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection;
as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to
make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,' should
Luxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the
British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon
of 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and
Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the
co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also
not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a _casus
belli_.
III
It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that her
eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, the
north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre,
and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along the
Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for military
operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deep
valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to
rectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and in
a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampart
which has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort,
Epinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line without
violating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the north
the line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg,
while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss
frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French defences,
the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in the war of
1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle against which to
launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris was therefore deemed
impossible if respect were to be paid to the neutrality of Belgium and
Luxemburg, and it was for this purely military reason that Germany has
to-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality of these states.
This was frankly admitted by Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if
they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in
view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have
got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time'.[8]
In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French
territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liege and thence into France
past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army
could debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch as
the French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had not
strongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as
the country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for
manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckoned
that the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in this
manner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east.
As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral.
It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controlling
as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not
be allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communication
between one portion of the German army and another.
That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years
past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a
matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would
involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty
was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the
French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The
plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt
the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are
either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual
conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward
Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the
consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he
informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do
not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it
whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the
Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should
have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or
misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the
thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the
military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite
well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our
part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been
expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the
shoulders of Great Britain.
This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the
ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology.
Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace
that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the
French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered
by Liege, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause.
For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was
tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of
Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.
Notes:
[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.]
[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague Peace
Conferences_, pp. 281-9.]
[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europe
by Treaty_, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]
[Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd.
7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.]
[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iii,
p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee by
Powers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867.']
[Footnote 7: Hertslet, _ut sup._, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High
Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy,
the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]
[Footnote 8: _Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German
Government_ (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]
[Footnote 9: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, p. 62, no.
116. July 31, 1914. See also _infra_ pp. 82 _et seqq_.]
CHAPTER II
THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871
Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should sketch
in outline the events which have produced the present grouping of
belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations which have
equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To understand why
Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the glove to France and
Russia, why England has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium,
but also as the friend of France, we must go back to the situation
created by the Franco-German War. Starting from that point, we must
notice in order the formation of the Triple Alliance between Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between France and
Russia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings. The
Triple Alliance has been the grand cause of the present situation; not
because such a grouping of the Central European Powers was
objectionable, but because it has inspired over-confidence in the two
leading allies; because they have traded upon the prestige of their
league to press their claims East and West with an intolerable disregard
for the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of
Germany towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step
by step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a
European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to represent
as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's well-being. These
precautions, so obviously necessary that they were continued and
expanded by the most pacific Government which England has seen since Mr.
Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms: that of diplomatic
understandings, and that of naval preparations. Whichever form they have
taken, they have been adopted in response to definite provocations, and
to threats which it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly
and jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in
view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her
armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with
reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country and
English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of hostile
Powers.
Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation since
1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886.
The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France submitted to the
demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a fresh era of European
diplomacy and international competition. The German Empire became at
once, and has ever since remained, the predominant Power in Western
Europe. The public opinion of this new Germany has been captured to no
small extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who
openly avowed that 'the greatness and good of the world is to be found
in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a
word of the German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the
establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential
preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and England.
But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remained
Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the German
Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position of the
Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected enemies. In
1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria and Russia,
the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, the so-called
_Dreikaiserbuendnis_, which was designed to perpetuate the _status quo_.
But the friendship with Russia quickly cooled; it received a sharp
set-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came forward rather
ostentatiously to save France from the alleged hostile designs of
Germany; it was certainly not improved when Bismarck in his turn
mediated between Russia and her opponents at the Congress of Berlin
(1878). On the other hand, a common interest in the Eastern Question
drew closer the bonds between Germany and Austria. The latter felt
herself directly menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was
not prepared to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence
in 1879 was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria
which has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The
Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely defensive
in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was the enemy whom
both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active
measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Power
which had Russian support. In 1882 the alliance of the two great German
Powers was joined by Italy--a surprising development which can only be
explained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not hope for
security at home, or for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so
long as she remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted
had a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy
would receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose
resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has
endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the diplomatic
system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results have been
commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and ambition which Italy
has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the whole she has been a sleeping
partner in the Alliance; its prestige has served almost exclusively for
the promotion of Austrian and German aims; and one of its results has
been to make Austria a formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic.
Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as Prince
Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though England was on
friendly terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured to
avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 1882 the English
occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a standing grievance in
the eyes of France. The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like
manner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and,
for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on
the watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But
common interests of very different kinds were tending to unite these
three Powers, not in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but
in a string of compacts concluded for particular objects.
One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the policy of
the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, particularly that of
Germany, had become incalculable and was only consistent in periodic
outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind which could be discerned a
steady determination to accumulate armaments which should be strong
enough to intimidate any possible competitor. The growth of this feeling
dates from the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser.
Bismarck had sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after
1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against
Austria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openly
announced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he
addressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive'
policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its
triumph:--
'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia;
it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more
advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I
do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not.'[10]
But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy in
less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed to
lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the result
Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France and
Russia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from a
friendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. There
is no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against that
unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceased
to dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused
the new strength which this alliance gave her.
It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown
aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the
Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that France
has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco was
permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africa
has been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africa
she has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed by
any European Power; her growing interests in Indo-China have impinged
only upon an English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined by
an Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to
some extent the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where
she partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German
Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods as a
_casus belli_. That the German people have viewed with jealousy the
growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite recently, on
the eve of the present war, we were formally given to understand that
Germany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and it
is easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies
of the German military and naval experts.