Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
These military developments did not escape English notice. They excited
endless speculation about the great war of the future, and the part
which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriously
supposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in the fighting upon
land. The problem most usually discussed in this connexion was that of
preparation to resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible to
avoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial Force large enough and
efficient enough to defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had
gone abroad? Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land
warfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth
century. But her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been
planned for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the
country had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national
fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long as
the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable invasion
of the British Isles was possible.
But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted a
growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid down as
our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our chief
European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would combine with Germany
to challenge our naval supremacy was improbable; but other states were
beginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied the possible
number of hostile combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong
fleet was only natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her
colonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a
definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme should
become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof of
malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when the programme of
1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so that the German Navy
was practically doubled. England was at that moment involved in the
South African War, and it was hard to see against whom the new fleet
could be used, if not against England. This was pointed out from time to
time by the Socialist opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox official
reply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that the strongest naval
Power should not be able to challenge her with any confidence. But the
feeling of the semi-official Navy League was known to be violently
hostile to England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its
popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league.
It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion that, on
the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right to unlimited
self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close attention to the German
Navy Laws; especially as they proved capable of unexpected acceleration.
The 'Two Power' standard, under the stress of German competition, became
increasingly difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclined
to denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government
tried the experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no
corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval Law of
1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; and German
ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutual
limitation of armaments.
In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships--which now began
to be considered the decisive factor in naval warfare--Germany would
actually be the superior by 1914 unless special measures were taken. The
British Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose from the
German Naval Law of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of
increasing expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the
race in naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling;
but we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, since
our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power'
standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object of
special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord said on March 13,
1911, that we should make our navy superior to any foreign navy and to
any _probable_ combination which we might have to meet single-handed. In
practice this meant a policy of developing, in the matter of
Dreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, over the German navy;
this, it was officially explained in 1912, had been for some years past
the actual Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston
Churchill, March 18, 1912).
But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 saw a new
German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure of L1,000,000
annually for six years, and had the effect of putting nearly four-fifths
of the German navy in a position of immediate readiness for war. Earlier
in the year the British Government had announced that, if the German
policy of construction were accelerated, we should add to our programme
double the number which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her
preparations we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German
Bill came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this
country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to nearly
a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first and smallest
instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the new German law.' The
new British policy was maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913
the First Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a 'naval
holiday,' a suspension of new construction by mutual consent. The
Imperial Chancellor responded only by suggesting that the proposal was
entirely unofficial, by asking for concrete proposals, and by saying
that the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval estimates in
1913 were half a million higher than those of 1912.
From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear that
on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the German
navy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last six
years, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which our
Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeed
from month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred years
that we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy
under one government and concentrated within easy distance of our
shores.'
On German principles we should long ago have adopted the
'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced by
Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But we
can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never
been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressive
colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possible
intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that
only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts
for the peace of Europe.
NOTE
_Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.
In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for the
delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of North
Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which were not
published until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which were
published at the time was as follows. By the first Article England
stated that she had not the intention of changing the political state of
Egypt; and France declared that she would not impede the action of
England in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for the
British occupation or in any other way. By the second Article France
declared that she had not the intention of changing the political state
of Morocco; and England recognized that it appertained to France, as the
Power conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this
country and to assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and
military reforms which it required, France promised to respect the
customary and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third
Article England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of
Egypt. By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain
'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not
lending themselves in either country to inequality in the establishment
of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The sixth and
seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the free passage of the Suez
Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The eighth declared that both
Governments took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain in
Morocco, and that France would make some arrangements with the Spanish
Monarchy. The ninth Article declared that each Government would lend its
diplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative to
Egypt and Morocco.[21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) related
to Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever the
Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,' and providing that the
Anglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this
arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government found
itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policy
in respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and
seventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is,
each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial
liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and the
Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any
intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial
organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian
legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and France
agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similar
reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian national
debt.
Notes:
[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444.]
[Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd.
7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See
_infra_, Appendix II.]
[Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, and
November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter.]
[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906).]
[Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M.
Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II.]
[Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
July 29, 1914.]
[Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911.]
[Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911.]
[Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911.]
[Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See
Appendix II.]
[Footnote 20: _Ibid_. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]
[Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904.]
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic
connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of
repression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days of
Frederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. National
sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as
1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from
Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left
the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on
Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her
side turned to new allies.
The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of the
Russian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slav
sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherished
no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honest
broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian
affair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.'
William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to
have conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing her
influence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And
it is this policy which is the _fons et origo_ of the present struggle;
for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so
long as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of
centuries.
After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned for
compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed some
recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
Hence she could expand southwards--ultimately perhaps to Salonica.
Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protege of
Austria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to
follow the line to Salonica,[22] so Germany, before the end of the
nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line of
penetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople,
through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic
influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of
Roumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communication
through his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a
German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh
to the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in
the way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in
Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to
exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from
South-Eastern Europe.
In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A
blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian
Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the
Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian
tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touch
with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria took
advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex
formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia,
which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the old
Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war with
Austria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only have
given her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, could
not do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of
giving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she
would not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She
has saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything
in her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has
sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, in
the sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in the
murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked
war rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav
sentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no
government could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is
not merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav
peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whether
South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost to
Russian influence.
Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she
has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and
the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German
alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a
policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles,
forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish
landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is
really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the
Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an
extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by
the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the
old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled
from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her
policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made
the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.
It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav
Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why,
it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there
any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to
Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to
pursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and of
disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond
between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other
and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought
Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight
Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the
interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of
Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new
constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.
'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt
chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had
aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day
Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England,
and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for
quotation.'[24]
In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only
coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed
much to the inspiration of England.
Notes:
[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912),
started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of
Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also
_Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is
reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica
railway.']
[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV,
_infra_.]
[Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. xii. 379.]
CHAPTER IV
CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS
The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely
intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed
account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the
reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a
plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither
discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor
distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals
which were made by would-be mediators.
The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old
quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June
28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of
ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre
of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the
town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a
bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot
by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently
planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired that
these provinces should be united to Servia.
The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the
conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a
Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the
Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided
the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from
Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian
customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no
proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the
Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it
was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within
forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be
published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten
engagements which the Servian Government were to give the
Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these
engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7).
On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other
Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper,
the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be a
public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the
Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the
'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the
Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to
Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power,
could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if
necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which
concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]
Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia
alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was
provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of
acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless
Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military
measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian
Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France
and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could
accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian
Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July
24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite
insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and
he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges
against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would
punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands
of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to
arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave
the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--the
four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.
On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian
Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian
demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points,
the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The
Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and
criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The
Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of
the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary
declared war on Servia.
Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's
solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after
July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France,
England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and
Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany,
however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal
intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia
consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase
ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the
Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian
question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer
was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but
subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress
between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]
No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28,
the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the
southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July
29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that
she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these
assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to
have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and
Austria-Hungary.