Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized
against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what
he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that
'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but
if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and
Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be
difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would
therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78]
This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable.
But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds
for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about
this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is
perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George
Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language
used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four
southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering
the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to
all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss
such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German
Ambassador, Count Pourtales, used such language to his home Government,
for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches
appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly
honest. The military attache says, 'I deem it certain that mobilization
has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful at
Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'.[81]
There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans
themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looks
at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial
German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war'
(_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a
very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in
the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization
elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th
before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact
that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July
that Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to be
equivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'.
Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war.
Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive
attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor was
in a position to make war'.[82] This attitude of mind was known and
deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed
to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in
earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count
Pourtales, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were
willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by
Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become
an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she
were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors
'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government
that Germany was making military and naval preparations against
Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'.[84]
After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the
situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and
strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though
under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July
30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from
her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the
sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will
be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir
George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that
all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed,
and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against
Servia.[87]
Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a
general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a
proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be against
Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89]
Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that
Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of
Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general
mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that
mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against
Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for
Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding
demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made
'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize
in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was
that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her
mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when
such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.
War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the
Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each
imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying
that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's
demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position
that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is
as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31
Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians,
apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to
discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia
announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve
her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia,
Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in
which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues
an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one
answer?
The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against
Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself,
and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany
threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military
preparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's
apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization
inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step
in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three
empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia
and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation
was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her
ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?
II
_Germany's attitude to France._
We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the
diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the
27th of July we are told that the German Government received 'the first
intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th
Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison'.[98]
Will it be believed that, except for the assertion 'of rapidly
progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land',[99] this
is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove
the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to point
out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard
of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of France', the French
Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that 'they had done
nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the
officers on leave'.[100]
The very next day the French Government had 'reliable information that
the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for
war',[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into
French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government
withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although
German reservists had been recalled from abroad 'by tens of thousands',
the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well might
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[103]
Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government
presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French
intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it
would consult its own interests.[104]
III
_The Question of British Neutrality_.
Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel.
If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only
involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly
against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France;
and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of
British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th,
when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if war
does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it,
and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[106] Two days later he wrote
again:--
'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be
dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to
disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my reference to it must not be
taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was
promised.'[107]
On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at
both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey,
in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the
Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside'.
Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador
that
'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not
involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did
become such that we thought British interests required us to
intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to
be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach
from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled
him or his Government into supposing that we should not take
action.'[108]
Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had
made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:--
'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main
principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would
never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there
might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed.
Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every
assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial
Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said
he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As
regards Holland ... so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to
give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do
likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations
Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war
was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided
against Germany.'[109]
This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British
Government:--
'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
on such terms.
'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for
France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her,
could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and
become subordinate to German policy.
'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
which the good name of this country would never recover.
'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.
We could not entertain that bargain either.[110]
He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely
free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by
the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:--
'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis
safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement
to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured
that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or
her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately
... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of
definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am
hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make
possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than
has been possible hitherto.'
Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France
should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be
violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning
was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken
up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he
received your communication without a comment.'[111]
But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely
complain that no warning had been given to him.
With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction
as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be
remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir
Rennell Rodd that he had
'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more
conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we
should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
issue with us.'[112]
As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is
not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir
Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin
sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning.
Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short
duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and
Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
Belgium so long as no other Power violates it',[113] the French gave an
unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a
striking contrast:--
'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult
the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I
gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give
could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in
the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether
they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless,
took note of your request.
'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that
certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an
instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany
had been placed under an embargo already.'[115]
It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a
contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was
warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in
this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the German
Government similar to that given by France:--
'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116]
The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and without
authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that Great
Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violate
Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such an
offer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack on
France and her colonies, about which it had been stated already that
there could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity of
France and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was
bound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in
rejecting what is now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous
proposal', namely, that France without actually losing territory might
be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
subordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubt
about Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his
statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[117] The important
points are that the offers of August 1 were made on the sole
responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from his
Government; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed the
conditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so
far was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of
Belgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the
neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky
may have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two
days later the German Government were making no concessions on that
point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a position
we had taken up on July 30, four days before.
One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have been
made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky
whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack
her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an
offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and
the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the
relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations
between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such
hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever
any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original
proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[118]
Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were still
discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be an
occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg.
Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and Lord
Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was
not intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any
Government which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by
the Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences
as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally
reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the more
cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Against
this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not
appeal to the Powers.[120]
Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to the
King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of
Belgium'.[121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to the
Belgian, asking for
'a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain
the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at
the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat
Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve
hours'.[122]
Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest against
this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves was
a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would
not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was told
to resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as Great
Britain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain the
independence and integrity of Belgium.[123] On receipt of the protest of
Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more
desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, under no
pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass through Belgium was
necessary because the 'German army could not be exposed to French attack
across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable
information'. It was for Germany 'a question of life and death to
prevent French advance'.[124] But matters had gone too far: that day
(August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, and
thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality,
issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:--
'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for
Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to
carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered
indispensable.
'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
Gemmenich.
'In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory
reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by
12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to
take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party
as ourselves.'[125]
The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of
disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the
'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment
at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839
would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid for
neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had
counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply
disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to
bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace
between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin
must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we
believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war
broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of
European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen.
But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German
hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir
Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on
July 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent
out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs
authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining
British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from
British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to
be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made
twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous
statement that 'no information was to be had'.[128]