Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
This, however, is a digression from the main question. History will
doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to
the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will
judge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral
country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on
August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government for
this wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. In
conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the
Chancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; the
argument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges is
difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death to
Germany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be
able to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This
excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those who
put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paid
homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that he
had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that the German army was
exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, the
Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any
such action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in his
speech to the Reichstag:--
'We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our
troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian
soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international
law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels
that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long
as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood
ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A
French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been
disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the
Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong--I speak openly--that
we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our
military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are
threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only
have one thought--how he is to hack his way through.'[129]
In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have an
example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The
violation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring us
into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties and
warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a
calculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany
had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to do
so, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course for
Germany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of their
own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain,
to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the
neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must
indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side of
Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward the
plea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war was
declared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with the
ineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in French
territory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though how
the presence of the French in a town of their own could be called a
violation of their neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From
that it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French
supplying a garrison to Liege. There can be little doubt that all these
attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgian
neutrality are another illustration of Swift's dictum to the effect that
'as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems', it
is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, 'even
by those who are most celebrated in that faculty'.[130]
IV
_England and Servia_.
We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis which
followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon the
presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and to
English readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude was
taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position,
which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no
direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to
prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not
see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political
and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian
Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity
or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to
military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of
Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case
the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere
to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by
racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself,
not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to
prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which
would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He
stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on
July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he
then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would
concern himself
'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the
peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and
Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132].'
In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German
Ambassador:--
'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to
trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves
about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum
which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would
take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133].'
Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy,
France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace
at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and
tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'give
Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servian
officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at
Serajevo[134].' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go;
Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when
he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public
opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:--
'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to
sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war
does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into
it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136]
However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was
presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the
Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff,
withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a
conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in
London immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would
prevent complications', and 'that all active military operations should
be suspended pending results of conference'.[138] This proposal failed,
as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th
Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to
his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the
dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called
to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with
Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and
Servia'.[140]
No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically
correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for
peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and
double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in
refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M.
Sazonof remarked that
'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of
international relations.'[141]
V
_Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_.
There is however another question which involves the whole foreign
policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by
boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France,
if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several
quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been
successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly
refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine
these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that
His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity
with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg
joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that
'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out;
we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the
outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].'
On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his
conviction that
'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His
Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of
France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a
result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there
would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her
attitude[144].'
Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:--
'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
thought it would have a great effect.'[145]
Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and
the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir
George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he
'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His
Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement
on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146]
On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so
far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would
merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present
attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon
that
'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we
should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a
question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for
supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid
being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148]
That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on
Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another
answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have
known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian
Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian
circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that
'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given
to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149]
The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace
owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent
mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward
Grey said:--
'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
neutrality.'[150]
It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified.
England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation,
but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing
to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due
observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again,
it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our
neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign
Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however,
as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward
Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral
under all circumstances.
Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's
prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was
throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably
he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing
rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the
conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames,
while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's
knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.
It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and
elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_
elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these
intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the
disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff
'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be
satisfactory'.[155]
To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is,
necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian
Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd.
But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German
White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing
the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the
persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any
negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.
Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir
Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the
first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to
submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St.
Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to
prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to
restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to
join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the
horrors of war from Europe.
VI
_Italy's comments on the situation_.
We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple
Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat
divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two
years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical
situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to
Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is
supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple
Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to
Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in
endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to
induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend
all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an
opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war
broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her
allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said,
is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of
Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official
documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a
conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy
was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the
idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again
approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in
London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly
to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia
to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and
went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought
most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful
whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military
operations, but made a further suggestion that
'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice
of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable
her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary
alone'.[162]
Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in
Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for
mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to
the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an
exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the
practical suggestion that
'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she
would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would
neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We
might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would
accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries,
discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]
Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying
Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should
'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which
has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires
neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire
Servian territory'.[166]
All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her
ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was
Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign
Minister:--
'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might
result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an
aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances
Italy would remain neutral.'[167]
The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France
opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would
have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to
take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple
Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.
NOTE
_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.
On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to
Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum
which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance
and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--
'I had never before seen one State address to another independent
State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent
sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials
who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]
It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the
Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as
an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit.
In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government
demanded:--
A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official
Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should
communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration
(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in
the propaganda;
(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may
be guilty of such machinations.
B. That Servia should undertake
(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of
Austria-Hungary;
(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies
and to confiscate their means of propaganda;
(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all
methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against
Austria-Hungary;
(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all
officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and
deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of
communicating;
(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian
movement;
(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;
(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and
of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised
by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;
(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in
arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who
helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;
(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials,
at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.
On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the
Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies
this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The
Servian Government agreed
A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration
(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against
Austria-Hungary;
(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial
and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the
propaganda;
(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who
are guilty of such acts.
B. That Servia would undertake
(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most
severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of
Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution
providing for the confiscation of such publications;
(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;
(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all
that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the
Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this
propaganda;
(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial
inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the
territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;
(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the
demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far
as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal
procedure and with good neighbourly relations;
(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian
officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law
of criminal procedure;
(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as
the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest
Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed
(on probation) by the directorate of railways;