Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) - Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic
of arms and explosives across the frontier;
(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as
soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages
and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by
the said officials.
The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory
and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same
evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they
published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the
Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found
unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand
No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample
may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed
out[175] that it
'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's
independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it
might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to
appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
Servia.'
Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand,
and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands
was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated
this as deliberate misrepresentation:--
'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to
do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state
police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The
reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on
account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable
difficulties.
...
'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
"enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation
of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in
great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our
demands as impossible.'[176]
It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a
genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria
might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign
Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to
permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to
justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression
'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war
inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war
with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to
be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to
Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of
mediation'.[178]
Notes:
[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]
[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]
[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
July 24.]
[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey,
July 25.]
[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26.
See also German White Book, p. 5.]
[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July
15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]
[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
August 1.]
[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August
1.]
[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey,
July 29.]
[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H.
Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]
[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 27.]
[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold,
July 24.]
[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
July 27.]
[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that
Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory
than the information of the German Imperial attache in Russia, whose
account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the
allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7;
also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.
For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange
Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 27.]
[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.]
[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E.
Grey, July 29, 1914.]
[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]
[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from
the _Militaer-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usually
over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the
higher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, of
whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that
order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without
exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with
complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.']
[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July
29.]
[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
July 30.]
[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_
published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July
31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the
frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]
[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21,
22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 31.]
[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.]
[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1,
encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the
substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the
discussions should take place in London with the participation of the
Great Powers.']
[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.]
[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.]
[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this.
Nevertheless it is true.']
[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister
for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.]
[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).]
[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
Aug. 1.]
[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
July 25.]
[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
July 27.]
[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 29 (received July 29).]
[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
July 31.]
[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie
and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.
It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was
bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia
(Art. 2).]
[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
August 1.]
[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]
[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor
telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the
English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute
neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the
French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on
Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']
[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
August 2.]
[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg,
to Sir E. Grey, August 2.]
[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
4.]
[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August
4.]
[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to
Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.]
[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
4.]
[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.]
[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.]
[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.]
[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.]
[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_
(October, 1706).]
[Footnote 131: p. 6.]
[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
July 24.]
[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.
Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden,
brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _demarche_ makes it
almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will
have mobilized against each other.']
[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July
24.]
[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24:
'I said ... direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on
behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public
opinion.']
[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
July 25.]
[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.]
[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
July 26.]
[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
29.]
[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the
Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
July 24.]
[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
July 29.]
[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27:
'Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a
menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence
at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend
who was anxious to preserve peace.']
[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
July 27.]
[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have private
information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian
ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the
German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he
endorses every line of it.']
[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.]
[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.]
[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
27.]
[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix
I).]
[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96,
Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G.
Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]
[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of
the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.]
[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd,
July 25.]
[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf.
No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.]
[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf.
No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]
[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
29.]
[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]
[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).]
[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).]
[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23),
which will be found in Appendix I.]
[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]
[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]
[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian
Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in
Appendix I.]
[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
I.]
[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
July 24.]
[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
I.]
[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
July 28.]
[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
27.]
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a
war between two different principles--that of _raison d'etat_, and that
of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared
in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when
the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of
a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the
demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law
and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now
appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which
claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe
in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands
for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to
which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand
in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such
covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national
historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the
Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what
they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says
Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above
it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here
no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_;
for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the
exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than
that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all
foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign
articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy
such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this
exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially
power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for
defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is
self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and
self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest
moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of
feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against
the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might,
and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we
should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not
conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is
precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the
armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the
_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that
Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he
failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that
is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is
naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive.
The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final
character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the
glory of war.
_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called
must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its
absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_
obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a
state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso
_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over
against other states.' International treaties are no absolute
limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for
such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge
set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last
resort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its own
repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that
the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the
violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is
ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states
to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his
master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of
Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students.
There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law.
'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say
that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No
self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to
any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest
ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and
foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'.
Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and
this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are
altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no
longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181]
But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as war
defensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the
all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to
Treitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following
headings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God';
'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'.
Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these
are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is
politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be
thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick
nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war
comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein
lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes
before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the
social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which
demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one
struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ could
not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall
always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'
Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization
of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to
preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to
preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism
will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the
world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or
may be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', the
teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable
biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is the
law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive--
primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve
all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away
by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself
colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find
them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the
watchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already
designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil
in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of
Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact
for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a
World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham,
an hypocrisy.[183]
The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral
veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old
days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of
conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in
such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to
what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a
'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at
those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live
as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right.
The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly
revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talk
of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the
'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating
supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of
power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern
Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the
doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force
disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political
morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a
doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its
state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity
and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when
'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture
goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has
been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the
intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state
should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By
their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain
smoking in ashes to the sky.