Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius - Niccolo Machiavelli
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And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to
keep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a like
cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is friend to
a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without means to
defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his dominions; or
it may be that having linked his fortunes with another's, he despairs of
finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of his ally, as was
the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused the interests of
France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to that of the princes
last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which awaited ruin in adhering
to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was also followed by Florence
when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly by the cause of the
French. And taking everything into account, I believe that in cases
of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of stability sooner in
commonwealths than in princes. For though commonwealths be like-minded
with princes, and influenced by the same passions, the circumstance that
their movements must be slower, makes it harder for them to resolve than
it is for a prince, for which reason they will be less ready to break
faith.
And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain
advantages, in this respect also, commonwealths observe their
engagements far more faithfully than princes; for abundant examples
might be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to
break faith, and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a
commonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made
to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting
that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great advantage
to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose to them,
lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity for acting
upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named Aristides to
receive his communication, and to act upon it as he thought fit. To him,
accordingly, Themistocles showed how the navy of united Greece, for the
safety of which the Athenians stood pledged, was so situated that they
might either gain it over or destroy it, and thus make themselves
absolute masters of the whole country. Aristides reporting to the
Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles was extremely
advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly refused to
entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted, nor any of
those other princes who have sought and found more profit in breaking
faith than in any other way.
As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been
observed by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of
everyday occurrence, and I am speaking here only of those engagements
which are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this respect,
likewise, I believe that commonwealths offend less than princes, and are
therefore more to be trusted.
CHAPTER LX.--_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome
were given without respect to Age_.
It is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the consulship
was thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this dignity to
all its citizens, without distinction either of age or blood; nay, that
in this matter respect for age was never made a ground for preference
among the Romans, whose constant aim it was to discover excellence
whether existing in old or young. To this we have the testimony of
Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his twenty-fourth year, who,
in addressing his soldiers, said of the consulship that it was "_the
reward not of birth but of desert_."
Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not,
is a question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood,
however, was made under necessity, and as I have observed on another
occasion, the same necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to
obtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which
Rome achieved. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold
out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards
whereof you have held out hopes. It was consequently necessary to
extend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship, on
which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually realizing
it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had to be
satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian birth in
any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we have seen
was the case with Venice, may treat these men as they please, those
other cities which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this
distinction. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood,
nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the
contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. For
where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence
which are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests with
the people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble
action which he has performed; but when a young man is of such
excellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal
achievement, it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable at
once to make use of him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and had
lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which his country might
have profited; as Rome profited by the services of Valerius Corvinus,
of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while yet very
young.
BOOK II.
* * * * *
PREFACE.
Men do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn
the present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not
merely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the
records left by historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the
days in which they remember their youth to have been spent. And although
this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one, I can see
that there are many causes to account for it; chief of which I take to
be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the whole
truth, those circumstances that would detract from the credit of the
past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that gives it
lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers
render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make
their achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the
great things they have done, but also lend such a colour to the
actions of their enemies, that any one born afterwards, whether in the
conquering or in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these men
and these times, and is constrained to praise and love them beyond all
others.
Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most
powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are
past, because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion
for envy. The contrary, however, is the case with the things we see, and
in which we take part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance with
them, no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize, along with
much that is good, much that displeases us, and so are forced to
pronounce them far inferior to the old, although in truth they deserve
far greater praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what relates to
the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time can
give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of
themselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which the
grounds for judging are not so clear.
I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising
obtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it
will happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are in
constant movement, it must be that they either rise or fall. Wherefore,
we may see a city or province furnished with free institutions by some
great and wise founder, flourish for a while through his merits, and
advance steadily on the path of improvement. Any one born therein
at that time would be in the wrong to praise the past more than the
present, and his error would be occasioned by the causes already
noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or province when the
time has come for it to fall away from its former felicity, would not be
mistaken in praising the past.
When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world,
remaining continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good
and evil; but that this good and this evil shift about from one country
to another, as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one
nation to another, according as the manners of these nations changed,
the world, as a whole, continuing as before, and the only difference
being that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat of its
excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in Persia, until
at last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after the
Roman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the world
has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that excellence
diffused among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the Franks, for
example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and the States of
Germany at the present day; and shared at an earlier time by that sect
of the Saracens who performed so many great achievements and gained so
wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire in the East.
In all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman power,
and among all these races, there existed, and in some part of them there
yet exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and justly to
be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these countries
should exalt past times over present, he might be mistaken; but any who,
living at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in Italy become
an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason to complain of his own
times, and to commend those others, in which there were many things
which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard being had to
religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished with every sort
of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the last extremity of
wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices of our age are the
more odious in that they are practised by those who sit on the judgment
seat, govern the State, and demand public reverence.
But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the
judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or
the past is the better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their
antiquity, they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have
of their own times, it ought not to be at fault in old men when they
compare the days of their youth with those of their maturity, both of
which have been alike seen and known by them. This were indeed true, if
men at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way, and
were constantly influenced by the same desires; but since they alter,
the times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to those
who have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing
things in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since,
when they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and
discernment, it must needs be that those things which in their youth
seemed to them tolerable and good, should in their old age appear
intolerable and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this to their
judgment, they lay the blame upon the times.
But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting
them to desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few,
there results a constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of
what they possess, prompting them to find fault with the present, praise
the past, and long for the future, even though they be not moved thereto
by any reasonable cause.
I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the
number of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of
mine, I render excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans while
I censure our own. And, indeed, were not the excellence which then
prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the sun, I
should proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from fear lest in
accusing others I should myself fall into this self-deception. But since
the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold to speak
freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in order that the
minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may be led to
shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by antiquity
whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty of every
good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the malice of
Time or of Fortune has not permitted him to put in practice; to the end,
that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better loved by Heaven
may be found able to carry them out.
Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods
followed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their city,
in this I shall speak of what was done by them to spread their Empire.
CHAPTER I.--_Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to
Valour or to Fortune_.
Many authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have
thought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to
their good fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons which
they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the admission
of the Romans themselves, since their having erected more temples to
Fortune than to any other deity, shows that it was to her that they
ascribed their success. It would seem, too, that Titus Livius was of
the same mind, since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth of any
Roman in which he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also make
mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion with which I can in
no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. For if no
commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because
none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that
growth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by
her conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and
devised by her first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired, as
shall be fully shown in many of the following Discourses.
The writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their
good fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two
great wars on their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no
wars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome the Samnites,
but undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered; nor
ever fought with the Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins, and
had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats; whereas, had any
two of these powers, while yet fresh and unexhausted, united together,
it may easily be believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic must have
followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so chanced
that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On the
contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one war,
another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one, another
broke out. And this we may plainly see from the order in which their
wars succeeded one another.
For, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the
Gauls, we find that during their struggle with the Equians and the
Volscians, and while these two nations continued strong, no others rose
against them. On these being subdued, there broke out the war with
the Samnites; and although before the close of that contest the Latin
nations had begun to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their
rebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and
helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels; on
whose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed.
When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses,
there followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites
were once more stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.
When he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered
on her first war with the Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than
all the Gallic nations on both sides of the Alps combined against the
Romans, by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and Pisa, where
now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they were at last routed with
tremendous slaughter.
This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no
contest of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and
the remnant of the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this
footing things continued down to the second Carthaginian war, which for
sixteen years kept the whole of Italy in a blaze. This too being brought
to a most glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian war, at
the close of which succeeded the war with Antiochus and Asia. These
subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king or people who
either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome.
But even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these
wars, and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized
not only the good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary
valour and prudence. And were any one to search for the causes of this
good fortune, he would have little difficulty in finding them, since
nothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so great
a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid to
engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none will ever
venture to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that
it will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his
neighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who,
on their part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the
methods he takes to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet. Distant
powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse with either, treat the
matter as too remote to concern them in any way; and abiding in this
error until the conflagration approaches their own doors, on its arrival
have no resource for its extinction, save in their own strength, which,
as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly powerful, no longer
suffices.
I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans
were subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid
being prolix, shall content myself with the single instance of the
Carthaginians, who, at the time when the Romans were contending with the
Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great power and held in high
repute, being already masters of the whole of Africa together with
Sicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in various parts of
Spain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a distance
from the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the
Romans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the
contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those
whom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their
friendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after
subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both
in Spain and Sicily. What happened in the case of the Carthaginians,
happened also in the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of
Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with another of them,
believed that other would have the advantage, and that there would be
time enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace or
war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in
this respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes acting
as they did, and of a valour equal to theirs.
As bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what
methods were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of other
nations, had I not already spoken of this at length in my _Treatise on
Princedoms_, wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here it is enough
to say briefly, that in a new province they always sought for some
friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb, a door
through which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their hold.
Thus we see them effect their entrance into Samnium through the Capuans,
into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily through the Mamertines,
into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through Massinissa,
into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes and other
princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in like
manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether to
acquire provinces or to keep them.
The nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to
stand in less need of Fortune's help than others who neglect it. But
that all may clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided
by valour than by Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the
following Chapter consider the character of those nations with whom they
had to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending their
freedom.
CHAPTER II.--_With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how
stubborn these were in defending their Freedom._
In subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more
distant provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love
which in those days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with such
obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing valour.
For we know by numberless instances, what perils these nations were
ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their freedom, and
what vengeance they took against those who deprived them of it. We know,
too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers from servitude.
And though, at the present day, there is but one province which can
be said to contain within it free cities, we find that formerly these
abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the ancient times of which I
speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany from Lombardy down to the
extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous free nations, such as the
Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites, besides many others in other
parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever read of there being any kings
over them, except those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, king of
Etruria. How the line of this last-named prince came to be extinguished,
history does not inform us; but it is clear that at the time when the
Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria was free, and so greatly rejoiced
in her freedom, and so detested the regal name, that when the
Veientines, who for their defence had created a king in Veii, sought aid
from the Etruscans against Rome, these, after much deliberation resolved
to lend them no help while they continued to live under a king;
judging it useless to defend a country given over to servitude by its
inhabitants.
It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among
nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally
increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have lived
under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what a
pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had
freed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to
contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself
from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the
well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a State
great; and, without question, this universal well-being is nowhere
secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever makes for
its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this man or to
that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are able to carry
them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they injure.
But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what
helps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that
whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least
evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor ever
increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it will
be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some able
tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms, the
advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State;
since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he
tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards
he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which he
acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules; because
to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies in
keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately
recognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his
country, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have
this view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into
Xenophon's treatise _De Tirannide_.