Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius - Niccolo Machiavelli
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These, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that
fortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that
those built to retain acquired territories are useless; and I am content
to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns they sought to
hold by the strong hand, rather pulled down fortresses than built them.
And if any, to controvert these views of mine, were to cite the case of
Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in recent, as towns which when
they rebelled were recovered by means of their citadels; I answer, that
for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus was sent at the end of a
year with an army strong enough to retake it even had there been no
fortress there; and that although he availed himself of the fortress for
the recovery of the town, he might, without it, have resorted to other
means which would have brought about the same result. Nor do I see of
what service a citadel can be said to be, when to recover the city you
must employ a consular army under a Fabius Maximus. But that the Romans
would, in any case, have recovered Tarentum, is plain from what happened
at Capua, where there was no citadel, and which they retook, simply by
the valour of their soldiers.
Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the
revolt of that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the
citadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city, you
should happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French had
theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being in command of the king's
forces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither
without an hour's delay, and reaching Brescia in three days, retook the
town with the help of the citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be
of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured by a de Foix,
and by that French army which in three days' time marched to its relief.
So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as against
others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent wars, many
fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same variety of fortune
with which open country has been acquired or lost; and this not only
in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of Naples, and in all
parts of Italy.
And, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against
foreign enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince
or people who possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a
good army, they are useless. For good armies without fortresses are in
themselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good armies
avail nothing. And this we see in the case of those nations which have
been thought to excel both in their government and otherwise, as, for
instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For while the Romans would build
no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained from building them, but
would not even suffer their cities to be enclosed with walls; desiring
to be protected by their own valour only, and by no other defence. So
that when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian what he thought of the
walls of Athens, he answered "that they were fine walls if meant to hold
women only."
If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his
dominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a
few days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not necessary,
may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is without a
strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his territories, or
upon his frontier, is either useless or hurtful, since they may readily
be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing them so strong that
the enemy is unable to take them by assault, he may leave them behind,
and so render them wholly unprofitable. For a brave army, unless stoutly
met, enters an enemy's country without regard to the towns or fortified
places it leaves in its rear, as we read of happening in ancient times,
and have seen done by Francesco Maria della Rovere, who no long while
ago, when he marched against Urbino, made little of leaving ten hostile
cities behind him.
The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do
without building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought
not to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he
dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well
affected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or
he be relieved by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly in time
of peace, and in war useless.
Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that
the Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so
also showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of
Latium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they
sought security in bolder and more sagacious courses.
CHAPTER XXV.--_That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must
not think to get possession of it through its Divisions._
Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the
nobles, it appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their
time to deal a fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they
assembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent
Caius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping
close by the Veientines, the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify
the Roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed the
Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from being divided they
became reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and defeated them.
Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men are to
adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when they
think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could conquer the
Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among themselves;
but this very attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin on their
assailants. For the causes of division in a commonwealth are, for the
most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes of union are fear and
war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been wise, the more divided they saw
Rome to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war with her, and
endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts. And the best
way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the confidence of
both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter so long as they
do not come to blows; but when they resort to open violence, then to
render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to plunge them deeper in
hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their forces without being led by
your putting forth an excess of strength to suspect you of a desire to
ruin them and remain their master. Where this is well managed, it will
almost always happen that you succeed in effecting the object you
propose to yourself.
The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another
matter, was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice
than this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by now
favouring one side and now the other, without incurring the suspicions
of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied out with their
harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their own accord into
the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, again, has never made any
change in her government which has had the support of the Florentines,
save when that support has been slight and insignificant; for whenever
the interference of Florence has been marked and decided, it has had the
effect of uniting all parties in support of things as they stood.
One other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than once
Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set wars on
foot against the Florentines, and always without success; so that, in
lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain that the mad
humours of the Florentines had cost him two millions of gold, without
his having anything to show for it. The Veientines and Etruscans,
therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false hopes, and in
the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched battle; and any
who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds and by similar
means against a divided people, will always find themselves deceived.
CHAPTER XXVI.--_That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses
them, without yielding him any Advantage._
To abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of the
wisest precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing from
the strength of an adversary; the latter only making him more cautious,
while the former inflames his hatred against you, and leads him to
consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt.
This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the
last Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those
verbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their
soldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your
enemy to vengeance, and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him
from doing you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which wound
those who use them. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in
connection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general,
after besieging this town for a great while, wearied out at last by its
protracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had actually
begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the place,
elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and upbraid
their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and to load
them with every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade, changing
his resolution, renewed the siege with such fury that in a few days
he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same thing befell the
Veientines, who, not content, as we have seen, to make war on the Romans
with arms, must needs assail them with foul reproaches, advancing to
the palisade of their camp to revile them, and molesting them more with
their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman soldiers, who at
first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls to lead them to
the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those others of whom mention
has just now been made, had to pay the penalty of their insolence.
Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities,
should take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches
from being used by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst
themselves or against an enemy. For when directed against an enemy they
lead to the mischiefs above noticed, while still worse consequences may
follow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as
sensible rulers have always taken for that purpose.
The legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having,
as shall in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their
conspiracy led to a mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius
Corvinus; when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made
their submission, it was declared that whosoever should thereafter
upbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this
mutiny, should be visited with the severest punishment. So likewise,
when Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with Hannibal, to
command a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits for soldiers
had furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an order
making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin.
So mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words
to others, or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in
sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer
indignation; "_for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth,
leaves always behind it a rankling memory._"[1]
[Footnote 1: Nam facetiae asperae, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem
sui memoriam relinquunt. _Tacit. An._ xv. 68.]
CHAPTER XXVII.--_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to
have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-Victory
turns to Defeat._
The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by an
insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby men
are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For such
false hopes, when they gain an entry into men's minds, cause them to
overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain
good, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And
this, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving
themselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by
particular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not
place it in so clear a light.
After routing the Romans at Cannae, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage
to announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the
Carthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise
citizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their
victory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might
have it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;
since it should be their object to show the Romans that they were strong
enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won in
the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the
Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the
opportunity to act upon it was gone.
When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the
citizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong from
being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness, sent
ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good servants, and
to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to receive either him
or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon, Alexander, displeased
that a single city should venture to close its gates against him to whom
all the rest of the world had thrown theirs open, repulsed the Tyrians,
and rejecting their overtures set to work to besiege their town. But as
it stood on the water, and was well stored with victual and all other
munitions needed for its defence, after four months had gone, Alexander,
perceiving that he was wasting more time in an inglorious attempt to
reduce this one city than had sufficed for most of his other conquests,
resolved to offer terms to the Tyrians, and to make them those
concessions which they themselves had asked. But they, puffed up by
their success, not merely refused the terms offered, but put to death
the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged by this, Alexander renewed the
siege, and with such vigour, that he took and destroyed the city, and
either slew or made slaves of its inhabitants.
In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with
the object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a subsidy
from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the citizens,
who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within the
Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the
Spaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in
their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make
terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and so
gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the Florentine
Republic.
A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful than
himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat, especially
when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms offered may
be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous for him who
accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial success. For which
reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens of Tyre that
Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at first rejected;
and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph that, by their
resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior to bow to their
will. And, in like manner, it should have been a sufficient victory for
the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part yielded to their wishes,
and abated something of their own demands, the purport of which was to
change the government of Florence, to sever her from her allegiance to
France, and, further, to obtain money from her. For if of these three
objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing the last two, while the
Florentines maintained the integrity of their government, a fair
share of honour and contentment would have fallen to each. And while
preserving their political existence, the Florentines should have made
small account of the other two conditions; nor ought they, even with the
possibility and almost certainty of greater advantages before them,
to have left matters in any degree to the arbitration of Fortune, by
pushing things to extremes, and incurring risks which no prudent man
should incur, unless compelled by necessity.
Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for
sixteen years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his
native country, found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been
defeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the
limits of her walls, and left without other resource save in him and his
army. Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake his country
had to play, and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried every
other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, judging that in
peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his country.
But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred him from
battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might, or if
he must fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant as
Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for
peace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his
country must be enslaved, what course ought to be followed by another
commander, less valiant and with less experience than he? But men labour
under this infirmity, that they know not where to set bounds to their
hopes, and building on these without otherwise measuring their strength,
rush headlong on destruction.
CHAPTER XXVIII.--_That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether
public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth_.
Certain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly Clusium
its chief city, the citizens of Clusium sought aid from Rome; whereupon
the Romans sent the three Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify
to them, in the name of the Roman people, that they must refrain from
making war on the Etruscans. From what befell the Romans in connection
with this embassy, we see clearly how far men may be carried in
resenting an affront. For these envoys arriving at the very moment when
the Gauls and Etruscans were about to join battle, being readier at
deeds than words, took part with the Etruscans and fought in their
foremost ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing the Roman
envoys, turned against the Romans all the hatred which before they had
felt for the Etruscans; and grew still more incensed when on making
complaint to the Roman senate, through their ambassador, of the wrong
done them, and demanding that the Fabii should be given up to them in
atonement for their offence, not merely were the offenders not given up
or punished in any way, but, on the contrary, when the comitia met were
created tribunes with consular powers. But when the Gauls found these
men honoured who deserved to be chastised, they concluded that what had
happened had been done by way of slight and insult to them, and, burning
with fury and resentment, hastened forward to attack Rome, which they
took with the exception of the Capitol.
Now this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from their disregard of
justice. For their envoys, who had violated the law of nations, and had
therefore deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated with
honour. And this should make us reflect, how carefully all princes and
commonwealths ought to refrain from committing like wrongs, not only
against communities, but also against particular men. For if a man be
deeply wronged, either by a private hand or by a public officer, and be
not avenged to his satisfaction, if he live in a republic, he will seek
to avenge himself, though in doing so he bring ruin on his country; or
if he live under a prince, and be of a resolute and haughty spirit, he
will never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the prince,
though he knows it may cost him dear. Whereof we have no finer or truer
example than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander.
For Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging to Philip's
court, having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by Attalus, one
of the foremost men of the royal household, repeatedly complained to
Philip of the outrage; who for a while put him off with promises of
vengeance, but in the end, so far from avenging him, promoted Attalus to
be governor of the province of Greece. Whereupon, Pausanias, seeing his
enemy honoured and not punished, turned all his resentment from him who
had outraged, against him who had not avenged him, and on the morning
of the day fixed for the marriage of Philip's daughter to Alexander of
Epirus, while Philip walked between the two Alexanders, his son and his
son-in-law, towards the temple to celebrate the nuptials, he slew him.
This instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys; and offers
a warning to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to
suppose, that when wrong upon wrong has been done him, he will not
bethink himself of revenge, however great the danger he runs, or the
punishment he thereby brings upon himself.
CHAPTER XXIX.--_That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would
not have them hinder her Designs._
If we note well the course of human affairs, we shall often find things
come about and accidents befall, against which it seems to be the will
of Heaven that men should not provide. And if this were the case even in
Rome, so renowned for her valour, religion, and wise ordinances, we
need not wonder if it be far more common in other cities and provinces
wherein these safeguards are wanting.
Having here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven influences men's
actions, Titus Livius turns it to account, and treats the subject at
large and in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was Heaven's
will, for ends of its own, that the Romans should feel its power, it
first of all caused these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls,
to act amiss, and then by their misconduct stirred up the Gauls to make
war on Rome; and, lastly, so ordered matters that nothing worthy of
their name was done by the Romans to withstand their attack. For it was
fore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus, who alone could supply the remedy
to so mighty an evil, should be banished to Ardea; and again, that
the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet attacks of the
Volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations, should fail to do so
when the Gauls were marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the
Romans got together was but a weak one, since they used no signal effort
to make it strong; nay, were so dilatory in arming that they were barely
in time to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no more than ten
miles distant from Rome. Here, again, the Roman tribunes pitched their
camp without observing any of the usual precautions, attending neither
to the choice of ground, nor to surround themselves with trench or
Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any other aid, human or Divine. In
ordering their army for battle, moreover, disposed it in weak columns,
and these far apart: so that neither men nor officers accomplished
anything worthy of the Roman discipline. The battle was bloodless for
the Romans fled before they were attacked; most of them retreating to
Veii, the rest to Rome, where, without turning aside to visit their
homes, they made straight for the Capitol.
Meanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves how they might
defend the city, did not even attend to closing the gates; and while
some of them made their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol
along with those who sought shelter there. It was only in the defence
of the Capitol that any method was observed, measures being taken to
prevent it being crowded with useless numbers, and all the victual which
could be got, being brought into it to enable it to stand a siege. Of
the women, the children, and the men whose years unfitted them for
service, the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring towns, the
rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders; so that no one who had
heard of the achievements of the Romans in past years, on being told of
what took place on this occasion, could have believed that it was of the
same people that things so contrary were related.