Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius - Niccolo Machiavelli
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But if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a Roman
citizen at a time when Rome was still uncorrupted, we should consider
how it may act on the citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then
was. And because there is no certain remedy we can apply to such
disorders when they arise in republics, it follows that it is impossible
to establish a republic which shall endure always; since in a thousand
unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it.
CHAPTER XVIII.--_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able
to forestall the designs of his Adversary._
It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful and
necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the intentions
and designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come at this
knowledge directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches it by
conjecture. Yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy's designs than
to construe his actions; and not so much those actions which are done
at a distance from us, as those done in our presence and under our very
eyes. For instance, it has often happened that when a battle has lasted
till nightfall, the winner has believed himself the loser, and the loser
has believed himself the winner and that this mistake has led him who
made it to follow a course hurtful to himself. It was from a mistake
of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the battle of Philippi. For
though Brutus was victorious with his wing of the army Cassius, whose
wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be defeated, and under this
belief gave way to despair and slew himself. So too, in our own days, in
the battle fought by Francis, king of France, with the Swiss at Santa
Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell, those of the Swiss who remained
unbroken, not knowing that the rest had been routed and slain, thought
they had the victory; and so believing would not retreat, but, remaining
on the field, renewed the combat the following morning to their great
disadvantage. Nor were they the only sufferers from their mistake,
since the armies of the Pope and of Spain were also misled by it, and
well-nigh brought to destruction. For on the false report of a victory
they crossed the Po, and had they only advanced a little further must
have been made prisoners by the victorious French.
An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps
both of the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being
in command against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the
engagement lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as both
armies had suffered what was almost a defeat, neither returned to their
camp, but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought they
would be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions, one of which
with the consul, the other with the centurion Tempanius by whose valour
the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At daybreak the
consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made straight
for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their own
country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither
thought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so
chanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the
second division of the Roman army, fell in with certain wounded Equians,
from whom he learned that their commanders had fled, abandoning their
camp; on hearing which, he at once returned to the Roman camp and
secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of the Equians, went back
victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned entirely on his being
the first to be informed of the enemy's condition. And here we are to
note that it may often happen that both the one and the other of two
opposed armies shall fall into the same disorder, and be reduced to the
same straits; in which case, that which soonest detects the other's
distress is sure to come off best.
I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own
country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the
territory of Pisa and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who
had undertaken its protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved
to make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the
Florentines in another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a strong
force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona, and seizing on the
village of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of Castiglione which stands
on the height above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines sought to
relieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay round Pisa. They
accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh
squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint
command of Jacopo IV. d'Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio
of Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above
Marradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and
lodged themselves in the village. But when the two armies had confronted
one another for several days, both began to suffer sorely from want of
victuals and other necessaries, and neither of them daring to attack
the other, or knowing to what extremities the other was reduced, both
simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the following morning,
and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella and Faenza, the
Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at daybreak, when both
armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so happened that an old
woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to pass unnoticed, leaving
the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine camp, where were certain
of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit. Learning from her that the
Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine commanders took courage, and
changing their plan, went in pursuit of the enemy as though they had
dislodged them, sending word to Florence that they had repulsed the
Venetians and gained a victory. But in truth this victory was wholly due
to their having notice of the enemy's movements before the latter had
notice of theirs. For had that notice been given to the Venetians first,
it would have wrought against us the same results as it actually wrought
for us.
CHAPTER XIX.--_Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for
controlling a Multitude._
The Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and
commons. Nevertheless, on war breaking out, Quintius and Appius Claudius
were sent forth in command of Roman armies. From his harshness and
severity to his soldiers, Appius was so ill obeyed by them, that after
sustaining what almost amounted to a defeat, he had to resign his
command. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment, kept
his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. From this it might
seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be humane than
haughty, and kindly rather than severe.
And yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors are agreed,
pronounces a contrary opinion where he says, "_In governing a multitude
it avails more to punish than to be compliant._"[1] If it be asked how
these opposite views can be reconciled, I answer that you exercise
authority either over men used to regard you as their equal, or over men
who have always been subject to you. When those over whom you exercise
authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to punishment or to
that severity of which Tacitus speaks. And since in Rome itself the
commons had equal weight with the nobles, none appointed their captain
for a time only, could control them by using harshness and severity.
Accordingly we find that those Roman captains who gained the love of
their soldiers and were considerate of them, often achieved greater
results than those who made themselves feared by them in an unusual
degree, unless, like Manlius Torquatus, these last were endowed with
consummate valour. But he who has to govern subjects such as those of
whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their growing insolent and trampling
upon him by reason of his too great easiness, must resort to punishment
rather than to compliance. Still, to escape hatred, punishment should be
moderate in degree, for to make himself hated is never for the interest
of any prince. And to escape hatred, a prince has chiefly to guard
against tampering with the property of any of his subjects; for where
nothing is to be gained by it, no prince will desire to shed blood,
unless, as seldom happens, constrained to do so by necessity. But where
advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will always flow, and neither
the desire to shed it, nor causes for shedding it will ever be wanting,
as I have fully shown when discussing this subject in another treatise.
Quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than Appius.
Nevertheless the opinion of Tacitus, duly restricted and not understood
as applying to a case like that of Appius, merits approval. But since I
have spoken of punishment and indulgence, it seems not out of place
to show how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the
citizens of Falerii.
[Footnote 1: "In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet."
But compare Annals, III. 55, "Obsequium inde in principem et aemulandi
amoi validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus."]
CHAPTER XX.--_How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii,
than all the might of the Roman Arms._
When the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii, the master of a
school wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught, thinking to
curry favour with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town with
these boys, on pretence of giving them exercise, and bringing them into
the camp where Camillus was, presented them to him, saying, "_To ransom
these that city would yield itself into your hands._" Camillus, however,
not only rejected this offer, but causing the schoolmaster to be
stripped and his hands tied behind him, gave each of the boys a scourge,
and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging him as they
went. When the citizens of Falerii heard of this, so much were they
pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus, that they resolved
to surrender their town to him without further defence.
This authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly
action may sometimes touch men's minds more nearly than a harsh
and cruel one; and that those cities and provinces into which the
instruments and engines of war, with every other violence to which men
resort, have failed to force a way, may be thrown open to a single act
of tenderness, mercy, chastity, or generosity. Whereof history supplies
us with many examples besides the one which I have just now noticed. For
we find that when the arms of Rome were powerless to drive Pyrrhus out
of Italy, he was moved to depart by the generosity of Fabritius in
disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had made the Romans to
poison him. Again, we read how Scipio gained less reputation in Spain by
the capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring a young and
beautiful wife unviolated to her husband; the fame of which action won
him the love of the whole province. We see, too, how much this generous
temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and how much it is
praised by historians and by those who write the lives of princes,
as well as by those who lay down rules of human conduct. Among whom
Xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours, and victories, and
how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus from his being kindly and gracious,
without taint of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other of those
vices which cast a stain upon men's lives.
And yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly opposite to these,
achieved splendid victories and a great renown, I think I am bound to
say something in my next Chapter as to how this happened.
CHAPTER XXI.--_How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary
to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the
other achieved in Spain._
Some, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking a contrary course,
nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued the
methods above spoken of; since it must seem as though success did not
depend on the causes I have named; nay, that if glory and fame are to be
won in other ways, these causes neither add to our strength nor advance
our fortunes. Wherefore, to make my meaning plain, and not to part
company with the men of whom I have been speaking, I say, that as, on
the one hand, we see Scipio enter Spain, and by his humane and generous
conduct at once secure the good-will of the province, and the admiration
and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other hand, we see Hannibal
enter Italy, and by methods wholly opposite, to wit, by violence and
rapine, by cruelty and treachery of every kind, effect in that country
the very same results. For all the States of Italy revolted in his
favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves on his side.
When we seek to know why this was, several reasons present themselves,
the first being that men so passionately love change, that, commonly
speaking, those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are
badly off: for as already has been said with truth, men are pampered by
prosperity, soured by adversity. This love of change, therefore, makes
them open the door to any one who puts himself at the head of new
movements in their country, and if he be a foreigner they adopt his
cause, if a fellow-countryman they gather round him and become his
partisans and supporters; so that whatever methods he may there use, he
will succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men being moved by two
chief passions, love and fear, he who makes himself feared commands with
no less authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as a rule, is
followed and obeyed more implicitly than the other. It matters little,
however, which of these two ways a captain chooses to follow, provided
he be of transcendent valour, and has thereby won for himself a great
name For when, like Hannibal or Scipio, a man is very valiant, this
quality will cloak any error he may commit in seeking either to be too
much loved or too much feared. Yet from each of these two tendencies,
grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a prince, may arise.
For he who would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so little from the
right road, becomes contemptible; while he who would be greatly feared,
if he go a jot too far, incurs hatred. And since it is impossible, our
nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean, it is essential
that any excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour, as it was in
Hannibal and Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while they were
exalted by the methods they followed, were also injured by them. How
they were exalted has been shown. The injury which Scipio suffered was,
that in Spain his soldiers, in concert with certain of his allies, rose
against him, for no other reason than that they stood in no fear of him.
For men are so restless, that if ever so small a door be opened to their
ambition, they forthwith forget all the love they have borne their
prince in return for his graciousness and goodness, as did these
soldiers and allies of Scipio; when, to correct the mischief, he was
forced to use something of a cruelty foreign to his nature.
As to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his
cruelty or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him;
but we may well believe that Naples and other towns which remained loyal
to the Roman people, did so by reason of the dread which his character
inspired. This, however, is abundantly clear, that his inhumanity made
him more detested by the Romans than any other enemy they ever had; so
that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy with his army, they gave up the traitor
who offered to poison him, Hannibal, even when disarmed and a fugitive,
they never forgave, until they had compassed his death.
To Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious, perfidious,
and cruel, these disadvantages resulted; but, on the other hand,
there accrued to him one great gain, noticed with admiration by all
historians, namely, that in his army, although made up of men of every
race and country, no dissensions ever broke out among the soldiers
themselves, nor any mutiny against their leader. This we can only
ascribe to the awe which his character inspired, which together with the
great name his valour had won for him, had the effect of keeping his
soldiers quiet and united. I repeat, therefore, that it is of little
moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with such
valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts. For, as I
have said, there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless
corrected by extraordinary valour.
And now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal, the former of whom
by praiseworthy, the latter by odious qualities, effected the same
results, I must not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two Roman
citizens, who by different, yet both by honourable methods, obtained a
like glory.
Chapter XXII.--_That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the
gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory._
There lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent captains, Manlius
Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in their triumphs and in their
renown, and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed
against the enemy; but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment
of their soldiers, followed very different methods. For Manlius, in
his command, resorted to every kind of severity, never sparing his men
fatigue, nor remitting punishment; while Valerius, on the contrary,
treated them with all kindness and consideration, and was easy and
familiar in his intercourse with them. So that while the one, to secure
the obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to death, the other never
dealt harshly with any man. Yet, for all this diversity in their modes
of acting, each had the same success against the enemy, and each
obtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself. For
no soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle, or rose in mutiny against
them, or in any particular opposed their will; though the commands of
Manlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour came to
be spoken of as a _Manlian order_.
Here, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius was obliged to
use such severity; next, why Valerius could behave so humanely; thirdly,
how it was that these opposite methods had the same results; and lastly,
which of the two methods it is better and more useful for us to follow.
Now, if we well examine the character of Manlius from the moment when
Titus Livius first begins to make mention of him, we shall find him to
have been endowed with a rare vigour both of mind and body, dutiful in
his behaviour to his father and to his country, and most reverent to his
superiors. All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, in his defence of
his father against the tribune, and in the words in which, before
going forth to fight the Gaul, he addressed the consul, when he said,
"_Although assured of victory, never will I without thy bidding engage
an enemy._" But when such a man as this attains to command, he looks to
find all others like himself; his dauntless spirit prompts him to engage
in daring enterprises, and to insist on their being carried out. And
this is certain, that where things hard to execute are ordered to be
done, the order must be enforced with sternness, since, otherwise, it
will be disobeyed.
And here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to
command, and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured their
power to enforce, with the willingness of others to yield obedience; and
who issue their orders when they find these conditions combining, but,
otherwise, abstain. Wherefore, a wise man was wont to say that to hold a
republic by force, there must be a proportion between him who uses the
force and him against whom it is used; and that while this proportion
obtains the force will operate; but that when he who suffers is stronger
than he who uses the force, we may expect to see it brought to an end at
any moment.
But returning to the matter in hand, I say that to command things hard
of execution, requires hardness in him who gives the command, and that a
man of this temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to enforce
them by gentleness. He who is not of such a temper must be careful not
to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty, but may use his natural
gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For common punishments are
not imputed to the prince, but to the laws and ordinances which he has
to administer.
We must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act with
severity by the unusual character of the commands which his natural
disposition prompted him to issue. Such commands are useful in a
republic, as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and
excellence. And were a republic, as I have before observed, fortunate
enough to come frequently under the influence of men who, by their
example, reinforce its laws, and not only retard its progress towards
corruption, but bring it back to its first perfection, it might endure
for ever.
Manlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity of their commands
maintained the military discipline of Rome; urged thereto, in the first
place, by his natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever he
was minded to command should be done. Valerius, on the other hand, could
afford to act humanely, because for him it was enough if all were done
which in a Roman army it was customary to do. And, since the customs of
that army were good customs, they sufficed to gain him honour, while at
the same time their maintenance cost him no effort, nor threw on him the
burthen of punishing transgressors; as well because there were none who
trangressed, as because had there been any, they would, as I have said,
have imputed their punishment to the ordinary rules of discipline, and
not to the severity of their commander. In this way Valerius had room
to exercise that humane disposition which enabled him at once to gain
influence over his soldiers and to content them. Hence it was that both
these captains obtaining the same obedience, could, while following
different methods, arrive at the same ends. Those, however, who seek to
imitate them may chance to fall into the errors of which I have already
spoken, in connection with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding contempt
or hatred, and which are only to be corrected by the presence of
extraordinary valour, and not otherwise.
It rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be
commended. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods
have their advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid down rules
for the conduct of princes, describe a character approaching more nearly
to that of Valerius than to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom I have
already cited, while giving many instances of the humanity of Cyrus,
conforms closely to what Livius tells us of Valerius. For Valerius being
made consul against the Samnites, on the eve of battle spoke to his men
with the same kindliness with which he always treated them; and Livius,
after telling us what he said, remarks of him: "_Never was there a
leader more familiar with his men; cheerfully sharing with the meanest
among them every hardship and fatigue. Even in the military games,
wherein those of the same rank were wont to make trial of their
strength or swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a part, nor disdain
any adversary who offered; meeting victory or defeat with an unruffled
temper and an unchanged countenance. When called on to act, his bounty
and generosity never fell short. When he had to speak, he was as mindful
of the feelings of others as of his own dignity. And, what more than
anything else secures the popular favour, he maintained when exercising
his magistracies the same bearing he had worn in seeking them._"
Of Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable terms, pointing
out that his severity in putting his son to death brought the Roman army
to that pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against the
Latins, nay, he goes so far in his praises that after describing the
whole order of the battle, comparing the strength of both armies, and
showing all the dangers the Romans ran, and the difficulties they had to
surmount, he winds up by saying, that it was the valour of Manlius which
alone gained for them this great victory, and that whichever side had
Manlius for its leader must have won the day. So that weighing all that
the historians tell us of these two captains, it might be difficult to
decide between them.