Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius - Niccolo Machiavelli
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The ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until the
Romans began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of Italy and
to countries beyond its shores; after which it seemed for a time to
slumber--and this, because the lands held by the enemies of Rome, out of
sight of her citizens and too remote to be conveniently cultivated, came
to be less desired. Whereupon the Romans grew less eager to punish their
enemies by dividing their lands, and were content, when they deprived
any city of its territory, to send colonists to occupy it. For causes
such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down to the time of the
Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the liberty of
Rome. For as it found the power of its adversaries doubled, such a flame
of hatred was kindled between commons and senate, that, regardless of
all civil restraints, they resorted to arms and bloodshed. And as the
public magistrates were powerless to provide a remedy, each of the two
factions having no longer any hopes from them, resolved to do what it
could for itself, and to set up a chief for its own protection. On
reaching this stage of tumult and disorder, the commons lent their
influence to Marius, making him four times consul; whose authority,
lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals, became so firmly
rooted that he was able to make himself consul other three times.
Against this scourge, the nobles, lacking other defence, set themselves
to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their faction, entered
on the civil wars; wherein, after much blood had been spilt, and after
many changes of fortune, they got the better of their adversaries. But
afterwards, in the time of Caesar and Pompey, the distemper broke out
afresh; for Caesar heading the Marian party, and Pompey, that of Sylla,
and war ensuing, the victory remained with Caesar, who was the first
tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was never again free. Such,
therefore, was the beginning and such the end of the Agrarian Law.
But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the
commons and senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to
laws favourable to freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the
Agrarian Law are opposed to that view. I am not, however, led to alter
my opinion on this account; for I maintain that the ambition of the
great is so pernicious that unless controlled and counteracted in a
variety of ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin. So that if
the controversy over the Agrarian Laws took three hundred years to
bring Rome to slavery, she would in all likelihood have been brought to
slavery in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means of this
law, and by other demands, constantly restrained the ambition of the
nobles.
We may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than
honours; for in the matter of honours, the Roman nobles always gave way
to the commons without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came to
be a question of property, so stubborn were they in its defence, that
the commons to effect their ends had to resort to those irregular
methods which have been described above. Of which irregularities the
prime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives are more to be commended
than their measures; since to pass a law with stringent retrospective
effect, in order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic, is
an unwise step, and one which, as I have already shown at length, can
have no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the abuse
leads; whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops more slowly,
or else, in course of time, and before it comes to a head, dies out of
itself.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.--_That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and
that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice._
A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and
Volscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations,
therefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians
and laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were
forced to make their case known to the Romans, and to ask to be defended
by them. The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the pestilence,
answered that they must look to their own defence, and with their own
forces, since Rome was in no position to succour them.
Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate,
and how at all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the
responsibility of determining the course their country should take; and
were not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on a course contrary to that
which was usual with them, or which they had decided to follow on some
other occasion. I say this because on other occasions this same senate
had forbidden these nations to defend themselves; and a less prudent
assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw that
prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of things,
and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So that,
although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend their
subjects, and equally distasteful--both for the reasons given, and for
others which may be understood--that their subjects should take up arms
in their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have recourse to
arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took an honourable
course in deciding that what had to be done should be done with their
leave, lest men driven to disobey by necessity should come afterwards to
disobey from choice. And although this may seem the course which every
republic ought reasonably to follow, nevertheless weak and badly-advised
republics cannot make up their minds to follow it, not knowing how to do
themselves honour in like extremities.
After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to his
terms, desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of his
people to Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A
council was held in Florence to consider how this request should be
dealt with, but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being
granted. Wherein the Roman method was not followed. For as the Duke had
a very strong force with him, while the Florentines were so bare of
troops that they could not have prevented his passage, it would have
been far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their
consent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, while
discredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less
by acceding to his demand.
But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for
then whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if
by chance it should do anything well, this will be set down to necessity
and not to prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances happening
in our own times, and in our own country. In the year 1500, King Louis
of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous to restore Pisa to the
Florentines, so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty thousand
ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being completed,
sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though a Frenchman, the
Florentines put much trust. Beaumont accordingly took up his position
with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in readiness to attack
the town. After he had been there for some days making arrangements for
the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa offering to surrender their
city to the French if a promise were given in the king's name, not
to hand it over to the Florentines until four months had run. This
condition was absolutely rejected by the Florentines, and the siege
being proceeded with, they were forced to retire with disgrace. Now the
proposal of the Pisans was rejected by the Florentines for no other
reason than that they distrusted the good faith of the King, into whose
hands their weakness obliged them to commit themselves, and did not
reflect how much more it was for their interest that, by obtaining
entrance into Pisa, he should have it in his power to restore the town
to them, or, failing to restore it, should at once disclose his designs,
than that remaining outside he should put them off with promises for
which they had to pay. It would therefore have been a far better course
for the Florentines to have agreed to Beaumont taking possession on
whatever terms.
This was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the
revolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French
troops to assist the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and began
to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were willing
to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms was
strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and thinking
that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took the entire
settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without consulting
the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to his own
satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his army. And
he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and ignorant of
the ways of the world; since if they desired to have Arezzo, they could
signify their wishes to the King, who would be much better able to give
it them when he had his soldiers inside, than when he had them outside
the town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never ceased to blame and abuse
M. Imbalt, until at last they came to see that if Beaumont had acted
in the same way, they would have got possession Of Pisa as well as of
Arezzo.
Applying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that
irresolute republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise courses;
for wherever there is room for doubt, their weakness will not suffer
them to come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be overcome by
some superior force which impels them forward, they remain always in
suspense.
CHAPTER XXXIX.--_That often the same Accidents are seen to befall
different Nations._
Any one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that
in all cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and
passions as always have prevailed; for which reason it should be an easy
matter for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee those
which are about to happen in any republic, and to apply such remedies as
the ancients have used in like cases; or finding none which have been
used by them, to strike out new ones, such as they might have used
in similar circumstances. But these lessons being neglected or not
understood by readers, or, if understood by them, being unknown to
rulers, it follows that the same disorders are common to all times.
In the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having lost a portion of its
territories, including Pisa and other towns, was forced to make war
against those who had taken possession of them, who being powerful, it
followed that great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose.
This large expenditure had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion
to numberless complaints on the part of the people; and inasmuch as the
war was conducted by a council of ten citizens, who were styled "the Ten
of the War," the multitude began to regard these with displeasure, as
though they were the cause of the war and of the consequent expenditure;
and at last persuaded themselves that if they got rid of this magistracy
there would be an end to the war. Wherefore when the magistracy of
"the Ten" should have been renewed, the people did not renew it, but,
suffering it to lapse, entrusted their affairs to the "Signory." This
course was most pernicious, since not only did it fail to put an end to
the war, as the people expected it would, but by setting aside men who
had conducted it with prudence, led to such mishaps that not Pisa only,
but Arezzo also, and many other towns besides were lost to Florence.
Whereupon, the people recognizing their mistake, and that the evil was
in the disease and not in the physician, reinstated the magistracy of
the Ten.
Similar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the consular authority.
For the people seeing one war follow another, and that they were never
allowed to rest, when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of
neighbouring nations who desired their overthrow, ascribed it to the
ambition of the nobles, who, as they believed, being unable to wreak
their hatred against them within the city, where they were protected by
the power of the tribunes, sought to lead them outside the city, where
they were under the authority of the consuls, that they might crush them
where they were without help. In which belief they thought it necessary
either to get rid of the consuls altogether, or so to restrict their
powers as to leave them no authority over the people, either in the city
or out of it.
The first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune
Terentillus, who proposed that a committee of five should be named to
consider and regulate the power of the consuls. This roused the anger of
the nobles, to whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority
was about to set for ever, and that no part would be left them in the
administration of the republic. Such, however, was the obstinacy of the
tribunes, that they succeeded in abolishing the consular title, nor were
satisfied until, after other changes, it was resolved that, in room of
consuls, tribunes should be appointed with consular powers; so much
greater was their hatred of the name than of the thing. For a long
time matters remained on this footing; till eventually, the commons,
discovering their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in the
same way as the Florentines reverted to "the Ten of the War."
CHAPTER XL.--_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what
therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the
same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._
It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in Rome
on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of all to
relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to discuss
those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve notice.
These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by those who
would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those who would
subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be seen that many
mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate and people, and
that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief decemvir, prejudicial
to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish in Rome.
After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles
as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be
better secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by
general consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws
which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might
serve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next
step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft
the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members,
among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was
appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws
might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in
particular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the appeal
to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be absolute
in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners came to
be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held by
the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel
persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his
bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and
disposition.
This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by
no more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom
the rest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute
authority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they
cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their
laws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed
them publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any
defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they
were finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified
throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the
laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would
consent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the
people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated,
and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without the
aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges in
criminal cases.
On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set to
canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such cordiality
did he display towards the commons while seeking their votes, that
the other candidates, "_unable to persuade themselves that so much
affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly disinterested,_"
began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him openly, sought to
circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the youngest of them all,
to declare to the people the names of the proposed decemvirs; thinking
that he would not venture to name himself, that being an unusual course
in Rome, and held discreditable. "_But what they meant as a hindrance,
he turned to account,_" by proposing, to the surprise and displeasure of
the whole nobility, his own name first, and then nominating nine others
on whose support he thought he could depend.
The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made,
Appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had
committed, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance to
appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit;
who, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors,
appointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were
directed against high and low alike; but presently they began to
intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the
latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to
another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.
The commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn
their eyes towards the nobles, "_and to look for a breeze of freedom
from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the
republic to its present straits._" To the nobles the sufferings of the
commons were not displeasing, from the hope "_that disgusted with the
existing state of affairs, they too might come to desire the restoration
of the consuls._"
When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an
end, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet
been published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their
magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering round
them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they enriched
with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned. "_Corrupted
by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence to public
freedom._"
It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir up
a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned that
the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position. For
without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by
assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority.
Nevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter
course. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly
Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the decemvirs,
whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the senate
through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their authority.
For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office of their own
free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore they decided
for war, and sent forth the armies under command of certain of the
decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the city, it so fell
out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that when he sought to
lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to save her from
dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome, and mutiny
among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest of the
plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there remained
until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and consuls
being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient freedom.
In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of
creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly
give rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the
people for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to
govern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to
freedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man,
and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the
creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers,
from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name,
and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the
appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius had
become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the nobles,
they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to commit this
error of lending its support to some one man, in order that he may
attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he will
inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until, with
the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles, and
will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have
been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they
recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for
help.
Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully
established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power
would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly
opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For
in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to
those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him
in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought
friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it be
the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which finds
itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who can
never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by reason of
their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours or wealth
enough to satisfy them all.
In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius
committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given,
as because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be
stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those
tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the nobles
for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the people for
their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in the former
case their authority has the stronger support. For with such support a
ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his State, as did
Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and by the whole of
Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were few in number,
and having the people on his side, he was able with their assistance to
defend himself; which he could not have done had they been against him.
But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant has few friends, its
internal strength will not avail him for its defence, and he will have
to seek aid from without in one of three shapes. For either he must hire
foreign guards to defend his person; or he must arm the peasantry, so
that they may play the part which ought to be played by the citizens; or
he must league with powerful neighbours for his defence. He who follows
these methods and observes them well, may contrive to save himself,
though he has the people for his enemy. But Appius could not follow the
plan of gaining over the peasantry, since in Rome they and the people
were one. And what he might have done he knew not how to do, and so was
ruined at the very outset.