The Works of Samuel Johnson, Vol. 6 - Samuel Johnson
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To this influence, and to this only, are to be attributed all the
cessions and submissions of the Indian princes, if, indeed, any such
cessions were ever made, of which we have no witness, but those who
claim from them; and there is no great malignity in suspecting, that
those who have robbed have also lied.
Some colonies, indeed, have been established more peaceably than others.
The utmost extremity of wrong has not always been practised; but those
that have settled in the new world, on the fairest terms, have no other
merit than that of a scrivener, who ruins in silence, over a plunderer
that seizes by force; all have taken what had other owners, and all have
had recourse to arms, rather than quit the prey on which they had
fastened.
The American dispute, between the French and us, is, therefore, only the
quarrel of two robbers for the spoils of a passenger; but, as robbers
have terms of confederacy, which they are obliged to observe, as members
of the gang, so the English and French may have relative rights, and do
injustice to each other, while both are injuring the Indians. And such,
indeed, is the present contest: they have parted the northern continent
of America between them, and are now disputing about their boundaries,
and each is endeavouring the destruction of the other, by the help of
the Indians, whose interest it is that both should be destroyed.
Both nations clamour, with great vehemence, about infractions of limits,
violation of treaties, open usurpation, insidious artifices, and breach
of faith. The English rail at the perfidious French, and the French at
the encroaching English: they quote treaties on each side, charge each
other with aspiring to universal monarchy, and complain, on either part,
of the insecurity of possession near such turbulent neighbours.
Through this mist of controversy, it can raise no wonder, that the truth
is not easily discovered. When a quarrel has been long carried on
between individuals, it is often very hard to tell by whom it was begun.
Every fact is darkened by distance, by interest, and by multitudes.
Information is not easily procured from far; those whom the truth will
not favour, will not step, voluntarily, forth to tell it; and where
there are many agents, it is easy for every single action to be
concealed.
All these causes concur to the obscurity of the question: By whom were
hostilities in America commenced? Perhaps there never can be remembered
a time, in which hostilities had ceased. Two powerful colonies, inflamed
with immemorial rivalry, and placed out of the superintendence of the
mother nations, were not likely to be long at rest. Some opposition was
always going forward, some mischief was every day done or meditated, and
the borderers were always better pleased with what they could snatch
from their neighbours, than what they had of their own.
In this disposition to reciprocal invasion, a cause of dispute never
could be wanting. The forests and deserts of America are without
landmarks, and, therefore, cannot be particularly specified in
stipulations; the appellations of those wide-extended regions have, in
every mouth, a different meaning, and are understood, on either side, as
inclination happens to contract or extend them. Who has yet pretended to
define, how much of America is included in Brazil, Mexico, or Peru? It
is almost as easy to divide the Atlantick ocean by a line, as clearly to
ascertain the limits of those uncultivated, uninhabitable, unmeasured
regions.
It is, likewise, to be considered, that contracts concerning boundaries
are often left vague and indefinite, without necessity, by the desire of
each party, to interpret the ambiguity to its own advantage, when a fit
opportunity shall be found. In forming stipulations, the commissaries
are often ignorant, and often negligent; they are, sometimes, weary with
debate, and contract a tedious discussion into general terms, or refer
it to a former treaty, which was never understood. The weaker part is
always afraid of requiring explanations, and the stronger always has an
interest in leaving the question undecided: thus it will happen, without
great caution on either side, that, after long treaties, solemnly
ratified, the rights that had been disputed are still equally open to
controversy.
In America, it may easily be supposed, that there are tracts of land not
yet claimed by either party, and, therefore, mentioned in no treaties;
which yet one, or the other, may be afterwards inclined to occupy; but
to these vacant and unsettled countries each nation may pretend, as each
conceives itself entitled to all that is not expressly granted to the
other.
Here, then, is a perpetual ground of contest; every enlargement of the
possessions of either will be considered as something taken from the
other, and each will endeavour to regain what had never been claimed,
but that the other occupied it.
Thus obscure in its original is the American contest. It is difficult to
find the first invader, or to tell where invasion properly begins; but,
I suppose, it is not to be doubted, that after the last war, when the
French had made peace with such apparent superiority, they naturally
began to treat us with less respect in distant parts of the world, and
to consider us, as a people from whom they had nothing to fear, and who
could no longer presume to contravene their designs, or to check their
progress.
The power of doing wrong with impunity seldom waits long for the will;
and, it is reasonable to believe, that, in America, the French would
avow their purpose of aggrandizing themselves with, at least, as little
reserve as in Europe. We may, therefore, readily believe, that they were
unquiet neighbours, and had no great regard to right, which they
believed us no longer able to enforce.
That in forming a line of forts behind our colonies, if in no other part
of their attempt, they had acted against the general intention, if not
against the literal terms of treaties, can scarcely be denied; for it
never can be supposed, that we intended to be inclosed between the sea
and the French garrisons, or preclude ourselves from extending our
plantations backwards, to any length that our convenience should
require.
With dominion is conferred every thing that can secure dominion. He that
has the coast, has, likewise, the sea, to a certain distance; he that
possesses a fortress, has the right of prohibiting another fortress to
be built within the command of its cannon. When, therefore, we planted
the coast of North America, we supposed the possession of the inland
region granted to an indefinite extent; and every nation that settled in
that part of the world, seems, by the permission of every other nation,
to have made the same supposition in its own favour.
Here, then, perhaps, it will be safest to fix the justice of our cause;
here we are apparently and indisputably injured, and this injury may,
according to the practice of nations, be justly resented. Whether we
have not, in return, made some encroachments upon them, must be left
doubtful, till our practices on the Ohio shall be stated and vindicated.
There are no two nations, confining on each other, between whom a war
may not always be kindled with plausible pretences on either part, as
there is always passing between them a reciprocation of injuries, and
fluctuation of encroachments.
From the conclusion of the last peace, perpetual complaints of the
supplantations and invasions of the French have been sent to Europe,
from our colonies, and transmitted to our ministers at Paris, where good
words were, sometimes, given us, and the practices of the American
commanders were, sometimes, disowned; but no redress was ever obtained,
nor is it probable, that any prohibition was sent to America. We were
still amused with such doubtful promises, as those who are afraid of war
are ready to interpret in their own favour, and the French pushed
forward their line of fortresses, and seemed to resolve, that before our
complaints were finally dismissed, all remedy should be hopeless.
We, likewise, endeavoured, at the same time, to form a barrier against
the Canadians, by sending a colony to New Scotland, a cold uncomfortable
tract of ground; of which we had long the nominal possession, before we
really began to occupy it. To this, those were invited whom the
cessation of war deprived of employment, and made burdensome to their
country; and settlers were allured thither by many fallacious
descriptions of fertile valleys and clear skies. What effects these
pictures of American happiness had upon my countrymen, I was never
informed, but, I suppose, very few sought provision in those frozen
regions, whom guilt, or poverty, did not drive from their native
country. About the boundaries of this new colony there were some
disputes; but, as there was nothing yet worth a contest, the power of
the French was not much exerted on that side; some disturbance was,
however, given, and some skirmishes ensued. But, perhaps, being peopled
chiefly with soldiers, who would rather live by plunder than by
agriculture, and who consider war as their best trade, New Scotland
would be more obstinately defended than some settlements of far greater
value; and the French are too well informed of their own interest, to
provoke hostility for no advantage, or to select that country for
invasion, where they must hazard much and can win little. They,
therefore, pressed on southward, behind our ancient and wealthy
settlements, and built fort after fort, at such distances that they
might conveniently relieve one another, invade our colonies with sudden
incursions, and retire to places of safety, before our people could
unite to oppose them.
This design of the French has been long formed, and long known, both in
America and Europe, and might, at first, have been easily repressed, had
force been used instead of expostulation. When the English attempted a
settlement upon the island of St. Lucia, the French, whether justly or
not, considering it as neutral, and forbidden to be occupied by either
nation, immediately landed upon it, and destroyed the houses, wasted the
plantations, and drove, or carried away, the inhabitants. This was done
in the time of peace, when mutual professions of friendship were daily
exchanged by the two courts, and was not considered as any violation of
treaties, nor was any more than a very soft remonstrance made on our
part.
The French, therefore, taught us how to act; but an Hanoverian quarrel
with the house of Austria, for some time, induced us to court, at any
expense, the alliance of a nation, whose very situation makes them our
enemies. We suffered them to destroy our settlements, and to advance
their own, which we had an equal right to attack. The time, however,
came, at last, when we ventured to quarrel with Spain, and then France
no longer suffered the appearance of peace to subsist between us, but
armed in defence of her ally.
The events of the war are well known: we pleased ourselves with a
victory at Dettingen, where we left our wounded men to the care of our
enemies, but our army was broken at Fontenoy and Val; and though, after
the disgrace which we suffered in the Mediterranean, we had some naval
success, and an accidental dearth made peace necessary for the French,
yet they prescribed the conditions, obliged us to give hostages, and
acted as conquerors, though as conquerors of moderation.
In this war the Americans distinguished themselves in a manner unknown
and unexpected. The New English raised an army, and, under the command
of Pepperel, took cape Breton, with the assistance of the fleet. This is
the most important fortress in America. We pleased ourselves so much
with the acquisition, that we could not think of restoring it; and,
among the arguments used to inflame the people against Charles Stuart,
it was very clamorously urged, that if he gained the kingdom, he would
give cape Breton back to the French.
The French, however, had a more easy expedient to regain cape Breton,
than by exalting Charles Stuart to the English throne. They took, in
their turn, fort St. George, and had our East India company wholly in
their power, whom they restored, at the peace, to their former
possessions, that they may continue to export our silver.
Cape Breton, therefore, was restored, and the French were reestablished
in America, with equal power and greater spirit, having lost nothing by
the war, which they had before gained.
To the general reputation of their arms, and that habitual superiority
which they derive from it, they owe their power in America, rather than
to any real strength or circumstances of advantage. Their numbers are
yet not great; their trade, though daily improved, is not very
extensive; their country is barren; their fortresses, though numerous,
are weak, and rather shelters from wild beasts, or savage nations, than
places built for defence against bombs or cannons. Cape Breton has been
found not to be impregnable; nor, if we consider the state of the places
possessed by the two nations in America, is there any reason upon which
the French should have presumed to molest us, but that they thought our
spirit so broken, that we durst not resist them; and in this opinion our
long forbearance easily confirmed them.
We forgot, or rather avoided to think, that what we delayed to do, must
be done at last, and done with more difficulty, as it was delayed
longer; that while we were complaining, and they were eluding, or
answering our complaints, fort was rising upon fort, and one invasion
made a precedent for another.
This confidence of the French is exalted by some real advantages. If
they possess, in those countries, less than we, they have more to gain,
and less to hazard; if they are less numerous, they are better united.
The French compose one body with one head. They have all the same
interest, and agree to pursue it by the same means. They are subject to
a governour, commissioned by an absolute monarch, and participating the
authority of his master. Designs are, therefore, formed without debate,
and executed without impediment. They have yet more martial than
mercantile ambition, and seldom suffer their military schemes to be
entangled with collateral projects of gain: they have no wish but for
conquest, of which they justly consider riches as the consequence.
Some advantages they will always have, as invaders. They make war at the
hazard of their enemies: the contest being carried on in our
territories, we must lose more by a victory, than they will suffer by a
defeat. They will subsist, while they stay, upon our plantations; and,
perhaps, destroy them, when they can stay no longer. If we pursue them,
and carry the war into their dominions, our difficulties will increase
every step as we advance, for we shall leave plenty behind us, and find
nothing in Canada, but lakes and forests, barren and trackless; our
enemies will shut themselves up in their forts, against which it is
difficult to bring cannon through so rough a country, and which, if they
are provided with good magazines, will soon starve those who besiege
them.
All these are the natural effects of their government and situation;
they are accidentally more formidable, as they are less happy. But the
favour of the Indians, which they enjoy, with very few exceptions, among
all the nations of the northern continent, we ought to consider with
other thoughts; this favour we might have enjoyed, if we had been
careful to deserve it. The French, by having these savage nations on
their side, are always supplied with spies and guides, and with
auxiliaries, like the Tartars to the Turks, or the Hussars to the
Germans, of no great use against troops ranged in order of battle, but
very well qualified to maintain a war among woods and rivulets, where
much mischief may be done by unexpected onsets, and safety be obtained
by quick retreats. They can waste a colony by sudden inroads, surprise
the straggling planters, frighten the inhabitants into towns, hinder the
cultivation of lands, and starve those whom they are not able to conquer
[24].
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL STATE OF GREAT BRITAIN.
Written in the year 1756 [25].
The present system of English politicks may properly be said to have
taken rise in the reign of queen Elizabeth. At this time the protestant
religion was established, which naturally allied us to the reformed
state, and made all the popish powers our enemies.
We began in the same reign to extend our trade, by which we made it
necessary to ourselves to watch the commercial progress of our
neighbours; and if not to incommode and obstruct their traffick, to
hinder them from impairing ours.
We then, likewise, settled colonies in America, which was become the
great scene of European ambition; for, seeing with what treasures the
Spaniards were annually enriched from Mexico and Peru, every nation
imagined, that an American conquest, or plantation, would certainly fill
the mother country with gold and silver. This produced a large extent of
very distant dominions, of which we, at this time, neither knew nor
foresaw the advantage or incumbrance; we seem to have snatched them into
our hands, upon no very just principles of policy, only because every
state, according to a prejudice of long continuance, concludes itself
more powerful, as its territories become larger.
The discoveries of new regions, which were then every day made, the
profit of remote traffick, and the necessity of long voyages, produced,
in a few years, a great multiplication of shipping. The sea was
considered as the wealthy element; and, by degrees, a new kind of
sovereignty arose, called naval dominion.
As the chief trade of the world, so the chief maritime power was at
first in the hands of the Portuguese and Spaniards, who, by a compact,
to which the consent of other princes was not asked, had divided the
newly discovered countries between them; but the crown of Portugal
having fallen to the king of Spain, or being seized by him, he was
master of the ships of the two nations, with which he kept all the
coasts of Europe in alarm, till the armada, which he had raised, at a
vast expense, for the conquest of England, was destroyed, which put a
stop, and almost an end, to the naval power of the Spaniards.
At this time, the Dutch, who were oppressed by the Spaniards, and feared
yet greater evils than they felt, resolved no longer to endure the
insolence of their masters: they, therefore, revolted; and, after a
struggle, in which they were assisted by the money and forces of
Elizabeth, erected an independent and powerful commonwealth.
When the inhabitants of the Low Countries had formed their system of
government, and some remission of the war gave them leisure to form
schemes of future prosperity, they easily perceived, that, as their
territories were narrow, and their numbers small, they could preserve
themselves only by that power which is the consequence of wealth; and
that, by a people whose country produced only the necessaries of life,
wealth was not to be acquired, but from foreign dominions, and by the
transportation of the products of one country into another.
From this necessity, thus justly estimated, arose a plan of commerce,
which was, for many years, prosecuted with industry and success, perhaps
never seen in the world before, and by which the poor tenants of
mud-walled villages, and impassable bogs, erected themselves into high
and mighty states, who put the greatest monarchs at defiance, whose
alliance was courted by the proudest, and whose power was dreaded by the
fiercest nation. By the establishment of this state, there arose, to
England, a new ally, and a new rival.
At this time, which seems to be the period destined for the change of
the face of Europe, France began first to rise into power, and, from
defending her own provinces with difficulty and fluctuating success, to
threaten her neighbours with encroachments and devastations. Henry the
fourth having, after a long struggle, obtained the crown, found it easy
to govern nobles, exhausted and wearied with a long civil war, and
having composed the disputes between the protestants and papists, so as
to obtain, at least, a truce for both parties, was at leisure to
accumulate treasure, and raise forces, which he purposed to have
employed in a design of settling for ever the balance of Europe. Of this
great scheme he lived not to see the vanity, or to feel the
disappointment; for he was murdered in the midst of his mighty
preparations.
The French, however, were, in this reign, taught to know their own
power; and the great designs of a king, whose wisdom they had so long
experienced, even though they were not brought to actual experiment,
disposed them to consider themselves as masters of the destiny of their
neighbours; and, from that time, he that shall nicely examine their
schemes and conduct, will, I believe, find that they began to take an
air of superiority, to which they had never pretended before; and that
they have been always employed, more or less openly, upon schemes of
dominion, though with frequent interruptions from domestick troubles,
and with those intermissions which human counsels must always suffer, as
men intrusted with great affairs are dissipated in youth, and languid in
age; are embarrassed by competitors, or, without any external reason,
change their minds.
France was now no longer in dread of insults, and invasions from
England. She was not only able to maintain her own territories, but
prepared, on all occasions, to invade others; and we had now a
neighbour, whose interest it was to be an enemy, and who has disturbed
us, from that time to this, with open hostility, or secret machinations.
Such was the state of England, and its neighbours, when Elizabeth left
the crown to James of Scotland. It has not, I think, been frequently
observed, by historians, at how critical a time the union of the two
kingdoms happened. Had England and Scotland continued separate kingdoms,
when France was established in the full possession of her natural power,
the Scots, in continuance of the league, which it would now have been
more than ever their interest to observe, would, upon every instigation
of the French court, have raised an army with French money, and harassed
us with an invasion, in which they would have thought themselves
successful, whatever numbers they might have left behind them. To a
people warlike and indigent, an incursion into a rich country is never
hurtful. The pay of France, and the plunder of the northern countries,
would always have tempted them to hazard their lives, and we should have
been under a necessity of keeping a line of garrisons along our border.
This trouble, however, we escaped, by the accession of king James; but
it is uncertain, whether his natural disposition did not injure us more
than this accidental condition happened to benefit us. He was a man of
great theoretical knowledge, but of no practical wisdom; he was very
well able to discern the true interest of himself, his kingdom, and his
posterity, but sacrificed it, upon all occasions, to his present
pleasure or his present ease; so conscious of his own knowledge and
abilities, that he would not suffer a minister to govern, and so lax of
attention, and timorous of opposition, that he was not able to govern
for himself. With this character, James quietly saw the Dutch invade our
commerce; the French grew every day stronger and stronger; and the
protestant interest, of which he boasted himself the head, was oppressed
on every side, while he writ, and hunted, and despatched ambassadours,
who, when their master's weakness was once known, were treated, in
foreign courts, with very little ceremony. James, however, took care to
be flattered at home, and was neither angry nor ashamed at the
appearance that he made in other countries.
Thus England grew weaker, or, what is, in political estimation, the same
thing, saw her neighbours grow stronger, without receiving
proportionable additions to her own power. Not that the mischief was so
great as it is generally conceived or represented; for, I believe, it
may be made to appear, that the wealth of the nation was, in this reign,
very much increased, though, that of the crown was lessened. Our
reputation for war was impaired; but commerce seems to have been carried
on with great industry and vigour, and nothing was wanting, but that we
should have defended ourselves from the encroachments of our neighbours.
The inclination to plant colonies in America still continued, and this
being the only project in which men of adventure and enterprise could
exert their qualities, in a pacifick reign, multitudes, who were
discontented with their condition in their native country, and such
multitudes there will always be, sought relief, or, at least, a change,
in the western regions, where they settled, in the northern part of the
continent, at a distance from the Spaniards, at that time almost the
only nation that had any power or will to obstruct us.