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The History of Rome (Volumes 1 5) - Theodor Mommsen

T >> Theodor Mommsen >> The History of Rome (Volumes 1 5)

The happy idea occurred to the Romans that they might make up for
what their vessels, with their unpractised officers and crews,
necessarily lacked in ability of manoeuvring, by again assigning a
more considerable part in naval warfare to the soldiers. They
stationed at the prow of each vessel a flying bridge, which could be
lowered in front or on either side; it was furnished on both sides
with parapets, and had space for two men in front. When the enemy's
vessel was sailing up to strike the Roman one, or was lying alongside
of it after the thrust had been evaded, the bridge on deck was
suddenly lowered and fastened to its opponent by means of a grappling-
iron: this not only prevented the running down, but enabled the Roman
marines to pass along the bridge to the enemy's deck and to carry it
by assault as in a conflict on land. No distinct body of marines
was formed, but land troops were employed, when required, for this
maritime service. In one instance as many as 120 legionaries fought
in each ship on occasion of a great naval battle; in that case however
the Roman fleet had at the same time a landing-army on board.

In this way the Romans created a fleet which was a match for the
Carthaginians. Those err, who represent this building of a Roman
fleet as a fairy tale, and besides they miss their aim; the feat must
be understood in order to be admired. The construction of a fleet by
the Romans was in very truth a noble national work--a work through
which, by their clear perception of what was needful and possible, by
ingenuity in invention, and by energy in resolution and in execution,
they rescued their country from a position which was worse than at
first it seemed.

Naval Victory at Mylae

The outset, nevertheless, was not favourable to the Romans. The Roman
admiral, the consul Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had sailed for
Messana with the first seventeen vessels ready for sea (494), fancied,
when on the voyage, that he should be able to capture Lipara by a
coup de main. But a division of the Carthaginian fleet stationed at
Panormus blockaded the harbour of the island where the Roman vessels
rode at anchor, and captured the whole squadron along with the consul
without a struggle. This, however, did not deter the main fleet from
likewise sailing, as soon as its preparations were completed, for
Messana. On its voyage along the Italian coast it fell in with a
Carthaginian reconnoitring squadron of less strength, on which it
had the good fortune to inflict a loss more than counterbalancing
the first loss of the Romans; and thus successful and victorious it
entered the port of Messana, where the second consul Gaius Duilius
took the command in room of his captured colleague. At the promontory
of Mylae, to the north-west of Messana, the Carthaginian fleet, that
advanced from Panormus under the command of Hannibal, encountered the
Roman, which here underwent its first trial on a great scale. The
Carthaginians, seeing in the ill-sailing and unwieldy vessels of the
Romans an easy prey, fell upon them in irregular order; but the newly
invented boarding-bridges proved their thorough efficiency. The Roman
vessels hooked and stormed those of the enemy as they came up one
by one; they could not be approached either in front or on the sides
without the dangerous bridge descending on the enemy's deck. When the
battle was over, about fifty Carthaginian vessels, almost the half of
the fleet, were sunk or captured by the Romans; among the latter was
the ship of the admiral Hannibal, formerly belonging to king Pyrrhus.
The gain was great; still greater the moral effect of the victory.
Rome had suddenly become a naval power, and held in her hand the
means of energetically terminating a war which threatened to be
endlessly prolonged and to involve the commerce of Italy in ruin.

The War on the Coasts of Sicily and Sardinia

Two plans were open to the Romans. They might attack Carthage on the
Italian islands and deprive her of the coast fortresses of Sicily and
Sardinia one after another--a scheme which was perhaps practicable
through well-combined operations by land and sea; and, in the event of
its being accomplished, peace might either be concluded with Carthage
on the basis of the cession of these islands, or, should such terms
not be accepted or prove unsatisfactory, the second stage of the war
might be transferred to Africa. Or they might neglect the islands and
throw themselves at once with all their strength on Africa, not, in
the adventurous style of Agathocles, burning their vessels behind them
and staking all on the victory of a desperate band, but covering with
a strong fleet the communications between the African invading army
and Italy; and in that case a peace on moderate terms might be
expected from the consternation of the enemy after the first
successes, or, if the Romans chose, they might by pushing matters
to an extremity compel the enemy to entire surrender.

They chose, in the first instance, the former plan of operations.
In the year after the battle of Mylae (495) the consul Lucius Scipio
captured the port of Aleria in Corsica--we still possess the tombstone
of the general, which makes mention of this deed--and made Corsica a
naval station against Sardinia. An attempt to establish a footing in
Ulbia on the northern coast of that island failed, because the fleet
wanted troops for landing. In the succeeding year (496) it was
repeated with better success, and the open villages along the coast
were plundered; but no permanent establishment of the Romans took
place. Nor was greater progress made in Sicily. Hamilcar conducted
the war with energy and adroitness, not only by force of arms on sea
and land, but also by political proselytism. Of the numerous small
country towns some every year fell away from the Romans, and had to
be laboriously wrested afresh from the Phoenician grasp; while in
the coast fortresses the Carthaginians maintained themselves without
challenge, particularly in their headquarters of Panormus and in their
new stronghold of Drepana, to which, on account of its easier defence
by sea, Hamilcar had transferred the inhabitants of Eryx. A second
great naval engagement off the promontory of Tyndaris (497), in which
both parties claimed the victory, made no change in the position of
affairs. In this way no progress was made, whether in consequence
of the division and rapid change of the chief command of the Roman
troops, which rendered the concentrated management of a series of
operations on a small scale exceedingly difficult, or from the general
strategical relations of the case, which certainly, as the science
of war then stood, were unfavourable to the attacking party in
general,(5) and particularly so to the Romans, who were still on
the mere threshold of scientific warfare. Meanwhile, although the
pillaging of the Italian coasts had ceased, the commerce of Italy
suffered not much less than it had done before the fleet was built.

Attack on Africa
Naval Victory of Ecnomus

Weary of a course of operations without results, and impatient to put
an end to the war, the senate resolved to change its system, and to
assail Carthage in Africa. In the spring of 498 a fleet of 330 ships
of the line set sail for the coast of Libya: at the mouth of the river
Himera on the south coast of Sicily it embarked the army for landing,
consisting of four legions, under the charge of the two consuls Marcus
Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Volso, both experienced generals.
The Carthaginian admiral suffered the embarkation of the enemy's
troops to take place; but on continuing their voyage towards Africa
the Romans found the Punic fleet drawn up in order of battle off
Ecnomus to protect its native land from invasion. Seldom have greater
numbers fought at sea than were engaged in the battle that now ensued.
The Roman fleet: of 330 sail contained at least 100,000 men in its
crews, besides the landing army of about 40,000; the Carthaginian of
350 vessels was manned by at least an equal number; so that well-nigh
three hundred thousand men were brought into action on this day to
decide the contest between the two mighty civic communities.
The Phoenicians were placed in a single widely-extended line, with
their left wing resting on the Sicilian coast. The Romans arranged
themselves in a triangle, with the ships of the two consuls as
admirals at the apex, the first and second squadrons drawn out in
oblique line to the right and left, and a third squadron, having the
vessels built for the transport of the cavalry in tow, forming the
line which closed the triangle. They thus bore down in close order on
the enemy. A fourth squadron placed in reserve followed more slowly.
The wedge-shaped attack broke without difficulty the Carthaginian
line, for its centre, which was first assailed, intentionally gave
way, and the battle resolved itself into three separate engagements.
While the admirals with the two squadrons drawn up on the wings
pursued the Carthaginian centre and were closely engaged with it, the
left wing of the Carthaginians drawn up along the coast wheeled round
upon the third Roman squadron, which was prevented by the vessels
which it had in tow from following the two others, and by a vehement
onset in superior force drove it against the shore; at the same time
the Roman reserve was turned on the open sea, and assailed from
behind, by the right wing of the Carthaginians. The first of these
three engagements was soon at an end; the ships of the Carthaginian
centre, manifestly much weaker than the two Roman squadrons with which
they were engaged, took to flight. Meanwhile the two other divisions
of the Romans had a hard struggle with the superior enemy; but in
close fighting the dreaded boarding-bridges stood them in good stead,
and by this means they succeeded in holding out till the two admirals
with their vessels could come up. By their arrival the Roman reserve
was relieved, and the Carthaginian vessels of the right wing retired
before the superior force. And now, when this conflict had been
decided in favour of the Romans, all the Roman vessels that still
could keep the sea fell on the rear of the Carthaginian left wing,
which was obstinately following up its advantage, so that it was
surrounded and almost all the vessels composing it were taken. The
losses otherwise were nearly equal. Of the Roman fleet 24 sail were
sunk; of the Carthaginian 30 were sunk, and 64 were taken.

Landing of Regulus in Africa

Notwithstanding its considerable loss, the Carthaginian fleet did not
give up the protection of Africa, and with that view returned to the
gulf of Carthage, where it expected the descent to take place and
purposed to give battle a second time. But the Romans landed, not on
the western side of the peninsula which helps to form the gulf, but on
the eastern side, where the bay of Clupea presented a spacious harbour
affording protection in almost all winds, and the town, situated close
by the sea on a shield-shaped eminence rising out of the plain,
supplied an excellent defence for the harbour. They disembarked the
troops without hindrance from the enemy, and established themselves
on the hill; in a short time an entrenched naval camp was constructed,
and the land army was at liberty to commence operations. The Roman
troops ranged over the country and levied contributions: they were
able to send as many as 20,000 slaves to Rome. Through the rarest
good fortune the bold scheme had succeeded at the first stroke, and
with but slight sacrifices: the end seemed attained. The feeling of
confidence that in this respect animated the Romans is evinced by the
resolution of the senate to recall to Italy the greater portion of the
fleet and half of the army; Marcus Regulus alone remained in Africa
with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. Their confidence,
however, was seemingly not overstrained. The Carthaginian army, which
was disheartened, did not venture forth into the plain, but waited to
sustain discomfiture in the wooded defiles, in which it could make no
use of its two best arms, the cavalry and the elephants. The towns
surrendered -en masse-; the Numidians rose in insurrection, and
overran the country far and wide. Regulus might hope to begin the
next campaign with the siege of the capital, and with that view he
pitched his camp for the winter in its immediate vicinity at Tunes.

Vain Negotiations for Peace

The spirit of the Carthaginians was broken: they sued for peace.
But the conditions which the consul proposed--not merely the cession
of Sicily and Sardinia, but the conclusion of an alliance on unequal
terms with Rome, which would have bound the Carthaginians to renounce
a war-marine of their own and to furnish vessels for the Roman wars
--conditions which would have placed Carthage on a level with Neapolis
and Tarentum, could not be accepted, so long as a Carthaginian army
kept the field and a Carthaginian fleet kept the sea, and the capital
stood unshaken.

Preparations of Carthage

The mighty enthusiasm, which is wont to blaze up nobly among Oriental
nations, even the most abased, on the approach of extreme peril--the
energy of dire necessity--impelled the Carthaginians to exertions,
such as were by no means expected from a nation of shopkeepers.
Hamilcar, who had carried on the guerilla war against the Romans in
Sicily with so much success, appeared in Libya with the flower of
the Sicilian troops, which furnished an admirable nucleus for the
newly-levied force. The connections and gold of the Carthaginians,
moreover, brought to them excellent Numidian horsemen in troops,
and also numerous Greek mercenaries; amongst whom was the celebrated
captain Xanthippus of Sparta, whose talent for organization and
strategical skill were of great service to his new masters.(6) While
the Carthaginians were thus making their preparations in the course of
the winter, the Roman general remained inactive at Tunes. Whether it
was that he did not anticipate the storm which was gathering over his
head, or that a sense of military honour prohibited him from doing
what his position demanded--instead of renouncing a siege which he was
not in a condition even to attempt, and shutting himself up in the
stronghold of Clupea, he remained with a handful of men before the
walls of the hostile capital, neglecting even to secure his line of
retreat to the naval camp, and neglecting to provide himself with
--what above all he wanted, and what might have been so easily
obtained through negotiation with the revolted Numidian tribes
--a good light cavalry. He thus wantonly brought himself and
his army into a plight similar to that which formerly befell
Agathocles in his desperate adventurous expedition.

Defeat of Regulus

When spring came (499), the state of affairs had so changed, that now
the Carthaginians were the first to take the field and to offer battle
to the Romans. It was natural that they should do so, for everything
depended on their getting quit of the army of Regulus, before
reinforcements could arrive from Italy. The same reason should have
led the Romans to desire delay; but, relying on their invincibleness
in the open field, they at once accepted battle notwithstanding their
inferiority of strength--for, although the numbers of the infantry on
both sides were nearly the same, their 4000 cavalry and 100 elephants
gave to the Carthaginians a decided superiority--and notwithstanding
the unfavourable nature of the ground, the Carthaginians having taken
up their position in a broad plain presumably not far from Tunes.
Xanthippus, who on this day commanded the Carthaginians, first threw
his cavalry on that of the enemy, which was stationed, as usual, on
the two flanks of the line of battle; the few squadrons of the Romans
were scattered like dust in a moment before the masses of the enemy's
horse, and the Roman infantry found itself outflanked by them and
surrounded. The legions, unshaken by their apparent danger, advanced
to attack the enemy's line; and, although the row of elephants placed
as a protection in front of it checked the right wing and centre of
the Romans, the left wing at any rate, marching past the elephants,
engaged the mercenary infantry on the right of the enemy, and
overthrew them completely. But this very success broke up the Roman
ranks. The main body indeed, assailed by the elephants in front and
by the cavalry on the flanks and in the rear, formed square, and
defended itself with heroic courage, but the close masses were at
length broken and swept away. The victorious left wing encountered
the still fresh Carthaginian centre, where the Libyan infantry
prepared a similar fate for it. From the nature of the ground and the
superior numbers of the enemy's cavalry, all the combatants in these
masses were cut down or taken prisoners; only two thousand men,
chiefly, in all probability, the light troops and horsemen who were
dispersed at the commencement, gained--while the Roman legions stood
to be slaughtered--a start sufficient to enable them with difficulty
to reach Clupea. Among the few prisoners was the consul himself, who
afterwards died in Carthage; his family, under the idea that he had
not been treated by the Carthaginians according to the usages of war,
wreaked a most revolting vengeance on two noble Carthaginian captives,
till even the slaves were moved to pity, and on their information the
tribunes put a stop to the shameful outrage.(7)

Evacuation of Africa

When the terrible news reached Rome, the first care of the Romans was
naturally directed to the saving of the force shut up in Clupea. A
Roman fleet of 350 sail immediately started, and after a noble victory
at the Hermaean promontory, in which the Carthaginians lost 114 ships,
it reached Clupea just in time to deliver from their hard-pressed
position the remains of the defeated army which were there entrenched.
Had it been despatched before the catastrophe occurred, it might have
converted the defeat into a victory that would probably have put an
end to the Punic wars. But so completely had the Romans now lost
their judgment, that after a successful conflict before Clupea they
embarked all their troops and sailed home, voluntarily evacuating
that important and easily defended position which secured to
them facilities for landing in Africa, and abandoning their
numerous African allies without protection to the vengeance of the
Carthaginians. The Carthaginians did not neglect the opportunity of
filling their empty treasury, and of making their subjects clearly
understand the consequences of unfaithfulness. An extraordinary
contribution of 1000 talents of silver (244,000 pounds) and 20,000
oxen was levied, and the sheiks in all the communities that had
revolted were crucified; it is said that there were three thousand of
them, and that this revolting atrocity on the part of the Carthaginian
authorities really laid the foundation of the revolution which broke
forth in Africa some years later. Lastly, as if to fill up the
measure of misfortune to the Romans even as their measure of success
had been filled before, on the homeward voyage of the fleet three-
fourths of the Roman vessels perished with their crews in a violent
storm; only eighty reached their port (July 499). The captains had
foretold the impending mischief, but the extemporised Roman admirals
had nevertheless given orders to sail.

Recommencement of the War in Sicily

After successes so immense the Carthaginians were able to resume their
offensive operations, which had long been in abeyance. Hasdrubal son
of Hanno landed at Lilybaeum with a strong force, which was enabled,
particularly by its enormous number of elephants--amounting to 140
--to keep the field against the Romans: the last battle had shown
that it was possible to make up for the want of good infantry to some
extent by elephants and cavalry. The Romans also resumed the war in
Sicily; the annihilation of their invading army had, as the voluntary
evacuation of Clupea shows, at once restored ascendency in the senate
to the party which was opposed to the war in Africa and was content
with the gradual subjugation of the islands. But for this purpose
too there was need of a fleet; and, since that which had conquered at
Mylae, at Ecnomus, and at the Hermaean promontory was destroyed, they
built a new one. Keels were at once laid down for 220 new vessels
of war--they had never hitherto undertaken the building of so many
simultaneously--and in the incredibly short space of three months
they were all ready for sea. In the spring of 500 the Roman fleet,
numbering 300 vessels mostly new, appeared on the north coast of
Sicily; Panormus, the most important town in Carthaginian Sicily,
was acquired through a successful attack from the seaboard, and the
smaller places there, Soluntum, Cephaloedium, and Tyndaris, likewise
fell into the hands of the Romans, so that along the whole north coast
of the island Thermae alone was retained by the Carthaginians.
Panormus became thenceforth one of the chief stations of the Romans
in Sicily. The war by land, nevertheless, made no progress; the two
armies stood face to face before Lilybaeum, but the Roman commanders,
who knew not how to encounter the mass of elephants, made no attempt
to compel a pitched battle.

In the ensuing year (501) the consuls, instead of pursuing sure
advantages in Sicily, preferred to make an expedition to Africa, for
the purpose not of landing but of plundering the coast towns. They
accomplished their object without opposition; but, after having first
run aground in the troublesome, and to their pilots unknown, waters of
the Lesser Syrtis, whence they with difficulty got clear again, the
fleet encountered a storm between Sicily and Italy, which cost more
than 150 ships. On this occasion also the pilots, notwithstanding
their representations and entreaties to be allowed to take the course
along the coast, were obliged by command of the consuls to steer
straight from Panormus across the open sea to Ostia.

Suspension of the Maritime War
Roman Victory at Panormus

Despondency now seized the fathers of the city; they resolved to
reduce their war-fleet to sixty sail, and to confine the war by sea
to the defence of the coasts, and to the convoy of transports.
Fortunately, just at this time, the languishing war in Sicily took a
more favourable turn. In the year 502, Thermae, the last point which
the Carthaginians held on the north coast, and the important island of
Lipara, had fallen into the hands of the Romans, and in the following
year (summer of 503) the consul Lucius Caecilius Metellus achieved
a brilliant victory over the army of elephants under the walls of
Panormus. These animals, which had been imprudently brought forward,
were wounded by the light troops of the Romans stationed in the moat
of the town; some of them fell into the moat, and others fell back
on their own troops, who crowded in wild disorder along with the
elephants towards the beach, that they might be picked up by the
Phoenician ships. One hundred and twenty elephants were captured, and
the Carthaginian army, whose strength depended on these animals, was
obliged once more to shut itself up in its fortresses. Eryx soon fell
into the hands of the Romans (505), and the Carthaginians retained
nothing in the island but Drepana and Lilybaeum. Carthage a second
time offered peace; but the victory of Metellus and the exhaustion
of the enemy gave to the more energetic party the upper hand
in the senate.

Siege of Lilybaeum

Peace was declined, and it was resolved to prosecute in earnest the
siege of the two Sicilian cities and for this purpose to send to sea
once more a fleet of 200 sail. The siege of Lilybaeum, the first
great and regular siege undertaken by Rome, and one of the most
obstinate known in history, was opened by the Romans with an important
success: they succeeded in introducing their fleet into the harbour
of the city, and in blockading it on the side facing the sea.
The besiegers, however, were not able to close the sea completely.
In spite of their sunken vessels and their palisades, and in spite of
the most careful vigilance, dexterous mariners, accurately acquainted
with the shallows and channels, maintained with swift-sailing vessels
a regular communication between the besieged in the city and the
Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana. In fact after some
time a Carthaginian squadron of 50 sail succeeded in running into
the harbour, in throwing a large quantity of provisions and a
reinforcement of 10,000 men into the city, and in returning
unmolested. The besieging land army was not much more fortunate.
They began with a regular attack; machines were erected, and in a
short time the batteries had demolished six of the towers flanking
the walls, so that the breach soon appeared to be practicable. But
the able Carthaginian commander Himilco parried this assault by giving
orders for the erection of a second wall behind the breach. An
attempt of the Romans to enter into an understanding with the garrison
was likewise frustrated in proper time. And, after a first sally
made for the purpose of burning the Roman set of machines had
been repulsed, the Carthaginians succeeded during a stormy night
in effecting their object. Upon this the Romans abandoned their
preparations for an assault, and contented themselves with blockading
the walls by land and water. The prospect of success in this way was
indeed very remote, so long as they were unable wholly to preclude the
entrance of the enemy's vessels; and the army of the besiegers was in
a condition not much better than that of the besieged in the city,
because their supplies were frequently cut off by the numerous and
bold light cavalry of the Carthaginians, and their ranks began to be
thinned by the diseases indigenous to that unwholesome region. The
capture of Lilybaeum, however, was of sufficient importance to induce
a patient perseverance in the laborious task, which promised to be
crowned in time with the desired success.