The History of Rome, Book III - Theodor Mommsen
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Departure of Hannibal
So Hannibal collected the troops, destined for the grand army, in
Cartagena at the beginning of the favourable season; there were 90,000
infantry and 12,000 cavalry, of whom about two-thirds were Africans
and a third Spaniards. The 37 elephants which they took with them
were probably destined rather to make an impression on the Gauls than
for serious warfare. Hannibal's infantry no longer needed, like that
led by Xanthippus, to shelter itself behind a screen of elephants, and
the general had too much sagacity to employ otherwise than sparingly
and with caution that two-edged weapon, which had as often occasioned
the defeat of its own as of the enemy's army. With this force the
general set out in the spring of 536 from Cartagena towards the Ebro.
He so far informed his soldiers as to the measures which he had taken,
particularly as to the connections he had entered into with the Celts
and the resources and object of the expedition, that even the common
soldier, whose military instincts lengthened war had developed, felt
the clear perception and the steady hand of his leader, and followed
him with implicit confidence to the unknown and distant land; and the
fervid address, in which he laid before them the position of their
country and the demands of the Romans, the slavery certainly reserved
for their dear native land, and the disgrace of the imputation that
they could surrender their beloved general and his staff, kindled a
soldierly and patriotic ardour in the hearts of all.
Position of Rome
Their Uncertain Plans for War
The Roman state was in a plight, such as may occur even in firmly-
established and sagacious aristocracies. The Romans knew doubtless
what they wished to accomplish, and they took various steps; but
nothing was done rightly or at the right time. They might long ago
have been masters of the gates of the Alps and have settled matters
with the Celts; the latter were still formidable, and the former were
open. They might either have had friendship, with Carthage, had they
honourably kept the peace of 513, or, had they not been disposed for
peace, they might long ago have conquered Cartilage: the peace was
practically broken by the seizure of Sardinia, and they allowed the
power of Carthage to recover itself undisturbed for twenty years.
There was no great difficulty in maintaining peace with Macedonia; but
they had forfeited her friendship for a trifling gain. There must
have been a lack of some leading statesman to take a connected and
commanding view of the position of affairs; on all hands either too
little was done, or too much. Now the war began at a time and at a
place which they had allowed the enemy to determine; and, with all
their well-founded conviction of military superiority, they were
perplexed as to the object to be aimed at and the course to be
followed in their first operations. They had at their disposal more
than half a million of serviceable soldiers; the Roman cavalry alone
was less good, and relatively less numerous, than the Carthaginian,
the former constituting about a tenth, the latter an eighth, of the
whole number of troops taking the field. None of the states affected
by the war had any fleet corresponding to the Roman fleet of 220
quinqueremes, which had just returned from the Adriatic to the western
sea. The natural and proper application of this crushing superiority
of force was self-evident. It had been long settled that the war
ought to be opened with a landing in Africa. The subsequent turn
taken by events had compelled the Romans to embrace in their scheme
of the war a simultaneous landing in Spain, chiefly to prevent the
Spanish army from appearing before the walls of Carthage. In
accordance with this plan they ought above all, when the war had been
practically opened by Hannibal's attack on Saguntum in the beginning
of 535, to have thrown a Roman army into Spain before the town fell;
but they neglected the dictates of interest no less than of honour.
For eight months Saguntum held out in vain: when the town passed into
other hands, Rome had not even equipped her armament for landing in
Spain. The country, however, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees was
still free, and its tribes were not only the natural allies of the
Romans, but had also, like the Saguntines, received from Roman
emissaries promises of speedy assistance. Catalonia may be reached by
sea from Italy in not much longer time than from Cartagena by and: had
the Romans started, like the Phoenicians, in April, after the formal
declaration of war that had taken place in the interval, Hannibal
might have encountered the Roman legions on the line of the Ebro.
Hannibal on the Ebro
At length, certainly, the greater part of the army and of the fleet
was got ready for the expedition to Africa, and the second consul
Publius Cornelius Scipio was ordered to the Ebro; but he took time,
and when an insurrection broke out on the Po, he allowed the army that
was ready for embarkation to be employed there, and formed new legions
for the Spanish expedition. So although Hannibal encountered on the
Ebro very vehement resistance, it proceeded only from the natives;
and, as under existing circumstances time was still more precious to
him than the blood of his men, he surmounted the opposition after some
months with the loss of a fourth part of his army, and reached the
line of the Pyrenees. That the Spanish allies of Rome would be
sacrificed a second time by that delay might have been as certainly
foreseen, as the delay itself might have been easily avoided; but
probably even the expedition to Italy itself, which in the spring of
536 must not have been anticipated in Rome, would have been averted
by the timely appearance of the Romans in Spain. Hannibal had by no
means the intention of sacrificing his Spanish "kingdom," and throwing
himself like a desperado on Italy. The time which he had spent in
the siege of Saguntum and in the reduction of Catalonia, and the
considerable corps which he left behind for the occupation of the
newly-won territory between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, sufficiently
show that, had a Roman army disputed the possession of Spain with him,
he would not have been content to withdraw from it; and--which was the
main point--had the Romans been able to delay his departure from Spain
for but a few weeks, winter would have closed the passes of the Alps
before Hannibal reached them, and the African expedition would have
departed without hindrance for its destination.
Hannibal in Gaul
Scipio at Massilia
Passage of the Rhone
Arrived at the Pyrenees, Hannibal sent home a portion of his troops;
a measure which he had resolved on from the first with the view of
showing to the soldiers how confident their general was of success,
and of checking the feeling that his enterprise was one of those from
which there is no return home. With an army of 50,000 infantry and
9000 cavalry, entirely veteran soldiers, he crossed the Pyrenees
without difficulty, and then took the coast route by Narbonne and
Nimes through the Celtic territory, which was opened to the army
partly by the connections previously formed, partly by Carthaginian
gold, partly by arms. It was not till it arrived in the end of July
at the Rhone opposite Avignon, that a serious resistance appeared to
await it. The consul Scipio, who on his voyage to Spain had landed at
Massilia (about the end of June), had there been informed that he had
come too late and that Hannibal had crossed not only the Ebro but the
Pyrenees. On receiving these accounts, which appear to have first
opened the eyes of the Romans to the course and the object of
Hannibal, the consul had temporarily given up his expedition to Spain,
and had resolved in connection with the Celtic tribes of that region,
who were under the influence of the Massiliots and thereby under that
of Rome, to receive the Phoenicians on the Rhone, and to obstruct
their passage of the river and their march into Italy. Fortunately
for Hannibal, opposite to the point at which he meant to cross, there
lay at the moment only the general levy of the Celts, while the consul
himself with his army of 22,000 infantry and 2000 horse was still in
Massilia, four days' march farther down the stream. The messengers of
the Gallic levy hastened to inform him. It was the object of Hannibal
to convey his army with its numerous cavalry and elephants across the
rapid stream under the eyes of the enemy, and before the arrival of
Scipio; and he possessed not a single boat. Immediately by his
directions all the boats belonging to the numerous navigators of
the Rhone in the neighbourhood were bought up at any price, and the
deficiency of boats was supplied by rafts made from felled trees;
and in fact the whole numerous army could be conveyed over in one day.
While this was being done, a strong division under Hanno, son of
Bomilcar, proceeded by forced marches up the stream till they reached
a suitable point for crossing, which they found undefended, situated
two short days' march above Avignon. Here they crossed the river on
hastily constructed rafts, with the view of then moving down on the
left bank and taking the Gauls, who were barring the passage of the
main army, in the rear. On the morning of the fifth day after they
had reached the Rhone, and of the third after Hanno's departure, the
smoke-signals of the division that had been detached rose up on the
opposite bank and gave to Hannibal the anxiously awaited summons for
the crossing. Just as the Gauls, seeing that the enemy's fleet of
boats began to move, were hastening to occupy the bank, their camp
behind them suddenly burst into flames. Surprised and divided, they
were unable either to withstand the attack or to resist the passage,
and they dispersed in hasty flight.
Scipio meanwhile held councils of war in Massilia as to the proper
mode of occupying the ferries of the Rhone, and was not induced to
move even by the urgent messages that came from the leaders of the
Celts. He distrusted their accounts, and he contented himself with
detaching a weak Roman cavalry division to reconnoitre on the left
bank of the Rhone. This detachment found the whole enemy's army
already transported to that bank, and occupied in bringing over the
elephants which alone remained on the right bank of the stream; and,
after it had warmly engaged some Carthaginian squadrons in the
district of Avignon, merely for the purpose of enabling it to complete
its reconnaissance--the first encounter of the Romans and Phoenicians
in this war--it hastily returned to report at head-quarters. Scipio
now started in the utmost haste with all his troops for Avignon; but,
when he arrived there, even the Carthaginian cavalry that had been
left behind to cover the passage of the elephants had already taken
its departure three days ago, and nothing remained for the consul but
to return with weary troops and little credit to Massilia, and to
revile the "cowardly flight" of the Punic leader. Thus the Romans had
for the third time through pure negligence abandoned their allies and
an important line of defence; and not only so, but by passing after
this first blunder from mistaken slackness to mistaken haste, and by
still attempting without any prospect of success to do what might have
been done with so much certainty a few days before, they let the real
means of repairing their error pass out of their hands. When once
Hannibal was in the Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone,
he could no longer be prevented from reaching the Alps; but if Scipio
had at the first accounts proceeded with his whole army to Italy--the
Po might have been reached by way of Genoa in seven days--and had
united with his corps the weak divisions in the valley of the Po,
he might have at least prepared a formidable reception for the enemy.
But not only did he lose precious time in the march to Avignon, but,
capable as otherwise he was, he wanted either the political courage
or the military sagacity to change the destination of his corps as the
change of circumstances required. He sent the main body under his
brother Gnaeus to Spain, and returned himself with a few men to Pisae.
Hannibal's Passage of the Alps
Hannibal, who after the passage of the Rhone had in a great assembly
of the army explained to his troops the object of his expedition, and
had brought forward the Celtic chief Magilus himself, who had arrived
from the valley of the Po, to address the army through an interpreter,
meanwhile continued his march to the passes of the Alps without
obstruction. Which of these passes he should choose, could not be
at once determined either by the shortness of the route or by the
disposition of the inhabitants, although he had no time to lose
either in circuitous routes or in combat. He had necessarily to
select a route which should be practicable for his baggage, his
numerous cavalry, and his elephants, and in which an army could
procure sufficient means of subsistence either by friendship or by
force; for, although Hannibal had made preparations to convey
provisions after him on beasts of burden, these could only meet for
a few days the wants of an army which still, notwithstanding its great
losses, amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Leaving out of view the coast
route, which Hannibal abstained from taking not because the Romans
barred it, but because it would have led him away from his
destination, there were only two routes of note leading across the
Alps from Gaul to Italy in ancient times:(3) the pass of the Cottian
Alps (Mont Genevre) leading into the territory of the Taurini (by Susa
or Fenestrelles to Turin), and that of the Graian Alps (the Little St.
Bernard) leading into the territory of the Salassi (to Aosta and
Ivrea). The former route is the shorter; but, after leaving the
valley of the Rhone, it passes by the impracticable and unfruitful
river-valleys of the Drac, the Romanche, and the upper Durance,
through a difficult and poor mountain country, and requires at least
a seven or eight days' mountain march. A military road was first
constructed there by Pompeius, to furnish a shorter communication
between the provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul.
The route by the Little St. Bernard is somewhat longer; but after
crossing the first Alpine wall that forms the eastern boundary of
the Rhone valley, it keeps by the valley of the upper Isere, which
stretches from Grenoble by way of Chambery up to the very foot of the
Little St. Bernard or, in other words, of the chain of the higher
Alps, and is the broadest, most fertile and most populous of all the
Alpine valleys. Moreover, the pass of the Little St. Bernard, while
not the lowest of all the natural passes of the Alps, is by far the
easiest; although no artificial road was constructed there, an
Austrian corps with artillery crossed the Alps by that route in 1815.
And lastly this route, which only leads over two mountain ridges, has
been from the earliest times the great military route from the Celtic
to the Italian territory. The Carthaginian army had thus in fact no
choice. It was a fortunate coincidence, but not a motive influencing
the decision of Hannibal, that the Celtic tribes allied with him in
Italy inhabited the country up to the Little St. Bernard, while
the route by Mont Genevre would have brought him at first into the
territory of the Taurini, who were from ancient times at feud with
the Insubres.
So the Carthaginian army marched in the first instance up the Rhone
towards the valley of the upper Isere, not, as might be presumed, by
the nearest route up the left bank of the lower Isere from Valence to
Grenoble, but through the "island" of the Allobroges, the rich, and
even then thickly peopled, low ground, which is enclosed on the north
and west by the Rhone, on the south by the Isere, and on the east
by the Alps. The reason of this movement was, that the nearest route
would have led them through an impracticable and poor mountain-
country, while the "island" was level and extremely fertile, and was
separated by but a single mountain-wall from the valley of the upper
Isere. The march along the Rhone into, and across, the "island"
to the foot of the Alpine wall was accomplished in sixteen days: it
presented little difficulty, and in the "island" itself Hannibal
dexterously availed himself of a feud that had broken out between two
chieftains of the Allobroges to attach to his interests one of the
most important of the chiefs, who not only escorted the Carthaginians
through the whole plain, but also supplied them with provisions, and
furnished the soldiers with arms, clothing, and shoes. But the
expedition narrowly escaped destruction at the crossing of the first
Alpine chain, which rises precipitously like a wall, and over which
only a single available path leads (over the Mont du Chat, near the
hamlet Chevelu). The population of the Allobroges had strongly
occupied the pass. Hannibal learned the state of matters early enough
to avoid a surprise, and encamped at the foot, until after sunset the
Celts dispersed to the houses of the nearest town; he then seized the
pass in the night Thus the summit was gained; but on the extremely
steep path, which leads down from the summit to the lake of Bourget,
the mules and horses slipped and fell. The assaults, which at
suitable points were made by the Celts upon the army in march, were
very annoying, not so much of themselves as by reason of the turmoil
which they occasioned; and when Hannibal with his light troops threw
himself from above on the Allobroges, these were chased doubtless
without difficulty and with heavy loss down the mountain, but the
confusion, in the train especially, was further increased by the noise
of the combat. So, when after much loss he arrived in the plain,
Hannibal immediately attacked the nearest town, to chastise and
terrify the barbarians, and at the same time to repair as far as
possible his loss in sumpter animals and horses. After a day's repose
in the pleasant valley of Chambery the army continued its march up the
Isere, without being detained either by want of supplies or by attacks
so long as the valley continued broad and fertile. It was only when
on the fourth day they entered the territory of the Ceutrones (the
modern Tarantaise) where the valley gradually contracts, that they had
again greater occasion to be on their guard. The Ceutrones received
the army at the boundary of their country (somewhere about Conflans)
with branches and garlands, furnished cattle for slaughter, guides,
and hostages; and the Carthaginians marched through their territory
as through a friendly land. When, however, the troops had reached the
very foot of the Alps, at the point where the path leaves the Isere,
and winds by a narrow and difficult defile along the brook Reclus
up to the summit of the St. Bernard, all at once the militia of the
Ceutrones appeared partly in the rear of the army, partly on the
crests of the rocks enclosing the pass on the right and left, in
the hope of cutting off the train and baggage. But Hannibal, whose
unerring tact had seen in all those advances made by the Ceutrones
nothing but the design of procuring at once immunity for their
territory and a rich spoil, had in expectation of such an attack
sent forward the baggage and cavalry, and covered the march with all
his infantry. By this means he frustrated the design of the enemy,
although he could not prevent them from moving along the mountain
slopes parallel to the march of the infantry, and inflicting very
considerable loss by hurling or rolling down stones. At the "white
stone" (still called -la roche blanche-), a high isolated chalk cliff
standing at the foot of the St. Bernard and commanding the ascent to
it, Hannibal encamped with his infantry, to cover the march of the
horses and sumpter animals laboriously climbing upward throughout
the whole night; and amidst continual and very bloody conflicts he at
length on the following day reached the summit of the pass. There,
on the sheltered table-land which spreads to the extent of two and a
half miles round a little lake, the source of the Doria, he allowed
the army to rest. Despondency had begun to seize the minds of the
soldiers. The paths that were becoming ever more difficult, the
provisions failing, the marching through defiles exposed to the
constant attacks of foes whom they could not reach, the sorely thinned
ranks, the hopeless situation of the stragglers and the wounded, the
object which appeared chimerical to all save the enthusiastic leader
and his immediate staff--all these things began to tell even on the
African and Spanish veterans. But the confidence of the general
remained ever the same; numerous stragglers rejoined the ranks; the
friendly Gauls were near; the watershed was reached, and the view of
the descending path, so gladdening to the mountain-pilgrim, opened up:
after a brief repose they prepared with renewed courage for the last
and most difficult undertaking, --the downward march. In it the army
was not materially annoyed by the enemy; but the advanced season--it
was already the beginning of September--occasioned troubles in the
descent, equal to those which had been occasioned in the ascent by the
attacks of the adjoining tribes. On the steep and slippery mountain-
slope along the Doria, where the recently-fallen snow had concealed
and obliterated the paths, men and animals went astray and slipped,
and were precipitated into the chasms. In fact, towards the end of
the first day's march they reached a portion of the path about 200
paces in length, on which avalanches are constantly descending from
the precipices of the Cramont that overhang it, and where in cold
summers snow lies throughout the year. The infantry passed over;
but the horses and elephants were unable to cross the smooth masses
of ice, on which there lay but a thin covering of freshly-fallen snow,
and the general encamped above the difficult spot with the baggage,
the cavalry, and the elephants. On the following day the horsemen,
by zealous exertion in entrenching, prepared a path for horses and
beasts of burden; but it was not until after a further labour of three
days with constant reliefs, that the half-famished elephants could at
length be conducted over. In this way the whole army was after a
delay of four days once more united; and after a further three days'
march through the valley of the Doria, which was ever widening and
displaying greater fertility, and whose inhabitants the Salassi,
clients of the Insubres, hailed in the Carthaginians their allies
and deliverers, the army arrived about the middle of September in the
plain of Ivrea, where the exhausted troops were quartered in the
villages, that by good nourishment and a fortnight's repose they might
recruit from their unparalleled hardships. Had the Romans placed a
corps, as they might have done, of 30,000 men thoroughly fresh and
ready for action somewhere near Turin, and immediately forced on a
battle, the prospects of Hannibal's great plan would have been very
dubious; fortunately for him, once more, they were not where they
should have been, and they did not disturb the troops of the enemy
in the repose which was so greatly needed.(4)
Results
The object was attained, but at a heavy cost. Of the 50,000
veteran infantry and the 9000 cavalry, which the army had numbered
at the crossing of the Pyrenees, more than half had been sacrificed
in the conflicts, the marches, and the passages of the rivers.
Hannibal now, according to his own statement, numbered not more
than 20,000 infantry--of whom three-fifths were Libyans and two-fifths
Spaniards--and 6000 cavalry, part of them doubtless dismounted: the
comparatively small loss of the latter proclaimed the excellence of
the Numidian cavalry no less than the consideration of the general
in making a sparing use of troops so select. A march of 526 miles or
about 33 moderate days' marching--the continuance and termination of
which were disturbed by no special misfortunes on a great scale that
could not be anticipated, but were, on the other hand, rendered
possible only by incalculable pieces of good fortune and still more
incalculable blunders of the enemy, and which yet not only cost such
sacrifices, but so fatigued and demoralized the army, that it needed
a prolonged rest in order to be again ready for action--is a military
operation of doubtful value, and it may be questioned whether Hannibal
himself regarded it as successful. Only in so speaking we may not
pronounce an absolute censure on the general: we see well the defects
of the plan of operations pursued by him, but we cannot determine
whether he was in a position to foresee them--his route lay through
an unknown land of barbarians--or whether any other plan, such as that
of taking the coast road or of embarking at Cartagena or at Carthage,
would have exposed him to fewer dangers. The cautious and masterly
execution of the plan in its details at any rate deserves our
admiration, and to whatever causes the result may have been due
--whether it was due mainly to the favour of fortune, or mainly to
the skill of the general--the grand idea of Hamilcar, that of taking
up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was now realized. It was his
genius that projected this expedition; and as the task of Stein and
Scharnhorst was more difficult and nobler than that of York and
Blucher, so the unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt
on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage
of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the
Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannae.