The History of Rome, Book V - Theodor Mommsen
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The Lukewarm
Far worse traits were the indifference of the lukewarm
and the narrow-minded stubbornness of the ultras. The former
could not be brought to act or even to keep silence. If they were asked
to exert themselves in some definite way for the common good,
with the inconsistency characteristic of weak people they regarded
any such suggestion as a malicious attempt to compromise them
still further, and either did not do what they were ordered at all
or did it with half heart. At the same time of course,
with their affectation of knowing better when it was too late
and their over-wise impracticabilities, they proved a perpetual clog
to those who were acting; their daily work consisted in criticizing,
ridiculing, and bemoaning every occurrence great and small,
and in unnerving and discouraging the multitude by their own
sluggishness and hopelessness.
The Ultras
While these displayed the utter prostration of weakness, the ultras
on the other hand exhibited in full display its exaggerated action.
With them there was no attempt to conceal that the preliminary
to any negotiation for peace was the bringing over of Caesar's head;
every one of the attempts towards peace, which Caesar repeatedly made
even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or employed
only to cover insidious attempts on the lives of the commissioners
of their opponent. That the declared partisans of Caesar
had jointly and severally forfeited life and property, was a matter
of course; but it fared little better with those more or less neutral.
Lucius Domitius, the hero of Corfinium, gravely proposed
in the council of war that those senators who had fought in the army
of Pompeius should come to a vote on all who had either remained neutral
or had emigrated but not entered the army, and should according
to their own pleasure individually acquit them or punish them
by fine or even by the forfeiture of life and property.
Another of these ultras formally lodged with Pompeius a charge
of corruption and treason against Lucius Afranius for his defective
defence of Spain. Among these deep-dyed republicans their
political theory assumed almost the character of a confession
of religious faith; they accordingly hated their own more lukewarm
partisans and Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible,
still more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull
obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterize orthodox theologians;
and they were mainly to blame for the numberless and bitter
separate quarrels which distracted the emigrant army and emigrant senate.
But they did not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus,
Titus Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory
in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Caesar's army
as fell into their hands to be executed en masse; which,
as may well be conceived, did not tend to make Caesar's troops
fight with less energy. If the counterrevolution in favour
of the friends of the constitution, for which all the elements
were in existence,(24) did not break out in Italy during
Caesar's absence, the reason, according to the assurance
of discerning opponents of Caesar, lay chiefly in the general dread
of the unbridled fury of the republican ultras after the restoration
should have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp
were in despair over this frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself
a brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might and could;
but he was too pusillanimous and in too awkward a position to prevent
or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as it became him
as commander-in-chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least
carried moral consistency into the struggle, attempted with more energy
to check such proceedings; he induced the emigrant senate
to prohibit by a special decree the pillage of subject towns
and the putting to death of a burgess otherwise than in battle.
The able Marcus Marcellus had similar views. No one, indeed,
knew better than Cato and Marcellus that the extreme party
would carry out their saving deeds, if necessary, in defiance
of all decrees of the senate. But if even now, when they had still
to regard considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras
could not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the victory
for a reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla themselves
would have turned away with horror; and we can understand why Cato,
according to his own confession, was more afraid of the victory
than of the defeat of his own party.
The Preparations for War
The management of the military preparations in the Macedonian camp
was in the hands of Pompeius the commander-in-chief. His position,
always troublesome and galling, had become still worse through
the unfortunate events of 705. In the eyes of his partisans he was
mainly to blame for this result. This judgment was in various respects
not just. A considerable part of the misfortunes endured
was to be laid to the account of the perversity and insubordination
of the lieutenant-generals, especially of the consul Lentulus
and Lucius Domitius; from the moment when Pompeius took the head
of the army, he had led it with skill and courage, and had saved
at least very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he was
not a match for Caesar's altogether superior genius, which was now
recognized by all, could not be fairly made matter of reproach to him.
But the result alone decided men's judgment. Trusting to the general
Pompeius, the constitutional party had broken with Caesar; the pernicious
consequences of this breach recoiled upon the general Pompeius;
and, though owing to the notorious military incapacity
of all the other chiefs no attempt was made to change the supreme
command yet confidence at any rate in the commander-in-chief
was paralyzed. To these painful consequences of the defeats endured
were added the injurious influences of the emigration.
Among the refugees who arrived there were certainly a number
of efficient soldiers and capable officers, especially those
belonging to the former Spanish army; but the number of those
who came to serve and fight was just as small as that of the generals
of quality who called themselves proconsuls and imperators
with as good title as Pompeius, and of the genteel lords
who took part in active military service more or less reluctantly,
was alarmingly great. Through these the mode of life in the capital
was introduced into the camp, not at all to the advantage of the army;
the tents of such grandees were graceful bowers, the ground
elegantly covered with fresh turf, the walls clothed with ivy;
silver plate stood on the table, and the wine-cup often circulated
there even in broad daylight. Those fashionable warriors formed
a singular contrast with Caesar's daredevils, who ate coarse bread
from which the former recoiled, and who, when that failed, devoured
even roots and swore that they would rather chew the bark of trees
than desist from the enemy. While, moreover, the action
of Pompeius was hampered by the necessity of having regard
to the authority of a collegiate board personally disinclined to him,
this embarrassment was singularly increased when the senate of emigrants
took up its abode almost in his very headquarters and all the venom
of the emigrants now found vent in these senatorial sittings.
Lastly there was nowhere any man of mark, who could have thrown
his own weight into the scale against all these preposterous doings.
Pompeius himself was intellectually far too secondary for that purpose,
and far too hesitating, awkward, and reserved. Marcus Cato
would have had at least the requisite moral authority, and would not
have lacked the good will to support Pompeius with it; but Pompeius,
instead of calling him to his assistance, out of distrustful
jealousy kept him in the background, and preferred for instance
to commit the highly important chief command of the fleet
to the in every respect incapable Marcus Bibulus rather than to Cato.
The Legions of Pompeius
While Pompeius thus treated the political aspect of his position
with his characteristic perversity, and did his best to make
what was already bad in itself still worse, he devoted himself
on the other hand with commendable zeal to his duty of giving military
organization to the considerable but scattered forces of his party.
The flower of his force was composed of the troops brought with him
from Italy, out of which with the supplementary aid of the Illyrian
prisoners of war and the Romans domiciled in Greece five legions
in all were formed. Three others came from the east--the two Syrian
legions formed from the remains of the army of Crassus, and one made up
out of the two weak legions hitherto stationed in Cilicia.
Nothing stood in the way of the withdrawal of these corps of occupation:
because on the one hand the Pompeians had an understanding
with the Parthians, and might even have had an alliance with them
if Pompeius had not indignantly refused to pay them the price
which they demanded for it--the cession of the Syrian province
added by himself to the empire; and on the other hand
Caesar's plan of despatching two legions to Syria, and inducing
the Jews once more to take up arms by means of the prince Aristobulus
kept a prisoner in Rome, was frustrated partly by other causes,
partly by the death of Aristobulus. New legions were moreover raised--
one from the veteran soldiers settled in Crete and Macedonia,
two from the Romans of Asia Minor. To all these fell to be added
2000 volunteers, who were derived from the remains of the Spanish
select corps and other similar sources; and, lastly, the contingents
of the subjects. Pompeius like Caesar had disdained to make
requisitions of infantry from them; only the Epirot, Aetolian,
and Thracian militia were called out to guard the coast, and moreover
3000 archers from Greece and Asia Minor and 1200 slingers
were taken up as light troops.
His Cavalry
The cavalry on the other hand--with the exception of a noble guard,
more respectable than militarily important, formed from the young
aristocracy of Rome, and of the Apulian slave-herdsmen whom Pompeius
had mounted (25)--consisted exclusively of the contingents
of the subjects and clients of Rome. The flower of it consisted
of the Celts, partly from the garrison of Alexandria,(26)
partly the contingents of king Deiotarus who in spite of his great age
had appeared in person at the head of his troops, and of the other
Galatian dynasts. With them were associated the excellent Thracian
horsemen, who were partly brought up by their princes Sadala
and Rhascuporis, partly enlisted by Pompeius in the Macedonian province;
the Cappadocian cavalry; the mounted archers sent by Antiochus
king of Commagene; the contingents of the Armenians from the west side
of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and from the other side under Megabates,
and the Numidian bands sent by king Juba--the whole body amounted
to 7000 horsemen.
Fleet
Lastly the fleet of Pompeius was very considerable. It was formed
partly of the Roman transports brought from Brundisium
or subsequently built, partly of the war vessels of the king of Egypt,
of the Colchian princes, of the Cilician dynast Tarcondimotus,
of the cities of Tyre, Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and generally
of all the Asiatic and Greek maritime states; and it numbered nearly
500 sail, of which the Roman vessels formed a fifth. Immense magazines
of corn and military stores were accumulated in Dyrrhachium.
The war-chest was well filled, for the Pompeians found themselves
in possession of the principal sources of the public revenue
and turned to their own account the moneyed resources of the client-
princes, of the senators of distinction, of the farmers of the taxes,
and generally of the whole Roman and non-Roman population
within their reach. Every appliance that the reputation
of the legitimate government and the much-renowned protectorship
of Pompeius over kings and peoples could move in Africa, Egypt,
Macedonia, Greece, Western Asia and Syria, had been put in motion
for the protection of the Roman republic; the report which circulated
in Italy that Pompeius was arming the Getae, Colchians,
and Armenians against Rome, and the designation of "king of kings"
given to Pompeius in the camp, could hardly be called exaggerations.
On the whole he had command over an army of 7000 cavalry
and eleven legions, of which it is true, but five at the most
could be described as accustomed to war, and over a fleet of 500 sail.
The temper of the soldiers, for whose provisioning and pay Pompeius
manifested adequate care, and to whom in the event of victory the most
abundant rewards were promised, was throughout good, in several--
and these precisely the most efficient--divisions even excellent
but a great part of the army consisted of newly-raised troops,
the formation and training of which, however zealously it was prosecuted,
necessarily required time. The force altogether was imposing,
but at the same time of a somewhat motley character.
Junction of the Pompeians on the Coast of Epirus
According to the design of the commander-in-chief the army and fleet
were to be in substance completely united by the winter of 705-706
along the coast and in the waters of Epirus. The admiral Bibulus
had already arrived with no ships at his new headquarters, Corcyra.
On the other hand the land-army, the headquarters of which had been
during the summer at Berrhoea on the Haliacmon, had not yet come up;
the mass of it was moving slowly along the great highway
from Thessalonica towards the west coast to the future headquarters
Dyrrhachium; the two legions, which Metellus Scipio was bringing up
from Syria, remained at Pergamus in Asia for winter quarters
and were expected in Europe only towards spring. They were taking time
in fact for their movements. For the moment the ports of Epirus
were guarded, over and above the fleet, merely by their own
civic defences and the levies of the adjoining districts.
Caesar against Pompeius
It thus remained possible for Caesar, notwithstanding the intervention
of the Spanish war, to assume the offensive also in Macedonia;
and he at least was not slow to act. He had long ago ordered
the collection of vessels of war and transports in Brundisium,
and after the capitulation of the Spanish army and the fall
of Massilia had directed the greater portion of the select troops
employed there to proceed to that destination. The unparalleled
exertions no doubt, which were thus required by Caesar
from his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts had done
and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions, the ninth
on its march through Placentia was a dangerous indication
of the temper prevailing in the army; but Caesar's presence of mind
and personal authority gained the mastery, and from this quarter
nothing impeded the embarkation. But the want of ships, through which
the pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened also
to frustrate this expedition. The war-vessels, which Caesar
had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports,
were not yet ready or at any rate not on the spot; his squadron
in the Adriatic had been in the previous year destroyed at Curicta;(27)
he found at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war
and scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the third part
of his army--of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry--destined for Greece.
The considerable fleet of the enemy exclusively commanded
the Adriatic and especially all the harbours of the mainland
and islands on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances
the question presents itself, why Caesar did not instead
of the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria,
which relieved him from all the perils threatened by the fleet
and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly came from Gaul,
than the route by Brundisium. It is true that the regions
of Illyria were rugged and poor beyond description; but they
were traversed by other armies not long afterwards, and this obstacle
can hardly have appeared insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul.
Perhaps he apprehended that during the troublesome march
through Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the Adriatic,
whereby their parts might come at once to be changed--with Caesar
in Macedonia, and Pompeius in Italy; although such a rapid change
was scarcely to be expected from his slow-moving antagonist.
Perhaps Caesar had decided for the maritime route on the supposition
that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condition
to command respect, and, when after his return from Spain
he became aware of the true state of things in the Adriatic,
it might be too late to change the plan of campaign. Perhaps--
and, in accordance with Caesar's quick temperament always urging him
to decision, we may even say in all probability--he found himself
irresistibly tempted by the circumstance that the Epirot coast
was still at the moment unoccupied but would certainly be covered
in a few days by the enemy, to thwart once more by a bold stroke
the whole plan of his antagonist.
Caesar Lands in Epirus
First Successes
However this may be, on the 4th Jan. 706(28) Caesar set sail
with six legions greatly thinned by toil and sickness and 600 horsemen
from Brundisium for the coast of Epirus. It was a counterpart
to the foolhardy Britannic expedition; but at least the first throw
was fortunate. The coast was reached in the middle of the Acroceraunian
(Chimara) cliffs, at the little-frequented roadstead of Paleassa
(Paljassa). The transports were seen both from the harbour of Oricum
(creek of Avlona) where a Pompeian squadron of eighteen sail was lying,
and from the headquarters of the hostile fleet at Corcyra;
but in the one quarter they deemed themselves too weak,
in the other they were not ready to sail, so that the first freight
was landed without hindrance. While the vessels at once returned
to bring over the second, Caesar on that same evening scaled
the Acroceraunian mountains. His first successes were as great
as the surprise of his enemies. The Epirot militia nowhere
offered resistance; the important seaport towns of Oricum
and Apollonia along with a number of smaller townships were taken,
and Dyrrhachium, selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal
and filled with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned,
was in the utmost danger.
Caesar Cut Off from Italy
But the further course of the campaign did not correspond
to this brilliant beginning. Bibulus subsequently made up in some measure
for the negligence, of which he had allowed himself to be guilty,
by redoubling his exertions. He not only captured nearly thirty
of the transports returning home, and caused them with every living
thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along
the whole district of coast occupied by Caesar, from the island Sason
(Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a most careful watch,
however troublesome it was rendered by the inclement season
of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary
for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra; in fact
his successor Libo--for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted
fatigues--even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium,
till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island
in front of it on which he had established himself. It was
not possible for Caesar's officers to convey the second portion
of the army over to their general. As little did he himself
succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pompeius learned through
one of Caesar's peace envoys as to his preparations for the voyage
to the Epirot coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march,
threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal.
The situation of Caesar was critical. Although he extended his range
in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible,
the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precarious,
while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium
and masters of the sea, had abundance of everything. With his army
presumably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle
to that of Pompeius at least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself
fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead
of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters
between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus,
facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the arrival
of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate
the enemy with an irresistibly superior force. Thus months passed.
If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy
a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar
still in the same position, he was to all appearance lost,
with his weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between
the immense fleet and the three times superior land army of the enemy;
and already the winter was drawing to a close. His sole hope
still depended on the transport fleet; that it should steal
or fight its way through the blockade was hardly to be hoped for;
but after the first voluntary foolhardiness this second venture
was enjoined by necessity. How desperate his situation appeared
to Caesar himself, is shown by his resolution--when the fleet
still came not--to sail alone in a fisherman's boat across the Adriatic
to Brundisium in order to fetch it; which, in reality, was only abandoned
because no mariner was found to undertake the daring voyage.
Antonius Proceed to Epirus
But his appearance in person was not needed to induce
the faithful officer who commanded in Italy, Marcus Antonius,
to make this last effort for the saving of his master. Once more
the transport fleet, with four legions and 800 horsemen on board
sailed from the harbour of Brundisium, and fortunately a strong
south wind carried it past Libo's galleys. But the same wind,
which thus saved the fleet, rendered it impossible for it to land
as it was directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled it
to sail past the camps of Caesar and Pompeius and to steer
to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, which town
fortunately still adhered to Caesar.(29) When it sailed
past the harbour of Dyrrhachium, the Rhodian galleys started
in pursuit, and hardly had the ships of Antonius entered
the port of Lissus when the enemy's squadron appeared before it.
But just at this moment the wind suddenly veered, and drove
the pursuing galleys back into the open sea and partly
on the rocky coast. Through the most marvellous good fortune
the landing of the second freight had also been successful.
Junction of Caesar's Army
Antonius and Caesar were no doubt still some four days' march
from each other, separated by Dyrrhachium and the whole army
of the enemy; but Antonius happily effected the perilous march
round about Dyrrhachium through the passes of the Graba Balkan,
and was received by Caesar, who had gone to meet him, on the right bank
of the Apsus. Pompeius, after having vainly attempted to prevent
the junction of the two armies of the enemy and to force the corps
of Antonius to fight by itself, took up a new position at Asparagium
on the river Genusus (Skumbi), which flows parallel to the Apsus
between the latter and the town of Dyrrhachium, and here remained
once more immoveable. Caesar felt himself now strong enough
to give battle; but Pompeius declined it. On the other hand Caesar
succeeded in deceiving his adversary and throwing himself unawares
with his better marching troops, just as at Ilerda, between
the enemy's camp and the fortress of Dyrrhachium on which it rested
as a basis. The chain of the Graba Balkan, which stretching
in a direction from east to west ends on the Adriatic
in the narrow tongue of land at Dyrrhachium, sends off--fourteen miles
to the east of Dyrrhachium--in a south-westerly direction a lateral
branch which likewise turns in the form of a crescent towards the sea,
and the main chain and lateral branch of the mountains enclose
between themselves a small plain extending round a cliff on the seashore.
Pompeius now took up his camp, and, although Caesar's army kept
the land route to Dyrrhachium closed against him, he yet with the aid
of his fleet remained constantly in communication with the town
and was amply and easily provided from it with everything needful;
while among the Caesarians, notwithstanding strong detachments
to the country lying behind, and notwithstanding all the exertions
of the general to bring about an organized system of conveyance
and thereby a regular supply, there was more than scarcity, and flesh,
barley, nay even roots had very frequently to take the place
of the wheat to which they were accustomed.
Caesar Invests the Camp of Pompeius
As his phlegmatic opponent persevered in his inaction, Caesar
undertook to occupy the circle of heights which enclosed the plain
on the shore held by Pompeius, with the view of being able at least
to arrest the movements of the superior cavalry of the enemy
and to operate with more freedom against Dyrrhachium, and if possible
to compel his opponent either to battle or to embarkation. Nearly
the half of Caesar's troops was detached to the interior;
it seemed almost Quixotic to propose with the rest virtually
to besiege an army perhaps twice as strong, concentrated in position,
and resting on the sea and the fleet. Yet Caesar's veterans by infinite
exertions invested the Pompeian camp with a chain of posts
sixteen miles long, and afterwards added, just as before Alesia,
to this inner line a second outer one, to protect themselves
against attacks from Dyrrhachium and against attempts to turn
their position which could so easily be executed with the aid
of the fleet. Pompeius attacked more than once portions
of these entrenchments with a view to break if possible the enemy's line,
but he did not attempt to prevent the investment by a battle;
he preferred to construct in his turn a number of entrenchments
around his camp, and to connect them with one another by lines.
Both sides exerted themselves to push forward their trenches
as far as possible, and the earthworks advanced but slowly amidst
constant conflicts. At the same time skirmishing went on
on the opposite side of Caesar's camp with the garrison of Dyrrhachium;
Caesar hoped to get the fortress into his power by means
of an understanding with some of its inmates, but was prevented
by the enemy's fleet. There was incessant fighting at very different
points--on one of the hottest days at six places simultaneously--
and, as a rule, the tried valour of the Caesarians had the advantage
in these skirmishes; once, for instance, a single cohort
maintained itself in its entrenchments against four legions
for several hours, till support came up. No prominent success
was attained on either side; yet the effects of the investment came
by degrees to be oppressively felt by the Pompeians. The stopping
of the rivulets flowing from the heights into the plain compelled them
to be content with scanty and bad well-water. Still more severely felt
was the want of fodder for the beasts of burden and the horses,
which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy; numbers of them died,
and it was of but little avail that the horses were conveyed by the fleet
to Dyrrhachium, because there also they did not find sufficient fodder.