The History of Rome, Book V - Theodor Mommsen
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Battle at the Nile
The junction took place without the enemy attempting to hinder it.
Caesar then marched into the Delta, whither the king had retreated,
overthrew, notwithstanding the deeply cut canal in their front,
the Egyptian vanguard at the first onset, and immediately stormed
the Egyptian camp itself. It lay at the foot of a rising ground
between the Nile--from which only a narrow path separated it--
and marshes difficult of access. Caesar caused the camp to be assailed
simultaneously from the front and from the flank on the path
along the Nile; and during this assault ordered a third detachment
to ascend unseen the heights behind the camp. The victory was complete
the camp was taken, and those of the Egyptians who did not fal
beneath the sword of the enemy were drowned in the attempt to escape
to the fleet on the Nile. With one of the boats, which sank
overladen with men, the young king also disappeared in the waters
of his native stream.
Pacificatin of Alexandria
Immediately after the battle Caesar advanced at the head
of his cavalry from the land-side straight into the portion
of the capital occupied by the Egyptians. In mourning attire,
with the images of their gods in their hands, the enemy received him
and sued for peace; and his troops, when they saw him return as victor
from the side opposite to that by which he had set forth, welcomed him
with boundless joy. The fate of the town, which had ventured
to thwart the plans of the master of the world and had brought him
within a hair's-breadth of destruction, lay in Caesar's hands;
but he was too much of a ruler to be sensitive, and dealt with
the Alexandrians as with the Massiliots. Caesar--pointing
to their city severely devastated and deprived of its granaries,
of its world-renowned library, and of other important public buildings
on occasion of the burning of the fleet--exhorted the inhabitants
in future earnestly to cultivate the arts of peace alone, and to heal
the wounds which they had inflicted on themselves; for the rest,
he contented himself with granting to the Jews settled in Alexandria
the same rights which the Greek population of the city enjoyed,
and with placing in Alexandria, instead of the previous Roman army
of occupation which nominally at least obeyed the kings of Egypt,
a formal Roman garrison--two of the legions besieged there,
and a third which afterwards arrived from Syria--under a commander
nominated by himself. For this position of trust a man
was purposely selected, whose birth made it impossible for him
to abuse it--Rufio, an able soldier, but the son of a freedman.
Cleopatra and her younger brother Ptolemaeus obtained the sovereignty
of Egypt under the supremacy of Rome; the princess Arsinoe
was carried off to Italy, that she might not serve once more as a pretext
for insurrections to the Egyptians, who were after the Oriental fashion
quite as much devoted to their dynasty as they were indifferent
towards the individual dynasts; Cyprus became again a part
of the Roman province of Cilicia.
Course of Things during Caesar's Absence in Alexandria
This Alexandrian insurrection, insignificant as it was in itself
and slight as was its intrinsic connection with the events
of importance in the world's history which took place at the same time
in the Roman state, had nevertheless so far a momentous influence
on them that it compelled the man, who was all in all and without whom
nothing could be despatched and nothing could be solved,
to leave his proper tasks in abeyance from October 706 up to March 707
in order to fight along with Jews and Bedouins against a city rabble.
The consequences of personal rule began to make themselves felt.
They had the monarchy; but the wildest confusion prevailed everywhere,
and the monarch was absent. The Caesarians were for the moment,
just like the Pompeians, without superintendence; the ability
of the individual officers and, above all, accident
decided matters everywhere.
Insubordination of Pharnaces
In Asia Minor there was, at the time of Caesar's departure for Egypt,
no enemy. But Caesar's lieutenant there, the able Gnaeus Domitius
Calvinus, had received orders to take away again from king Pharnaces
what he had without instructions wrested from the allies of Pompeius;
and, as Pharnaces, an obstinate and arrogant despot like his father,
perseveringly refused to evacuate Lesser Armenia, no course remained
but to march against him. Calvinus had been obliged to despatch
to Egypt two out of the three legions left behind with him and formed
out of the Pharsalian prisoners of war; he filled up the gap
by one legion hastily gathered from the Romans domiciled in Pontus
and two legions of Deiotarus exercised after the Roman manner,
and advanced into Lesser Armenia. But the Bosporan army,
tried in numerous conflicts with the dwellers on the Black Sea,
showed itself more efficient than his own.
Calvinus Defeated at Nicopolis
Victory of Caesar at Ziela
In an engagement at Nicopolis the Pontic levy of Calvinus
was cut to pieces and the Galatian legions ran off; only the one old
legion of the Romans fought its way through with moderate loss.
Instead of conquering Lesser Armenia, Calvinus could not even prevent
Pharnaces from repossessing himself of his Pontic "hereditary states,"
and pouring forth the whole vials of his horrible sultanic caprices
on their inhabitants, especially the unhappy Amisenes
(winter of 706-707). When Caesar in person arrived in Asia Minor
and intimated to him that the service which Pharnaces had rendered
to him personally by having granted no help to Pompeius could not be
taken into account against the injury inflicted on the empire,
and that before any negotiation he must evacuate the province of Pontus
and send back the property which he had pillaged, he declared himself
doubtless ready to submit; nevertheless, well knowing how good reason
Caesar had for hastening to the west, he made no serious preparations
for the evacuation. He did not know that Caesar finished
whatever he took in hand. Without negotiating further,
Caesar took with him the one legion which he brought from Alexandria
and the troops of Calvinus and Deiotarus, and advanced against
the camp of Pharnaces at Ziela. When the Bosporans saw him approach,
they boldly crossed the deep mountain-ravine which covered their front,
and charged the Romans up the hill. Caesar's soldiers
were still occupied in pitching their camp, and the ranks wavered
for a moment; but the veterans accustomed to war rapidly rallied
and set the example for a general attack and for a complete victory
(2 Aug. 707). In five days the campaign was ended--an invaluable piece
of good fortune at this time, when every hour was precious.
Regulation of Asia Minor
Caesar entrusted the pursuit of the king, who had gone home by way
of Sinope to Pharnaces' illegitimate brother, the brave Mithradates
of Pergamus, who as a reward for the services rendered by him in Egypt
received the crown of the Bosporan kingdom in room of Pharnaces.
In other respects the affairs of Syria and Asia Minor were peacefully
settled; Caesar's own allies were richly rewarded, those of Pompeius
were in general dismissed with fines or reprimands. Deiotarus alone,
the most powerful of the clients of Pompeius, was again confined
to his narrow hereditary domain, the canton of the Tolistobogii.
In his stead Ariobarzanes king of Cappadocia was invested with
Lesser Armenia, and the tetrarchy of the Trocmi usurped by Deiotarus
was conferred on the new king of the Bosporus, who was descended
by the maternal side from one of the Galatian princely houses
as by the paternal from that of Pontus.
War by Land and Sea in Illyria
Defeat of Gabinius
Naval Victory at Tauris
In Illyria also, while Caesar was in Egypt, incidents of a very grave
nature had occurred. The Dalmatian coast had been for centuries
a sore blemish on the Roman rule, and its inhabitants had been
at open feud with Caesar since the conflicts around Dyrrhachium;
while the interior also since the time of the Thessalian war,
swarmed with dispersed Pompeians. Quintus Cornificius
had however, with the legions that followed him from Italy,
kept both the natives and the refugees in check and had
at the same time sufficiently met the difficult task of provisioning
the troops in these rugged districts. Even when the able
Marcus Octavius, the victor of Curicta,(45) appeared with a part
of the Pompeian fleet in these waters to wage war there against Caesar
by sea and land, Cornificius not only knew how to maintain himself,
resting for support on the ships and the harbour of the Iadestini
(Zara), but in his turn also sustained several successful engagements
at sea with the fleet of his antagonist. But when the new governor
of Illyria, the Aulus Gabinius recalled by Caesar from exile,(46)
arrived by the landward route in Illyria in the winter of 706-707
with fifteen cohorts and 3000 horse, the system of warfare
changed. Instead of confining himself like his predecessor
to war on a small scale, the bold active man undertook at once,
in spite of the inclement season, an expedition with his whole force
to the mountains. But the unfavourable weather, the difficulty
of providing supplies, and the brave resistance of the Dalmatians,
swept away the army; Gabinius had to commence his retreat,
was attacked in the course of it and disgracefully defeated
by the Dalmatians, and with the feeble remains of his fine army
had difficulty in reaching Salonae, where he soon afterwards died.
Most of the Illyrian coast towns thereupon surrendered to the fleet
of Octavius; those that adhered to Caesar, such as Salonae
and Epidaurus (Ragusa vecchia), were so hard pressed by the fleet
at sea and by the barbarians on land, that the surrender
and capitulation of the remains of the army enclosed in Salonae
seemed not far distant. Then the commandant of the depot at Brundisium,
the energetic Publius Vatinius, in the absence of ships of war caused
common boats to be provided with beaks and manned with the soldiers
dismissed from the hospitals, and with this extemporized
war-fleet gave battle to the far superior fleet of Octavius
at the island of Tauris (Torcola between Lesina and Curzola)--
a battle in which, as in so many cases, the bravery of the leader
and of the marines compensated for the deficiencies of the vessels,
and the Caesarians achieved a brilliant victory. Marcus Octavius
left these waters and proceeded to Africa (spring of 707);
the Dalmatians no doubt continued their resistance for years
with great obstinacy, but it was nothing beyond a local mountain-warfare.
When Caesar returned from Egypt, his resolute adjutant had already got rid
of the danger that was imminent in Illyria.
Reorganization of the Coalition in Africa
All the more serious was the position of things in Africa,
where the constitutional party had from the outset of the civil war
ruled absolutely and had continually augmented their power.
Down to the battle of Pharsalus king Juba had, properly speaking,
borne rule there; he had vanquished Curio, and his flying horsemen
and his numberless archers were the main strength of the army;
the Pompeian governor Varus played by his side so subordinate
a part that he even had to deliver those soldiers of Curio,
who had surrendered to him, over to the king, and had to look on
while they were executed or carried away into the interior of Numidia.
After the battle of Pharsalus a change took place. With the exception
of Pompeius himself, no man of note among the defeated party
thought of flight to the Parthians. As little did they attempt to hold
the sea with their united resources; the warfare waged by Marcus Octavius
in the Illyrian waters was isolated, and was without permanent success.
The great majority of the republicans as of the Pompeians
betook themselves to Africa, where alone an honourable
and constitutional warfare might still be waged against the usurper.
There the fragments of the army scattered at Pharsalus, the troops
that had garrisoned Dyrrhachium, Corcyra, and the Peloponnesus,
the remains of the Illyrian fleet, gradually congregated;
there the second commander-in-chief Metellus Scipio,
the two sons of Pompeius, Gnaeus and Sextus, the political leader
of the republicans Marcus Cato, the able officers Labienus,
Afranius, Petreius, Octavius and others met. If the resources
of the emigrants had diminished, their fanaticism had, if possible,
even increased. Not only did they continue to murder their prisoners
and even the officers of Caesar under flag of truce, but king Juba,
in whom the exasperation of the partisan mingled with the fury
of the half-barbarous African, laid down the maxim that in every
community suspected of sympathizing with the enemy the burgesses
ought to be extirpated and the town burnt down, and even practically
carried out this theory against some townships, such as the unfortunate
Vaga near Hadrumetum. In fact it was solely owing to the energetic
intervention of Cato that the capital of the province itself
the flourishing Utica--which, just like Carthage formerly,
had been long regarded with a jealous eye by the Numidian kings--
did not experience the same treatment from Juba, and that measures
of precaution merely were taken against its citizens,
who certainly were not unjustly accused of leaning towards Caesar.
As neither Caesar himself nor any of his lieutenants undertook
the smallest movement against Africa, the coalition had full time
to acquire political and military reorganization there. First of all,
it was necessary to fill up anew the place of commander-in-chief
vacant by the death of Pompeius. King Juba was not disinclined
still to maintain the position which he had held in Africa
up to the battle of Pharsalus; indeed he bore himself no longer
as a client of the Romans but as an equal ally or even as a protector,
and took it upon him, for example, to coin Roman silver money
with his name and device; nay, he even raised a claim to be the sole
wearer of purple in the camp, and suggested to the Roman commanders
that they should lay aside their purple mantle of office.
Further Metellus Scipio demanded the supreme command for himself,
because Pompeius had recognized him in the Thessalian campaign
as on a footing of equality, more from the consideration that he was
his son-in-law than on military grounds. The like demand was raised
by Varus as the governor--self-nominated, it is true--of Africa,
seeing that the war was to be waged in his province. Lastly the army
desired for its leader the propraetor Marcus Cato. Obviously
it was right. Cato was the only man who possessed the requisite
devotedness, energy, and authority for the difficult office;
if he was no military man, it was infinitely better to appoint
as commander-in-chief a non-military man who understood how to listen
to reason and make his subordinates act, than an officer of untried
capacity like Varus, or even one of tried incapacity like Metellus
Scipio. But the decision fell at length on this same Scipio,
and it was Cato himself who mainly determined that decision.
He did so, not because he felt himself unequal to such a task,
or because his vanity found its account rather in declining
than in accepting; still less because he loved or respected Scipio,
with whom he on the contrary was personally at variance,
and who with his notorious inefficiency had attained a certain importance
merely in virtue of his position as father-in-law to Pompeius;
but simply and solely because his obstinate legal formalism chose
rather to let the republic go to ruin in due course of law
than to save it in an irregular way. When after the battle of Pharsalus
he met with Marcus Cicero at Corcyra, he had offered to hand over
the command in Corcyra to the latter--who was still from the time
of his Cilician administration invested with the rank of general--
as the officer of higher standing according to the letter of the law,
and by this readiness had driven the unfortunate advocate,
who now cursed a thousand times his laurels from the Arnanus,
almost to despair; but he had at the same time astonished all men
of any tolerable discernment. The same principles were applied now,
when something more was at stake; Cato weighed the question
to whom the place of commander-in-chief belonged, as if the matter
had reference to a field at Tusculum, and adjudged it to Scipio.
By this sentence his own candidature and that of Varus were set aside.
But he it was also, and he alone, who confronted with energy
the claims of king Juba, and made him feel that the Roman nobility
came to him not suppliant, as to the great-prince of the Parthians,
with a view to ask aid at the hands of a protector, but as entitled
to command and require aid from a subject. In the present state
of the Roman forces in Africa, Juba could not avoid lowering
his claims to some extent; although he still carried the point
with the weak Scipio, that the pay of his troops should be charged
on the Roman treasury and the cession of the province of Africa
should be assured to him in the event of victory.
By the side of the new general-in-chief the senate of the "three hundred"
again emerged. It established its seat in Utica, and replenished
its thinned ranks by the admission of the most esteemed
and the wealthiest men of the equestrian order.
The warlike preparations were pushed forward, chiefly through
the zeal of Cato, with the greatest energy, and every man capable
of arms, even the freedman and Libyan, was enrolled in the legions;
by which course so many hands were withdrawn from agriculture
that a great part of the fields remained uncultivated, but an imposing
result was certainly attained. The heavy infantry numbered fourteen
legions, of which two were already raised by Varus, eight others
were formed partly from the refugees, partly from the conscripts
in the province, and four were legions of king Juba armed
in the Roman manner. The heavy cavalry, consisting of the Celts
and Germans who arrived with Labienus and sundry others incorporated
in their ranks, was, apart from Juba's squadron of cavalry equipped
in the Roman style, 1600 strong. The light troops consisted
of innumerable masses of Numidians riding without bridle or rein
and armed merely with javelins, of a number of mounted bowmen,
and a large host of archers on foot. To these fell to be added Juba's
120 elephants, and the fleet of 55 sail commanded by Publius Varus
and Marcus Octavius. The urgent want of money was in some measure
remedied by a self-taxation on the part of the senate, which was
the more productive as the richest African capitalists had been
induced to enter it. Corn and other supplies were accumulated
in immense quantities in the fortresses capable of defence;
at the same time the stores were as far as possible removed
from the open townships. The absence of Caesar, the troublesome temper
of his legions, the ferment in Spain and Italy gradually raised
men's spirits, and the recollection of the Pharsalian defeat
began to give way to fresh hopes of victory.
The time lost by Caesar in Egypt nowhere revenged itself
more severely than here. Had he proceeded to Africa immediately
after the death of Pompeius, he would have found there a weak,
disorganized, and frightened army and utter anarchy among the leaders;
whereas there was now in Africa, owing more especially to Cato's energy,
an army equal in number to that defeated at Pharsalus, under leaders
of note, and under a regulated superintendence.
Movements in Spain
A peculiar evil star seemed altogether to preside over this African
expedition of Caesar. He had, even before his embarkation for Egypt,
arranged in Spain and Italy various measures preliminary and preparatory
to the African war; but out of all there had sprung nothing but mischief.
From Spain, according to Caesar's arrangement, the governor
of the southern province Quintus Cassius Longinus was to cross
with four legions to Africa, to be joined there by Bogud
king of West Mauretania,(47) and to advance with him towards
Numidia and Africa. But that army destined for Africa
included in it a number of native Spaniards and two whole legions
formerly Pompeian; Pompeian sympathies prevailed in the army
as in the province, and the unskilful and tyrannical behaviour
of the Caesarian governor was not fitted to allay them. A formal revolt
took place; troops and towns took part for or against the governor;
already those who had risen against the lieutenant of Caesar
were on the point of openly displaying the banner of Pompeius;
already had Pompeius' elder son Gnaeus embarked from Africa for Spain
to take advantage of this favourable turn, when the disavowal
of the governor by the most respectable Caesarians themselves
and the interference of the commander of the northern province
suppressed just in right time the insurrection. Gnaeus Pompeius,
who had lost time on the way with a vain attempt to establish himself
in Mauretania, came too late; Gaius Trebonius, whom Caesar
after his return from the east sent to Spain to relieve Cassius
(autumn of 707), met everywhere with absolute obedience. But of course
amidst these blunders nothing was done from Spain to disturb
the organization of the republicans in Africa; indeed in consequence
of the complications with Longinus, Bogud king of West Mauretania,
who was on Caesar's side and might at least have put some obstacles
in the way of king Juba, had been called away with his troops to Spain.
Military Revolt in Campania
Still more critical were the occurrences among the troops
whom Caesar had caused to be collected in southern Italy, in order
to his embarkation with them for Africa. They were for the most part
the old legions, which had founded Caesar's throne in Gaul, Spain,
and Thessaly. The spirit of these troops had not been improved
by victories, and had been utterly disorganized by long repose
in Lower Italy. The almost superhuman demands which the general
made on them, and the effects of which were only too clearly apparent
in their fearfully thinned ranks, left behind even in these men of iron
a leaven of secret rancour which required only time and quiet
to set their minds in a ferment. The only man who had influence
over them, had been absent and almost unheard-of for a year;
while the officers placed over them were far more afraid of the soldiers
than the soldiers of them, and overlooked in the conquerors
of the world every outrage against those that gave them quarters,
and every breach of discipline. When the orders to embark for Sicily
arrived, and the soldier was to exchange the luxurious ease of Campania
for a third campaign certainly not inferior to those of Spain
and Thessaly in point of hardship, the reins, which had been
too long relaxed and were too suddenly tightened, snapt asunder.
The legions refused to obey till the promised presents
were paid to them, scornfully repulsed the officers sent by Caesar,
and even threw stones at them. An attempt to extinguish the incipient
revolt by increasing the sums promised not only had no success,
but the soldiers set out in masses to extort the fulfilment
of the promises from the general in the capital. Several officers,
who attempted to restrain the mutinous bands on the way, were slain.
It was a formidable danger. Caesar ordered the few soldiers
who were in the city to occupy the gates, with the view of warding off
the justly apprehended pillage at least at the first onset,
and suddenly appeared among the furious bands demanding to know
what they wanted. They exclaimed: "discharge." In a moment
the request was granted. Respecting the presents, Caesar added,
which he had promised to his soldiers at his triumph, as well as
respecting the lands which he had not promised to them
but had destined for them, they might apply to him on the day
when he and the other soldiers should triumph; in the triumph itself
they could not of course participate, as having been previously
discharged. The masses were not prepared for things taking this turn;
convinced that Caesar could not do without them for the African campaign,
they had demanded their discharge only in order that, if it were refused,
they might annex their own conditions to their service. Half unsettled
in their belief as to their own indispensableness; too awkward
to return to their object, and to bring the negotiation
which had missed its course back to the right channel; ashamed, as men,
by the fidelity with which the Imperator kept his word even to soldiers
who had forgotten their allegiance, and by his generosity
which even now granted far more than he had ever promised;
deeply affected, as soldiers, when the general presented to them
the prospect of their being necessarily mere civilian spectators
of the triumph of their comrades, and when he called them no longer
"comrades" but "burgesses,"--by this very form of address,
which from his mouth sounded so strangely, destroying as it were
with one blow the whole pride of their past soldierly career;
and, besides all this, under the spell of the man whose presence
had an irresistible power--the soldiers stood for a while mute
and lingering, till from all sides a cry arose that the general
would once more receive them into favour and again permit them
to be called Caesar's soldiers. Caesar, after having allowed himself
to be sufficiently entreated, granted the permission; but the ringleaders
in this mutiny had a third cut off from their triumphal presents.
History knows no greater psychological masterpiece, and none
that was more completely successful.