What Germany Thinks - Thomas F. A. Smith
Another authority quoted to support his point is Professor Hilty
(University of Bern, 1889). "A neutral State may not conclude a treaty
_in advance_ to protect its own neutrality, because by this means a
protectorate relationship would be created."
Frank continues (p. 21): "Hence Belgian neutrality was guaranteed in the
interests of the balance of power in Europe, and I have already pointed
out that the same idea prevailed when the barrier-systems of 1815 and
1818 were established.
"Considering the matter from this point of view, the falsity of modern
Belgium's interpretation at once becomes apparent. According to Belgian
official opinion her neutrality obligations only came into force in the
event of war, and therefore could not be violated during peace. But this
balance of power was to be maintained, above all in time of peace, and
might not be disturbed by any peaceful negotiations whatever, especially
if these were calculated to manifest themselves in either advantageous
or prejudicial form, in the event of war.
"In this category we may place the surrender of territory. No impartial
thinker can deny that the cession of Antwerp to England would have been
a breach of neutrality on the part of Belgium, even if it had occurred
in peace time. The same is true for the granting of occupation rights,
and landing places for troops, or for the establishment of a harbour
which might serve as a basis for the military or naval operations of
another State.
"Moreover, it is unnecessary to exert one's imagination in order to
discover 'peaceful negotiations' which are incompatible with permanent
neutrality, for history offers us two exceedingly instructive examples.
When a tariff union between France and Belgium was proposed in 1840,
England objected because the plan was not in accord with Belgian
neutrality. Again in 1868, when the Eastern Railway Company of France
sought to obtain railway concessions in Belgium, it was the latter
country which refused its consent, and in the subsequent parliamentary
debate the step was designated an act of neutrality."
From this extract it is evident that Professor Frank has undermined his
own case. Belgian neutrality was intended by the great powers to be the
corner-stone of the European balance of power. During the last forty
years Germany's carefully meditated increase of armaments on land and
sea threatened to dislodge the corner-stone. When the Conference of
London declared Belgium to be a permanently neutral country, there was
apparent equality of power on each side of the stone. In 1870 the
Franco-German war showed that the balance of power was already disturbed
at this corner of the European edifice. Still Germany's pledged word was
considered sufficient guarantee of the _status quo_.
Since 1870 the potential energy on the German side of the corner-stone
has increased in an unprecedented degree, and this huge energy has been
consistently converted into concrete military and naval forces. This
alteration in the potential _status quo ante_ has been partly the result
of natural growth, but in a still greater degree, to Germany's doctrine
that it is only might which counts.
Another German professor[138] had defined the position in a sentence:
"Germany is a boiler charged to danger-point with potential energy. In
such a case is it a sound policy to try to avert the possibility of an
explosion by screwing down all its safety-valves?" Recognizing that
Belgian neutrality has existed for many years past solely on Germany's
good-will, it became the right and urgent duty of the other signatory
powers to endeavour to strengthen the corner-stone. Germany absolutely
refused to relax in any way the pressure which her "potential energy"
was exercising at this point, therefore it was necessary above all for
France and Great Britain to bolster up the threatened corner.
[Footnote 138: Hermann Oncken (Heidelberg), in the _Quarterly Review_,
October, 1913. The author of the article charges Great Britain with
screwing down the valves, which is a deliberate distortion of the truth.
Britain has always opened her markets free to German goods and admitted
the same privileges to her rival--so far as these did not run contrary
to established rights--in all parts of the world. With regard to
territorial expansion a treaty had been drawn up between the two Powers
and was ready to be signed just when war broke out. That treaty would
have afforded Germany immense opportunities for expansion, but not at
the expense of Europe. Germany, however, desired European expansion, and
according to her accepted teaching, the fate of extra-European
territories will be decided on the battlefields of Europe.]
The former Power could have achieved this purpose by building a chain of
huge fortresses along her Belgian frontier. Why this precautionary
measure was never taken is difficult to surmise, but had it been taken,
Germany would have ascribed to her neighbour plans of aggression--and
declared war.
Great Britain could have restored the balance by creating an army of
several millions. Lord Haldane has announced that the late Liberal
Government was "afraid" to do this, although the fear of losing office
may have been greater than their fear for Germany.
The measures which England did take were merely non-binding
conversations with the military authorities of France and Belgium; the
making of plans for putting a British garrison of defence on Belgian
territory in the event of the latter's neutrality being violated or
threatened; and the printing of books describing the means of
communication in Belgium.[139]
[Footnote 139: "Belgium, Road and River Reports," prepared by the
General Staff, Vol. I., 1912; II., 1913; III. & IV., 1914. Copies of
this work have been seized by the Germans in Belgium, and capital is
being made of the incident to prove a violation of Belgian neutrality.
If the British General Staff had nothing better to do than to compile
guide-books to Belgium for a non-existent British army, it appears
merely amusing. But if the late Liberal Government believed that
Germany's potential energy could be prevented from breaking through into
Belgian territory by a barricade of guide-books--it was a lamentable
error of judgment. On the whole we are forced to call it a tragical
irony, that the only defences which Belgium possessed against the _furor
teutonicus_--excepting the Belgian army--were a "scrap of paper" and a
barricade of the same material.]
As a result of these measures, Belgium stands charged by Germany with
having broken her own neutrality, and German writers are naively asking
why Belgium did not give the same confidence to Germany which she gave
to England. The German mind knows quite well, that in building strategic
railways to the Belgian frontier she betrayed the line of direction
which the potential energy was intended to take, when the burst came.
Unofficially Germany has long since proclaimed her intention to invade
Belgium; it was an "open secret."
The _denouement_ of August 4th, 1914, when Belgian neutrality was
declared a "scrap of paper,"[140] was not the inspiration of a moment,
nor a decision arrived at under the pressure of necessity, but the
result of years of military preparation and planning. It had been
carefully arranged that the boiler should pour forth its energy through
the Belgian valve.
[Footnote 140: This famous phrase was employed as far back as 1855 by a
Belgian Minister in the House of Deputies, Brussels. M. Lebeau in
pleading for greater military preparation used these words: "History has
shown what becomes of neutralities which were guaranteed, by what may be
termed a 'scrap of paper.'"]
Or to draw another comparison, it is a modern variety of the wolf and
the lamb fable, with this difference: the wolf has first of all
swallowed the lamb, and now excuses himself by asserting that the
traitorous wretch had muddied the stream.
Belgians were painfully aware of the danger threatening them, and would
have made greater efforts to protect themselves, had not their own
Social Democrats resisted every military proposal. As the matter stands
to-day, however, all the efforts which Belgium did make, are classed by
Germany as intrigues of the Triple Entente, threatening her (Germany's)
existence, and all the horrors which have fallen upon this gallant
"neutral" country the German Pecksniff designates "Belgium's
Atonement."[141] It is to be feared that sooner or later, unless
Germany's military pride and unbounded greed of her neighbour's goods
can be checked, German professors will be engaged in the scientific task
of proving that the waters of the upper Rhine are unpalatable because
the lamb residing in Holland has stirred up mud in the lower reaches of
the same river!
[Footnote 141: _Belgien's Suebne_, the title of a chapter describing the
desolation and havoc of war, in a book entitled "Mit dem Hauptquartier
nach Westen," by Heinrich Binder. Berlin, 1915.]
Belgium knew that England and France had no other interest than the
maintenance of her neutrality. Belgium saw and felt, where the storm
clouds lowered, and probably sought or accepted advice from those Powers
who wished to perpetuate both the territorial integrity and neutrality
of Belgium. Germany's afterthought on the point is: "It was Belgium's
duty to protect her neutrality, and she owed this duty to all States
alike in the interests of the balance of power--a conception to which
she owes her existence.
"She was bound to treat all the signatory Powers in the same manner, but
she failed to do so, in that she permitted one or two of them to gain an
insight into her system of defence. By this means she afforded the
States admitted to her confidence, certain advantages which they could
employ for their own ends at any moment.
"By allowing certain of the great Powers to see her cards, Belgium was
not supporting the European balance, but seriously disturbing it. Even
Belgium's Legation Secretary in Berlin had warned his Government
concerning the political dangers arising out of intimacy with England.
By revealing her system of defence to England, Belgium destroyed its
intrinsic value and still more--she violated her international
obligations."[142]
[Footnote 142: Professor Frank's work, pp. 29-30.]
Considering that the British army at that time was small, that Britain
had no idea of annexing Belgian territory, one naturally wonders how the
value of Belgium's defence system had been depreciated by conversations
with British officers. In effect, Germany maintains that Belgium should
have behaved as a nonentity, which is contrary to all reason.
The Berlin Government has always treated her small neighbour as a
sovereign State, equal in quality, though not in power, to any State in
the world. If Germany recognized Belgium's sovereignty, why should not
England do the same, and, above all, why had Belgium no right to think
of her self-preservation, when she knew the danger on her eastern
frontier grew more menacing month by month?
Frank concludes his dissertation with his opinion of England and quotes
Thucydides, V., 105, as the best applicable characterization of the
British with which he is acquainted. "Among themselves, indeed, and out
of respect for their traditional constitution, they prove to be quite
decent. As regards their treatment of foreigners, a great deal might be
said, yet we will try to express it in brief. Among all whom we know
they are the most brazen in declaring what is good to be agreeable, and
what is profitable to be just."
The very offence which Germany accuses England of having premeditated,
she committed herself many years before. When France seemed to threaten
Belgium's existence, King Leopold I. concluded a secret treaty[143] with
the king of Prussia, whereby the latter was empowered to enter Belgium
and occupy fortresses in case of France becoming dangerous. The French
danger passed away, and its place was taken by a more awful menace--the
pressure of German potential energy; and when Belgium in turn opened her
heart (this is the unproved accusation which Germany makes
to-day--Author) to England, then she has violated her neutrality and
undermined the balance of power.[144] There is even a suspicion that
Leopold II. renewed this treaty with Germany in 1890, in spite of the
fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince de Chimay, in an
official speech denied its existence.
[Footnote 143: Germans love anything which is "secret."
"Geheimniskraemerei" ("affectation of mysteriousness and secrecy") is a
national and individual characteristic of the German people.--Author.]
[Footnote 144: Karl Hampe: "Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart"
("Belgium Past and Present"), p. 49.]
Professor Schoenborn's essay on Belgian neutrality is the least
satisfactory exposition of the three professorial effusions; it is no
credit to a man of learning, and is merely the work of an incapable
partisan trying to make a bad cause into a good one. Schoenborn
commences[145] with the customary German tactics by stating that
Bethmann-Hollweg's "scrap-of-paper" speech, and von Jagow's (German
Secretary of State) explanations to the Belgian representative in Berlin
on August 3rd, 1914, are of no importance in deciding the justice of
Germany's violation of her pledged word. One is led to inquire, When is
a German utterance--whether given in the Reichstag by the Chancellor or
on paper in the form of a treaty--final and binding?
[Footnote 145: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World
War"), pp. 566-8.]
Subterfuges, insinuations, distortions, even brazen falsehoods, are
scattered throughout German war literature, thicker "than Autumnal
leaves in Vallombrosa's brook." It is to be feared that just as Germans
have lied for a century to prove that the English were annihilated at
the battle of Waterloo, and for over forty years to show that Bismarck
was not a forger, so they will lie for centuries to come in order to
prove that the invasion of Belgium was not what Bethmann-Hollweg called
it, a "breach of international law."
Like his _confreres_, Herr Schoenborn admits that Germany was pledged to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, but the said neutrality was
non-existent, which appears somewhat paradoxical. Yet this is not the
least logical part of his case. "The passage of German troops through
Belgium was indispensable in the interests of the preservation of the
German Empire. A successful resistance to the annihilation-plans which
our enemies had wrought for our downfall seemed possible only by this
means. The Government regretted that, by so doing, we should commit a
formal infringement of the rights of a third State (Belgium), and
promised to make all possible compensation for the transgression.
"The judicial point of view which influenced the decision of the German
Government is perhaps, best illustrated by a parallel taken from the
ordinary laws of the country: A forester (game-keeper) is attacked by a
poacher, and in that same moment perceives a second poacher bearing a
gun at full-cock, creeping into a strange house in order to obtain a
better shot at the forester. Just as he is about to enter the house the
forester breaks the door open and thus forestalls him--in order to
surprise and overcome him. The forester is justified in taking this
step, but must make good all damage resulting to the householder."[146]
[Footnote 146: Ibid., p. 575.]
The instance holds good in the land of _Kultur_, where law and order
affords so little protection to a civilian and his property; but in
countries where laws are based upon culture the author believes that the
forester would receive condign punishment for breaking into another
man's house, no matter under what pretext. Unconsciously the learned
professor is humorous when he compares Germany to a gamekeeper and
Russia and France to poachers; but he is naive to a degree of stupidity,
when he makes France carry a weapon fully prepared to shoot the
forester.
We will consult another German authority to show that France's weapons
were not at full-cock.
"During the last ten years France has given special attention to the
fortresses on the German frontier. But those facing Belgium have been so
carelessly equipped that we see clearly to what a degree she relied upon
her neighbour. The forts are in the same condition as they were twenty
or thirty years ago. As some of these fortifications were built fifty
years ago, various points on the frontier are strategically, absolutely
useless.
"A typical example of this, is Fort les Ayvelles, which is intended to
protect the bridges and Meuse crossings south of Mezieres-Charleville;
the fort was levelled to the ground by 300 shots from our 21-centimetre
howitzers. It was built in 1878 and armed with forty cannon; of these
the principal weapons consisted of two batteries each containing six
9-centimetre cannon, which, however, were cast in the years 1878-1880,
and in the best case could only carry 4,000 yards. Then there were some
12-centimetre bronze pieces cast in 1884, and a few five-barrelled
revolver cannon.
"Besides these there were old howitzers from the year 1842;
muzzle-loaders with the characteristic pyramids of cannon ball by the
side, such as are often used in Germany at village festivals or to fire
a salute. The fort itself was a perfect picture of the obsolete and
out-of-date. Apart from the crude, primitive equipment, the organization
must have been faulty indeed.
"On the road leading up to the fort we saw some tree-branches which had
been hurriedly placed as obstacles, and higher up wire entanglements had
been commenced at the last moment. At least one battery was useless, for
the field of fire was cut off by high trees, and at the last minute the
garrison had tried to place the guns in a better position.
"Our artillery which fired from a north-westerly position displayed a
precision of aim which is rare. One battery had had nearly every gun put
out of action by clean hits. In several cases we saw the barrel of the
gun yards away from its carriage, and only a heap of wheels, earth,
stones, etc., marked the place where it had stood.
"Another proof of the excellent work done by the artillery, was the fact
that hardly a shell had struck the earth in the 500 yards from the
battery to the fort. After the former had been disposed of, the
artillery fire was concentrated on the fort, which was reduced to a heap
of rubbish. The stonework and the high walls--yards thick--had tumbled
to pieces like a child's box of bricks.
"A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they
had fled almost at the first shot. Instead of putting these men in
trenches, their superiors had put them at this 'lost post' and allowed
them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.
"Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who
had witnessed the hopeless struggle. He lived to see his men save their
lives in wild flight--and then ended his own."[147]
[Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," pp.
107-9.]
Here we have a sorry picture of the poacher whom Germany feared so much.
The world knows now that neither Britain, France nor Russia were
prepared for war, which excludes the probability that they desired or
provoked a conflict. But Germany knew that, and much more, in the month
of July, 1914. Bethmann-Hollweg when addressing the Reichstag drew a
terrifying picture of French armies[148] standing ready to invade
Belgium, but he knew full well that the necessary base-fortresses were
lacking on the Franco-Belgian frontier.
[Footnote 148: Richard Grasshoff in his work "Belgien's Schuld"
("Belgium's Guilt"), p. 14 _et seq_., reproduces several confessions
alleged to have been made by French soldiers, prisoners of war in
Germany, stating that they entered Belgian territory on July 31st, 1914.
At present it is impossible to test the value of this evidence. Cf. p.
151.]
As regards the alleged plans which Germany's enemies had made to
annihilate Germany, it will be necessary for Professor Schoenborn to
prove that the Entente Powers had: (1.) Caused the murder in Serajewo;
(2.) Despatched the ultimatum to Serbia; (3.) Prepared themselves for
war. Until he proves these three points the world will continue to
believe that it was Germany alone who cherished "annihilation-plans."
Schoenborn mentions too, Britain's refusal to promise her neutrality
even if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium. This offer was made
to Sir Edward Grey, who declined it. According to Professor Schoenborn
Germany's final decision to invade Belgium was only taken after that
refusal. It is a striking example of the immorality which prevails both
in Germany's business and political life. She gave her solemn pledge in
1839, yet endeavoured to sell the same pledge in 1914--for Britain's
neutrality!
The author once made an agreement with a German, but soon found that the
arrangement was ignored and wrote to the person in question: "You have
employed our arrangement merely as a means for making further incursions
into my rights."
That summarizes the Teutonic conception of a treaty, either private or
national. It is only a wedge with which to broaden the way for a further
advance. Usually a man signs an agreement with an idea of finality, and
looks forward to freedom from further worry in the matter. Not so the
German; with him it is an instrument to obtain, or blackmail, further
concessions; and as individuals, instead of occupying their thoughts and
energies in the faithful fulfilment of its terms, they plot and plan in
the pursuit of ulterior advantages.
Heidelberg's great scholar seems to have had doubts concerning his
simile of the gamekeeper; hence in his last footnote he makes the
innocuous remark: "Because the house-breaking gamekeeper fired the first
shot, it is not usual to draw the conclusion that the poacher had only
defensive intentions" (p. 590).
All in all, Professor Schoenborn's attempt at partisanship is a
miserable failure, and as an academic thesis it is doubtful whether the
faculty of law in any German university would grant a student a degree
for such a crude effort.
Various facts indicate Germany's intention to annex Belgium, if not the
entire country, then those districts in which Flemish is spoken. Germany
has suddenly remembered that the Flemings are a Low German people and
that they have been "oppressed" by the Walloons. The hypocrisy of the
plea becomes evident when we recall German (including Austrian)
oppression of the Poles, Slavs and Hungarians.
One writer[149] has even endeavoured to prove that the House of Hesse
has a legitimate historical claim to the province of Brabant. But as the
following extracts will show, there is method in this madness. No pains
are being spared to stir up racial feeling between the two peoples
(Flemings and Walloons) who form King Albert's subjects. All the
internal differences are being dished up to convince the inhabitants of
Flanders that they will be much better off under the German heel.[150]
[Footnote 149: Dr. Karl Knetsch: "Des Hauses Hessen Ansprueche auf
Brabant" ("The House of Hesse's Claims to Brabant"). Marburg, 1915.]
[Footnote 150: The _Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten_ for September 19th,
1915, contains a long account of a petition which was presented to Herr
von Hissing, General Governor of Belgium, by a branch of the General
Union of the Netherlands. The branch society is in Lierre (a town
occupied by the Germans), and the petition is a statement of Flemish
national and language aspirations. Unfortunately the document in
question "makes a bitter attack on Franco-Belgian endeavours to rob the
Flemings of their rights." It is superfluous to quote more; this
sentence alone shows the origin of the petition to be German.]
Forgetting their tyrannous efforts to stamp out the Polish language and
Polish national feelings, the Germans are now sorrowing over the alleged
attempts of the Walloons to suffocate the Flemish dialect. German war
books breathe hate and contempt for the Walloons, but bestow clumsy
bear-like caresses (no doubt unwelcome to their recipients) on the
Flemings.
In a work[151] already cited the following passages occur, in addition
to three whole chapters intended to supply historical proof that
Flanders is by the very nature of things a part of the German Empire.
[Footnote 151: Wilhelm Kotzde: "Von Luettich bis Flandern" ("From Liege
into Flanders"). Weimar, 1914.]
"The German people committed a grave crime, when they fought among
themselves and left their race-brothers on the frontier, defenceless and
at the mercy of a foreign Power. Therefore we have no right to scold
these brothers (the Flemings), but should rather fetch them back into
the German fold" (p. 40).
Kotzde reports a conversation which he had with an educated Fleming last
autumn. "'We do not like the French and English,' said the Fleming. 'But
what about Brussels?' I remarked. 'They are a people for themselves. The
Flemish capital is Antwerp' he answered.