What Germany Thinks - Thomas F. A. Smith
[Footnote 179: Ibid., p. 101.]
"I spoke of the good understanding between the natives and our soldiers.
Probably that is not so easy to attain everywhere. We drove long
distances from the Prince's headquarters and once passed through a
famous town which sees the German conquerors for a second time. (No
doubt Sedan is meant.--Author.)
"Most of the inhabitants know it is the Crown Prince by the signs of
reverence shown him on all sides, by officers and men alike. But the
citizens of the twice-conquered town bite their lips, turn their heads
aside, and pretend indifference. The women too--many of them in deep
mourning--turn away, or sometimes stand and stare as if with suddenly
aroused interest. Here the ancient hate glowers in silence.
"It seems as if a parole of mute non-respect has been passed round. This
town, which has become world-famous on account of the _debacle_ of the
Third Empire, lives to see with gnashing of teeth the downfall of the
Republic. But they do not believe it yet."[180]
[Footnote 180: Ibid., p. 108.]
"French and Russian prisoners are working on the roads, wheeling barrows
of stone and filling the holes made by shell fire. Some of them, without
thinking, touch their caps when their guards stand stiffly at the
salute. (And how few guards are necessary to watch this tame herd!)
Others gaze at our car as it rushes past without giving any salute;
their faces express astonishment, curiosity, but no excitement."[181]
[Footnote 181: Ibid., pp. 107-110.]
Another illuminating page tells of the Crown Prince's anger on hearing
that Italy had joined the Allies, and how they went for a motor-ride as
an antidote to the royal rage.
German humour is generally unconscious and mostly unintentional. After a
policy of bullying towards France for forty-four years, Germany has
discovered during the course of the war that France is the cat's-paw of
Russia and Great Britain--principally the latter.
One writer,[182] in some fifty pages of venom, endeavours to show that
England is France's executioner. Another[183] gives our ally the advice
"awake!" After Germany has played the _saigner-a-blanc_ game in Northern
France for more than a year, the advice seems rather belated.
[Footnote 182: Walter Unus: "England als Henker Frankreichs."
Braunschweig, 1915.]
[Footnote 183: Ernst Heinemann: "Frankreich, erwache!" Berlin, 1915.]
Herr Heinemann writes, p. 33: "France is not fighting for herself, but
for England and Russia.
"Poor deceived France! She has given fifteen milliards of francs to
Russia so that she may at last draw the sword in defence of
Russo-Serbian and British commercial interests. She has placed her money
and her beautiful land at the disposal of her so-called friends--for the
sake of a mad idea which these friends have cleverly exploited
(_revanche idee_).
"England has declared that she will continue the war for twenty years,
twenty years--on French soil. If under these circumstances the French
broke with their allies--who have exploited France for the last
twenty-five years, and who have plunged her into this war---in order to
arrive at a reasonable understanding with Germany; then they would only
show that they do not intend to accept the final consequences of the
mistakes committed by the French Government.
"No one is compelled to eat the last drop of a soup prepared by false
friends. In this sense, to seduce France to a direct breach of faith
with her allies, would in truth, only mean the protection of France's
best interests" (pp. 51-2).
One other writer deserves mention--a lecturer in history, Bonn
University--because he presents an opinion the exact contrary to the one
last quoted. According to Dr. Platzhoff, France herself is the guilty
party, who has tricked Russia and Great Britain into the service of
revenge for 1870.
"Therefore France found it necessary to extract herself from isolation,
and acquire allies against her neighbour (Germany). In several decades
of painful effort, French diplomacy has solved the problem in brilliant
fashion. _Revanche_--and alliance policy are inseparable
conceptions."[184]
[Footnote 184: Dr. Walter Platzhoff; "Deutschland und Frankreich," p.
18.]
In contrast to most German authors, Platzhoff admits that the _Entente
Cordiale_ was called into being by Germany herself. "This development
caused great anxiety in Germany. But it seems certain that Germany could
have prevented it by one means alone--an open agreement with England.
And Berlin, after considering the matter carefully, had declined the
latter."[185]
[Footnote 185: Ibid., p. 22.]
"That France would enter the field on Russia's behalf is a logical
consequence not only of the Dual Alliance treaty, but also of the policy
pursued during recent decades. In vain French ministers have protested
their love of peace and their innocence in causing this war. The policy
of alliances and revenge was certain to end in a world conflagration.
"Already voices make themselves heard which prophesy a revolution in
French policy and a later _entente_ with Germany."[186]
[Footnote 186: Ibid., pp. 26-8.]
Many such passages might be cited to prove that Germany would like to
see a split among the allies. But France's honour and welfare are in her
own hands, and it appears a futile hope that Germany, after failing to
bring France to submission and self-effacement by threats of _saigner a
blanc_, will succeed in her purpose by the reality.
CHAPTER XI
THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WAR
Mention has already been made that a large number of Germany's war books
has emanated from the universities. Not the least important of these
efforts is "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World
War.")[187] Twenty well-known university professors have contributed to
the work; the fact being emphasized that special facilities have been
accorded to them by the German foreign office. For British readers the
chapters by Professors Marcks and Oncken are the most interesting, viz.,
"England's Policy of Might" by the former, and "Events leading up to the
War" and "The Outbreak of War" by the latter. They take up a fifth of
the 686 pages of which the entire work consists.
[Footnote 187: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," herausgegeben von Otto
Hintze, Friedrich Meinecke, Hermann Oncken und Hermann Schumacher.
Leipzig und Berlin, 1915.]
The purpose of Professor Marcks' essay is to prove on historical and
scientific lines the lessons which have been taught in German schools
for nearly half a century, _i.e._, England is an astute but ruthless
robber who respects no right, and no nation which stands in her way.
"England's modern history begins with the Tudors and her world policy
with Elizabeth. First of all, England had to liberate herself,
economically and politically, from a position of dependence on the other
Powers; then she took up her particular attitude to the world. Her
separation from the Roman Catholic Church was exceedingly rich in
consequences; this step assigned to her a peculiar place in the camp of
the nations, and exercised a deep influence upon her intellectual
development. It gave her an impetus towards internal and external
independence.
"But the determining factor for England's future was her insular
position; this has been the case from the time Europe entered the
ocean-period. Since the year 1600 England, by her commerce and politics,
has influenced Europe from without, while she has maintained for herself
a position of independence, and directed her energies across the ocean
into the wide world. Successively she seized upon the Baltic, North Sea,
and Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became the merchant and shipbuilder
for most of the European nations.
"The sea has given her everything--independence, security and
prosperity--both in treasure and lands. The sea protected her and spared
her the unpleasantness of mighty neighbours. It was the ocean which
permitted free development to her internal life, parliament, government
and administration, and saved her from the continental form of
Government--a strong, armed monarchy.
"The sea has allowed the English to develop, undisturbed, the
peculiarities of their race--personal energy, trained by contact with
the ocean; personal freedom, favoured but not oppressed by the living
organism of the State. The sea afforded them liberty of action in every
direction without fear of attack from behind. Freed from the chains
which bound Europe, England went out into the wide world.
"Yet she remained constantly associated with the continent, not only
because Europe was her field of action. English statesmen have always
seized upon every opportunity to influence European policy; at first
this was from motives of defence, but afterwards from an ever-increasing
spirit of aggression. The balance of power on the continent has always
been one of the premises for England's security and existence.
"She is indebted to her insular position for the supreme advantage of
being able to exercise her influence in Europe without allowing her
forces to be tied to the continent; European countries were bound by
their own conflicts and differences, enabling England to exert her
influence upon them without active participation. England has become
thoroughly accustomed to a state of affairs under which she has no
neighbours and never permits any--not even on the sea. She has come to
consider this her God-given prerogative.
"The barriers of geographical position which hampered other lands,
nature did not impose upon England; the security afforded by her girdle
of waves seemed as it were to impel her to strike out into the
unbounded, and to look upon every obstacle as a wrong. There is a thread
of daring lawlessness running through all England's world-struggles,
through all periods of her history, right down to the present day.
"When England speaks of humanity she means herself; her cosmopolitan
utterances refer to her own nationality. She forgets too easily that
other nations have arisen on the earth who esteem their own
distinguishing traits and are inspired by the ardent desire to uphold
their own institutions, forms of Government and culture. England
believes all too easily that the world's map should be all one colour.
But the soul of the modern world demands variety."[188]
[Footnote 188: Ibid., 297 _et seq_.]
There is no important objection to raise against Professor Marcks'
statement of English history and Britain's favoured position on the
surface of the globe. Germany did not choose her own geographical
situation in the world--it is hers by nature and the right of historical
succession. Britain has never envied her or endeavoured to deprive her
of the advantages consequent upon her "place in the sun."
Neither did the British select their island home; destiny and history
were again the determining factors. But it would be a travesty of the
truth to assert that Germany has not envied her that position, together
with the advantages arising from it. Yet in the same degree as the
inhabitants of these islands have used the "talents" entrusted to them
through their favourable position, Germany's jealousy seems to have
become more bitterly angry. By right of birth and national necessity
Germany demands the domination of the Rhine, but she fails to recognize
that right of birth and the demands of national existence compel Britain
to claim the domination of the seas.
The remainder of Professor Marcks' essay is devoted to proving that "the
freedom of our world requires that it shall not be so in future."
Whatever motives actuated Germany in precipitating the war, this much is
now evident--it is her supreme desire and the aim of her highest
endeavour to destroy Britain's favoured situation and every advantage
accruing to her from it.
To-day the issue is clear and simple for Germany--the annihilation of
British power and influence in the world. Literally hundreds of German
war books echo that cry, and, above all else, it is the hope of
attaining this aim which has aroused the bitterest war fury in the
entire German nation--man, woman and child. Reduced to first principles,
this difference of geographical position and the varying advantages
arising therefrom are the prime causes--if not _the_ cause--of the
present world-struggle.
It was solely the fear of perpetuating British supremacy[189] which has
led Germany consistently to reject the extended hand of friendship.
Standing side by side with Great Britain, either in friendship or
alliance, Germany would have given her approval to Britain's historical
position in the world. When this country departed from the policy of
"splendid isolation" repeated attempts were made to establish more
intimate relations with Germany (1898-1902).
[Footnote 189: Graf Ernst zu Reventlow: "Der Vampir des Festlandes
("England, the Vampire of the Continent"). Berlin, 1915, p. 117.
"England's withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual
plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates
from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow
herself to be employed against Russia. In Germany to-day, voices may be
heard proclaiming that von Buelow chose wrongly in refusing England's
offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friendship with
iniquitous ingratitude. The latter represents the truth.
"But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in
mind. The acceptance of Great Britain's offer would have placed a tie
upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable. Germany would
have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to
fight British battles on the continent. Besides which the choice
concerned Germany's world future, above all the development of the
German war fleet."]
But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes: "Germany refused the hand
extended to her." Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have
chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German
Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists: "When
the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has
offered the hand of friendship to England."
It is only one more confirmation that the "law of necessity" is
incompatible with the truth. The truth is that Germany preferred to
drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her
friendship. Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish
her plans for unlimited naval expansion--which she believed to be the
only means of destroying Britain's position, and with that resolution
already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished
Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand:
"I bide my time!"
Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme
issue--and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day--is
whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her
by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted
by Germany. That is the one political thought which permeates German
intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed
to darken this issue.
Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in
considerable detail, and to him the policy of _ententes_ appears to be
the main cause leading up to the world war. From this alone it is
obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the _ententes_
in themselves are results, not prime causes. The prime causes leading to
these political agreements are to be found in Germany's attitude to the
rest of Europe. In a word they were defensive actions taken by the
Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.
German aggression consisted in committing herself to unlimited
armaments, cherishing the irreconcilable determination to be the
strongest European power. According to her doctrine of might, everything
can be attained by the mightiest. British advances she answered with
battleships, simultaneously provoking France and Russia by increasing
her army corps. The balance of power in Europe, Germany declares to be
an out-of-date British fad, invented solely in the interests of these
islands.
In secret Germany has long been an apostate to the balance-of-power
theory; the war has caused her to drop the mask, and it was without
doubt her resolve never to submit to the chains of the balance in
Europe, which forced three other States to waive their differences and
form the Triple Entente. Simply stated this is cause and result. But
Professor Oncken maintains--and in doing so he voices German national
opinion--that the entire _entente_ policy was a huge scheme to bring
about Germany's downfall.
He goes further and proclaims that the Hague Conference (1907) was a
British trick to place the guilt of armaments on Germany's shoulders.
"England filled the world with disarmament projects so that afterwards,
full of unction, she could denounce Germany as the disturber of the
peace. At that time the Imperial Chancellor answered justly: 'Pressure
cannot be brought to bear on Germany, not even moral pressure!'"[190]
And in that sentence German obstinacy and sullen irreconcilability is
most admirably expressed.
[Footnote 190: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 495.]
Having seen that Professor Oncken has failed to recognize the prime
causes which provoked the _entente_ policy, it is not surprising to find
him equally in error when discussing the diplomatic clashes between the
rival camps. The professor calls them _Machtproben_ ("tests of power");
but how he can dare to state that these diplomatic trials of strength
were engineered by Great Britain--remains his own secret.
"King Edward's meeting with the Czar at Reval in June, 1908, was
followed by a far-reaching Macedonian reform programme, the commencement
of the division of European Turkey. What Britain had failed to induce
Germany to help her in executing, was to be attained with the sword's
point directed against Germany. And Britain proceeded in cold blood to
conjure up an era of might-struggles, which, in the island language, is
called preserving the balance of power."[191]
[Footnote 191: Ibid., p. 297.]
The trials of strength recounted by Oncken are the Bosnian crisis, the
Morocco question, and the Austro-Serbian quarrel which led to the
present war. It seems banal to have to point out that Bosnia was
unlawfully annexed by Germany's vassal--Austria; that Germany, herself,
brought Europe to the verge of war by sending the _Panther_ to Agadir;
and that the final catastrophic _Machtprobe_ was likewise provoked by
Germany's eastern vassal.
For good or evil Germany has been convinced for nearly two decades that
the balance of power in Europe was an obstacle to her world future.
Furthermore, she believed that the balance imposed fetters upon her
which only mighty armaments could break. All Germany's energies in the
domain of diplomacy have been set in motion to make the balance of power
a mere figment of the imagination.
In pursuing this end it has suited her purpose to declare all attempts
at maintaining the outward appearances of equality between the Powers of
Europe to be Machiavellian schemes against her existence; or to cite the
Kaiser's own words, "to deprive Germany of her place in the sun."
Britain's _entente_ policy was the only one calculated to preserve our
own existence, and to restrain Germany from establishing a hegemony in
Europe. She was completely convinced that the domination of Europe
belonged to her by right of mental, moral and military superiority over
her neighbours. Not in vain have Germany's educational institutions
inculcated the belief in her population that the British Empire is an
effete monstrosity with feet of clay; France a rotten, decaying empire,
and Russia a barbarian Power with no new _Kultur_ to offer Europe except
the knout.
Inspired by such conceptions, together with an astoundingly exaggerated
idea of Germany's peerlessness in order, discipline, obedience,
morality, genius and other ethical values, as well as an unshaken belief
in Germany's invincibility by land and sea--the entire nation, from
Kaiser to cobbler, has long since held that by right of these
virtues--by right of her absolute superiority over all other
nations--Germany could and must claim other rights and powers than those
which fell to her under an antiquated balance of European power.
In few words that is the gospel of _Deutschland, Deutschland, ueber
alles_. These are the motives which inspired Germany's naval expansion
and forbade her to accept a compromise. The same ideals led to her
endeavours to shatter the _ententes_, and it is alone the general
acceptance of this gospel, which explains the remarkable unanimity with
which the German nation has stood behind the Kaiser's Government in each
trial of strength. They have learned to consider all attempts of the
lesser peoples (Britain, France and Russia included) to maintain
themselves against the Teutonic onset as impudent attacks on sacred
Germany, which also illuminates the fact that Germans call the present
struggle--"Germany's holy, sacred war."
German statesmen were quite clear as to the national course at least
fifteen years ago. Hence they have persistently pursued a policy of no
compromise and no agreements. A compromise recognizes and perpetuates,
in part at least, the very thing which stands in the way. An agreement
with Britain in regard to naval armaments would have perpetuated British
naval supremacy, as well as recognized its necessity. Likewise an
agreement, or the shadow of an understanding with France on the question
of Alsace-Lorraine would have been a recognition of French claims. Hence
on these two questions--which are merely given as examples illustrative
of German mentality--every attempt at an agreement has been a failure.
A cardinal point in Germany's programme has been the consistent manner
in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain
in order to deal with them separately or alone. That her endeavours
ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has
drawn Germany's opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the
increasing force of her efforts. Both in peace and war, Germany desired
and endeavoured to switch off Britain's influence in Europe.
The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts
to dislodge Great Britain from her _ententes_, while her repeated
attempts to buy this country's neutrality, down to the eve of war, are
proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[192] If she had
succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power
could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.
[Footnote 192: Professor Schiemann: "Wie England eine Verstaendigung mit
Deutschland verhinderte" ("How England prevented an Understanding with
Germany"). Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21: "From the very commencement Berlin
was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack
was exceedingly small, if England's entrance to this Germanophobe
combination could be prevented. Therefore we endeavoured to secure
England's neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German
alliance could not be achieved--an alliance which would have guaranteed
the world's peace." (Schiemann's insinuation that Germany desired an
alliance is an instance of _suggestio falsi_. Germany had decided in
1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.--Author.)]
Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by
the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the
Central Empires. The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them,
for the British Ambassador declared to the Russian Government on July
24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian
question. Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says
Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable
semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with
Germany.
"On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit,
and assured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no
circumstances wage war on Germany. A ministry which made preparations
for war, would be immediately overthrown."[193]
[Footnote 193: Ibid., p. 27. In the light of this revelation it would be
interesting to know what was the real motive which induced Mr. Trevelyan
to resign his office when war broke out. Either he was conscious of
having seriously compromised his position as a Minister of the Crown, or
he conscientiously believed that Britain was drawing the sword in an
unjust cause. Unfortunately a section of the British public accepted the
latter interpretation. In any case, Mr. Trevelyan's indiscretion affords
overwhelming proof that he had an utterly false conception of
Germany.--Author.]
Professor Schiemann affirms that his good impression was strengthened by
a visit to London during March and April, 1914, and reports a
conversation which he had with Lord Haldane when dining privately with
the latter in London. After returning to Berlin, he says he received a
letter from Lord Haldane dated April 17th, 1914, but from Schiemann's
quotation it is not evident whether the following is an extract or the
entire letter: