What Germany Thinks - Thomas F. A. Smith
"It was a great pleasure to see you and to have had the full and
unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is like yours, to bring
Germany and Great Britain into relations of ever-closer intimacy and
friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as
well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work
special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation which I believe
is now beginning become closer and closer.[194]
[Footnote 194: Lord Haldane has stated during the war that his visit to
Berlin in 1912 had filled his mind with doubt and suspicion in regard to
Germany.--Author.]
"Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the
groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more
will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the relations that are
normal and healthy reappear.[195] Something of this good work has now
come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the
chance of growth is given."[196]
[Footnote 195: A word or phrase appears to have been dropped in this
sentence.--Author.]
[Footnote 196: Professor Schiemann's book, pp. 27-8.]
It is not difficult to conceive that such utterances, on the part of two
British ministers, would raise hopes in the German mind, for it would be
useless to imagine that Professor Schiemann would keep them secret for
his own private edification. And it is possible that they led the German
Government into a false reckoning as to what this country would do under
certain circumstances, and so encouraged Germany into taking up an
irreconcilable attitude in the crisis of July, 1914.
Whatever Germany expected must, however, for the present, remain a
matter of conjecture. Schiemann's comment on the above letter leaves no
doubt that he expected Lord Haldane[197] to resign. "When one remembers
that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and was
therefore privy to all the secret moves of Sir Edward Grey, it is hard
to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments expressed in this letter.
Besides, he did not resign like three other members of the Cabinet (Lord
Morley, Burns and Charles Trevelyan) when Sir Edward's foul play lay
open to the world on August 4th."
[Footnote 197: Lord Haldane seems to have injured his reputation both in
Great Britain and Germany. Professor Oncken designates him: "the
one-time friend of Germany, the decoy-bird of the British cabinet."
_Vide_ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 561.]
The most regrettable side of the whole incident is that the resignation
of the above gentlemen has been proclaimed by innumerable German writers
as proof of Sir Edward Grey's double dealing, and proof that Britain is
waging an unjust war. Still, it may console these gentlemen to know that
the nation which wages war on women and children acclaims them to-day
"all honourable men," and doubtless without the Shakespearian
intonation.
By reason of the above incidents, and more of a similar nature, Germans
accuse the late Liberal Government with perfidy of the basest kind. The
author is not in the least inclined to admit the charge, but thinks,
rather, that the Government in question--individually and
collectively--was astonishingly ignorant of European conditions and
problems, especially those prevailing in the Germanic Empires.
To what a degree Germany was obsessed by the idea that Britain was
trying to strangle her by an encircling policy, is apparent in a
diplomatic document quoted by Professor Oncken. Its author's name is not
given, and it was doubtless a secret report sent to the German Foreign
Office in 1912; its freedom from bias is also questionable. Moreover, it
is probable that it belongs to the same category of documents as those
quoted in the French Yellow Book--reports intended to exercise due
influence on the mind of the Emperor.
"French diplomacy is succeeding more and more in entangling England in
the meshes of her net. The encouragement which England gives, directly
or indirectly, to French chauvinism may one day end in a catastrophe in
which English and French soldiers must pay with their blood on French
battlefields for England's encircling policy. The seeds sown by King
Edward are springing up."
Another link in the chain of proof of Britain's guilt, is found in the
documents seized by the Germans in Brussels. The enemy seems to attach
great importance to them, for they are being employed in much the same
way that parliamentary candidates use pamphlets during an election. Yet
they do not contain a particle of proof that Britain had hostile
intentions against Germany, but only confirm the presence of the German
menace.
The documents[198] in question are reports sent by the Belgian Legation
Secretaries in London, Paris and Berlin to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs in Brussels. These gentlemen held opinions identical with those
expressed again and again in German newspapers, and even in some British
and French organs. Messieurs Comte de Lalaing (London), Greindl
(Berlin), Leghait (Paris), evidently believed that the activities of the
Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente endangered the peace of Europe.
[Footnote 198: Published by the Berlin Government as supplements to the
_Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, July 29th and 31st; August 4th, 8th
and 12th, 1915.]
Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive
of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian
Government. If read as a modern edition of "Pepys' Diary" they form
entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they
be classed as historical sources. A gentleman who reports to his
Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delcasse
and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly
rank as an historian.
Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M.
Greindl as a gentleman of German origin. If this be true it would
probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said
documents, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential
treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials.
German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government
has not deigned to reply to these "revelations." There is really nothing
to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on
contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911. But a brutal
sequence of events in 1914 showed them--if they had not been convinced
during the preceding three years--that they had drawn false conclusions
from their observations.
To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of
European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies
German participation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that
Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free
hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands
were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers
found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section
of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.
His comment on Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace is characteristic:
"England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace.
It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals. But
mere good-will is not everything. It is much more important to weigh
their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed: Whether
they were intended to preserve the world's peace under conditions
honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the _Entente_ a
one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future
predominance."[199]
[Footnote 199: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 544.]
"Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal. On the
evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia's consent, he proposed to
the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London
ambassadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of
the conflict.
"The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an
indirect recognition on her part of Russia's interest in the conflict.
"Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual
obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a
'London Centre' during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the
role--to say nothing of Italy--which Russia's two comrades would have
played in the conference. During its course Russia would have continued
her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge
herself not to mobilize.
"Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare assert that the man (Sir
Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable
opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial
chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian
mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more
convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a
diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.
"Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order
to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[200]
[Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 _et seq_.]
An analysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results:
First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to
mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental
principle underlying the Germanic attitude is again exposed, viz., that
Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of
power in the Balkans and in Europe (_vide_, p. 63). Thirdly, a
diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the
two groups of Powers.
In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the
Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital
question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very
beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to
achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been
allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe
would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple
Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable
consequence.
If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M.
de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would
never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution
of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all
desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and
it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a
most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.
The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic
conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A
reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second
is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have
reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a
decade--the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited
assertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual
Alliance would have survived the shock.
Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir
Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in
Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War
from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same
nation of being the originator of the world war.
Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey
initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord
Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three
gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and
afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy,
succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idee_ and the spirit of Russian
aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of
friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial
pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that
sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's
declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France,
Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a
lie in essentials."
[Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor
Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G.
B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]
Following the development of events after the conference proposal had
been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government
endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion
prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in
every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were
obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this
false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France.
"It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought.
Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon
Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps
which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed
desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all
his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria
and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning
England's eventual attitude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to
energetic measures.
"But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On
the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary
had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands--and in truth with
England's co-operation--to such a degree that their acceptance would
have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.
"And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had
been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia
suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision
(mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of
English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support
and with it England's, turned the scale--against peace.
"That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is
confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will
admit."[202]
[Footnote 202: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 553-4.]
Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a
letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to
his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the
Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on
July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on
the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame
Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed
to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that
no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was
proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into
their hands.
Overwhelming importance is attached to this document by German war
writers. The more important passages of the despatch run as follows:
"The last two days have passed in the expectation of events which are
bound to follow[203] upon Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against
Serbia. The most contradictory reports were in circulation, without any
possibility of confirming their truth or falsity.
[Footnote 203: Thus the impartial witness whom Germans quote to prove
their innocence definitely states that Russia had no other course left
open to her by Austria's actions.--Author.]
"One thing is, however, indisputable, viz., that Germany has done
everything possible both here and in Vienna[204] to find a means of
avoiding a general conflict, but has only been met with the
determination of the Vienna cabinet, on the one hand, not to yield a
single step, and on the other hand Russian distrust of Vienna's
declaration that they merely intend a punitive expedition against
Serbia.
[Footnote 204: How could M. de l'Escaille know what had passed in
Vienna?--Author.]
"One must really believe that everybody wants war, and is only anxious
to postpone the declaration in order to gain time. At first England gave
out, that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir
George Buchanan said that definitely. But to-day they are firmly
convinced in St. Petersburg, indeed they have received an assurance,
that England will stand by France. This support is of extraordinary
importance, and has contributed not a little to the war-party gaining
the upper hand.
"In the cabinet sitting held yesterday, there were differences of
opinion, and the mobilization order was postponed. This morning at four
o'clock mobilization was ordered.
"The Russian army feels itself strong, and is full of enthusiasm. The
reorganization of the navy is still so incomplete that it would be out
of the count in case of war. For that reason England's assurance of help
was of the greatest consequence."[205]
[Footnote 205: "Kriegs-Depeschen, 1914" ("German War-Telegrams, 1914").
Berlin, 1914; p. 96 _et seq_.]
If Professor Oncken is correct in stating that Sir Edward Grey's
measures were calculated to exercise a pressure on Germany and Austria,
then he merely confirms what this country has hitherto believed--Sir
Edward Grey acted rightly. Where else should he have exerted pressure
except in the quarter from whence a provocative, insolent challenge had
proceeded?
With regard to the assertion that Russia--stiffened by England--took a
"momentous decision" on the evening of July 30th, Professor Oncken is
guilty of distortion. The decision to mobilize had been taken earlier,
and as M. de l'Escaille wrote, was made public at four o'clock on the
morning of July 30th.
Whether Russia had increased her demands ("peremptorily sharpened" are
Oncken's words) the reader can judge for himself by comparing the two
texts.
I II
"If Austria, recognizing "If Austria agrees to
that the Austro-Serbian stay the advance of her
question has troops on Serbian territory,
assumed the character and if, recognizing
of a European question, that the Austro-Serbian
declares herself ready to dispute has assumed the
eliminate from her ultimatum character of a question
the points which of European interest, she
infringe the sovereign admits that the Great
rights of Serbia, Russia Powers shall examine
engages to stop her the satisfaction which
military preparations." Serbia might give to
(Russian Orange Book, the Austro--Hungarian
No. 60.) Government without
affecting her sovereign
rights and independence,
Russia undertakes
to maintain her waiting
attitude." (French
Yellow Book, No. 113.)
Oncken, in making this comparison, comments: "It is most remarkable that
the original formula chosen by Sasonow had been peremptorily sharpened
(_einschneidend verschaerft_) on July 31st at the request of the British
Ambassador. This interference by England in the formulation of the
proposal must arouse the gravest doubt regarding the peaceful tendencies
of England's policy. Sasonow had every reason to thank Grey 'for the
firm, amicable tone which he has employed in his pourparlers with
Germany and Austria.'"[206]
[Footnote 206: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 553. Oncken's
quotation in the last lines taken from the Russian Orange Book, No. 69.]
Sir Edward Grey had proposed five days earlier (July 26th) that all
military measures should cease pending a settlement. Hence the
introduction of this clause is not a new demand. Moreover, in the
meantime Russia and Germany--in spite of the latter's denial--had
commenced to mobilize; Austria had mobilized and commenced hostilities
against Serbia. Thus there were far more urgent reasons to include the
cessation of military measures on July 31st than before. Lastly, it was
the only acceptable pledge of Austrian sincerity which Russia could
accept. Whether the formula would have met with Austria's approval
cannot be determined, for Austria was saved from what Oncken terms
"complete submission" by Germany's ultimatum to Russia, despatched on
the same day, July 31st.
It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought
Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately
shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia
should demobilize.
If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de
l'Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of
German diplomacy. But, as the same gentleman testifies: "Austria would
not yield a step"--the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered
her to stand firm. Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a
matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany's
peace endeavours.
Oncken further mentions Britain's refusal to remain neutral in return
for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits
the question of French colonies. His analysis of the Belgian question
deserves quotation: "Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found
one in the question of Belgian neutrality. It was just such a reason as
he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public
opinion. And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied
by appeals to international law and humanity, by England's and the
world's Press.
"But there is more than one irrefutable proof at hand, to show that this
reason for war, was merely a veil covering the real ones. Anticipating
Grey's intentions, before the German Government had finally declared
themselves on the subject,[207] Prince Lichnowsky put the question to
Sir Edward Grey on August 1st, as to whether England would remain
neutral if Germany undertook to respect the neutrality of Belgium.
[Footnote 207: Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether
she would respect Belgium's neutrality.--Author.]
"Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could--if he
was really concerned about Belgium--have spared that unhappy land its
terrible fate. But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality
had been taken from our opponent's hand in advance. Yet Grey actually
considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British
Cabinet. Yes, he dared even more.
"After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the _Labour
Leader_, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August
27th, as to whether Lichnowsky's proposal had been submitted to the
Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful
negotiations with Germany. Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate
between official proposals made by a government, and a private question
asked by an ambassador.
"When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was
cried down. The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from
this Parliamentary incident: 'That all Sir Edward Grey's answers to Mr.
Keir Hardie's questions are examples of _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio
falsi_.' His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value
as objective evidence.
"After Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate
England's conditions for her neutrality. At the same time the Ambassador
increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity
of France and her colonies in return for England's neutrality. Grey
suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on
this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans. Only an
immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.
"Even before he could assume that Belgian neutrality was in danger, he
pledged English policy to the wishes of France. On the afternoon of the
same August 1st, he gave the French Ambassador--who was anxiously
pressing for a decision--reason to believe that he would be able to give
a formal promise on the following day. At the Cabinet meeting on August
2nd--the same in which he suppressed Germany's offer!--he got a motion
accepted empowering him to assure Cambon that if Germany attacked the
French coast, England would intervene."