Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato - Thomas Taylor
Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one
good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together
with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these
distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timaeus
you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the
demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the
Phaedrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and
the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above
the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of
the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the
intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn
the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted
the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And
with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions
from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in
each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from
which it is easy for those who are exorcised in divine concerns to discover
by a reasoning process the idioms of each.
"It is necessary, however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with
Platonic principles and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the
Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus;
Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the origins of the
gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of
the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the
Philebus, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound
and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the
gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left
for us in writing admirable conceptions about these principles,
celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate
fabrication. Again, in the Timaeus, endeavouring to teach us about the
sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them
the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these
divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods
proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by
theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the Cratylus he
follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine
processions. But in the Gorgias he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting
the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where
discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists;
rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing
first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables.
"Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a
proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that
we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different
dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one
mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For
if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to
different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous
doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents
us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and
their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who
endeavor to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior[9]
to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when,
on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its
generation in the perfect. For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the
theory of the intelligible genera, and the Phaedrus appears to present us
with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be
the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the
generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the
progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all
things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between the one,
and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince.
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[9] A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in
itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal
subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless
comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole.
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"Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your
boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these
dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you
acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato;
nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures.
Perhaps, indeed, they will say that certain persons, junior to Plato,
have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one
perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one
entire theory about nature from the Timaeus; but from the Republic, or
Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form
of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which
contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called
the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect
knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated as to boast on
account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind
abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides,
things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic
dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake
of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like
manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and
in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous
narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the
fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only
exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons,
but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the
knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns.
For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the
reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable
manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic
information which they contain.
"Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it fit
that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of
fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating
secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak
without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative,
but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by
the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not
regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if
you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other
theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the
Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of
physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning
bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to
intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the
Timaeus the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake
of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary
that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of
material things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and of
physical forms, separate from nature. But in the Phaedrus, Plato
celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and
every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania; the manner in which
the reminiscence of souls takes place; and the passage to these from
hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either
physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are
introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore,
can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and
worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to
evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is
precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is
violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an
adventitious order, as in a drama? And such are the particulars which may
be urged against our design.
"To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then
that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient
opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of
the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of
the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates
the nature of the thing proposed. But some times he establishes the
theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus, his subject
respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading
thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory
order.
"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the
all-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete
number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will
alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we
have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the
Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish
all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in
order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each
other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of
a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence, characterized by
unity, occult and simple; but such as are last are multiplied, are
distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in
power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according
to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but
more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of
the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all
the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this
is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the
procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of
wholes.[10] The Parmenides therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato
the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this,
the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline
about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine
wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature.
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[10] The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as
the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first
produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterward
those which rank as parts through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the
artificer of the universe, is almost always called [Greek: demiourgos ton
olon], the demiurgus of wholes. See the Timaeus, and the Introduction to it.
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And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to
these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the
Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more
imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit
reasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus,
they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may
be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the
Parmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least
degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature."
All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the
reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the
theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the
mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently
unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and
notes to that dialogue.
The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that doctrine concerning
ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the
Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however
is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately
received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished
rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible,
intellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal
essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally
subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in
coordinate genera give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and
incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in
the whole extent of beings; viz. the intelligible, the dianoetic, and the
sensible; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the
respective essential properties of the natures by which they are
contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed
among divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and
final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes
sometimes concur, and are united among themselves, (which Aristotle says
is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of
nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which
on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all
things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the
natures which they have generated, are the paradigms, or exemplars of all
things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account
of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since
therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so
much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though
they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the
artificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the
intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul
similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a
secondary degree.
These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but
with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the
defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For,
as Plato says in the Phaedrus, when the winged powers of the soul are
perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction
with divine natures governs the world. In the Timaeus, he manifestly
asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in
geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his Republic (in
the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of
intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to
denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures.
In the Phaedo he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence;
because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle
dianoetic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived
and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena.
Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language
abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established
those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the
soul, as is evident from his Phaedrus and Phaedo. In the 10th book of the
Republic too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine
intellect. In the Phaedrus, he asserts that souls elevated to the
supercelestial place, behold Justice herself, temperance herself, and
science herself; and lastly in the Phaedo he evinces the immortality of
the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms.
Syrianus[11], in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, shows in defense of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenideans,
and Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men
according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippus,
Archedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by
many differences from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do
they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as
those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted
from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus:[12] for if that
which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect.
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[11] See my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader
conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with
the introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in
possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the
ancients on this subject.
[12] It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the
original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was
merely the restorer of it.
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Nor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards
asserted them to be. Nor is idea definite reason, nor material form; for
these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas
are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder
is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much
distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular
Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons
perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these
reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in
sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the
reason of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and
immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato
says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a
reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent
spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction
with divinity. Boethus,[13] the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to
join Cornutus; thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible
natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they
are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which
they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of
particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are
posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can
things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are
nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative
ideas?
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[13] This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in
his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded
with Boetius, the roman senator and philosopher.
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In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the
contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically
([Greek: noeros kai tetradikos]), in animal itself ([Greek: en to
antozoo]), or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually
and decadically ([Greek: noeros kai dekadikos]), in the intellect of the
artificer of the universe; for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, "Divine
number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives
at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal
recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable
and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the
immortal gods and earth-born men."
[Greek:
Proeisi gar o Theios arithmos, os phesin o Pythagoreios eis auton
umnos,
Monados ek keuthmonos akeralou esti'an iketai
Tetrada epi zatheen, he de teke metera panton,
Pandechea, presbeiran, oron peri pasi titheiran,
Atropon, akamatou, dekada kleiousi min agnen,
Athanatoi to theoi kai gegeneeis anthropoi.]
And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus,
Pythagoras and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar
language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect
cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these
governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all
mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it
preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it
illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it
illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of
its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes
privation of cause and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it
imparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it
converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own
omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it
understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any
thing which ranks among true beings, that is not comprehended in the
essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which
are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it,
and introduce to the whole of things, a cause which is at the same time
productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and
the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they
energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness.
And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and
ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute.
From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible
world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer
intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as
a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the
essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity the sensible
universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be
consubsistent with its cause, or in other words, must be a perpetual
emanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing
which is generated, is either generated by art or by nature, or according
to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating
according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but
that things operating according to power should have their productions
coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent
with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer
of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be,
but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence
therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature,
since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its
productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be
necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be
incorporeal. It remains therefore, that the demiurgus produced the
universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists
together with the cause containing this power: and hence production of
this kind cannot be destroyed unless the producing cause is deprived of
power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe
caused it to be coexistent with himself.
This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an
intelligible world replete with the archetypal ideas of all things,
considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and
perpetually advancing to being (en to gignesthai), and compared with its
paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as
animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the
supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from
whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the Timaeus to be a
blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a
perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a
whole with a total subsistence, on account of the perpetuity of its
duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence
Plato calls it a whole of wholes; by the other wholes which are
comprehended in its meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire,
the whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the
whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers parts with
a total subsistence, are considered by Plato as aggoregately perpetual.
For if the body of this world is perpetual, this also must be the case
with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and
in order that wholes with a partial subsistence, such as all individuals,
may rank in the last gradation of things.