The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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38. The levy completed, the consuls waited a few days, till the allies
of the Latin confederacy arrived. At this time the soldiers were bound
by an oath, which had never before been the case, dictated by the
military tribunes, that they would assemble at the command of the
consuls, and not depart without orders; for up to that time the
military oath only had been employed; and further, when the soldiers
met to divide into decuries or centuries, the cavalry being formed
into decuries and the infantry into centuries, all swore together,
amongst themselves, of their own accord, that they would not depart or
quit their ranks for flight or fear, except for the purpose of taking
up or fetching a weapon, and either striking an enemy or saving a
countryman. This, from being a voluntary compact among the soldiers
themselves, was converted into the legal compulsion of an oath by the
tribunes. Before the standards were moved from the city, the harangues
of Varro were frequent and furious, protesting that the war had been
invited into Italy by the nobles, and that it would continue fixed in
the bowels of the state if it employed any more such generals as
Fabius; that he would bring the war to conclusion on the very day he
got sight of the enemy. His colleague Paulus made but one speech, on
the day before they set out from the city, which was more true than
gratifying to the people, in which nothing was said severely against
Varro, except this only. "That he wondered how any general, before he
knew any thing of his own army, or that of the enemy, the situation of
the places, or the nature of the country, even now while in the city,
and with the gown on, could tell what he must do when in arms, and
could even foretell the day on which he would fight standard to
standard with the enemy. That, for his own part, he would not, before
the time arrived, prematurely anticipate those measures which
circumstances imposed on men, rather than men on circumstances. He
could only wish that those measures which were taken with due caution
and deliberation might turn out prosperously. That temerity, setting
aside its folly, had hitherto been also unsuccessful." This obviously
appeared, that he would prefer safe to precipitate counsels; but that
he might persevere the more constantly in this, Quintus Fabius Maximus
is reported to have thus addressed him on his departure.
39. "If you either had a colleague like yourself, Lucius Aemilius,
which is what I should prefer, or you were like your colleague, an
address from me would be superfluous. For were you both good consuls,
you would do every thing for the good of the state from your own sense
of honour, even without my saying a word: and were you both bad
consuls, you would neither receive my words into your ears, nor my
counsels into your minds. As the case now is, looking at your
colleague and yourself, a man of such character, my address will be
solely to you; who, I feel convinced, will prove yourself a good man
and a worthy citizen in vain, if the state on the other hand should
halt. Pernicious counsels will have the same authority and influence
as those which are sound. For you are mistaken, Lucius Paulus, if you
imagine that you will have a less violent contest with Caius Terentius
than with Hannibal. I know not whether the former, your opponent, or
the latter, your open enemy, be the more hostile. With the latter you
will have to contend in the field only; with the former, at every
place and time. Hannibal, moreover, you have to oppose with your own
horse and foot; while Varro will head your own soldiers against you.
Let Caius Flaminius be absent from your thoughts, even for the omen's
sake. Yet he only began to play the madman's consul, in his province,
and at the head of the army. This man is raving before he put up for
the consulship, afterwards while canvassing for it, and now having
obtained it, before he has seen the camp or the enemy. And he who by
talking largely of battles and marshalled armies, even now excites
such storms among the citizens with their gowns on, what do you think
he will effect among the youth in arms, where words are followed
forthwith by acts? But be assured, if this man, as he protests he
will, shall immediately engage the enemy either I am unacquainted with
military affairs, with this kind of war, and the character of the
enemy, or another place will become more celebrated than the
Trasimenus by our disaster. Neither is this the season for boasting
while I am addressing one man; and besides, I have exceeded the bounds
of moderation in despising rather than in courting fame. But the case
is really this. The only way of conducting the war against Hannibal is
that which I adopted: nor does the event only, that instructor of
fools, demonstrate it, but that same reasoning which has continued
hitherto, and will continue unchangeable so long as circumstances
shall remain the same. We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own
country, and our own soil. All around us are countrymen and allies in
abundance. With arms, men, horses, and provisions, they do and will
assist us. Such proofs of their fidelity have they given in our
adversity. Time, nay, everyday makes us better, wiser, and firmer.
Hannibal, on the contrary, is in a foreign, a hostile land, amidst all
hostile and disadvantageous circumstances, far from his home, far from
his country; he has peace neither by land nor sea: no cities, no walls
receive him: he sees nothing any where which he can call his own: he
daily lives by plunder. He has now scarcely a third part of that army
which he conveyed across the Iberus. Famine has destroyed more than
the sword; nor have the few remaining a sufficient supply of
provisions. Do you doubt, therefore, whether by remaining quiet we
shall not conquer him who is daily sinking into decrepitude? who has
neither provisions nor money? How long before the walls of Geronium, a
miserable fortress of Apulia, as if before the walls of Carthage--?
But not even in your presence will I boast. See how Cneius Servilius
and Atilius, the last consuls, fooled him. This is the only path of
safety, Lucius Paulus, which your countrymen will render more
difficult and dangerous to you than their enemies will. For your own
soldiers will desire the same thing as those of the enemy: Varro, a
Roman consul, and Hannibal, a Carthaginian general, will wish the same
thing. You alone must resist two generals: and you will resist them
sufficiently if you stand firm against the report and the rumours of
men; if neither the empty glory of your colleague, and the unfounded
calumnies against yourself, shall move you. They say that truth too
often suffers, but is never destroyed. He who despises fame will have
it genuine. Let them call you coward instead of cautious, dilatory
instead of considerate, unwarlike instead of an expert general. I
would rather that a sagacious enemy should fear you, than that foolish
countrymen should commend you. A man who hazards all things Hannibal
will despise, him who does nothing rashly he will fear. And neither do
I advise that nothing should be done; but that in what you do, reason
should guide you, and not fortune. All things will be within your own
power, and your own. Be always ready armed and on the watch, and
neither be wanting when a favourable opportunity presents itself, nor
give any favourable opportunity to the enemy. All things are clear and
sure to the deliberate man. Precipitation is improvident and blind."
40. The address of the consul in reply was by no means cheerful,
admitting that what he said was true, rather than easy to put in
practice. He said, "That to him, as dictator, his master of the horse
was unbearable: what power or influence could a consul have against a
factious and intemperate colleague? That he had in his former
consulate escaped a popular conflagration not without being singed:
his prayer was, that every thing might happen prosperously; but if, on
the contrary, any misfortune should occur, that he would rather expose
his life to the weapons of the enemy, than to the votes of his
incensed countrymen." Directly after this discourse, it is related
that Paulus set out, escorted by the principal senators. The plebeian
consul attended his own plebeian party, more distinguished by their
numbers than respectability. When they had arrived at the camp, the
old and new troops being united, they formed two distinct camps, so
that the new and smaller one might be the nearer to Hannibal, and the
old one might contain the greater part, and all the choicest of the
troops. They then sent to Rome Marcus Atilius, the consul of the
former year, who alleged his age in excuse. They appoint Geminus
Servilius to the command of a Roman legion, and two thousand of the
allied infantry and cavalry in the lesser camp. Hannibal, although he
perceived that the forces of the enemy were augmented by one-half, was
yet wonderfully rejoiced at the arrival of the consuls; for he had not
only nothing remaining of the provisions which he daily acquired by
plunder, but there was not even any thing left which he could seize,
the corn in all the surrounding country having been collected into
fortified cities, when the country was too unsafe; so that, as was
afterwards discovered, there scarcely remained corn enough for ten
days, and the Spaniards would have passed over to the enemy, through
want of food, if the completion of that time had been awaited.
41. But fortune afforded materials also to the headstrong and
precipitate disposition of the consul, for in checking the plundering
parties a battle having taken place, of a tumultuary kind, and
occasioned rather by a disorderly advance of the soldiers, than by a
preconcerted plan, or by the command of the general, the contest was
by no means equal with the Carthaginians. As many as one thousand
seven hundred of them were slain, but not more than one hundred of the
Romans and allies. The consul Paulus, however, who was in command on
that day, (for they held the command on alternate days,) apprehending
an ambuscade, restrained the victorious troops in their headstrong
pursuit; while Varro indignantly vociferated, that the enemy had been
allowed to slip out of their hands, and that the war might have been
terminated had not the pursuit been stopped. Hannibal was not much
grieved at that loss; nay, rather he felt convinced, that the temerity
of the more presumptuous consul, and of the soldiers, particularly the
fresh ones, would be lured by the bait; and besides, all the
circumstances of the enemy were as well known to him as his own: that
dissimilar and discordant men were in command; that nearly two-thirds
of the army consisted of raw recruits. Accordingly, concluding that he
now had both a time and place adapted for an ambuscade, on the
following night he led his troops away with nothing but their arms,
leaving the camp filled with all their effects, both public and
private. His infantry drawn up he conceals on the left, on the
opposite side of the adjoining hills; his cavalry on the right; his
baggage in an intermediate line he leads over the mountains through a
valley, in order that he might surprise the enemy when busy in
plundering the camp, deserted, as they would imagine, by its owners,
and when encumbered with booty. Numerous fires were left in the camp,
to produce a belief that his intention was to keep the consuls in
their places by the appearance of a camp, until he could himself
escape to a greater distance, in the same manner as he had deceived
Fabius the year before.
42. When it was day, the outpost withdrawn first occasioned surprise,
then, on a nearer approach, the unusual stillness. At length, the
desertion being manifest, there is a general rush to the pavilions of
the consuls, of those who announced the flight of the enemy so
precipitate, that they left their camp, with their tents standing;
and, that their flight might be the more secret, that numerous fires
were left. Then a clamour arose that they should order the standards
to be advanced, and lead them in pursuit of the enemy, and to the
immediate plunder of the camp. The other consul too was as one of the
common soldiers. Paulus again and again urged, that they should see
their way before them, and use every precaution. Lastly, when he could
no longer withstand the sedition and the leader of the sedition, he
sends Marius Statilius, a prefect, with a Lucanian troop, to
reconnoitre, who, when he had ridden up to the gates, ordered the rest
to stay without the works, and entered the camp himself, attended by
two horsemen. Having carefully examined every thing, he brings back
word that it was manifestly a snare: that fires were left in that part
of the camp which faced the enemy: that the tents were open, and that
all their valuables were left exposed: that in some places he had seen
silver carelessly thrown about the passages, as if laid there for
plunder. This intelligence, which it was hoped would deter their minds
from greediness, inflamed them; and the soldiers clamorously
declaring, that unless the signal was given they would advance without
their leaders, they by no means wanted one, for Varro instantly gave
the signal for marching. Paulus, whom, unwilling from his own
suggestions to move, the chickens had not encouraged by their
auspices, ordered the unlucky omen to be reported to his colleague,
when he was now leading the troops out of the gate. And though Varro
bore it impatiently, yet the recent fate of Flaminius, and the
recorded naval defeat of Claudius, the consul in the first Punic war,
struck religious scruples into his mind. The gods themselves (it might
almost be said) rather postponed than averted the calamity which hung
over the Romans; for it fell out by mere accident, that when the
soldiers did not obey the consul who ordered them to return to the
camp, two slaves, one belonging to a horseman of Formiae, the other to
one of Sidicinum, who had been cut off by the Numidians among a party
of foragers, when Servilius and Atilius were consuls, had escaped on
that day to their masters: and being brought into the presence of the
consuls, inform them that the whole army of Hannibal was lying in
ambush on the other side of the adjoining mountains. The seasonable
arrival of these men restored the consuls to their authority, when the
ambition of one of them had relaxed his influence with the soldiers,
by an undignified compliance.43. Hannibal, perceiving that the Romans
had been indiscreetly prompted rather than rashly carried to a
conclusion, returned to his camp without effecting any thing, as his
stratagem was discovered. He could not remain there many days, in
consequence of the scarcity of corn; and, moreover, not only among the
soldiers, who were mixed up of the off-scouring of various nations,
but even with the general himself, day by day new designs arose: for,
first, when there had been murmuring of the soldiers, and then an open
and clamorous demand of their arrears of pay, and a complaint first of
the scarcity of provisions, and lastly of famine; and there being a
report that the mercenaries, particularly the Spanish, had formed a
plan of passing over to the enemy, it is affirmed that Hannibal
himself too sometimes entertained thoughts of flying into Gaul, so
that, having left all his infantry, he might hurry away with his
cavalry. Such being the plans in agitation, and such the state of
feeling in the camp, he resolved to depart thence into the regions of
Apulia, which were warmer, and therefore earlier in the harvest.
Thinking also, that the farther he retired from the enemy, the more
difficult would desertion be to the wavering. He set out by night,
having, as before, kindled fires, and leaving a few tents to produce
an appearance; that a fear of an ambuscade, similar to the former,
might keep the Romans in their places. But when intelligence was
brought by the same Lucanian Statilius, who had reconnoitred every
place on the other side the mountains, and beyond the camp, that the
enemy was seen marching at a distance, then plans began to be
deliberated on about pursuing him. The consuls persisted in the same
opinions they ever entertained; but nearly all acquiesced with Varro,
and none with Paulus except Servilius, the consul of the former year.
In compliance with the opinion of the majority, they set out, under
the impulse of destiny, to render Cannae celebrated by a Roman
disaster. Hannibal had pitched his camp near that village, with his
back to the wind Vulturnus, which, in those plains which are parched
with drought, carries with it clouds of dust. This circumstance was
not only very advantageous to the camp, but would be a great
protection to them when they formed their line; as they, with the wind
blowing only on their backs, would combat with an enemy blinded with
the thickly blown dust.
44. When the consuls, employing sufficient diligence in exploring the
road in pursuit of the Carthaginian, had arrived at Cannae, where they
had the enemy in the sight of them, having divided their forces, they
fortify two camps with nearly the same interval as before, at
Geronium. The river Aufidus, which flowed by both the camps, afforded
approach to the watering parties of each, as opportunity served,
though not without contest. The Romans in the lesser camp, however,
which was on the other side the Aufidus, were more freely furnished
with water, because the further bank had no guard of the enemy.
Hannibal, entertaining a hope that the consuls would not decline a
battle in this tract, which was naturally adapted to a cavalry
engagement, in which portion of his forces he was invincible, formed
his line, and provoked the enemy by a skirmishing attack with his
Numidians. Upon this the Roman camp began again to be embroiled by a
mutiny among the soldiers, and the disagreement of the consuls: since
Paulus instanced to Varro the temerity of Sempronius and Flaminius;
while Varro pointed to Fabius, as a specious example to timid and
inactive generals. The latter called both gods and men to witness,
"that no part of the blame attached to him that Hannibal had now made
Italy his own, as it were, by right of possession; that he was held
bound by his colleague; that the swords and arms were taken out of the
hands of the indignant soldiers who were eager to fight." The former
declared, "that if any disaster should befall the legions thus exposed
and betrayed into an ill-advised and imprudent battle, he should be
exempt from any blame, though the sharer of all the consequences. That
he must take care that their hands were equally energetic in the
battle whose tongues were so forward and impetuous."
45. While time is thus consumed in altercation rather than
deliberating, Hannibal, who had kept his troops drawn up in order of
battle till late in the day, when he had led the rest of them back
into the camp, sends Numidians across the river to attack a watering
party of the Romans from the lesser camp. Having routed this
disorderly band by shouting and tumult, before they had well reached
the opposite bank, they advanced even to an outpost which was before
the rampart, and near the, very gates of the camp. It seemed so great
an indignity, that now even the camp of the Romans should be terrified
by a tumultuary band of auxiliaries, that this cause alone kept back
the Romans from crossing the river forthwith, and forming their line,
that the chief command was on that day held by Paulus. Accordingly
Varro, on the following day, on which it was his turn to hold the
command, without consulting his colleague, displayed the signal for
battle, and forming his troops, led them across the river. Paulus
followed, because he could better disapprove of the proceeding, than
withhold his assistance. Having crossed the river, they add to their
forces those which they had in the lesser camp; and thus forming their
line, place the Roman cavalry in the right wing, which was next the
river; and next them the infantry: at the extremity of the left wing
the allied cavalry; within them the allied infantry, extending to the
centre, and contiguous to the Roman legions. The darters, and the rest
of the light-armed auxiliaries, formed the van. The consuls commanded
the wings; Terentius the left, Aemilius the right. To Geminus Sevilius
was committed the charge of maintaining the battle in the centre.
46. Hannibal, at break of day, having sent before him the Baliares and
other light-armed troops, crossed the river, and placed his troops in
line of battle, as he had conveyed them across the river. The Gallic
and Spanish cavalry he placed in the left wing, opposite the Roman
cavalry: the right wing was assigned to the Numidian cavalry, the
centre of the line being strongly formed by the infantry, so that both
extremities of it were composed of Africans, between which Gauls and
Spaniards were placed. One would suppose the Africans were for the
most part Romans, they were so equipped with arms captured at the
Trebia, and for the greater part at the Trasimenus. The shields of the
Gauls and Spaniards were of the same shape; their swords unequal and
dissimilar. The Gauls had very long ones, without points. The
Spaniards, who were accustomed to stab more than to cut their enemy,
had swords convenient from their shortness, and with points. The
aspect of these nations in other respects was terrific, both as to the
appearance they exhibited and the size of their persons. The Gauls
were naked above the navel: the Spaniards stood arrayed in linen vests
resplendent with surprising whiteness, and bordered with purple. The
whole amount of infantry standing in battle-array was forty thousand,
of cavalry ten. The generals who commanded the wings were on the left
Hasdrubal, on the right Maharbal: Hannibal himself, with his brother
Mago, commanded the centre. The sun very conveniently shone obliquely
upon both parties; the Romans facing the south, and the Carthaginians
the north; either placed so designedly, or having stood thus by
chance. The wind, which the inhabitants of the district call the
Vulturnus, blowing violently in front of the Romans, prevented their
seeing far by rolling clouds of dust into their faces.
47. The shout being raised, the auxiliaries charged, and the battle
commenced in the first place with the light-armed troops: then the
left wing, consisting of the Gallic and Spanish cavalry, engages with
the Roman right wing, by no means in the manner of a cavalry battle;
for they were obliged to engage front to front; for as on one side the
river, on the other the line of infantry hemmed them in, there was no
space left at their flanks for evolution, but both parties were
compelled to press directly forward. At length the horses standing
still, and being crowded together, man grappling with man, dragged him
from his horse. The contest now came to be carried on principally on
foot. The battle, however, was more violent than lasting; and the
Roman cavalry being repulsed, turn their backs. About the conclusion
of the contest between the cavalry, the battle between the infantry
commenced. At first the Gauls and Spaniards preserved their ranks
unbroken, not inferior in strength or courage: but at length the
Romans, after long and repeated efforts, drove in with their even
front and closely compacted line, that part of the enemy's line in the
form of a wedge, which projected beyond the rest, which was too thin,
and therefore deficient in strength. These men, thus driven back and
hastily retreating, they closely pursued; and as they urged their
course without interruption through this terrified band, as it fled
with precipitation, were borne first upon the centre line of the
enemy; and lastly, no one opposing them, they reached the African
reserved troops. These were posted at the two extremities of the line,
where it was depressed; while the centre, where the Gauls and
Spaniards were placed, projected a little. When the wedge thus formed
being driven in, at first rendered the line level, but afterwards, by
the pressure, made a curvature in the centre, the Africans, who had
now formed wings on each side of them, surrounded the Romans on both
sides, who incautiously rushed into the intermediate space; and
presently extending their wings, enclosed the enemy on the rear also.
After this the Romans, who had in vain finished one battle, leaving
the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had slaughtered, in addition
commence a fresh encounter with the Africans, not only disadvantageous,
because being hemmed in they had to fight against troops who surrounded
them, but also because, fatigued, they fought with those who were fresh
and vigorous.
48. Now also in the left wing of the Romans, in which the allied
cavalry were opposed to the Numidians, the battle was joined, which
was at first languid, commencing with a stratagem on the part of the
Carthaginians. About five hundred Numidians, who, besides their usual
arms, had swords concealed beneath their coats of mail, quitting their
own party, and riding up to the enemy under the semblance of
deserters, with their bucklers behind them, suddenly leap down from
their horses; and, throwing down their bucklers and javelins at the
feet of their enemies, are received into their centre, and being
conducted to the rear, ordered to remain there; and there they
continued until the battle became general. But afterwards, when the
thoughts and attention of all were occupied with the contest,
snatching up the shields which lay scattered on all hands among the
heaps of slain, they fell upon the rear of the Roman line, and
striking their backs and wounding their hams, occasioned vast havoc,
and still greater panic and confusion. While in one part terror and
flight prevailed, in another the battle was obstinately persisted in,
though with little hope. Hasdrubal, who was then commanding in that
quarter, withdrawing the Numidians from the centre of the army, as the
conflict with their opponents was slight, sends them in pursuit of the
scattered fugitives, and joining the Africans, now almost weary with
slaying rather than fighting the Spanish and Gallic infantry.