The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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60. When he had finished his address, the crowd of persons in the
comitium immediately set up a loud lamentation, and stretched out
their hands to the senate, imploring them to restore to them their
children, their brothers, and their kinsmen. Their fears and affection
for their kindred had brought the women also with the crowd of men in
the forum. Witnesses being excluded, the matter began to be discussed
in the senate. There being a difference of opinion, and some advising
that they should be ransomed at the public charge, others, that the
state should be put to no expense, but that they should not be
prevented redeeming themselves at their own cost; and that those who
had not the money at present should receive a loan from the public
coffer, and security given to the people by their sureties and
properties; Titus Manlius Torquatus, a man of primitive, and, as some
considered, over-rigorous severity, being asked his opinion, is
reported thus to have spoken: "Had the deputies confined themselves to
making a request, in behalf of those who are in the hands of the
enemy, that they might be ransomed, I should have briefly given my
opinion, without inveighing against any one. For what else would have
been necessary but to admonish you, that you ought to adhere to the
custom handed down from your ancestors, a precedent indispensable to
military discipline. But now, since they have almost boasted of having
surrendered themselves to the enemy, and have claimed to be preferred,
not only to those who were captured by the enemy in the field, but to
those also who came to Venusia and Canusium, and even to the consul
Terentius himself; I will not suffer you to remain in ignorance of
things which were done there. And I could wish that what I am about to
bring before you, were stated at Canusium, before the army itself, the
best witness of every man's cowardice or valour; or at least that one
person, Publius Sempronius, were here, whom had they followed as their
leader, they would this day have been soldiers in the Roman camp, and
not prisoners in the power of the enemy. But though the enemy was
fatigued with fighting, and engaged in rejoicing for their victory,
and had, the greater part of them, retired into their camp, and they
had the night at their disposal for making a sally, and as they were
seven thousand armed troops, might have forced their way through the
troops of the enemy, however closely arrayed; yet they neither of
themselves attempted to do this, nor were willing to follow another.
Throughout nearly the whole night Sempronius ceased not to admonish
and exhort them, while but few of the enemy were about the camp, while
there was stillness and quiet, while the night would conceal their
design, that they would follow him; that before daybreak they might
reach places of security, the cities of their allies. If as Publius
Decius, the military tribune in Samnium, said, within the memory of
our grandfathers; if he had said, as Calpurnius Flamma, in the first
Punic war, when we were youths, said to the three hundred volunteers,
when he was leading them to seize upon an eminence situated in the
midst of the enemy: LET US DIE, SOLDIERS, AND BY OUR DEATHS RESCUE THE
SURROUNDED LEGIONS FROM AMBUSCADE;--if Publius Sempronius had said
thus, he would neither have considered you as Romans nor men, had no
one stood forward as his companion in so valorous an attempt. He
points out to you the road that leads not to glory more than to
safety; he restores you to your country, your parents, your wives and
children. Do you want courage to effect your preservation? What would
you do if you had to die for your country? Fifty thousand of your
countrymen and allies on that very day lay around you slain. If so
many examples of courage did not move you, nothing ever will. If so
great a carnage did not make life less dear, none ever will. While in
freedom and safety, show your affection for your country; nay, rather
do so while it is your country, and you its citizens. Too late you now
endeavour to evince your regard for her when degraded, disfranchised
from the rights of citizens, and become the slaves of the
Carthaginians. Shall you return by purchase to that degree which you
have forfeited by cowardice and neglect? You did not listen to
Sempronius, your countryman, when he bid you take arms and follow him;
but a little after you listened to Hannibal, when he ordered your arms
to be surrendered, and your camp betrayed. But why do I charge those
men with cowardice, when I might tax them with villany? They not only
refused to follow him who gave them good advice, but endeavoured to
oppose and hold him back, had not some men of the greatest bravery,
drawing their swords, removed the cowards. Publius Sempronius, I say,
was obliged to force his way through a band of his countrymen, before
he burst through the enemy's troops. Can our country regret such
citizens as these, whom if all the rest resembled, she would not have
one citizen of all those who fought at Cannae? Out of seven thousand
armed men, there were six hundred who had courage to force their way,
who returned to their country free, and in arms; nor did forty
thousand of the enemy successfully oppose them. How safe, think you,
would a passage have been for nearly two legions? Then you would have
had this day at Canusium, conscript fathers, twenty thousand bold and
faithful. But now how can these men be called faithful and good
citizens, (for they do not even call themselves brave,) except any man
suppose that they showed themselves such when they opposed those who
were desirous of forcing their way through the enemy? or, unless any
man can suppose, that they do not envy those men their safety and
glory acquired by valour, when the must know that their timidity and
cowardice were the cause of their ignominious servitude? Skulking in
their tents they preferred to wait for the light and the enemy
together, when they had an opportunity of sallying forth during the
silence of the night. But though they had not courage to sally forth
from the camp, had they courage to defend it strenuously? Having
endured a siege for several days and nights, did they protect their
rampart by their arms, and themselves by their rampart? At length,
having dared and suffered every extremity, every support of life being
gone, their strength exhausted with famine, and unable to hold their
arms, were they subdued by the necessities of nature rather than by
arms? At sunrise, the enemy approached the rampart: before the second
hour, without hazarding any contest, they delivered up their arms and
themselves. Here is their military service for you during two days.
When they ought to have stood firm in array and fight on, then they
fled back into their camp; when they ought to have fought before their
rampart, they delivered up their camp: good for nothing, either in the
field or the camp. I redeem you. When you ought to sally from the
camp, you linger and hesitate; and when you ought to stay and protect
your camp in arms, you surrender the camp, your arms, and yourselves
to the enemy. I am of opinion, conscript fathers, that these men
should no more be ransomed, than that those should be surrendered to
Hannibal, who sallied from the camp through the midst of the enemy,
and, with the most distinguished courage, restored themselves to their
country."
61. After Manlius had thus spoken, notwithstanding the captives were
related to many even of the senators, besides the practice of the
state, which had never shown favour to captives, even from the
remotest times, the sum of money also influenced them: for they were
neither willing to drain the treasury, a large sum of money having
been already issued for buying and arming slaves to serve in the war,
nor to enrich Hannibal, who, according to report, was particularly in
want of this very thing. The sad reply, that the captives would not be
ransomed, being delivered, and fresh grief being added to the former
on account of the loss of so many citizens, the people accompanied the
deputies to the gate with copious tears and lamentations. One of them
went home, because he had evaded his oath by artfully returning to the
camp. But when this was known and laid before the senate, they all
resolved that he should be apprehended and conveyed to Hannibal by
guards, furnished by the state. There is another account respecting
the prisoners, that ten came first, and that, the senate hesitating
whether they should be admitted into the city or not, they were
admitted, on the understanding that they should not have an audience
of the senate. That when these staid longer than the expectation of
all, three more came, Scribonius, Calpurnius, and Manlius. That then
at length a tribune of the people, a relation of Scribonius, laid
before the senate the redemption of the captives, and that they
resolved that they should not be ransomed. That the three last
deputies returned to Hannibal, and the ten former remained, because
they had evaded their oath, having returned to Hannibal after having
set out, under pretence of learning afresh the names of the captives.
That a violent contest took place in the senate, on the question of
surrendering them, and that those who thought they ought to be
surrendered were beaten by a few votes, but that they were so branded
by every kind of stigma and ignominy by the ensuing censors, that some
of them immediately put themselves to death, and the rest, for all
their life afterwards, not only shunned the forum, but almost the
light and publicity. You can more easily wonder that authors differ so
much than determine what is the truth. How much greater this disaster
was than any preceding, even this is a proof, that such of the allies
as had stood firm till that day then began to waver, for no other
cause certainly but that they despaired of the empire. The people who
revolted to the Carthaginians were these: the Atellani, Calatini, the
Hirpini, some of the Apulians, the Samnites, except the Pentrians, all
the Bruttians, and the Lucanians. Besides these the Surrentinians, and
almost the whole coast possessed by the Greeks, the people of
Tarentum, Metapontum, Croton, the Locrians, and all Cisalpine Gaul.
Yet not even these losses and defections of their allies so shook the
firmness of the Romans, that any mention of peace was made among them,
either before the arrival of the consul at Rome, or after he came
thither, and renewed the memory of the calamity they had suffered. At
which very juncture, such was the magnanimity of the state, that the
consul, as he returned after so severe a defeat, of which he himself
was the principal cause, was met in crowds of all ranks of citizens,
and thanks bestowed because he had not despaired of the republic, in
whose case, had he been a Carthaginian commander, no species of
punishment would have been spared.
BOOK XXIII.
_The Campanians revolt to Hannibal. Mago is sent to Carthage to
announce the victory of Cannae. Hanno advises the Carthaginian senate
to make peace with the Romans, but is overborne by the Barcine
faction. Claudius Marcellus the praetor defeats Hannibal at Nola.
Hannibal's army is enervated in mind and body by luxurious living at
Capua. Casilinum is besieged by the Carthaginians, and the inhabitants
reduced to the last extremity of famine. A hundred and ninety-seven
senators elected from the equestrian order. Lucius Postumius is, with
his army, cut off by the Gauls. Cneius and Publius Scipio defeat
Hasdrubal in Spain, and gain possession of that country. The remains
of the army, defeated at Cannae, are sent off to Sicily, there to
remain until the termination of the war. An alliance is formed between
Philip, king of Macedon, and Hannibal. Sempronius Gracchus defeats the
Campanians. Successes of Titus Manlius in Sardinia he takes Hasdrubal
the general, Mago, and Hanno prisoners. Claudius Marcellus again
defeats the army of Hannibal at Nola, and the hopes of the Romans are
revived as to the results of the war._
* * * * *
1. After the battle of Cannae, Hannibal, having captured and plundered
the Roman camp, had immediately removed from Apulia into Samnium;
invited into the territory of the Hirpini by Statius, who promised
that he would surrender Compsa. Tiebius, a native of Compsa, was
conspicuous for rank among his countrymen; but a faction of the Mopsii
kept him down--a family of great influence through the favour of the
Romans. After intelligence of the battle of Cannae, and a report of
the approach of Hannibal, circulated by the discourse of Trebius, the
Mopsian party had retired from the city; which was thus given up to
the Carthaginian without opposition, and a garrison received into it.
Leaving there all his booty and baggage, and dividing his forces, he
orders Mago to receive under his protection the cities of that
district which might revolt from the Romans, and to force to defection
those which might be disinclined. He himself, passing through the
territory of Campania, made for the lower sea, with the intention of
assaulting Naples, in order that he might be master of a maritime
city. As soon as he entered the confines of the Neapolitan territory,
he placed part of his Numidians in ambush, wherever he could find a
convenient spot; for there are very many hollow roads and secret
windings: others he ordered to drive before them the booty they had
collected from the country, and, exhibiting it to the enemy, to ride
up to the gates of the city. As they appeared to be few in number and
in disorder, a troop of horse sallied out against them, which was cut
off, being drawn into an ambuscade by the others, who purposely
retreated: nor would one of them have escaped, had not the sea been
near, and some vessels, principally such as are used in fishing,
observed at a short distance from the shore, afforded an escape for
those who could swim. Several noble youths, however, were captured and
slain in that affair. Among whom, Hegeas, the commander of the
cavalry, fell when pursuing the retreating enemy too eagerly. The
sight of the walls, which were not favourable to a besieging force,
deterred the Carthaginian from storming the city.
2. Thence he turned his course to Capua, which was wantoning under a
long course of prosperity, and the indulgence of fortune: amid the
general corruption, however, the most conspicuous feature was the
extravagance of the commons, who exercised their liberty without
limit. Pacuvius Calavius had rendered the senate subservient to
himself and the commons, at once a noble and popular man, but who had
acquired his influence by dishonourable intrigues. Happening to hold
the chief magistracy during the year in which the defeat at the
Trasimenus occurred, and thinking that the commons, who had long felt
the most violent hostility to the senate, would attempt some desperate
measure, should an opportunity for effecting a change present itself;
and if Hannibal should come into that quarter with his victorious
army, would murder the senators and deliver Capua to the
Carthaginians; as he desired to rule in a state preserved rather than
subverted (for though depraved he was not utterly abandoned), and as
he felt convinced that no state could be preserved if bereaved of its
public council, he adopted a plan by which he might preserve the
senate and render it subject to himself and the commons. Having
assembled the senate, he prefaced his remarks by observing, "that
nothing would induce him to acquiesce in a plan of defection from the
Romans, were it not absolutely necessary; since he had children by the
daughter of Appius Claudius, and had a daughter at Rome married to
Livius: but that a much more serious and alarming matter threatened
them, than any consequences which could result from such a measure.
For that the intention of the commons was not to abolish the senate by
revolting to the Carthaginians, but to murder the senators, and
deliver the state thus destitute to Hannibal and the Carthaginians.
That it was in his power to rescue them from this danger, if they
would resign themselves to his care, and, forgetting their political
dissensions, confide in him." When, overpowered with fear, they all
put themselves under his protection, he proceeded: "I will shut you up
in the senate-house, and pretending myself to be an accomplice in the
meditated crime, I will, by approving measures which I should in vain
oppose, find out a way for your safety. For the performance of this
take whatever pledge you please." Having given his honour, he went
out; and having ordered the house to be closed, placed a guard in the
lobby that no one might enter or leave it without his leave.
3. Then assembling the people, he thus addressed them: "What you have
so often wished for, Campanians, the power of punishing an
unprincipled and detestable senate, you now have, not at your own
imminent peril, by riotously storming the houses of each, which are
guarded and garrisoned with slaves and dependants, but free and
without danger. Take them all, shut up in the senate-house, alone and
unarmed; nor need you do any thing precipitately or blindly. I will
give you the opportunity of pronouncing upon the life or death of
each, that each may suffer the punishment he has deserved. But, above
all, it behoves you so to give way to your resentment, as considering
that your own safety and advantage are of greater importance. For I
apprehend that you hate these particular senators, and not that you
are unwilling to have any senate at all; for you must either have a
king, which all abominate, or a senate, which is the only course
compatible with a free state. Accordingly you must effect two objects
at the same time; you must remove the old senate and elect a new one.
I will order the senators to be summoned one by one, and I shall put
it to you to decide whether they deserve to live or die: whatever you
may determine respecting each shall be done; but before you execute
your sentence on the culprit, you shall elect some brave and strenuous
man as a fresh senator to supply his place." Upon this he took his
seat, and, the names having been thrown together into an urn, he
ordered that the name which had the lot to fall out first should be
proclaimed, and the person brought forward out of the senate-house.
When the name was heard, each man strenuously exclaimed that he was a
wicked and unprincipled fellow, and deserved to be punished. Pacuvius
then said, "I perceive the sentence which has been passed on this man;
now choose a good and upright senator in the room of this wicked and
unprincipled one." At first all was silence, from the want of a better
man whom they might substitute; afterwards, one of them, laying aside
his modesty, nominating some one, in an instant a much greater clamour
arose; while some denied all knowledge of him, others objected to him
at one time on account of flagitious conduct, at another time on
account of his humble birth, his sordid circumstances, and the
disgraceful nature of his trade and occupation. The same occurred with
increased vehemence with respect to the second and third senators, so
that it was evident that they were dissatisfied with the senator
himself, but had not any one to substitute for him; for it was of no
use that the same persons should be nominated again, to no other
purpose than to hear of their vices, and the rest were much more mean
and obscure than those who first occurred to their recollection. Thus
the assembly separated, affirming that every evil which was most known
was easiest to be endured, and ordering the senate to be discharged
from custody.
4. Pacuvius, having thus rendered the senators more subservient to
himself than to the commons by the gift of their lives, ruled without
the aid of arms, all persons now acquiescing. Henceforward the
senators, forgetful of their rank and independence, flattered the
commons; saluted them courteously; invited them graciously;
entertained them with sumptuous feasts; undertook those causes, always
espoused that party, decided as judges in favour of that side, which
was most popular, and best adapted to conciliate the favour of the
commons. Now, indeed, every thing was transacted in the senate as if
it had been an assembly of the people. The Capuans, ever prone to
luxurious indulgence not only from natural turpitude, but from the
profusion of the means of voluptuous enjoyment which flowed in upon
them, and the temptations of all the luxuries of land and sea; at that
time especially proceeded to such a pitch of extravagance in
consequence of the obsequiousness of the nobles and the unrestrained
liberty of the commons, that their lust and prodigality had no bounds.
To a disregard for the laws, the magistrates, and the senate, now,
after the disaster of Cannae, was added a contempt for the Roman
government also, for which there had been some degree of respect. The
only obstacles to immediate revolt were the intermarriages which, from
a remote period, had connected many of their distinguished and
influential families with the Romans; and, which formed the strongest
bond of union, that while several of their countrymen were serving in
the Roman armies, particularly three hundred horsemen, the flower of
the Campanian nobility, had been selected and sent by the Romans to
garrison the cities of Sicily.
5. The parents and relations of these men with difficulty obtained
that ambassadors should be sent to the Roman consul. The consul, who
had not yet set out for Canusium, they found at Venusia with a few
half-armed troops, an object of entire commiseration to faithful, but
of contempt to proud and perfidious allies, like the Campanians. The
consul too increased their contempt of himself and his cause, by too
much exposing and exhibiting the disastrous state of his affairs; for
when the ambassadors had delivered their message, which was, that the
senate and people of Capua were distressed that any adverse event
should have befallen the Romans, and were promising every assistance
in prosecuting the war, he observed, "In bidding us order you to
furnish us with all things which are necessary for the war,
Campanians, you have rather observed the customary mode of addressing
allies, than spoken suitably to the present posture of our affairs;
for hath anything been left us at Cannae, so that, as if we possessed
that, we can desire what is wanting to be supplied by our allies? Can
we order a supply of infantry, as if we had any cavalry? Can we say we
are deficient in money, as if that were the only thing we wanted?
Fortune has not even left us anything which we can add to. Our
legions, cavalry, arms, standards, horses, men, money, provisions, all
perished either in the battle, or in the two camps which were lost the
following day. You must, therefore, Campanians, not assist us in the
war, but almost take it upon yourselves in our stead. Call to mind how
formerly at Saticula we received into our protection and defended your
ancestors, when dismayed and driven within their walls; terrified not
only by their Samnite but Sidicinian enemies; and how we carried on,
with varying success, through a period of almost a century, a war with
the Samnites, commenced on your account. Add to this, that when you
gave yourselves up to us we granted you an alliance on equal terms,
that we allowed you your own laws, and lastly, what before the
disaster at Cannae was surely a privilege of the highest value, we
bestowed the freedom of our city on a large portion of you, and held
it in common with you. It is your duty, therefore, Campanians, to look
upon this disaster which has been suffered as your own, and to
consider that our common country must be protected. It is not a
Samnite or Tuscan foe we are engaged with, so that the empire taken
from us might still continue in Italy. A Carthaginian enemy draws
after him from the remotest regions of the world, from the straits of
the ocean and the pillars of Hercules, a body of soldiers who are not
even natives of Africa, destitute of all laws, and of the condition
and almost of the language of men. Savage and ferocious from nature
and habit, their general has rendered them still more so, by forming
bridges and works with heaps of human bodies; and, what the tongue can
scarcely utter, by teaching them to live on human flesh. What man,
provided he were born in any part of Italy, would not abominate the
idea of seeing and having for his masters these men, nourished with
such horrid food, whom even to touch were an impiety; of fetching laws
from Africa and Carthage; and of suffering Italy to become a province
of the Moors and Numidians? It will be highly honourable, Campanians,
that the Roman empire, sinking under this disastrous defeat, should be
sustained and restored by your fidelity and your strength. I conceive
that thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse may be raised in
Campania. You have already abundance of money and corn. If your zeal
corresponds with your means, neither will Hannibal feel that he has
been victorious, nor the Romans that they have been defeated."