The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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15. On the approach of the Roman praetor, the Carthaginians retired
from the territory of Nola and marched down to the sea close upon
Naples, eager to get possession of a maritime town to which there
would be a safe course for ships from Africa. But hearing that Naples
was held by a Roman prefect, Marcus Junius Silanus, who had been
invited thither by the Neapolitans themselves, he left Naples as he
had left Nola, and directed his course to Nuceria, which he at length
starved into capitulation, after having besieged it for a considerable
time, often by open force, and often by soliciting to no purpose
sometimes the commons, at other times the nobles; agreeing that they
should depart with single garments and without arms. Then, as wishing
to appear from the beginning to show lenity to all the inhabitants of
Italy except the Romans, he proposed rewards and honours to those who
might remain with him, and would be willing to serve with him. He
retained none, however, by the hopes he held out; they all dispersed
in different directions throughout the cities of Campania, wherever
either hospitable connexions or the casual impulse of the mind
directed them, but principally to Nola and Naples. About thirty
senators, including as it happened all of the first rank, made for
Capua; but being shut out thence, because they had closed their gates
on Hannibal, they betook themselves to Cumae. The plunder of Nuceria
was, given to the soldiery, the city sacked and burned. Marcellus
continued to hold possession of Nola, relying not more from confidence
in his own troops than from the favourable disposition of the leading
inhabitants. Apprehensions were entertained of the commons,
particularly Lucius Bantius, whose having been privy to an attempt at
defection, and dread of the Roman praetor, stimulated sometimes to the
betrayal of his country, at others, should fortune fail him in that
undertaking, to desertion. He was a young man of vigorous mind, and at
that time enjoying the greatest renown of almost any of the allied
cavalry. Found at Cannae half dead amid a heap of slain, Hannibal had
sent him home, after having had him cured, with the kindest attention,
and even with presents. In gratitude for this favour, he had conceived
a wish to put Nola under the power and dominion of the Carthaginian;
but his anxiety and solicitude for effecting a change did not escape
the notice of the praetor. However, as it was necessary that he should
be either restrained by penal inflictions or conciliated by favours,
he preferred attaching to himself a brave and strenuous ally, to
depriving the enemy of him; and summoning him into his presence, in
the kindest manner said, "that the fact that he had many among his
countrymen who were jealous of him, might be easily collected from the
circumstance that not one citizen of Nola had informed him how many
were his splendid military exploits. But that it was impossible for
the valour of one who served in the Roman camp to remain in obscurity;
that many who had served with him had reported to him how brave a man
he was, how often and what dangers he had encountered for the safety
and honour of the Roman people; and how in the battle of Cannae he had
not given over fighting till, almost bloodless, he was buried under a
heap of men, horses, and arms which fell upon him. Go on then," says
he, "and prosper in your career of valour, with me you shall receive
every honour and every reward, and the oftener you be with me, the
more you shall find it will be to your honour and emolument." He
presented the young man, delighted with these promises, with a horse
of distinguished beauty, ordered the quaestor to give him five hundred
denarii, and commanded the lictors to allow him to approach him
whenever he might please.
16. The violent spirit of the youth was so much soothed by the
courteous treatment of Marcellus, that thenceforward no one of the
allies displayed greater courage or fidelity in aiding the Roman
cause. Hannibal being now at the gates, for he had moved his camp back
again from Nuceria to Nola, and the commons beginning to turn their
attention to revolt afresh, Marcellus, on the approach of the enemy,
retired within the walls; not from apprehension for his camp, but lest
he should give an opportunity for betraying the city, which too many
were anxiously watching for. The troops on both sides then began to be
drawn up; the Romans before the walls of Nola, the Carthaginians
before their own camp. Hence arose several battles of small account
between the city and the camp, with varying success, as the generals
were neither willing to check the small parties who inconsiderately
challenged the enemy, nor to give the signal for a general engagement.
While the two armies continued to be thus stationed day after day, the
chief men of the Nolans informed Marcellus, that conferences were held
by night between the commons of Nola and the Carthaginians; and that
it was fixed, that, when the Roman army had gone out at the gates,
they should make plunder of their baggage and packages, then close the
gates and post themselves upon the walls, in order that when in
possession of the government and the city, they might then receive the
Carthaginian instead of the Roman. On receiving this intelligence
Marcellus, having bestowed the highest commendations on the senators,
resolved to hazard the issue of a battle before any commotion should
arise within the city. He drew up his troops in three divisions at the
three gates which faced the enemy; he gave orders that the baggage
should follow close by, that the servants, suttlers' boys, and
invalids should carry palisades; at the centre gate he stationed the
choicest of the legionary troops and the Roman cavalry, at the two
gates on either side, the recruits, the light-armed, and the allied
cavalry. The Nolans were forbidden to approach the walls and gates,
and the troops designed for a reserve were set over the baggage, lest
while the legions were engaged in the battle an attack should be made
upon it. Thus arranged they were standing within the gates. Hannibal,
who had waited with his troops drawn up in battle-array, as he had
done for several days, till the day was far advanced, at first was
amazed that neither the Roman army marched out of the gates, nor any
armed man was to be seen on the walls, but afterwards concluding that
the conferences had been discovered, and that they were quiet through
fear, he sent back a portion of his troops into the camp, with orders
to bring into the front line, with speed, every thing requisite for
assaulting the city; satisfied that if he urged them vigorously while
they were indisposed to action, the populace would excite some
commotion in the city. While, in the van, the troops were running up
and down in a hurried manner in discharge of their several duties, and
the line was advancing up to the gates, suddenly throwing open the
gate, Marcellus ordered that the signal should be given, and a shout
raised, and that first the infantry and after them the cavalry should
burst forth upon the enemy with all possible impetuosity. They had
occasioned abundant terror and confusion in the centre of the enemy's
line, when, at the two side gates, the lieutenant-generals, Publius
Valerius Flaccus and Caius Aurelius, sallied forth upon the wings. The
servants, suttlers' boys, and the other multitude appointed to guard
the baggage, joined in the shout, so that they suddenly exhibited the
appearance of a vast army to the Carthaginians, who despised chiefly
their paucity of numbers. For my own part I would not take upon me to
assert what some authors have declared, that two thousand eight
hundred of the enemy were slain, and that the Romans lost not more
than five hundred. Whether the victory was so great or not; it is
certain that a very important advantage, and perhaps the greatest
during the war, was gained on that day: for not to be vanquished by
Hannibal was then a more difficult task to the victorious troops, than
to conquer him afterwards.
17. When Hannibal, all hope of getting possession of Nola being lost,
had retired to Acerrae, Marcellus, having closed the gates and posted
guards in different quarters to prevent any one from going out,
immediately instituted a judicial inquiry in the forum, into the
conduct of those who had been secretly in communication with the
enemy. He beheaded more than seventy who were convicted of treason,
and ordered their foods to be confiscated to the Roman state; and then
committing the government to the senate, set out with all his forces,
and, pitching a camp, took up a position above Suessula. The
Carthaginian, having at first endeavoured to win over the people of
Acerrae to a voluntary surrender, but finding them resolved, makes
preparations for a siege and assault. But the people of Acerrae had
more spirit than power. Despairing therefore, of the defence of the
city, when they saw their walls being circumvallated, before the lines
of the enemy were completed, they stole off in the dead of night
through the opening in the works, and where the watches had been
neglected; and pursuing their course through roads and pathless
regions, accordingly as design or mistake directed each, made their
escape to those towns of Campania which they knew had not renounced
their fidelity. After Acerrae was plundered and burnt, Hannibal,
having received intelligence that the Roman dictator with the
new-raised legions was seen at some distance from Casilinum, and
fearing lest, the camp of the enemy being so near, something might
occur at Capua, marched his army to Casilinum. At that time Casilinum
was occupied by five hundred Praenestines, with a few Romans and
Latins, whom the news of the defeat at Cannae had brought to the same
place. These men setting out from home too late, in consequence of the
levy at Praeneste not being completed at the appointed day, and
arriving at Casilinum before the defeat was known there, where they
united themselves with other troops, Romans and allies, were
proceeding thence in a tolerably large body, but the news of the
battle at Cannae them back to Casilinum. Having spent several days
there in evading and concerting plots, in fear themselves and
suspected by the Campanians, and having now received certain
information that the revolt of Capua and the reception of Hannibal
were in agitation, they put the townsmen to the sword by night, and
seized upon the part of the town on this side the Vulturnus, for it is
divided by that river. Such was the garrison the Romans had at
Casilinum; to these was added a cohort of Perusians, in number four
hundred and sixty, who had been driven to Casilinum by the same
intelligence which had brought the Praenestines a few days before.
They formed a sufficient number of armed men for the defence of walls
of so limited extent, and protected on one side by the river. The
scarcity of corn made them even appear too numerous.
18. Hannibal having now advanced within a short distance of the place,
sent forward a body of Getulians under a commander named Isalca, and
orders them in the first place, if an opportunity of parley should be
given, to win them over by fair words, to open the gates, and admit a
garrison; but, if they persisted in obstinate opposition, to proceed
to action, and try if in any part he could force an entrance into the
city. When they had approached the walls, because silence prevailed
there appeared a solitude; and the barbarian, supposing that they had
retired through fear, made preparation for forcing the gates and
breaking away the bars, when, the gates being suddenly thrown open,
two cohorts, drawn up within for that very purpose, rushed forth with
great tumult, and made a slaughter of the enemy. The first party being
thus repulsed, Maharbal was sent with a more powerful body of troops;
but neither could even he sustain the sally of the cohorts. Lastly,
Hannibal, fixing his camp directly before the walls, prepared to
assault this paltry city and garrison, with every effort and all his
forces, and having completely surrounded the city with a line of
troops, lost a considerable number of men, including all the most
forward, who were shot from the walls and turrets, while he pressed on
and provoked the enemy. Once he was very near cutting them off, by
throwing in a line of elephants, when aggressively sallying forth, and
drove them in the utmost confusion into the town; a good many, out of
so small a number, having been slain. More would have fallen had not
night interrupted the battle. On the following day, the minds of all
were possessed with an ardent desire to commence the assault,
especially after a golden mural crown had been promised, and the
general himself had reproached the conquerors of Saguntum with the
slowness of their siege of a little fort situated on level ground;
reminding them, each and all, of Cannae, Trasimenus, and Trebia. They
then began to apply the vineae and to spring mines: nor was any
measure, whether of open force or stratagem, unemployed against the
various attempts of the enemy. These allies of the Romans erected
bulwarks against the vineae, cut off the mines of the enemy by
cross-mines, and met their efforts both covertly and openly, till, at
last, shame compelled Hannibal to desist from his undertaking; and,
fortifying a camp in which he placed a small guard, that the affair
might not appear to have been abandoned, he retired into winter
quarters to Capua. There he kept, under cover, for the greater part of
the winter, that army, which, though fortified by frequent and
continued hardships against every human ill, had yet never experienced
or been habituated to prosperity. Accordingly, excess of good fortune
and unrestrained indulgence were the ruin of men whom no severity of
distress had subdued; and so much the more completely, in proportion
to the avidity with which they plunged into pleasures to which they
were unaccustomed. For sleep, wine, feasting, women, baths, and ease,
which custom rendered more seductive day by day, so completely
unnerved both mind and body, that from henceforth their past victories
rather than their present strength protected them; and in this the
general is considered by those who are skilled in the art of war to
have committed a greater error than in not having marched his troops
to Rome forthwith from the field of Cannae: for his delay on that
occasion might be considered as only to have postponed his victory,
but this mistake to have bereaved him of the power of conquering.
Accordingly, by Hercules, as though he marched out of Capua with
another army, it retained in no respect any of its former discipline;
for most of the troops returned in the embrace of harlots; and as soon
as they began to live under tents, and the fatigue of marching and
other military labours tried them, like raw troops, they failed both
in bodily strength and spirit. From that time, during the whole period
of the summer campaign, a great number of them slunk away from the
standards without furloughs, while Capua was the only retreat of the
deserters.
19. However, when the rigour of winter began to abate, marching his
troops out of their winter quarters he returned to Casilinum; where,
although there had been an intermission of the assault, the
continuance of the siege had reduced the inhabitants and the garrison
to the extremity of want. Titus Sempronius commanded the Roman camp,
the dictator having gone to Rome to renew the auspices. The swollen
state of the Vulturnus and the entreaties of the people of Nola and
Acerrae, who feared the Campanians if the Roman troops should leave
them, kept Marcellus in his place; although desirous himself also to
bring assistance to the besieged. Gracchus, only maintaining his post
near Casilinum, because he had been enjoined by the dictator not to
take any active steps during his absence, did not stir; although
intelligence was brought from Casilinum which might easily overcome
every degree of patience. For it appeared that some had precipitated
themselves from the walls through famine and that they were standing
unarmed upon the walls, exposing their undefended bodies to the blows
of the missile weapons. Gracchus, grieved at the intelligence, but not
daring to fight contrary to the injunctions of the dictator, and yet
aware that he must fight if he openly attempted to convey in
provisions, and having no hope of introducing them clandestinely,
collected corn from all parts of the surrounding country, and filling
several casks sent a message to the magistrate to Casilinum, directing
that they might catch the casks which the river would bring down. The
following night, while all were intent upon the river, and the hopes
excited by the message from the Romans, the casks sent came floating
down the centre of the stream, and the corn was equally distributed
among them all. This was repeated the second and third day; they were
sent off and arrived during the same night; and hence they escaped the
notice of the enemy's guards. But afterwards, the river, rendered more
than ordinarily rapid by continual rains, drove the casks by a cross
current to the bank which the enemy were guarding; there they were
discovered sticking among the osiers which grew along the banks; and,
it being reported to Hannibal, from that time the watches were kept
more strictly, that nothing sent to the city by the Vulturnus might
escape notice. However, nuts poured out at the Roman camp floated down
the centre of the river to Casilinum, and were caught with hurdles. At
length they were reduced to such a degree of want, that they
endeavoured to chew the thongs and skins which they tore from their
shields, after softening them in warm water; nor did they abstain from
mice or any other kind of animals. They even dug up every kind of herb
and root from the lowest mounds of their wall; and when the enemy had
ploughed over all the ground producing herbage which was without the
wall, they threw in turnip seed, so that Hannibal exclaimed, Must I
sit here at Casilinum even till these spring up? and he, who up to
that time had not lent an ear to any terms, then at length allowed
himself to be treated with respecting the ransom of the free persons.
Seven ounces of gold for each person were agreed upon as the price;
and then, under a promise of protection, they surrendered themselves.
They were kept in chains till the whole of the gold was paid, after
which they were sent back to Cumae, in fulfilment of the promise. This
account is more credible than that they were slain by a body of
cavalry, which was sent to attack them as they were going away. They
were for the most part Praenestines. Out of the five hundred and
seventy who formed the garrison, almost one half were destroyed by
sword or famine; the rest returned safe to Praeneste with their
praetor Manicius, who had formerly been a scribe. His statue placed in
the forum at Praeneste, clad in a coat of mail, with a gown on, and
with the head covered, formed an evidence of this account; as did also
three images with this legend inscribed on a brazen plate, "Manicius
vowed these in behalf of the soldiers who were in the garrison at
Casilinum." The same legend was inscribed under three images placed in
the temple of Fortune.
20. The town of Casilinum was restored to the Campanians, strengthened
by a garrison of seven hundred soldiers from the army of Hannibal,
lest on the departure of the Carthaginian from it, the Romans should
assault it. To the Praenestine soldiers the Roman senate voted double
pay and exemption from military service for five years. On being
offered the freedom of the state, in consideration of their valor,
they would not make the exchange. The account of the fate of the
Perusians is less clear, as no light is thrown upon it by any monument
of their own, or any decree of the Romans. At the same time the
Petelini, the only Bruttian state which had continued in the Roman
alliance, were attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who were in
possession of the surrounding country, but also by the rest of the
Bruttian states, on account of their having adopted a separate policy.
The Petelini, unable to bear up against these distresses, sent
ambassadors to Rome to solicit aid, whose prayers and entreaties (for
on being told that they must themselves take measures for their own
safety, they gave themselves up to piteous lamentations in the
vestibule of the senate-house) excited the deepest commiseration in
the fathers and the people. On the question being proposed a second
time to the fathers by Manius Pomponius, the praetor, after examining
all the resources of the empire, they were compelled to confess that
they had no longer any protection for their distant allies, and bid
them return home, and having done every thing which could be expected
from faithful allies, as to what remained to take measures for their
own security in the present state of fortune. On the result of this
embassy being reported to the Petelini, their senate was suddenly
seized with such violent grief and dismay, that some advised that they
should run away wherever each man could find an asylum, and abandon
the city. Some advised, that as they were deserted by their ancient
allies, they should unite themselves with the rest of the Bruttian
states, and through them surrender themselves to Hannibal. The opinion
however which prevailed was that of those who thought that nothing
should be done in haste and rashly, and that they should take the
whole matter into their consideration again. The next day, when they
had cooled upon it, and their trepidation had somewhat subsided, the
principal men carried their point that they should collect all their
property out of the fields, and fortify the city and the walls.
21. Much about the same time letters were brought from Sicily and
Sardinia. That of Titus Otacilius the propraetor was first read in the
senate. It stated that Lucius Furius the praetor had arrived at
Lilybaeum from Africa with his fleet. That he himself, having been
severely wounded, was in imminent danger of his life; that neither pay
nor corn was punctually furnished to the soldiers or the marines; nor
were there any resources from which they could be furnished. That he
earnestly advised that such supplies should be sent with all possible
expedition; and that, if it was thought proper, they should send one
of the new praetors to succeed him.
Nearly the same intelligence respecting corn and pay was conveyed in a
letter from Aulus Cornelius Mammula, the propraetor, from Sardinia.
The answer to both was, that there were no resources from whence they
could be supplied, and orders were given to them that they should
themselves provide for their fleets and armies. Titus Otacilius having
sent ambassadors to Hiero, the only source of assistance the Romans
had, received as much money as was wanting to pay the troops and a
supply of corn for six months. In Sardinia, the allied states
contributed liberally to Cornelius. The scarcity of money at Rome also
was so great, that on the proposal of Marcus Minucius, plebeian
tribune, a financial triumvirate was appointed, consisting of Lucius
Aemilius Papus, who had been consul and censor, Marcus Atilius
Regulus, who had been twice consul, and Lucius Scribonius Libo, who
was then plebeian tribune. Marcus and Caius Atilius were also created
a duumvirate for dedicating the temple of Concord, which Lucius
Manlius had vowed when praetor. Three pontiffs were also created,
Quintus Caecilius Metellus, Quintus Fabius Maximus, and Quintus
Fulvius Flaccus, in the room of Publius Scantinius deceased, and of
Lucius Aemilius Paulus the consul, and of Quintus Aelius Paetus, who
had fallen in the battle of Cannae.
22. The fathers having repaired, as far as human counsels could effect
it, the other losses from a continued series of unfortunate events, at
length turned their attention on themselves, on the emptiness of the
senate-house, and the paucity of those who assembled for public
deliberation. For the senate-roll had not been reviewed since the
censorship of Lucius Aemilius and C. Flaminius, though unfortunate
battles, during a period of five years, as well as the private
casualties of each, had carried off so many senators. Manius
Pomponius, the praetor, as the dictator was now gone to the army after
the loss of Casilinum, at the earnest request of all, brought in a
bill upon the subject. When Spurius Carvilius, after having lamented
in a long speech not only the scantiness of the senate, but the
fewness of citizens who were eligible into that body, with the design
of making up the numbers of the senate and uniting more closely the
Romans and the Latin confederacy, declared that he strongly advised
that the freedom of the state should be conferred upon two senators
from each of the Latin states, if the Roman fathers thought proper,
who might be chosen into the senate to supply the places of the
deceased senators. This proposition the fathers listened to with no
more equanimity than formerly to the request when made by the Latins
themselves. A loud and violent expression of disapprobation ran
through the whole senate-house. In particular, Manlius reminded them
that there was still existing a man of that stock, from which that
consul was descended who formerly threatened in the Capitol that he
would with his own hand put to death any Latin senator he saw in that
house. Upon which Quintus Fabius Maximus said, "that never was any
subject introduced into the senate at a juncture more unseasonable
than the present, when a question had been touched upon which would
still further irritate the minds of the allies, who were already
hesitating and wavering in their allegiance. That that rash suggestion
of one individual ought to be annihilated by the silence of the whole
body; and that if there ever was a declaration in that house which
ought to be buried in profound and inviolable silence, surely that
above all others was one which deserved to be covered and consigned to
darkness and oblivion, and looked upon as if it had never been made."
This put a stop to the mention of the subject. They determined that a
dictator should be created for the purpose of reviewing the senate,
and that he should be one who had been a censor, and was the oldest
living of those who had held that office. They likewise gave orders
that Caius Terentius, the consul, should be called home to nominate a
dictator; who, leaving his troops in Apulia, returned to Rome with
great expedition; and, according to custom, on the following night
nominated Marcus Fabius Buteo dictator, for six months, without a
master of the horse, in pursuance of the decree of the senate.