The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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19. Hannibal, having moved his camp from the territory of Beneventum
to Capua, drew out his troops in order of battle the third day after
his arrival; not entertaining the least doubt but that, as the
Campanians had fought successfully a few days ago when he was absent,
the Romans would be still less able to withstand him and his army,
which had been so often victorious. After the battle had commenced,
the Roman line was distressed chiefly from the attack of the cavalry,
being overwhelmed with their darts, till the signal was given to the
Roman cavalry to direct their horses against the enemy; thus it was a
battle of the cavalry. But at this time the Sempronian army, commanded
by Cneius Cornelius the quaestor, being descried at a distance,
excited alarm in both parties equally, lest those who were approaching
should be fresh enemies. As if by concert, therefore, both sounded a
retreat; and the troops were withdrawn from the field to their camps,
in an equal condition; a greater number, however, of the Romans fell
in the first charge of the cavalry. The consuls, to divert the
attention of Hannibal from Capua, departed thence on the following
night in different directions, Fulvius into the territory of Cuma,
Claudius into Lucania. The next day Hannibal, having received
intelligence that the camp of the Romans was deserted, and that they
had gone off in different directions in two divisions, doubtful at
first which he should follow, commenced the pursuit of Appius; who,
after leading him about whichever way he pleased, returned by another
route to Capua. Hannibal, while in this quarter, had another
opportunity of gaining an advantage. Marcus Centenius, surnamed
Penula, was distinguished among the centurions of the first rank by
the size of his person, and his courage. Having gone through his
period of service, he was introduced to the senate by Publius
Cornelius Sulla, when he requested of the fathers that five thousand
men might be placed at his disposal. He said, that "as he was
acquainted with the character of the enemy, and the nature of the
country, he should speedily perform some service; and that he would
employ those arts by which our generals and armies had been hitherto
ensnared against the inventor of them." This was not promised more
foolishly than it was believed; as if the qualifications of a soldier
and a general were the same. Instead of five, eight thousand men were
given him, half Romans, half allies. He himself also got together a
considerable number of volunteers, in the country, on his march; and
having almost doubled his force, arrived in Lucania, where Hannibal
had halted after having in vain pursued Claudius. No doubt could be
entertained of the issue of a contest which was to take place between
Hannibal, as general on one side, and a centurion on the other;
between armies, one of which had grown old in victory, the other
entirely inexperienced, and for the most part even tumultuary and
half-armed. As soon as the troops came within sight of each other,
and neither of them declined an engagement, the lines were formed. The
battle, notwithstanding the utter disparity of the contending parties,
lasted more than two hours, the Roman troops acting with the greatest
spirit as long as their general survived. But after that he had
fallen, for he continually exposed himself to the weapons of the
enemy, not only from regard to his former character, but through fear
of the disgrace which would attach to him if he survived a disaster
occasioned by his own temerity, the Roman line was immediately routed.
But so completely were they prevented from flying, every way being
beset by the cavalry, that scarcely a thousand men escaped out of so
large an army; the rest were destroyed on all hands, in one way or
other.
20. The siege of Capua was now resumed by the consuls with the utmost
energy. Every thing requisite for the business was conveyed thither
and got in readiness. A store of corn was collected at Casilinum; at
the mouth of the Vulturnus, where a town now stands, a strong post was
fortified; and a garrison was stationed in Puteoli, which Fabius had
formerly fortified, in order to have the command of the neighbouring
sea and the river. Into these two maritime forts, the corn recently
sent from Sicily, with that which Marcus Junius, the praetor, had
bought up in Etruria, was conveyed from Ostia, to supply the army
during the winter. But, in addition to the disaster sustained in
Lucania, the army also of volunteer slaves, who had served during the
life of Gracchus with the greatest fidelity, as if discharged from
service by the death of their general, left their standards. Hannibal
was not willing that Capua should be neglected, or his allies
deserted, at so critical a juncture; but, having obtained such success
from the temerity of one Roman general, his attention was fixed on the
opportunity which presented itself of crushing the other general and
his army. Ambassadors from Apulia reported that Cneius Fulvius, the
praetor, had at first conducted his measures with caution, while
engaged in besieging certain towns of Apulia, which had revolted to
Hannibal; but that afterwards, in consequence of extraordinary
success, both himself and his soldiers, being glutted with booty, had
so given themselves up to licentiousness and indolence, that all
military discipline was disregarded. Having frequently on other
occasions, as well as but a few days ago, experienced what an army was
good for, when conducted by an unskilful commander, he moved his camp
into Apulia.
21. The Roman legions, and the praetor, Fulvius, were in the
neighbourhood of Herdonia, where, receiving intelligence of the
approach of the enemy, they had nearly torn up the standards and gone
out to battle without the praetor's orders; nor did any thing tend
more to prevent it than the assured hope they entertained that they
could do so whenever they pleased, consulting only their own will. The
following night, Hannibal having obtained information that the camp
was in a state of tumult, and that most of the troops were in a
disorderly manner urging the general to give the signal, and calling
out to arms, and therefore feeling convinced that an opportunity
presented itself for a successful battle, distributed three thousand
light troops in the houses in the neighbourhood, and among the thorns
and woods. These, on a signal being given, were to rise up from their
lurking-place with one accord; and Mago, with about two thousand
horse, was ordered to occupy all the roads in the direction in which
he supposed their flight would be directed. Having made these
preparations during the night, he led his troops into the field at
break of day. Nor did Fulvius decline the challenge; not so much from
any hope of success entertained by himself, as drawn by the blind
impetuosity of his soldiers. Accordingly, the line itself was formed
with the same want of caution with which they entered the field,
agreeably to the whim of the soldiers, who came up as chance directed,
and took their stations just where they pleased; which they afterwards
abandoned, as fear or caprice suggested. The first legion and the left
wing of the allied troops were drawn up in front. The line was
extended to a great length, the tribunes remonstrating, that there was
no strength in it, and that wherever the enemy made the charge they
would break through it: but no salutary advice reached their minds,
nor even their ears. Hannibal was now come up, a general of a totally
different character, with an army neither similar in its nature, nor
similarly marshalled. The consequence was, that the Romans did not so
much as sustain their shout and first attack. Their general, equal to
Centenius in folly and temerity, but by no means to be compared with
him in courage, when he saw things going against him, and his troops
in confusion, hastily mounting his horse, fled from the field with
about two hundred horsemen. The rest of the troops, beaten in front,
and surrounded on the flank and rear, were slaughtered to such a
degree, that out of eighteen thousand men, not more than two thousand
escaped. The enemy got possession of the camp.
22. When these disastrous defeats, happening one upon another, were
reported at Rome, great grief and consternation seized the city. But
still, as the consuls had been hitherto successful when it was most
important, they were the less affected by these disasters. Caius
Lastorius and Marcus Metilius were sent as ambassadors to the consuls,
with directions carefully to collect the remains of the two armies,
and use every endeavour to prevent their surrendering themselves to
the enemy, through fear or despair, (which was the case after the
battle of Cannae,) and to search for the deserters from the army of
volunteer slaves. Publius Cornelius was charged with the same
business; to him also the levy was intrusted. He caused an order to be
issued throughout the market and smaller towns, that search should be
made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to
their standards. All these things were executed with the most vigilant
care. The consul, Appius Claudius, having placed Decius Junius in
command at the mouth of the Vulturnus, and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at
Puteoli, with directions to send off the corn immediately to the camp,
as each of the ships from Etruria and Sardinia arrived with it,
returned himself to Capua, and found his colleague Quintus Fulvius at
Casilinum, conveying every requisite thence, and making every
preparation for the siege of Capua. Both of them then joined in
besieging the city, summoning Claudius Nero, the praetor, from the
Claudian camp at Suessula; who, leaving a small garrison there,
marched down to Capua with all the rest of his forces. Thus there were
three generals' tents erected round Capua; and three armies, applying
themselves to the work in different parts, proceeded to surround the
city with a ditch and rampart, erecting forts at moderate intervals.
The Campanians attempting to obstruct the work, a battle was fought in
several places at once; the consequence of which was, that at length
the Campanians confined themselves within their gates and walls.
Before, however, these works were carried quite round, ambassadors
were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua was abandoned, and almost
given up to the Romans, and to implore him, that he would now, at
least, bring them assistance, when they were not only besieged, but
surrounded by a rampart. A letter was sent to the consuls from Publius
Cornelius, the praetor, directing that before they completely enclosed
Capua with their works, they should grant permission to such of the
Campanians as chose to quit Capua, and take their property with them.
That those should retain their liberty, and all their possessions, who
quitted it before the ides of March, but that those who quitted it
after that day, as well as those who continued there, would be
considered as enemies. Proclamation was made to the Campanians to this
effect, but it was received with such scorn, that they spontaneously
used insulting language and menaces. Hannibal had marched his legions
from Herdonea to Tarentum, with the hope of getting possession of the
citadel of that place, by force or stratagem. But not succeeding
there, he turned his course to Brundusium, thinking that town would be
betrayed to him, but, while fruitlessly spending time there also, the
Campanian ambassadors came to him with complaints and entreaties.
Hannibal answered them in a proud manner, that he had before raised
the siege of Capua, and that now the consuls would not sustain his
approach. The ambassadors, dismissed with these hopes, with difficulty
effected their return to Capua, which was by this time surrounded by a
double trench and rampart.
23. At the time when the circumvallation of Capua was carrying on with
the greatest activity, the siege of Syracuse, which had been forwarded
by intestine treachery, in addition to the efforts and bravery of the
general and his army, was brought to a conclusion. For in the
beginning of spring, Marcellus being in doubt whether he should direct
the operations of the war against Himilco and Hippocrates at
Agrigentum, or press the siege of Syracuse, though he saw that it was
impossible to take the city by force, which, from its situation, both
with respect to sea and land, was impregnable, nor by famine, as it
was supported by an uninterrupted supply of provisions from Carthage,
yet that he might leave no course untried, directed the Syracusan
deserters (and there were in the Roman camp some men in this situation
of the highest rank, who had been driven out of the city during the
defection from the Romans, because they were averse to a change of
measures) to sound the feelings of those who were of the same party in
conferences, and to promise them, that if Syracuse was delivered up,
they should have their liberty, and be governed by their own laws.
There was no opportunity however, of having a conference; for as many
were suspected of disaffection, the attention and observation of all
were exerted, lest any thing of the kind should occur unknown to them.
One of the exiles, who was a servant, having been allowed to enter the
city in the character of a deserter, assembled a few persons, and
opened a conversation upon the subject. After this, certain persons,
covering themselves with nets in a fishing smack, were in this way
conveyed round to the Roman camp, and conferred with the fugitives.
The same was frequently repeated by different parties, one after
another; and at last they amounted to eighty. But after every thing
had been concerted for betraying the city, the plot was reported to
Epicydes, by one Attalus, who felt hurt that he had not been intrusted
with the secret; and they were all put to death with torture. This
attempt having miscarried, another hope was immediately raised. One
Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to king
Philip, had been taken prisoner by the Roman fleet. Epicydes was
particularly anxious to ransom this man above any other; nor was
Marcellus disinclined to grant it; the Romans, even at this time,
being desirous of gaining the friendship of the Aetolians, with whom
the Lacedaemonians were in alliance. Some persons having been sent to
treat respecting his ransom, the most central and convenient place to
both parties for this purpose appeared to be at the Trogilian port,
near the tower called Galeagra. As they went there several times, one
of the Romans, having a near view of the wall, and having determined
its height, as nearly as it could be done by conjecture, from counting
the stones, and by forming an estimate, in his own mind, what was the
height of each stone in the face of the work; and having come to the
conclusion that it was considerably lower than he himself and all the
rest had supposed it, and that it was capable of being scaled with
ladders of moderate size, laid the matter before Marcellus. It
appeared a thing not to be neglected; but as the spot could not be
approached, being on this very account guarded with extraordinary
care, a favourable opportunity of doing it was sought for. This a
deserter suggested, who brought intelligence that the Syracusans were
celebrating the festival of Diana; that it was to last three days, and
that as there was a deficiency of other things during the siege, the
feasts would be more profusely celebrated with wine, which was
furnished by Epicydes to the people in general, and distributed
through the tribes by persons of distinction. When Marcellus had
received this intelligence, he communicated it to a few of the
military tribunes; then having selected, through their means, such
centurions and soldiers as had courage and energy enough for so
important an enterprise, and having privately gotten together a number
of scaling-ladders, he directed that a signal should be given to the
rest of the troops to take their refreshment, and go to rest early,
for they were to go upon an expedition that night. Then the time, as
it was supposed, having arrived, when, after having feasted from the
middle of the day, they would have had their fill of wine, and have
begun to sleep, he ordered the soldiers of one company to proceed with
the ladders, while about a thousand armed men were in silence marched
to the spot in a slender column. The foremost having mounted the wall,
without noise or confusion, the others followed in order; the boldness
of the former inspiring even the irresolute with courage.
24. The thousand armed men had now taken a part of the city, when the
rest, applying a greater number of ladders, mounted the wall on a
signal given from the Hexapylos. To this place the former party had
arrived in entire solitude; as the greater part of them, having
feasted in the towers, were either asleep from the effects of wine, or
else, half asleep, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they
surprised in their beds, and put to the sword. They began then to
break open a postern gate near the Hexapylos, which required great
force; and a signal was given from the wall by sounding a trumpet, as
had been agreed upon. After this, the attack was carried on in every
quarter, not secretly, but by open force; for they had now reached
Epipolae, a place protected by numerous guards, where the business was
to terrify the enemy, and not to escape their notice. In effect they
were terrified; for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard,
and the shouts of the men who had got possession of the walls and a
part of the city, the guards concluded that every part was taken, and
some of them fled along the wall, others leaped down from it, or were
thrown down headlong by a crowd of the terrified townsmen. A great
part of the inhabitants, however, were ignorant of this disastrous
event, all of them being overpowered with wine and sleep; and because,
in a city of so wide extent, what was perceived in one quarter was not
readily made known through the whole city. A little before day,
Marcellus having entered the city with all his forces, through the
Hexapylos, which was forced open roused all the townsmen; who ran to
arms, in order, if possible, by their efforts, to afford succour to
the city, which was now almost taken. Epicydes advanced with a body of
troops at a rapid pace from the Insula, which the Syracusans
themselves call Nasos, not doubting but that he should be able to
drive out what he supposed a small party, which had got over the wall
through the negligence of the guards. He earnestly represented to the
terrified inhabitants who met him, that they were increasing the
confusion, and that in their accounts they made things greater and
more important than they really were. But when he perceived that every
place around Epipolae was filled with armed men, after just teasing
the enemy with the discharge of a few missiles, he marched back to the
Achradina, not so much through fear of the number and strength of the
enemy, as that some intestine treachery might show itself, taking
advantage of the opportunity, and he might find the gates of the
Achradina and island closed upon him in the confusion. When Marcellus,
having entered the walls, beheld this city as it lay subjected to his
view from the high ground on which he stood, a city the most
beautiful, perhaps, of any at that time, he is said to have shed tears
over it; partly from the inward satisfaction he felt at having
accomplished so important an enterprise, and partly in consideration
of its ancient renown. The fleets of the Athenians sunk there, and two
vast armies destroyed, with two generals of the highest reputation, as
well as the many wars waged with the Carthaginians with so much peril
arose before his mind; the many and powerful tyrants and kings; but
above all Hiero, a king who was not only fresh in his memory, but who
was distinguished for the signal services he had rendered the Roman
people, and more than all by the endowments which his own virtues and
good fortune had conferred. All these considerations presenting
themselves at once to his recollection, and reflecting, that in an
instant every thing before him would be in flames, and reduced to
ashes; before he marched his troops to the Achradina, he sent before
him some Syracusans, who, as was before observed, were among the Roman
troops, to induce the enemy, by a persuasive address, to surrender the
city.
25. The gates and walls of the Achradina were occupied principally by
deserters, who had no hopes of pardon in case of capitulation. These
men would neither suffer those who were sent to approach the walls,
nor to address them. Marcellus, therefore, on the failure of this
attempt, gave orders to retire to the Euryalus, which is an eminence
at the extremity of the city, at the farthest point from the sea, and
commanding the road leading into the fields and the interior of the
island, and is conveniently situated for the introduction of supplies.
This fort was commanded by Philodemus, an Argive, who was placed in
this situation by Epicydes. Marcellus sent Sosis, one of the
regicides, to him. After a long conversation, being put off for the
purpose of frustrating him, he brought back word to Marcellus, that
Philodemus had taken time to deliberate. This man postponing his
answer day after day, till Hippocrates and Himilco should quit their
present position, and come up with their legions; not doubting but
that if he should receive them into the fort, the Roman army, shut up
as it was within the walls, might be annihilated, Marcellus, who saw
that the Euryalus would neither be delivered up to him, nor could be
taken by force, pitched his camp between Neapolis and Tycha, which are
names of divisions of the city, and are in themselves like cities;
fearful lest if he entered populous parts of the city, he should not
be able to restrain his soldiers, greedy of plunder, from running up
and down after it. When three ambassadors came to him from Tycha and
Neapolis with fillets and other badges of supplicants, imploring him
to abstain from fire and slaughter, Marcellus, having held a council
respecting these entreaties, for so they were, rather than demands,
ordered his soldiers, according to the unanimous opinion of the
council, not to offer violence to any free person, but told them that
every thing else might be their booty. The walls of the houses forming
a protection for his camp, he posted guards and parties of troops at
the gates, which were exposed, as they faced the streets, lest any
attack should be made upon his camp while the soldiers were dispersed
in pursuit of plunder. After these arrangements, on a signal given,
the soldiers dispersed for that purpose; and though they broke open
doors and every place resounded in consequence of the alarm and
confusion created, they nevertheless refrained from blood. They did
not desist from plunder till they had gutted the houses of all the
property which had been accumulated during a long period of
prosperity. Meanwhile, Philodemus also, who despaired of obtaining
assistance, having received a pledge that he might return to Epicydes
in safety, withdrew the garrison, and delivered up the fortress to the
Romans. While the attention of all was engaged by the tumult
occasioned in that part of the city which was captured, Bomilcar,
taking advantage of the night, when, from the violence of the weather
the Roman fleet was unable to ride at anchor in the deep, set out from
the bay of Syracuse, with thirty-five ships, and sailed away into the
main without interruption; leaving fifty-five ships for Epicydes and
the Syracusans; and having informed the Carthaginians in what a
critical situation Syracuse was placed, returned, after a few days,
with a hundred ships; having, as report says, received many presents
from Epicydes out of the treasure of Hiero.
26. Marcellus, by gaining possession of the Euryalus, and placing a
garrison in it, was freed from one cause of anxiety; which was, lest
any hostile force received into that fortress on his rear might annoy
his troops, shut up and confined as they were within the walls. He
next invested the Achradina, erecting three camps in convenient
situations, with the hope of reducing those enclosed within it to the
want of every necessary. The outposts of both sides had remained
inactive for several days, when the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco
suddenly caused the Romans to be attacked aggressively on all sides;
for Hippocrates, having fortified a camp at the great harbour, and
given a signal to those who occupied the Achradina, attacked the old
camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus had the command; and Epicydes
sallied out against the outposts of Marcellus, the Carthaginian fleet
coming up to that part of the shore which lay between the city and the
Roman camp, so that no succour could be sent by Marcellus to
Crispinus. The enemy, however, produced more tumult than conflict; for
Crispinus not only drove back Hippocrates from his works, but pursued
him as he fled with precipitation, while Marcellus drove Epicydes into
the city; and it was considered that enough was now done even to
prevent any danger arising in future from their sudden sallies. They
were visited too by a plague; a calamity extending to both sides, and
one which might well divert their attention from schemes of war. For
as the season of the year was autumn, and the situation naturally
unwholesome, though this was much more the case without than within
the city, the intolerable intensity of the heat had an effect upon the
constitution of almost every man in both the camps. At first they
sickened and died from the unhealthiness of the season and climate;
but afterwards the disease was spread merely by attending upon, and
coming in contact with, those affected; so that those who were seized
with it either perished neglected and deserted, or else drew with them
those who sat by them and attended them, by infecting them with the
same violence of disease. Daily funerals and death were before the
eye; and lamentations were heard from all sides, day and night. At
last, their feelings had become so completely brutalized by being
habituated to these miseries, that they not only did not follow their
dead with tears and decent lamentations, but they did not even carry
them out and bury them; so that the bodies of the dead lay strewed
about, exposed to the view of those who were awaiting a similar fate;
and thus the dead were the means of destroying the sick, and the sick
those who were in health, both by fear and by the filthy state and the
noisome stench of their bodies. Some preferring to die by the sword,
even rushed alone upon the outposts of the enemy. The violence of the
plague, however, was much greater in the Carthaginian than the Roman
army; for the latter, from having been a long time before Syracuse,
had become more habituated to the climate and the water. Of the army
of the enemy, the Sicilians, as soon as they perceived that diseases
had become very common from the unwholesomeness of the situation,
dispersed to their respective cities in the neighbourhood; but the
Carthaginians, who had no place to retire to, perished, together with
their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, to a man. Marcellus, on
seeing the violence with which the disease was raging, had removed his
troops into the city, where their debilitated frames were recruited in
houses and shade. Many however, of the Roman army were cut off by this
pestilence.