The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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27. The land forces of the Carthaginians being thus destroyed, the
Sicilians, who had served under Hippocrates retired to two towns of no
great size, but well secured by natural situation and fortifications;
one was three miles, the other fifteen, from Syracuse. Here they
collected a store of provisions from their own states, and sent for
reinforcements. Meanwhile, Bomilcar, who had gone a second time to
Carthage, by so stating the condition of their allies as to inspire a
hope that they might not only render them effectual aid, but also that
the Romans might in a manner be made prisoners in the city which they
had captured, induced the Carthaginians to send with him as many ships
of burden as possible, laden with every kind of provisions, and to
augment the number of his ships. Setting sail, therefore, from
Carthage with a hundred and thirty men of war and seven hundred
transports, he had tolerably fair winds for crossing over to Sicily,
but was prevented by the same wind from doubling Cape Pachynum. The
news of the approach of Bomilcar, and afterwards his unexpected delay,
excited alternate fear and joy in the Romans and Syracusans. Epicydes,
apprehensive lest if the same wind which now detained him should
continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian
fleet would return to Africa, put the Achradina in the hands of the
generals of the mercenary troops, and sailed to Bomilcar; whom he at
length prevailed upon to try the issue of a naval battle, though he
found him with his fleet stationed in the direction of Africa, and
afraid of fighting, not so much because he was unequal in the strength
or the number of his ships, for he had more than the Romans, as
because the wind was more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his
own. Marcellus also seeing that an army of Sicilians was assembling
from every part of the island, and that the Carthaginian fleet was
approaching with a great want of supplies, though inferior in the
number of his ships, resolved to prevent Bomilcar from coming to
Syracuse, lest, blocked up in the city of his enemies, he should be
pressed both by sea and land. The two hostile fleets were stationed
near the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as the sea
should become calm enough to admit of their sailing out into the deep.
Accordingly, the east wind, which had blown violently for several
days, now subsiding, Bomilcar got under sail first, his van seeming to
make for the main sea, in order to double the promontory with greater
ease; but seeing the Roman ships bearing down upon him, terrified by
some unexpected occurrence, it is not known what, he sailed away into
the main sea; and sending messengers to Heraclea, to order the
transports to return to Africa, he passed along the coast of Sicily
and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, thus suddenly disappointed in such
great expectations, to avoid returning to endeavour to raise the siege
of a city, a great part of which was already in the hands of the
enemy, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to wait the issue of the
contest, rather than take any new measures when there.
28. Intelligence of these events having been carried into the camp of
the Sicilians, that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the
island was deserted by the Carthaginians, and almost again delivered
up to the Romans; after sounding the inclinations of the besieged in
conferences, they sent ambassadors to Marcellus, to treat about terms
of capitulation. They had not much difficulty in coming to an
agreement, that all the parts of the island which had been under the
dominion of their kings should be ceded to the Romans; that the rest,
with their liberty and their own laws, should be preserved to the
Sicilians. They then invited to a conference the persons who had been
intrusted with the management of affairs by Epicydes; to whom they
said, that they were sent from the army of the Sicilians, at once to
Marcellus and to them, that both those who were besieged and those who
were not might share the same fortune; and that neither of them might
stipulate any thing for themselves separately. They were then allowed
to enter, in order to converse with their relations and friends; when,
laying before them the terms which they had made with Marcellus, and
holding out to them a hope of safety, they induced them to join with
them in an attack upon the prefects of Epicydes, Polyclitus,
Philistion, and Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. Having put them to death,
they summoned the multitude to an assembly; and after complaining of
the famine, at which they had been accustomed to express their
dissatisfaction to each other in secret, they said, that "although
they were pressed by so many calamities, they had no right to accuse
Fortune, because it was at their own option how long they should
continue to suffer them. That the motive which the Romans had in
besieging Syracuse was affection for the Syracusans, and not hatred;
for when they heard that the government was usurped by Hippocrates and
Epicydes, the creatures first of Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they
took arms and began to besiege the city, in order to reduce not the
city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates is slain,
Epicydes shut out of Syracuse, his praefects put to death, and the
Carthaginians driven from the entire possession of Sicily by sea and
land, what reason can the Romans have left why they should not desire
the preservation of Syracuse, in the same manner as they would if
Hiero were still lining, who cultivated the friendship of Rome with
unequalled fidelity? That, therefore, neither the city nor its
inhabitants were in any danger, except from themselves, if they
neglected an opportunity of restoring themselves to the favour of the
Romans; and that no so favourable a one would ever occur as that which
presented itself at the present instant, immediately upon its
appearing that they were delivered from their insolent tyrants."
29. This speech was received with the most unqualified approbation of
all present. It was resolved, however, that praetors should be elected
before the nomination of deputies; which being done, some of the
praetors themselves were sent as deputies to Marcellus, the chief of
whom thus addressed him: "Neither in the first instance did we
Syracusans revolt from you, but Hieronymus, whose impiety towards you
was by no means so great as towards us; nor afterwards was it any
Syracusan who disturbed the peace established by the death of the
tyrant, but Hippocrates and Epicydes, creatures of the tyrant; while
we were overpowered, on the one hand by fear, and on the other by
treachery. Nor can any one say that there ever was a time when we were
in possession of our liberty, when we were not also at peace with you.
In the present instance, manifestly, as soon as ever we became our own
masters, by the death of those persons who held Syracuse in
subjection, we lost no time in coming to deliver up our arms, to
surrender ourselves, our city, and our walls, and to refuse no
conditions which you shall impose upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods
have given the glory of having captured the most renowned and
beautiful of the Grecian cities. Every memorable exploit which we have
at any time achieved by land or sea accrues to the splendour of your
triumph. Would you wish that it should be known only by fame, how
great a city has been captured by you, rather than that she should
stand as a monument even to posterity; so that to every one who visits
her by sea or land, she may point out at one time our trophies gained
from the Athenians and Carthaginians, at another time those which you
have gained from us; and that you should transmit Syracuse unimpaired
to your family, to be kept under the protection and patronage of the
race of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have greater
weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was your friend for a
much longer period than the former was your enemy. From the latter you
have realized even benefits, while the frenzy of Hieronymus only
brought ruin upon himself." At the hands of the Romans all things were
obtainable and secure. There was a greater disposition to war, and
more danger to be apprehended among themselves; for the deserters,
thinking that they were delivered up to the Romans, induced the
mercenary auxiliaries to entertain the same apprehension; and hastily
seizing their arms, they first put the praetors to death, and then ran
through the city to massacre the Syracusans. In their rage they slew
all whom chance threw in their way, and plundered every thing which
presented itself; and then, lest they should have no leaders, they
elected six praetors, so that three might have the command in the
Achradina, and three in the island. At length, the tumult having
subsided, and the mercenary troops having ascertained, by inquiry,
what had been negotiated with the Romans, it began to appear, as was
really the case, that their cause and that of the deserters were
different.
30. The ambassadors returned from Marcellus very opportunely. They
informed them that they had been influenced by groundless suspicions,
and that the Romans saw no reason why they should inflict punishment
upon them. Of the three praefects of the Achradina one was a Spaniard,
named Mericus. To him one of the Spanish auxiliaries was designedly
sent, among those who accompanied the ambassadors. Having obtained an
interview with Mericus in the absence of witnesses, he first explained
to him the state in which he had left Spain, from which he had lately
returned: "That there every thing was in subjection to the Roman arms;
that it was in his power, by doing the Romans a service, to become the
first man among his countrymen, whether he might be inclined to serve
with the Romans, or to return to his country. On the other hand, if he
persisted in preferring to hold out against the siege, what hope could
he have, shut up as he was by sea and land?" Mericus was moved by
these suggestions, and when it was resolved upon to send ambassadors
to Marcellus, he sent his brother among them; who, being brought into
the presence of Marcellus, apart from the rest, by means of the same
Spaniard, after receiving an assurance of protection, arranged the
method of carrying their object into effect, and then returned to the
Achradina. Mericus then, in order to prevent any one from conceiving a
suspicion of treachery, declared, that he did not like that deputies
should be passing to and fro; he thought that they should neither
admit nor send any; and in order that the guards might be kept more
strictly, that such parts as were most exposed should be distributed
among the prefects, each being made responsible for the safety of his
own quarter. All approved of the distribution of the posts. The
district which fell to the lot of Mericus himself extended from the
fountain Arethusa to the mouth of the large harbour, of which he
caused the Romans to be informed. Accordingly, Marcellus ordered a
transport with armed men to be towed by a quadrireme to the Achradina
during the night, and the soldiers to be landed in the vicinity of
that gate which is near the fountain of Arethusa. This order having
been executed at the fourth watch, and Mericus having received the
soldiers when landed at the gate, according to the agreement,
Marcellus assaulted the walls of the Achradina with all his forces at
break of day, so that he not only engaged the attention of those who
occupied the Achradina, but also bands of armed men, quitting their
own posts ran to the spot from the island, in order to repel the
furious attack of the Romans. During this confusion, some light ships
which had been prepared beforehand, and had sailed round, landed a
body of armed men at the island; these suddenly attacking the
half-manned stations and the opened door of the gate at which the
troops had a little before run out, got possession of the island
without much opposition, abandoned as it was, in consequence of the
flight and trepidation of its guards. Nor were there any who rendered
less service, or showed less firmness in maintaining their posts, than
the deserters; for as they did not repose much confidence even in
those of their own party, they fled in the middle of the contest. When
Marcellus learnt that the island was taken, one quarter of the
Achradina in the hands of his troops, and that Mericus, with the men
under his command, had joined them, he sounded a retreat, lest the
royal treasure, the fame of which was greater than the reality, should
be plundered.
31. The impetuosity of the soldiers having been checked, time and
opportunity to escape were given to the deserters in the Achradina;
and the Syracusans, at length delivered from their fears, threw open
the gates of the Achradina, and sent deputies to Marcellus, requesting
only safety for themselves and children. Having summoned a council, to
which the Syracusans were invited who were among the Roman troops,
having been driven from home during the disturbances, Marcellus
replied, "that the services rendered by Hiero through a period of
fifty years, were not more in number than the injuries committed
against the Roman people in these few years by those who had had
possession of Syracuse; but that most of these injuries had justly
recoiled upon their authors, and that they had inflicted much more
severe punishment upon themselves for the violation of treaties, than
the Roman people desired. That he was indeed now besieging Syracuse
for the third year, but not that the Romans might hold that state in a
condition of slavery, but that the ringleaders of the deserters might
not keep it in a state of thraldom and oppression. What the Syracusans
could do was exemplified, either by the conduct of those Syracusans
who were among the Roman troops, or that of the Spanish general,
Mericus, who had delivered up the post which he was appointed to
command, or, lastly, by the late but bold measure adopted by the
Syracusans themselves. That the greatest possible recompence for all
the evils and dangers which he had for so long a time undergone, both
by sea and land, around the walls of Syracuse, was the reflection,
that he had been able to take that city." The quaestor was then sent
with a guard to the island, to receive and protect the royal treasure.
The city was given up to be plundered by the soldiery, after guards
had been placed at each of the houses of those who had been with the
Roman troops. While many acts exhibited horrid examples of rage and
rapacity, it is recorded that Archimedes, while intent on some figures
which he had described in the dust, although the confusion was as
great as could possibly exist in a captured city, in which soldiers
were running up and down in search of plunder, was put to death by a
soldier, who did not know who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at
this event, and that pains were taken about his funeral, while his
relations also for whom diligent inquiry was made, derived honour and
protection from his name and memory. Such, for the most part, was the
manner in which Syracuse was captured. The quantity of booty was so
great, that had Carthage itself, which was carrying on a contest on
equal terms, been captured, it would scarcely have afforded so much. A
few days before the taking of Syracuse, Titus Otacilius passed over
from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and entering the
harbour before it was light, took some transports laden with corn;
then landing, he laid waste a considerable portion of the country
around Utica, and brought back to his ships booty of every
description. He returned to Lilybaeum, the third day after he set out,
with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The
corn he sent immediately to Syracuse; and had it not been for the very
seasonable arrival of this supply, a destructive famine threatened
alike the victors and the vanquished.
32. Nothing very memorable had been done in Spain for about two years,
the operations of the war consisting more in laying plans than in
fighting; but during the same summer in which the events above
recorded took place, the Roman generals, quitting their winter
quarters, united their forces; then a council was summoned; and the
opinions of all accorded, that since their only object hitherto had
been to prevent Hasdrubal from pursuing his march into Italy, it was
now time that an effort should be made to bring the war in Spain to a
termination; and they thought that the twenty thousand Celtiberians,
who had been induced to take arms that winter, formed a sufficient
accession to their strength. There were three armies of the enemy.
Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and Mago, who had united their forces, were
about a five days' journey from the Romans. Hasdrubal, son of
Hamilcar, who was the old commander in Spain, was nearer to them: he
was with his army near the city Anitorgis. The Roman generals were
desirous that he should be overpowered first; and they hoped that they
had enough and more than enough strength for the purpose. Their only
source of anxiety was, lest the other Hasdrubal and Mago, terrified at
his discomfiture, should protract the war by withdrawing into
trackless forests and mountains. Thinking it, therefore, the wisest
course to divide their forces and embrace the whole Spanish war, they
arranged it so that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the
Roman and allied troops against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cneius
Cornelius, with the remaining third of the original army, and with the
Celtiberians added to them, should carry on the war with the Barcine
Hasdrubal. The two generals and their armies, setting out together,
preceded by the Celtiberians, pitched their camp near the city
Anitorgis, within sight of the enemy, the river only separating them.
Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but
Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him.
33. Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the
camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian
auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian
nations in general, and particularly of all those nations among which
he had served for so many years; as there was every facility of
intercourse, for both camps were full of Spaniards, by secret
conferences with the chiefs of the Celtiberians, he agreed with them,
for a large consideration, to take their forces away. Nor did they
conceive it to be any great crime; for the object was not that they
should turn their arms against the Romans, while the reward which they
were to receive to abstain from the war was large enough to remunerate
them for their service in it. At the same time the mere rest from
labour, the return to their homes, with the pleasure of seeing their
friends and property, were pleasing to the generality. Accordingly,
the multitude were prevailed upon as easily as their leaders. They
had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Romans, in consequence of the
smallness of their numbers, should they endeavour to detain them by
force. It will indeed be the duty of all Roman generals to take care,
and the instances here recorded should be considered as strong
arguments, never to place so much confidence in foreign auxiliaries,
as not to retain in their camps a preponderance of their own strength
and of that force which is properly their own. The Celtiberians,
suddenly taking up their standards, marched away, replying only to the
Romans, who asked the cause of their departure and entreated them to
stay, that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio seeing that
his allies could be detained neither by prayers nor force, and that he
was neither a match for his enemy without them, nor could again effect
a junction with his brother, no other course which promised safety
offering itself, resolved to retire as far as possible, carefully
using every caution not to encounter the enemy any where on level
ground. On his departing, the enemy, crossing the river, pursued him
almost in his footsteps.
34. During the same period an equal terror and a greater danger
pressed upon Publius Scipio. Masinissa was a young man at that time an
ally of the Carthaginians, whom afterwards the friendship of the
Romans rendered illustrious and powerful. He not only opposed himself
with his Numidian cavalry to Scipio on his approach, but afterwards
harassed him incessantly day and night, so as both to cut off his
stragglers, who had gone out to a distance from the camp in search of
wood and forage, and riding up to the very gates of his camp, and
charging into the midst of his advanced guards, to fill every quarter
with the utmost confusion. By night also alarm was frequently
occasioned in the gates and rampart by his sudden attacks. Nor was
there any time or place at which the Romans were exempt from fear and
anxiety; and driven within their rampart, and deprived of every
necessary, they suffered in a manner a regular siege; and it appeared
that it would have been still straiter, if Indibilis, who it was
reported was approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani,
should form a junction with the Carthaginians. Scipio, though a wary
and provident general, overpowered by difficulties, adopted the rash
measure of going to meet Indibilis by night, with the intention of
fighting him wherever he should meet him. Leaving, therefore, a small
force in his camp, under the command of Titus Fonteius,
lieutenant-general, he set out at midnight, and meeting with the
enemy, came to battle with him. The troops fought in the order of
march rather than of battle. The Romans, however, had the advantage,
though in an irregular fight; but the Numidian cavalry, whose
observation the general supposed that he had escaped, suddenly
spreading themselves round his flanks, occasioned great terror. After
a new contest had been entered into with the Numidians, a third enemy
came up in addition to the rest, the Carthaginian generals having come
up with their rear when they were now engaged in fighting. Thus the
Romans were surrounded on every side by enemies; nor could they make
up their minds which they should attack first, or in what part,
forming themselves into a close body, they should force their way
through. The general, while fighting and encouraging his men, exposing
himself wherever the strife was the hottest, was run through the right
side with a lance; and when the party of the enemy, which, formed into
a wedge, had charged the troops collected round the general, perceived
Scipio falling lifeless from his horse, elated with joy, they ran
shouting through the whole line with the news that the Roman general
had fallen. These words spreading in every direction, caused the enemy
to be considered as victors, and the Romans as vanquished. On the loss
of the general the troops immediately began to fly from the field; but
though it was not difficult to force their way through the Numidians
and the other light-armed auxiliaries, yet it was scarcely possible
for them to escape so large a body of cavalry, and infantry equal to
horses in speed. Almost more were slain in the flight than in the
battle; nor would a man have survived, had not night put a stop to the
carnage, the day by this time rapidly drawing to a close.
35. After this, the Carthaginian generals, who were not slow in
following up their victory, immediately after the battle, scarcely
giving their soldiers necessary rest, hurry their army to Hasdrubal,
son of Hamilcar; confidently hoping, that after uniting their forces
with his, the war might be brought to a conclusion. On their arrival,
the warmest congratulations passed between the troops and their
generals, who were delighted with their recent victory; for they had
not only destroyed one distinguished general and all his men, but
looked forward to another victory of equal magnitude as a matter of
certainty. The intelligence of this great disaster had not yet reached
the Romans; but there prevailed a kind of melancholy silence and mute
foreboding, such as is usually found in minds which have a
presentiment of impending calamity. The general himself, besides
feeling that he was deserted by his allies, and that the forces of the
enemy were so much augmented, was disposed from conjecture and
reasoning rather to a suspicion that some defeat had been sustained,
than to any favourable hopes. "For how could Hasdrubal and Mago bring
up their troops without opposition, unless they had terminated their
part of the war? How was it that his brother had not opposed his
progress or followed on his rear? in order that if he could not
prevent the armies and generals of the enemy from forming a junction,
he might himself join his forces with his brother's." Disturbed with
these cares, he believed that the only safe policy for the present was
to retire as far as possible; and, accordingly, he marched a
considerable distance thence in one night, the enemy not being aware
of it, and on that account continuing quiet. At dawn, perceiving that
their enemy had decamped, they sent the Numidians in advance, and
began to pursue them as rapidly as possible. The Numidians overtook
them before night, and charged; sometimes their rear, at other times
their flanks. They then began to halt and defend themselves as well as
they could; but Scipio exhorted them at once to fight so as not to
expose themselves, and march at the same time, lest the infantry
should overtake them.