The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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36. But having made but little progress for a long time, in
consequence of his making his troops sometimes advance and at others
halt, and night now drawing on, Scipio recalled his troops from the
battle, and collecting them, withdrew to a certain eminence, not very
safe, indeed, particularly for dispirited troops, but higher than any
of the surrounding places. There, at first, his infantry, drawn up
around his baggage and cavalry, which were placed in their centre, had
no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the charging Numidians; but
afterwards, when three generals with three regular armies marched up
in one entire body, and it was evident that his men would not be able
to do much by arms in defending the position without fortifications,
the general began to look about, and consider whether he could by any
means throw a rampart around; but the hill was so bare, and the soil
so rough, that neither could a bush be found for cutting a palisade,
nor earth for making a mound, nor the requisites for making a trench
or any other work; nor was the place naturally steep or abrupt enough
to render the approach and ascent difficult to the enemy, as it rose
on every side with a gentle acclivity. However, that they might raise
up against them some semblance of a rampart, they placed around them
the panniers tied to the burdens, building them up as it were to the
usual height, and when there was a deficiency of panniers for raising
it, they presented against the enemy a heap of baggage of every kind.
The Carthaginian armies coming up, very easily marched up the
eminence, but were stopped by the novel appearance of the
fortification, as by something miraculous, when their leaders called
out from all sides, asking "what they stopped at? and why they did not
tear down and demolish that mockery, which was scarcely strong enough
to impede the progress of women and children; that the enemy, who were
skulking behind their baggage, were, in fact, captured and in their
hands." Such were the contemptuous reproofs of their leaders. But it
was not an easy task either to leap over or remove the burdens raised
up against them, or to cut through the panniers, closely packed
together and covered completely with baggage. When the removal of the
burdens had opened a way to the troops, who were detained by them for
a long time, and the same had been done in several quarters, the camp
was now captured on all sides; the Romans were cut to pieces on all
hands, the few by the many, the dispirited by the victorious. A great
number of the men, however, having fled for refuge into the
neighbouring woods, effected their escape to the camp of Publius
Scipio, which Titus Fonteius commanded. Some authors relate that
Cneius Scipio was slain on the eminence on the first assault of the
enemy; others that he escaped with a few attendants to a castle near
the camp; this, they say, was surrounded with fire, by which means the
doors which they could not force were consumed; that it was thus
taken, and all within, together with the general himself, put to
death. Cneius Scipio was slain in the eighth year after his arrival in
Spain, and on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. At
Rome the grief occasioned by their death was not more intense than
that which was felt throughout Spain. The sorrow of the citizens,
however, was partly distracted by the loss of the armies, the
alienation of the province, and the public disaster, while in Spain
they mourned and regretted the generals themselves, Cneius, however,
the more, because he had been longer in command of them, had first
engaged their affections, and first exhibited a specimen of Roman
justice and forbearance.
37. When it seemed that the Roman armies were annihilated, and Spain
lost, one man recovered this desperate state of affairs. There was in
the army one Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an
enterprising youth, and possessing a mind and genius far superior to
the condition in which he had been born. To his high talents had been
added the discipline of Cneius Scipio, under which he had been
thoroughly instructed during a course of so many years in all the
qualifications of a soldier. This man, having collected the troops
which had been dispersed in the flight, and drafted some from the
garrisons, had formed an army not to be despised, and united it with
Titus Tonteius, the lieutenant-general of Publius Scipio. But so
transcendent was the Roman knight in authority and honour among the
troops, that when, after fortifying a camp on this side of the Iberus,
it had been resolved that a general of the two armies should be
elected in an assembly of the soldiers, relieving each other in the
guard of the rampart, and in keeping the outposts until every one had
given his vote, they unanimously conferred the supreme command upon
Lucius Marcius. All the intervening time, which was but short, was
occupied in fortifying their camp and collecting provisions, and the
soldiers executed every order not only with vigour, but with feelings
by no means depressed. But when intelligence was brought them that
Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, who was coming to put the finishing stroke to
the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when they
saw the signal for battle displayed by a new commander, then calling
to mind whom they had had for their leaders a little while ago,
relying on what leaders and what forces they used to go out to fight,
they all suddenly burst into tears and beat their heads, some raising
their hands to heaven and arraigning the gods, others prostrating
themselves upon the ground and invoking by name each his own former
commander. Nor could their lamentations be restrained, though the
centurions endeavoured to animate their companies, and though Marcius
himself soothed and remonstrated with them, asking them "why they had
given themselves up to womanish and unavailing lamentations rather
than summon up all their courage to protect themselves and the
commonwealth together, and not suffer their generals to lie
unavenged?" But suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard;
for by this time the enemy were near the rampart. Upon this, their
grief being suddenly converted into rage, they hastily ran to arms,
and, as it were, burning with fury, rushed to the gates and charged
the enemy, while advancing in a careless and disorderly manner. This
unexpected event instantly struck terror into the Carthaginians, who
wondering whence so many enemies could have sprung up so suddenly, as
the army had been almost annihilated; what could have inspired men who
had been vanquished and routed with such boldness and confidence in
themselves; what general could have arisen now that the two Scipios
were slain; who could command the camp, and who had given the signal
for battle; in consequence of these so many and so unexpected
circumstances, at first, being in a state of complete uncertainty and
amazement, they gave ground; but afterwards, discomfited by the
violence of the charge, they turned their backs; and either there
would have been a dreadful slaughter of the flying enemy, or a rash
and dangerous effort on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius
promptly given the signal for retreat, and by throwing himself in the
way of the front rank, and even holding some back with his own hands,
repressed the infuriated troops. He then led them back to the camp,
still eager for blood and slaughter. When the Carthaginians, who were
at first compelled to fly with precipitation from the rampart of their
enemy, saw that no one pursued them, concluding that they had stopped
from fear, now on the other hand went away to their camp at an easy
pace, with feelings of contempt for the enemy. There was a
corresponding want of care in guarding their camp; for though the
enemy were near, yet it seemed that they were but the remains of the
two armies which had been cut to pieces a few days before. As in
consequence of this all things were neglected in the enemy's camp,
Marcius having ascertained this, addressed his mind to a measure which
on the first view of it might appear rather rash than bold: it was,
aggressively to assault the enemy's camp, concluding that the camp of
Hasdrubal, while alone, might be carried with less difficulty than his
own could be defended, if the three armies and as many generals should
again unite; taking into consideration also that either if he
succeeded he would retrieve their prostrate fortune, or if repulsed,
still, by making the attack himself, he would rescue himself from
contempt.
38. Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of
night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to
his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be
addressed and exhorted; and having called an assembly, he discoursed
as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders,
both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every
one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me,
conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and
anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master
of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did
not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon
myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of
the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not
even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what
manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains
of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which
incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present,
and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams
by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to
suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had
been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth
to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and
their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to
their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I
would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest
reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could
wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them
by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live
and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the
memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as
though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor
certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself
yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that
memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name
had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and
valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster
at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of
fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a
mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general:
for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were
pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break
your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous
opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed,
seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard,
unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of
gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state
of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what
means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended
your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would
give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were
afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves
ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure
against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave
unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared
about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the
present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and
assaulted, should aggressively assault their camp ourselves. Let us
dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the
courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its
appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead
you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that
they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our
shout at their gates, when heard, and the first assault, will carry
their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with
sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying
defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be
recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring
one; but in difficult and almost desperate circumstances the boldest
counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has
arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you
delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it
has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We
have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made
trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and
cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday's
irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces
should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and
three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not
withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so
the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no
other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing
but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour
of the gods, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous,
you may burst into the enemy's camp with the same spirit with which
you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their
new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the
more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting
their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater
part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were
in motion.
39. At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other
forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with
trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort
and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The
communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of
the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy;
and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the
rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their
own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and
a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep;
others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw;
others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who
were assailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a
manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other,
nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the
midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as
the passes were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each
escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut
off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment,
and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that
carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the
other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them
with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from
the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage,
wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected
and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the
men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground,
or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these
men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the
recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no
effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates.
Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of
the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which
would have continued for a long time, had not the bloody appearance of
the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the
other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm
produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken
with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a
passage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps
of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius.
Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into
Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain,
one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great
booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and
thirty-eight pounds' weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine
Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was
captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other
battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten
thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso
writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago
incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the
general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real
glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing
his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving
it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a
shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it,
remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a
monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs
continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as
both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats,
hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.
40. During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture
of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much
honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to
the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the
city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse
abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired
according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the
admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with
which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled;
which at last recoiled upon the Roman gods, and first upon that very
temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were
in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the
Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this
description, of which a very small portion can be found. Embassies
from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were
different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had
either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture
of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who
had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse,
as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however,
had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed
by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one
sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by
nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an
energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under
the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were
assigned by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran
the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity,
in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of
bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time
he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed
in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest.
Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been
hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at
the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him,
had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the
river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately
advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the
enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and
what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or
deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his
enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an
engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his
enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of
the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about
three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to
appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned
the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the
generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who
was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he,
"that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a
Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?"
Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to
their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they
should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully,
Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.
41. But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal
from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should
succumb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his
soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While
marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy's
line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same
causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their
number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their
commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by
generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part
in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this
instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the
intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the
enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans principally
feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only
because they were deprived of the principal part of their strength,
but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be
attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great
resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business.
The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when
they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their
flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were
all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off
to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many
thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants.
This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which
he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing;
the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor,
should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that
while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance
was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come
to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the
consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the
election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius
were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son
of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this
Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius,
and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city
jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia.
The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.