The History of Rome; Books Nine to Twenty Six - Titus Livius
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BOOK XXVI.
_Hannibal encamps on the banks of the Amo, within three miles of
Rome. Attended by two thousand horsemen, he advances close to the
Colline gate to take a view of the walls and situation of the city. On
two successive days the hostile armies are hindered from engaging by
the severity of the weather. Capua taken by Quintus Fulvius and Appius
Claudius, the chief nobles die, voluntarily, by poison. Quintus
Fulvius having condemned the principal senators to death, at the
moment they are actually tied to the stakes, receives despatches from
Rome, commanding him to spare their lives, which he postpones reading
until the sentence is executed. Publius Scipio, offering himself for
the service, is sent to command in Spain, takes New Carthage in one
day. Successes in Sicily. Treaty of friendship with the Aetolians. War
with Philip, king of Macedonia, and the Acarnanians._
* * * * *
1. The consuls, Cneius Fulvius Centumalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba,
having entered on their office on the ides of March, assembled the
senate in the Capitol, and took the opinion of the fathers on the
state of the republic, the manner of conducting the war, and on what
related to the provinces and the armies. Quintus Fulvius and Appius
Claudius, the consuls of the former year, were continued in command;
and the armies which they before had were assigned to them, it being
added that they should not withdraw from Capua, which they were
besieging, till they had taken it. The Romans were now solicitously
intent upon this object, not from resentment so much, which was never
juster against any city, as from the consideration that as this city,
so celebrated and powerful, had by its defection drawn away several
states, so when reduced it would bring back their minds to respect for
the former supreme government. Two praetors also of the former year,
Marcus Junius and Publius Sempronius, were each continued in command
of the two legions which they had under them, the former in Etruria,
the latter in Gaul. Marcus Marcellus also was continued in command,
that he might, as proconsul, finish the war in Sicily with the army he
had there. If he wanted recruits he was to take them from the legions
which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided
he did not choose any soldier who was of the number of those whom the
senate had refused to allow to be discharged, or to return home till
the war was put an end to. To Caius Sulpicius, to whose lot Sicily had
fallen, the two legions which Publius Cornelius had commanded were
assigned, to be recruited from the army of Cneius Fulvius, which had
been shamefully beaten, and had experienced a dreadful loss the year
before in Apulia. To soldiers of this description the senate had
assigned the same period of service as to those who fought at Cannae;
and as an additional mark of ignominy upon both, they were not allowed
to winter in towns, or to build huts for wintering within the distance
of ten miles from any town. To Lucius Cornelius, in Sardinia, the two
legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded were assigned; if recruits
were wanted, the consuls were ordered to enlist them. To Titus
Otacilius and Marcus Valerius was allotted the protection of the
coasts of Sicily and Greece, with the legions and fleets which they
had commanded. The Greek coast had fifty ships with one legion; the
Sicilian, a hundred ships with two legions. Twenty-three legions were
employed by the Romans in carrying on the war this year by land and
sea.
2. In the beginning of the year, on a letter from Lucius Marcius being
laid before the senate, they considered his achievements as most
glorious; but the title of honour which he assumed (for though he was
neither invested with the command by the order of the people, nor by
the direction of the fathers, his letter ran in this form, "The
propraetor to the senate") gave offence to a great many. It was
considered as an injurious precedent for generals to be chosen by the
armies, and for the solemn ceremony of elections, held under auspices,
to be transferred to camps and provinces, and (far from the control of
the laws and magistrates) to military thoughtlessness. And though some
gave it as their opinion, that the sense of the senate should be taken
on the matter, yet it was thought more advisable that the discussion
should be postponed till after the departure of the horsemen who
brought the letter from Marcius. It was resolved, that an answer
should be returned respecting the corn and clothing of the army,
stating, that the senate would direct its attention to both those
matters; but that the letter should not be addressed to Lucius
Marcius, propraetor, lest he should consider that as already
determined which was the very point they reserved for discussion.
After the horsemen were dismissed, it was the first thing the consuls
brought before the senate; and the opinions of all to a man coincided,
that the plebeian tribunes should be instructed to consult the commons
with all possible speed, as to whom they might resolve to send into
Spain to take the command of that army which had been under the
conduct of Cneius Scipio. The plebeian tribunes were instructed
accordingly, and the question was published. But another contest had
pre-engaged the minds of the people: Caius Sempronius Blaesus, having
brought Cneius Fulvius to trial for the loss of the army in Apulia,
harassed him with invectives in the public assemblies: "Many
generals," he reiterated, "had by indiscretion and ignorance brought
their armies into most perilous situations, but none, save Cneius
Fulvius, had corrupted his legions by every species of excess before
he betrayed them to the enemy; it might therefore with truth be said,
that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were
defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own general. No man, when he
gave his vote, took sufficient pains in ascertaining who it was to
whom he was intrusting an army. What a difference was there between
this man and Tiberius Sempronius! The latter having been intrusted
with an army of slaves, had in a short time brought it to pass, by
discipline and authority, that not one of them in the field of battle
remembered his condition and birth, but they became a protection to
our allies and a terror to our enemies. They had snatched, as it were,
from the very jaws of Hannibal, and restored to the Roman people,
Cumae, Beneventum, and other towns. But Cneius Fulvius had infected
with the vices peculiar to slaves, an army of Roman citizens, of
honourable parentage and liberal education; and had thus made them
insolent and turbulent among their allies, inefficient and dastardly
among their enemies, unable to sustain, not only the charge, but the
shout of the Carthaginians. But, by Hercules, it was no wonder that
the troops did not stand their ground in the battle, when their
general was the first to fly; with him, the greater wonder was that
any had fallen at their posts, and that they were not all the
companions of Cneius Fulvius in his consternation and his flight.
Caius Flaminius, Lucius Paullus, Lucius Posthumius, Cneius and Publius
Scipio, had preferred falling in the battle to abandoning their armies
when in the power of the enemy. But Cneius Fulvius was almost the only
man who returned to Rome to report the annihilation of his army. It
was a shameful crime that the army of Cannae should be transported
into Sicily, because they fled from the field of battle, and not be
allowed to return till the enemy has quitted Italy; that the same
decree should have been lately passed with respect to the legions of
Cneius Fulvius; while Cneius Fulvius himself has no punishment
inflicted upon him for running away, in a battle brought about by his
own indiscretion; that he himself should be permitted to pass his old
age in stews and brothels, where he passed his youth, while his
troops, whose only crime was that they resembled their general, should
be sent away in a manner into banishment, and suffer an ignominious
service. So unequally," he said, "was liberty shared at Rome by the
rich and the poor, by the ennobled and the common people."
3. The accused shifted the blame from himself to his soldiers; he
said, "that in consequence of their having in the most turbulent
manner demanded battle, they were led into the field, not on the day
they desired, for it was then evening, but on the following; that they
were drawn up at a suitable time and on favourable ground; but either
the reputation or the strength of the enemy was such, that they were
unable to stand their ground. When they all fled precipitately, he
himself also was carried away with the crowd, as had happened to Varro
at the battle of Cannae, and to many other generals. How could he, by
his sole resistance, benefit the republic, unless his death would
remedy the public disasters? that he was not defeated in consequence
of a failure in his provisions; that he had not, from want of caution,
been drawn into a disadvantageous position; that he had not been cut
off by an ambuscade in consequence of not having explored his route,
but had been vanquished by open force, and by arms, in a regular
engagement. He had not in his power the minds of his own troops, or
those of the enemy. Courage and cowardice were the result of each
man's natural constitution." He was twice accused, and the penalty was
laid at a fine. On the third accusation, at which witnesses were
produced, he was not only overwhelmed with an infinity of disgraceful
charges, but a great many asserted on oath, that the flight and panic
commenced with the praetor, that the troops being deserted by him, and
concluding that the fears of their general were not unfounded, turned
their backs; when so strong a feeling of indignation was excited, that
the assembly clamorously rejoined that he ought to be tried capitally.
This gave rise to a new controversy; for when the tribune, who had
twice prosecuted him as for a finable offence, now, on the third
occasion, declared that he prosecuted him capitally; the tribunes of
the commons being appealed to, said, "they would not prevent their
colleague from proceeding, as he was permitted according to the custom
of their ancestors, in the manner he himself preferred, whether
according to the laws or to custom, until he had obtained judgment
against a private individual, convicting him either of a capital or
finable offence." Upon this, Sempronius said, that he charged Cneius
Fulvius with the crime of treason; and requested Caius Calpurnius, the
city praetor, to appoint a day for the comitia. Another ground of hope
was then tried by the accused, viz. if his brother, Quintus Fulvius,
could be present at his trial, who was at that time flourishing in the
fame of his past achievements and in the near expectation of taking
Capua. Fulvius wrote to the senate, requesting the favour in terms
calculated to excite compassion, in order to save the life of his
brother; but the fathers replied, that the interest of the state would
not admit of his leaving Capua. Cneius Fulvius, therefore, before the
day appointed for the comitia arrived, went into exile to Tarquinii,
and the commons resolved that it was a legal exile.
4. Meanwhile all the strength of the war was directed against Capua.
It was, however, more strictly blockaded than besieged. The slaves and
populace could neither endure the famine, nor send messengers to
Hannibal through guards so closely stationed. A Numidian was at length
found, who, on undertaking to make his way with it, was charged with a
letter; and going out by night, through the midst of the Roman camp,
in order to fulfil his promise, he inspired the Campanians with
confidence to try the effect of a sally from every quarter, while they
had any strength remaining. In the many encounters which followed,
their cavalry were generally successful, but their infantry were
beaten: however, it was by no means so joyful to conquer, as it was
miserable to be worsted in any respect by a besieged and almost
subdued enemy. A plan was at length adopted, by which their deficiency
in strength might be compensated by stratagem. Young men were selected
from all the legions, who, from the vigour and activity of their
bodies, excelled in swiftness; these were supplied with bucklers
shorter than those worn by horsemen, and seven javelins each, four
feet in length, and pointed with steel in the same manner as the
spears used by light-armed troops. The cavalry taking one of these
each upon their horses, accustomed them to ride behind them, and to
leap down nimbly when the signal was given. When, by daily practice,
they appeared to be able to do this in an orderly manner, they
advanced into the plain between the camp and the walls, against the
cavalry of the Campanians, who stood there prepared for action. As
soon as they came within a dart's cast, on a signal given, the light
troops leaped down, when a line of infantry formed out of the body of
horse suddenly rushed upon the cavalry of the enemy, and discharged
their javelins one after another with great rapidity; which being
thrown in great numbers upon men and horses indiscriminately, wounded
a great many. The sudden and unsuspected nature of the attack,
however, occasioned still greater terror; and the cavalry charging
them, thus panic-struck, chased them with great slaughter as far as
their gates. From that time the Roman cavalry had the superiority; and
it was established that there should be velites in the legions. It is
said that Quintus Navius was the person who advised the mixing of
infantry with cavalry, and that he received honour from the general on
that account.
5. While affairs were in this state at Capua, Hannibal was perplexed
between two objects, the gaining possession of the citadel of
Tarentum, and the retaining of Capua. His concern for Capua, however,
prevailed, on which he saw that the attention of every body, allies
and enemies, was fixed; and whose fate would be regarded as a proof of
the consequences resulting from defection from the Romans. Leaving
therefore, a great part of his baggage among the Bruttians, and all
his heavier armed troops, he took with him a body of infantry and
cavalry, the best he could select for marching expeditiously, and bent
his course into Campania. Rapidly as he marched he was followed by
thirty-three elephants. He took up his position in a retired valley
behind Mount Tifata, which overhung Capua. Having at his coming taken
possession of fort Galatia, the garrison of which he dislodged by
force, he then directed his efforts against those who were besieging
Capua. Having sent forward messengers to Capua stating the time at
which he would attack the Roman camp, in order that they also, having
gotten themselves in readiness for a sally, might at the same time
pour forth from all their gates, he occasioned the greatest possible
terror; for on one side he himself attacked them suddenly, and on the
other side all the Campanians sallied forth, both foot and horse,
joined by the Carthaginian garrison under the command of Bostar and
Hanno. The Romans, lest in so perilous an affair they should leave any
part unprotected, by running together to any one place, thus divided
their forces: Appius Claudius was opposed to the Campanians; Fulvius
to Hannibal; Caius Nero, the propraetor, with the cavalry of the sixth
legion, placed himself in the road leading to Suessula; and Caius
Fulvius Flaccus, the lieutenant-general, with the allied cavalry, on
the side opposite the river Vulturnus. The battle commenced not only
with the usual clamour and tumult, but in addition to the din of men,
horses, and arms, a multitude of Campanians, unable to bear arms,
being distributed along the walls, raised such a shout together with
the clangour of brazen vessels, similar to that which is usually made
in the dead of night when the moon is eclipsed, that it diverted the
attention even of the combatants. Appius easily repulsed the
Campanians from the rampart. On the other side Hannibal and the
Carthaginians, forming a larger force, pressed hard on Fulvius. There
the sixth legion gave way; being repulsed, a cohort of Spaniards with
three elephants made their way up to the rampart. They had broken
through the centre of the Roman line, and were in a state of anxious
and perilous suspense, whether to force their way into the camp, or be
cut off from their own army. When Fulvius saw the disorder of the
legion, and the danger the camp was in, he exhorted Quintus Navius,
and the other principal centurions, to charge the cohort of the enemy
which was fighting under the rampart; he said, "that the state of
things was most critical; that either they must retire before them, in
which case they would burst into the camp with less difficulty than
they had experienced in breaking through a dense line of troops, or
they must cut them to pieces under the rampart: nor would it require a
great effort; for they were few, and cut off from their own troops,
and if the line which appeared broken, now while the Romans were
dispirited, should turn upon the enemy on both sides, they would
become enclosed in the midst, and exposed to a twofold attack."
Navius, on hearing these words of the general, snatched the standard
of the second company of spearmen from the standard-bearer, and
advanced with it against the enemy, threatening that he would throw it
into the midst of them unless the soldiers promptly followed him and
took part in the fight. He was of gigantic stature, and his arms set
him off; the standard also, raised aloft, attracted the gaze both of
his countrymen and the enemy. When, however, he had reached the
standards of the Spaniards, javelins were poured upon him from all
sides, and almost the whole line was turned against him; but neither
the number of his enemies nor the force of the weapons could repel the
onset of this hero.
6. Marcus Atilius, the lieutenant-general, also caused the standard of
the first company of principes of the same legion to be borne against
a cohort of the Spaniards. Lucius Portius Licinus and Titus Popilius,
the lieutenant-generals, who had the command of the camp, fought
valiantly in defence of the rampart, and slew the elephants while in
the very act of crossing it. The carcasses of these filling up the
ditch, afforded a passage for the enemy as effectually as if earth had
been thrown in, or a bridge erected over it; and a horrid carnage took
place amid the carcasses of the elephants which lay prostrate. On the
other side of the camp, the Campanians, with the Carthaginian
garrison, had by this time been repulsed, and the battle was carried
on immediately under the gate of Capua leading to Vulturnus. Nor did
the armed men contribute so much in resisting the Romans, who
endeavoured to force their way in, as the gate itself, which, being
furnished with ballistas and scorpions, kept the enemy at bay by the
missiles discharged from it. The ardour of the Romans was also clamped
by the general, Appius Claudius, receiving a wound; he was struck by a
javelin in the upper part of his breast, beneath the left shoulder,
while encouraging his men before the front line. A great number,
however, of the enemy were slain before the gate, and the rest were
driven in disorder into the city. When Hannibal saw the destruction of
the cohort of Spaniards, and that the camp of the enemy was defended
with the utmost vigour, giving up the assault, he began to withdraw
his standards, making his infantry face about, but throwing out his
cavalry in the rear lest the enemy should pursue them closely. The
ardour of the legions to pursue the enemy was excessive, but Flaccus
ordered a retreat to be sounded, considering that enough had been
achieved to convince the Campanians, and Hannibal himself, how unable
he was to afford them protection. Some who have undertaken to give
accounts of this battle, record that eight thousand of the army of
Hannibal, and three thousand Campanians, were slain; that fifteen
military standards were taken from the Carthaginians, and eighteen
from the Campanians. In other authors I find the battle to have been
by no means so important, and that there was more of panic than
fighting; that a party of Numidians and Spaniards suddenly bursting
into the Roman camp with some elephants, the elephants, as they made
their way through the midst of the camp, threw down their tents with a
great noise, and caused the beasts of burden to break their halters
and run away. That in addition to the confusion occasioned, a
stratagem was employed; Hannibal having sent in some persons
acquainted with the Latin language, for he had some such with him, who
might command the soldiers, in the name of the consuls, to escape
every one as fast as he could to the neighbouring mountains, since the
camp was lost; but that the imposture was soon discovered, and
frustrated with a great slaughter of the enemy; that the elephants
were driven out of the camp by fire. However commenced, and however
terminated, this was the last battle which was fought before the
surrender of Capua. Seppius Lesius was Medixtuticus, or chief
magistrate of Capua, that year, a man of obscure origin and slender
fortune. It is reported that his mother, when formerly expiating a
prodigy which had occurred in the family in behalf of this boy, who
was an orphan, received an answer from the aruspex, stating, that "the
highest office would come to him;" and that not recognising, at Capua,
any ground for such a hope, exclaimed, "the state of the Campanians
must be desperate indeed, when the highest office shall come to my
son." But even this expression, in which the response was turned into
ridicule, turned to be true, for those persons whose birth allowed
them to aspire to high offices, refusing to accept them when the city
was oppressed by sword and famine, and when all hope was lost, Lesius,
who complained that Capua was deserted and betrayed by its nobles,
accepted the office of chief magistrate, being the last Campanian who
held it.
7. But Hannibal, when he saw that the enemy could not be drawn into
another engagement, nor a passage be forced through their camp into
Capua, resolved to remove his camp from that place and leave the
attempt unaccomplished, fearful lest the new consuls might cut off his
supplies of provision. While anxiously deliberating on the point to
which he should next direct his course, an impulse suddenly entered
his mind to make an attack on Rome, the very source of the war. That
the opportunity of accomplishing this ever coveted object, which
occurred after the battle of Cannae, had been neglected, and was
generally censured by others, he himself did not deny. He thought that
there was some hope that he might be able to get possession of some
part of the city, in consequence of the panic and confusion which his
unexpected approach would occasion, and that if Rome were in danger,
either both the Roman generals, or at least one of them, would
immediately leave Capua; and if they divided their forces, both
generals being thus rendered weaker, would afford a favourable
opportunity either to himself or the Campanians of gaining some
advantage. One consideration only disquieted him, and that was, lest
on his departure the Campanians should immediately surrender. By means
of presents he induced a Numidian, who was ready to attempt any thing,
however daring, to take charge of a letter; and, entering the Roman
camp under the disguise of a deserter, to pass out privately on the
other side and go to Capua. As to the letter, it was full of
encouragement. It stated, that "his departure, which would be
beneficial to them, would have the effect of drawing off the Roman
generals and armies from the siege of Capua to the defence of Rome.
That they must not allow their spirits to sink; that by a few days'
patience they would rid themselves entirely of the siege." He then
ordered the ships on the Vulturnus to be seized, and rowed up to the
fort which he had before erected for his protection. And when he was
informed that there were as many as were necessary to convey his army
across in one night, after providing a stock of provisions for ten
days, he led his legions down to the river by night, and passed them
over before daylight.
8. Fulvius Flaccus, who had discovered from deserters that this would
happen, before it took place, having written to Rome to the senate to
apprize them of it, men's minds were variously affected by it
according to the disposition of each. As might be expected in so
alarming an emergency, the senate was immediately assembled, when
Publius Cornelius, surnamed Asina, was for recalling all the generals
and armies from every part of Italy to protect the city, disregarding
Capua and every other concern. Fabius Maximus thought that it would be
highly disgraceful to retire from Capua, and allow themselves to be
terrified and driven about at the nod and menaces of Hannibal. "Was it
probable that he, who, though victorious at Cannae, nevertheless dared
not approach the city, now, after having been repulsed from Capua, had
conceived hopes of making himself master of Rome? It was not to
besiege Rome, but to raise the siege of Capua that he was coming.
Jupiter, the witness of treaties violated by Hannibal, and the other
deities, would defend the city of Rome with that army which is now at
the city." To these opposite opinions, that of Publius Valerius
Flaccus, which recommended a middle course, was preferred. Regardful
of both objects, he thought that a letter should be written to the
generals at Capua, informing them of the force they had at the city
for its protection, and stating, that as to the number of forces which
Hannibal was bringing with him, or how large an army was necessary to
carry on the siege of Capua, they themselves knew. If one of the
generals and a part of the army could be sent to Rome, and at the same
time Capua could be efficiently besieged by the remaining general and
army, that then Claudius and Fulvius should settle between themselves
which should continue the siege of Capua, and which should come to
Rome to protect their capital from being besieged. This decree of the
senate having been conveyed to Capua, Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul,
who was to go to Rome, as his colleague was ill from his wound,
crossed the Vulturnus with a body of troops, to the number of fifteen
thousand infantry and a thousand horse, selected from the three
armies. Then having ascertained that Hannibal intended to proceed
along the Latin road, he sent persons before him to the towns on and
near the Appian way, Setia, Cora, and Lanuvium, with directions that
they should not only have provisions ready in their towns, but should
bring them down to the road from the fields which lay out of the way,
and that they should draw together into their towns troops for their
defence, in order that each state might be under its own protection.