The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 6. - Ulysses S. Grant
On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on
the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions
to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his
forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was
thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down
in Sheridan's instructions.
On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under
General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture
Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges
across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side,
and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.
General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and
deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without
attempting one.
Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back
to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via
the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.
This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the
enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.
The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the
12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,
crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak
Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps
reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,
on the night of the 13th.
During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia
had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more
desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two
armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of
either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was
displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture
Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,
assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.
Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been
fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only
be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of
the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and
terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,
and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the
offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the
fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the
attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of
the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of
Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.
During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James
River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by
wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack
of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge
vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the
quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency
displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief
quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to
occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and
but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.
The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,
commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate
command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,
giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the
mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and
depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at
Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met
the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was
defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding
the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal
from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General
H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:
"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.
* * * * * * * "The enemy are
evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the
branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think
it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach
Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too
much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service. * * *
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."
"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.
"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should
do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be
destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he
could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville
join this army.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."
General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,
after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the
field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of
artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the
same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from
which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he
reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was
very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him
sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile
country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,
point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was
very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the
17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of
ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of
Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from
the defence of the North.
Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a
position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should
the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would
have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main
line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its
defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General
Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no
doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his
instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of
his country.
To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing
the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's
Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight
of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly
pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.
After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda
Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of
Petersburg.
The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give
him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I
would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and
throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be
done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the
enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,
and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next
morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to
satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines
until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the
assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the
Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing
fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about
seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced
Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear
the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. General
Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just
after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might
wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed
knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he
requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured
works, which was done before midnight.
By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack
was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under
Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th
corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and
the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock
the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of
the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four
hundred prisoners.
The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in
with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the
enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The
advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then
proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far
as possible without attacking fortifications.
On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of
his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to
get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn
before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,
at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.
As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I
ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that
were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to
report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his
present line urged upon him.
About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the
line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with
his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,
the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.
But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold
them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of
his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.
On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected
by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of
the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda
Hundred.
On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against
the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the
enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The
result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's
cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom
he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in
complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our
hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On
the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa
Court House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by
infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the
latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme
right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and
was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not
having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals
being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and
hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the
north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching
White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at
that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after
heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,
without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.
On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army
of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of
the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.
Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot
and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen
miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and
defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station
on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he
found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not
dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met
the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony
Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he
made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station
(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the
enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the
loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way
into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,
succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our
left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than
compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by
railroad with Richmond for several weeks.
With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the
Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the
Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of
his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine
that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's
lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and
two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to
the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler
had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our
lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting
this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting
lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.
The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large
force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the
diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force
back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of
the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to
relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the
assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and
Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved
in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and
five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a
regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th
corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance
promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason
to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were
immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up
enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),
and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus
held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were
withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.
Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was
retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the
Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he
returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement
of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the
Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river
and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of
navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great
delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this
purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against
Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning
to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued
immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River
expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time
made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments
from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,
of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions
of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to
Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.
General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across
the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's
Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own
command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from
Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the
Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not
sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and
although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,
and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two
division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before
him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance
reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a
reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the
enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost
about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss
was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.
Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the
assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the
troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the
enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all
the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright
commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken
at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;
and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of
the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.
Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,
I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies
operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement
against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;
and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between
any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much
as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the
fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to
return to the James.
About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was
ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved
down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the
30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.
From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down
between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit
messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to
thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be
received showing a different state of facts from those on which they
were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that
must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise
would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that
some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the
Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle
Department, and I so recommended.
On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to
Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his
assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time
the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our
forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the
crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at
Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the
4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for
myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after
consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following
instructions:
"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.
"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this
concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From
Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the
Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him
wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as
it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a
small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,
detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after
the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,
the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville
may be taken into account.