How Jerusalem Was Won - W.T. Massey
HOW JERUSALEM WAS WON
BEING THE RECORD OF ALLENBY'S CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE
by
W.T. MASSEY
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE LONDON NEWSPAPERS WITH THE EGYPTIAN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
LONDON 1919
PREFACE
This narrative of the work accomplished for civilisation by General
Allenby's Army is carried only as far as the occupation of Jericho.
The capture of that ancient town, with the possession of a line of
rugged hills a dozen miles north of Jerusalem, secured the Holy City
from any Turkish attempt to retake it. The book, in fact, tells
the story of the twenty-third fall of Jerusalem, one of the most
beneficent happenings of all wars, and marking an epoch in the
wonderful history of the Holy Place which will rank second only to
that era which saw the birth of Christianity. All that occurred in the
fighting on the Gaza-Beersheba line was part and parcel of the taking
of Jerusalem, the freeing of which from four centuries of Turkish
domination was the object of the first part of the campaign. The Holy
City was the goal sought by every officer and man in the Army; and
though from the moment that goal had been attained all energies were
concentrated upon driving the Turk out of the war, there was not a
member of the Force, from the highest on the Staff to the humblest
private in the ranks, who did not feel that Jerusalem was the greatest
prize of the campaign.
In a second volume I shall tell of that tremendous feat of arms which
overwhelmed the Turkish Armies, drove them through 400 miles of
country in six weeks, and gave cavalry an opportunity of proving that,
despite all the arts and devices of modern warfare, with fighters
and observers in the air and an entirely new mechanism of war, they
continued as indispensable a part of an army as when the legions
of old took the field. This is too long a story to be told in this
volume, though the details of that magnificent triumph are so firmly
impressed on the mind that one is loth to leave the narration of them
to a future date. For the moment Jerusalem must be sufficient, and if
in the telling of the British work up to that point I can succeed in
giving an idea of the immense value of General Allenby's Army to the
Empire, of the soldier's courage and fortitude, of his indomitable
will and self-sacrifice and patriotism, it will indeed prove the most
grateful task I have ever set myself.
_April 1919._
CONTENTS
Chap.
I. PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR
II. OLD BATTLEGROUNDS
III. DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK
IV. TRAINING THE ARMY
V. RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE
VI. PREPARING FOR 'ZERO DAY'
VII. THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY
VIII. GAZA DEFENCES
IX. CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT
X. THROUGH GAZA INTO THE OPEN
XI. TWO YEOMANRY CHARGES
XII. LOOKING TOWARDS JERUSALEM
XIII. INTO THE JUDEAN HILLS
XIV. THE DELIVERANCE OF THE HOLY CITY
XV. GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY
XVI. MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE
XVII. A GREAT FEAT OF WAR
XVIII. BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN
XIX. THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND
XX. OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN
APPENDICES
INDEX
LIST OF MAPS
PLAN OF SOUTHERN PALESTINE
PLAN OF GAZA-BEERSHEBA LINE
PLAN OF THE BETH-HORON COUNTRY
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF JERUSALEM
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO THE HOLY CITY. GENERAL ALLENBY RECEIVED BY THE
MILITARY GOVERNOR OP JERUSALEM, DECEMBER 11, 1917
KANTARA TERMINUS OF THE DESERT MILITARY RAILWAY
EAST FORCE H.Q. DUG-OUTS NEAR GAZA
WADI GHUZZE NEAR SHELLAL
OUR WATERWORKS AT SHELLAL
ON THE MOVE IN THE DESERT
THE GREAT MOSQUE AT GAZA
TURKISH HEADQUARTERS AT GAZA. Note the Crusader Lion in Wall.
A DESERT MOTOR ROAD NEAR SHELLAL
TURKISH DUG-OUTS AT GAZA
BEERSHEBA RAILWAY STATION WITH MINED ROLLING STOCK
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HARRY CHAUVEL OUTSIDE BEERSHEBA MOSQUE, NOVEMBER 1,
1917
EL MUGHAR. THE SCENE OF A YEOMANRY CHARGE
BURIAL-PLACE OF ST. GEORGE, PATRON SAINT OF ENGLAND (AT LUDD)
YEOMANRY GRAVES AT BETH-HORON THE UPPER, WHERE JOSHUA COMMANDED
THE SUN TO REMAIN STILL TO ENABLE THE ISRAELITES TO OVERTHROW THE
PHILISTINES
IN THE JUDEAN HILLS
A ROMAN CENTURION'S TOMB, KURYET EL ENAB
ONE OF KING SOLOMON'S POOLS
A TYPICAL NEW ZEALANDER
WADI SURAR, CROSSED BY LONDON TERRITORIALS ON THE MORNING OF THEIR
ASSAULT ON THE JERUSALEM DEFENCES
THE DEIR YESIN POSITION WEST OF JERUSALEM
EASTERN FACE OF NEBI SAMWIL MOSQUE, SHOWING DESTRUCTION BY TURKISH
SHELL-FIRE
OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO THE HOLY CITY. GENERAL ALLENBY ARRIVING OUTSIDE
THE JAFFA GATE
OFFICIAL ENTRY. GENERAL ALLENBY RECEIVING THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM (A
DESCENDANT OF MAHOMET)
JERUSALEM FROM MOUNT OF OLIVES
JERUSALEM FROM GARDEN OF GETHSEMANE
PANEL IN THE CHAPEL OF THE KAISERIN AUGUSTA VICTORIA HOSPICE ON THE
MOUNT OF OLIVES
BETHLEHEM
CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY, BETHLEHEM
AIN KARIM, PART OF THE JERUSALEM DEFENCES
RIVER AUJA, CROSSED AT NIGHT BY LOWLAND TERRITORIALS
JERISHEH MILL, RIVER AUJA, ONE OF THE LOWLANDERS' CROSSINGS
BARREL BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER AUJA
DESTROYED BRIDGE ON THE JERICHO ROAD
THE WILDERNESS, WITH A GLIMPSE OF THE DEAD SEA
LONDONERS' BRIDGE OVER THE JORDAN. THE RIVER IS IN FLOOD
GERMAN PRISONERS CROSSING THE JORDAN
NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES AT BETHLEHEM
A HAIRPIN BEND ON THE JERUSALEM ROAD
CHAPTER I
PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR
In a war which involved the peoples of the four quarters of the globe
it was to be expected that on the world's oldest battleground would
be renewed the scenes of conflict of bygone ages. There was perhaps a
desire of some elements of both sides, certainly it was the unanimous
wish of the Allies, to avoid the clash of arms in Palestine, and to
leave untouched by armies a land held in reverence by three of the
great religions of the world. But this ancient cockpit of warring
races could not escape. The will of those who broke the peace
prevailed. Germany's dream of Eastern Empires and world domination,
the lust of conquest of the Kaiser party, required that the tide of
war should once more surge across the land, and if the conquering
hosts left fewer traces of war wreckage than were to be expected in
their victorious march, it was due not to any anxiety of our foes
to avoid conflict about, and damage to, places with hallowed
associations, but to the masterly strategy of the British
Commander-in-Chief who manoeuvred the Turkish Armies out of positions
defending the sacred sites.
The people of to-day who have lived through the war, who have had
their view bewildered by ever-recurring anxieties, by hopes shattered
and fears realised, by a succession of victories and defeats on a
colossal scale, and by a sudden collapse of the enemy, may fail to see
the Palestine campaign in true perspective. But in a future generation
the calm judgment of the historian in reviewing the greatest of all
wars will, if I mistake not, pay a great tribute to General Allenby's
strategy, not only as marking the commencement of the enemy's
downfall, but as preserving from the scourge of war those holy places
which symbolise the example by which most people rule their lives.
Britons who value the good name of their country will appreciate what
this means to those who shall come after us--that the record of a
great campaign carried out exclusively by British Imperial troops was
unsullied by a single act to disturb the sacred monuments, and left
the land in the full possession of those rich treasures which stand
for the principles that guided our actions and which, if posterity
observes them, will make a better and happier world.
A few months after the Turks entered the war it was obvious that
unaided they could never realise the Kaiser's hope of cutting the Suez
Canal communications of the British Empire. The German commitments in
Europe were too overwhelming to permit of their rendering the Turks
adequate support for a renewed effort against Egypt after the failure
of the attack on the Canal in February 1915. There was an attempt
by the Turks in August 1916, but it was crushed by Anzac horse and
British infantry at Romani,[1] a score of miles from Port Said, and
thereafter the Turks in this theatre were on the defensive. Some
declare the Dardanelles enterprise to have been a mistake; others
believe that had we not threatened the Turks there Egypt would
have had to share with us the anxieties that war brings alike upon
attackers and defenders. Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, however we regard
those expeditions in the first years of the struggle, undoubtedly
prevented the Turks employing a large army against Egypt, and the
possibilities resulting from a defeat there were so full of danger to
us, not merely in that half-way house of the Empire but in India and
the East generally, that if Gallipoli served to avert the disaster
that ill-starred expedition was worth undertaking. We had to drive
the Turks out of the Sinai Peninsula--Egyptian territory--and, that
accomplished, an attack on the Turks through Palestine was imperative
since the Russian collapse released a large body of Turkish troops
from the Caucasus who would otherwise be employed in Mesopotamia.
[Footnote 1: _The Desert Campaigns_: London, Constable and Co., Ltd.]
When General Allenby took over the command of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force the British public as a whole did not fully
realise the importance of the Palestine campaign. Most of them
regarded it as a 'side show,' and looked upon it as one of those minor
fields of operations which dissipated our strength at a time when it
was imperative we should concentrate to resist the German effort on
the Western Front. They did not know the facts. In our far-flung
Empire it was essential that we should maintain our prestige among
the races we governed, some of them martial peoples who might remain
faithful to the British flag only so long as we could impress them
with our power to win the war. They were more influenced by a triumph
in Mesopotamia, which was nearer their doors, than by a victory in
France, and the occupation of Bagdad was a victory of greater import
to the King's Indian subjects than the German retirement from the
Hindenburg line. If there ever was a fear of serious trouble in India
the advance of General Maude in Mesopotamia dispelled it, and made it
easier not only to release a portion of our white garrison in India
for active service elsewhere, but to recruit a large force of Indians
for the Empire's work in other climes. Bagdad was a tremendous blow to
German ambitions. The loss of it spelt ruin to those hopes of Eastern
conquest which had prompted the German intrigues in Turkey, and it was
certain that the Kaiser, so long as he believed in ultimate victory,
would refuse to accept the loss of Bagdad as final. Russia's
withdrawal as a belligerent released a large body of Turkish troops
in the Caucasus, and set free many Germans, particularly 'technical
troops' of which the Turks stood in need, for other fronts. It was
then that the German High Command conceived a scheme for retaking
Bagdad, and the redoubtable von Falkenhayn was sent to Constantinople
charged with the preparations for the undertaking. Certain it is that
it would have been put into execution but for the situation created by
the presence of a large British Army in the Sinai Peninsula. A large
force was collected about Aleppo for a march down the Euphrates
valley, and the winter of 1917-18 would have witnessed a stern
struggle for supremacy in Mesopotamia if the War Cabinet had not
decided to force the Turks to accept battle where they least wanted
it.
The views of the British War Cabinet on the war in the East, at any
rate, were sound and solid. They concentrated on one big campaign,
and, profiting from past mistakes which led to a wastage of strength,
allowed all the weight they could spare to be thrown into the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force under a General who had proved his high military
capacity in France, and in whom all ranks had complete confidence, and
they permitted the Mesopotamian and Salonika Armies to contain the
enemies on their fronts while the Army in Palestine set out to crush
the Turks at what proved to be their most vital point. As to whether
the force available on our Mesopotamia front was capable of defeating
the German scheme I cannot offer an opinion, but it is beyond all
question that the conduct of operations in Palestine on a plan at once
bold, resolute, and worthy of a high place in military history saved
the Empire much anxiety over our position in the Tigris and Euphrates
valleys, and probably prevented unrest on the frontiers of India and
in India itself, where mischief makers were actively working in the
German cause. Nor can there be any doubt that the brilliant campaign
in Palestine prevented British and French influence declining among
the Mahomedan populations of those countries' respective spheres of
control in Africa. Indeed I regard it as incontrovertible that the
Palestine strategy of General Allenby, even apart from his stupendous
rush through Syria in the autumn of the last year of war, did as much
to end the war in 1918 as the great battles on the Western Front,
for if there had been failure or check in Palestine some British and
French troops in France might have had to be detached to other fronts,
and the Germans' effort in the Spring might have pushed their line
farther towards the Channel and Paris. If Bagdad was not actually
saved in Palestine, an expedition against it was certainly stopped by
our Army operating on the old battlegrounds in Palestine. We lost many
lives, and it cost us a vast amount of money, but the sacrifices
of brave men contributed to the saving of the world from German
domination; and high as the British name stood in the East as the
upholder of the freedom of peoples, the fame of Britain for justice,
fair dealing, and honesty is wider and more firmly established to-day
because the people have seen it emerge triumphantly from a supreme
test.
In the strategy of the world war we made, no doubt, many mistakes, but
in Palestine the strategy was of the best, and in the working out of a
far-seeing scheme, victories so influenced events that on this front
began the final phase of the war--once Turkey was beaten, Bulgaria and
Austria-Hungary submitted and Germany acknowledged the inevitable.
Falkenhayn saw that the Bagdad undertaking was impossible so long as
we were dangerous on the Palestine front, and General Allenby's attack
on the Gaza line wiped the Bagdad enterprise out of the list of German
ambitions. The plan of battle on the Gaza-Beersheba line resembled
in miniature the ending of the war. If we take Beersheba for Turkey,
Sheria and Hareira for Bulgaria and Austria, and Gaza for Germany,
we get the exact progress of events in the final stage, except that
Bulgaria's submission was an intelligent anticipation of the laying
down of their arms by the Turks. Gaza-Beersheba was a rolling up from
our right to left; so was the ending of the Hun alliance.
CHAPTER II
OLD BATTLEGROUNDS
It was in accordance with the fitness of things that the British Army
should fight and conquer on the very spots consecrated by the memories
of the most famous battles of old. From Gaza onwards we made our
progress by the most ancient road on earth, for this way moved
commerce between the Euphrates and the Nile many centuries before the
East knew West. We fought on fields which had been the battlegrounds
of Egyptian and Assyrian armies, where Hittites, Ethiopians, Persians,
Parthians, and Mongols poured out their blood in times when kingdoms
were strong by the sword alone. The Ptolemies invaded Syria by this
way, and here the Greeks put their colonising hands on the country.
Alexander the Great made this his route to Egypt. Pompey marched over
the Maritime Plain and inaugurated that Roman rule which lasted for
centuries; till Islam made its wide irresistible sweep in the seventh
century. Then the Crusaders fought and won and lost, and Napoleon's
ambitions in the East were wrecked just beyond the plains.
Up the Maritime Plain we battled at Gaza, every yard of which had
been contested by the armies of mighty kings in the past thirty-five
centuries, at Akir, Gezer, Lydda, and around Joppa. All down the ages
armies have moved in victory or flight over this plain, and General
Allenby in his advance was but repeating history. And when the
Turks had been driven beyond the Plain of Philistia, and the
Commander-in-Chief had to decide how to take Jerusalem, we saw the
British force move along precisely the same route that has been taken
by armies since the time when Joshua overcame the Amorites and the day
was lengthened by the sun and moon standing still till the battle
was won. Geography had its influence on the strategy of to-day as
completely as it did when armies were not cumbered with guns and
mechanical transport. Of the few passes from the Maritime Plain over
the Shephelah into the Judean range only that emerging from the green
Vale of Ajalon was possible, if we were to take Jerusalem, as the
great captains of old took it, from the north. The Syrians sometimes
chose this road in preference to advancing through Samaria, the Romans
suffered retreat on it, Richard Coeur de Lion made it the path for his
approach towards the Holy City, and, precisely as in Joshua's day and
as when in the first century the Romans fell victims to a tremendous
Jewish onslaught, the fighting was hardest about the Beth-horons, but
with a different result--the invaders were victorious. The corps which
actually took Jerusalem advanced up the new road from Latron through
Kuryet el Enab, identified by some as Kirjath-jearim where the
Philistines returned the Ark, but that road would have been denied to
us if we had not made good the ancient path from the Vale of Ajalon to
Gibeon. Jerusalem was won by the fighting at the Beth-horons as
surely as it was on the line of hills above the wadi Surar which
the Londoners carried. There was fighting at Gibeon, at Michmas, at
Beeroth, at Ai, and numerous other places made familiar to us by the
Old Testament, and assuredly no army went forth to battle on more
hallowed soil.
Of all the armies which earned a place in history in Palestine,
General Allenby's was the greatest--the greatest in size, in
equipment, in quality, in fighting power, and not even the invading
armies in the romantic days of the Crusades could equal it in
chivalry. It fought the strong fight with clean hands throughout, and
finished without a blemish on its conduct. It was the best of all the
conquering armies seen in the Holy Land as well as the greatest.
Will not the influence of this Army endure? I think so. There is an
awakening in Palestine, not merely of Christians and Jews, but of
Moslems, too, in a less degree. During the last thirty years there
have grown more signs of the deep faiths of peoples and of their
veneration of this land of sacred history. If their institutions and
missions could develop and shed light over Palestine even while the
slothful and corrupt Turk ruled the land, how much faster and more in
keeping with the sanctity of the country will the improvement be under
British protection? The graves of our soldiers dotted over desert
wastes and cornfields, on barren hills and in fertile valleys, ay, and
on the Mount of Olives where the Saviour trod, will mark an era more
truly grand and inspiring, and offer a far greater lesson to future
generations than the Crusades or any other invasion down the track of
time. The Army of General Allenby responded to the happy thought of
the Commander-in-Chief and contributed one day's pay for the erection
of a memorial near Jerusalem in honour of its heroic dead. Apart from
the holy sites, no other memorial will be revered so much, and future
pilgrims, to whatever faith they belong, will look upon it as a
monument to men who went to battle to bring lasting peace to a land
from which the Word of Peace and Goodwill went forth to mankind.
In selecting General Sir Edmund Allenby as the Palestine Army's chief
the War Cabinet made a happy choice. General Sir Archibald Murray
was recalled to take up an important command at home after the two
unsuccessful attempts to drive the Turks from the Gaza defences. The
troops at General Murray's disposal were not strong enough to take
the offensive again, and it was clear there must be a long period of
preparation for an attack on a large scale. General Allenby brought to
the East a lengthy experience of fighting on the Western Front, where
his deliberate methods of attack, notably at Arras, had given the
Allies victories over the cleverest and bravest of our enemies.
Palestine was likely to be a cavalry, as well as an infantry,
campaign, or at any rate the theatre of war in which the mounted arm
could be employed with the most fruitful of results. General Allenby's
achievements as a cavalry leader in the early days of the war marked
him as the one officer of high rank suited for the Palestine command,
and his proved capacity as a General both in open and in trench
warfare gave the Army that high degree of confidence in its
Commander-in-Chief which it is so necessary that a big fighting force
should possess. A tremendously hard worker himself, General Allenby
expected all under him to concentrate the whole of their energies
on their work. He had the faculty for getting the best out of his
officers, and on his Staff were some of the most enthusiastic soldiers
in the service. There was no room for an inefficient leader in any
branch of the force, and the knowledge that the Commander-in-Chief
valued the lives and the health of his men so highly that he would not
risk a failure, kept all the staffs tuned up to concert pitch. We
saw many changes, and the best men came to the top. His own vigour
infected the whole command, and within a short while of arriving at
the front the efficiency of the Army was considerably increased.
The Palestine G.H.Q. was probably nearer the battle front than any
G.H.Q. in other theatres of operations, and when the Army had broken
through and chased the enemy beyond the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, G.H.Q.
was opened at Bir Salem, near Ramleh, and for several months was
actually within reach of the long-range guns which the Turks
possessed. The rank and file were not slow to appreciate this. They
knew their Commander-in-Chief was on the spot, keeping his eye and
hand on everything, organising with his organisers, planning with
his operation staff, familiar with every detail of the complicated
transport system, watching his supply services with the keenness of a
quartermaster-general, and taking that lively interest in the medical
branch which betrayed an anxious desire for the welfare and health of
the men. The rank and file knew something more than this. They saw the
Commander-in-Chief at the front every day. General Allenby did not
rely solely on reports from his corps. He went to each section of the
line himself, and before practically every major operation he saw the
ground and examined the scheme for attack. There was not a part of the
line he did not know, and no one will contradict me when I say that
the military roads in Palestine were known by no one better than the
driver of the Commander-in-Chief's car. A man of few words, General
Allenby always said what he meant with soldierly directness, which
made the thanks he gave a rich reward. A good piece of work brought a
written or oral message of thanks, and the men were satisfied they
had done well to deserve congratulations. They were proud to have the
confidence of such a Chief and to deserve it, and they in their turn
had such unbounded faith in the military judgment of the General and
in the care he took to prevent unnecessary risk of life, that there
was nothing which he sanctioned that they would not attempt. Such
mutual confidence breeds strength, and it was the Commander-in-Chief's
example, his tact, energy, and military genius which made his Army a
potent power for Britain and a strong pillar of the Allies' cause.
Let it not be imagined that General Allenby in his victorious campaign
shone only as a great soldier. He was also a great administrator. In
England little was known about this part of the General's work, and
owing to the difficulties of the task and to the consideration which
had, and still has, to be shown to the susceptibilities of a number of
friendly nations and peoples, it may be long before the full story of
the administration of the occupied territory in Palestine is unfolded
for general appreciation. It is a good story, worthy of Britain's
record as a protector of peoples, and though from the nature of his
conquest over the Turks in the Bible country the name of General
Allenby will adorn the pages of history principally as a victor, it
will also stand before the governments of states as setting a model
for a wise, prudent, considerate, even benevolent, administration of
occupied enemy territory. In days when Powers driven mad by military
ambition tear up treaties as scraps of paper, General Allenby observed
the spirit as well as the letter of the Hague Convention, and found
it possible to apply to occupied territory the principles of
administration as laid down in the Manual of Military Law.