The Bullitt Mission to Russia - William C. Bullitt
THE BULLITT MISSION TO RUSSIA
Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate of WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
MCMXIX
CONTENTS
THE COMMITTEE MEETS
MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS
ORDERED TO RUSSIA
COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA
THE TROOPS AT ARCHANGEL
SITUATION IN RUSSIA
FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE
WHAT AMERICA WANTED
THE BRITISH TERMS
TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED
GOVERNMENTS
MR. BULLITT'S REPORT ON RUSSIA
ECONOMIC SITUATION
SOCIAL CONDITIONS
POLITICAL SITUATION
PEACE PROPOSALS
CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX TO REPORT
TRANSPORT
FOOD
MANAGEMENT
SOCIAL CONDITIONS
STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES
ARMY
LENIN'S PRESTIGE
CONCESSIONS
BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE
BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED
PROPOSED DECLARATION OF ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS' POLICY AND OFFER OF
ARMISTICE
NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA
AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL
BULLITT MEMORANDUM FOR AUCHINCLOSS
REPLY OF PRESIDENT AND THREE PREMIERS TO NANSEN
HOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL
LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT
MR. BULLITT RESIGNS
REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS
REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETTIT
SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD
THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., Friday, September 12, 1919.
The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman,
at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 310, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge presiding.
Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding,
and New.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt is to make a statement to the committee this
morning. I think I ought to say that Mr. Bullitt was summoned on the
23d of August, I believe, and he was in the woods at that time, out of
reach of telegraph or telephone or mail, and only received the summons
a few days ago. He came at once to Washington. That is the reason of
the delay in his hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, will you take the stand and give your full
name, please, to the stenographer?
Mr. BULLITT, William C. Bullitt.
The CHAIRMAN. You are a native and a resident of Philadelphia, are you
not?
Mr. BULLITT. I am, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war, what were you engaged in?
Mr. BULLITT. Before the war I was employed by the Philadelphia Public
Ledger. I had been a correspondent for them in various places, and I
had been a member of the editorial staff in Philadelphia for a time.
The CHAIRMAN. You went abroad for them as a correspondent?
Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Before we went into the war?
Mr. BULLITT. Before we went into the war I toured Germany, Austria,
Hungary, Belgium, Poland, and other places, studying conditions there,
for the purposes of the Public Ledger.
The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, what did you do? You came
back?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; I came back. I was in the United States at that
time.
The CHAIRMAN. At that time?
Mr. BULLITT. And I was asked to enter the Department of State, to work
in the Division of Western European Affairs under Mr. Grew, in which
my special province was to follow the political situation of Germany
and Austria-Hungary, to prepare the confidential reports of the
department on Germany, Austria, and Hungary--the weekly reports--and
also such memoranda on conditions as the President and the Secretary
and others might call for.
The CHAIRMAN. And then you went to Paris as a member of the staff,
after the armistice?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I was an employee of the department at the time of
the armistice, and I was ordered to Paris as a member of the staff of
the commission.
Senator KNOX. When did you first go to Paris, Mr. Bullitt?
Mr. BULLITT. I sailed on the _George Washington_. I went over with the
original trip of the President.
Senator KNOX. And you were there continuously how long?
Mr. BULLITT. I remained in Paris until--I can give you the exact
date--I was ordered to go on a special mission to Berne about the
first week of February. I can give you the exact date, if it is of any
moment.
Senator KNOX. No; it is not.
Mr. BULLITT. I remained a week in Berne, then returned and remained in
Paris until I was ordered to go to Russia.
I left for Russia on the 22d of February. I was in Paris during the
entire period until the 22d of February. Senator KNOX. You said you
went over on the original trip of the President. Just to get these
dates right, when did you reach Paris?
Mr. BULLITT. I left New York on December 4 and, as I remember, we
reached Paris on December 13.
Senator KNOX. And you were there, then, until you went to Berne in
February?
Mr. BULLITT. In February,
Senator KNOX. What was your personal relation to the peace conference
and its work?
MR. BULLITT'S OFFICIAL STATUS
Mr. BULLITT. When I first arrived I was asked to take charge of a
confidential bulletin which was to be gotten out for the benefit of
the commissioners each morning. It was to be read by them. That lasted
a very short time, and as is usual with most things of the kind, we
discovered that the commissioners did not care to spend the time
reading it, and therefore it was decided to abolish this bulletin, and
that instead I should receive all the intelligence reports of military
intelligence, of the State Department, intelligence received through
all the special dispatches of the ambassadors, etc., in fact, all the
information that came in, and a section was created called the Current
Intelligence Section. I was called the Chief of the Division of
Current Intelligence Summaries.
Senator KNOX. Then, as I understand, your function was to acquaint
yourself with everything that was going on in connection with the
conference, and disseminate the news to the different branches of the
peace conference and the different bureaus?
Mr. BULLITT. I was to report only to the commissioners.
Senator KNOX. Well, but the essential thing is, was it your duty to
get information?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was my duty to be in constant touch with everyone
who was in the American delegation, and present information to the
commissioners each morning. I had 20 minutes with each commissioner
each morning.
Senator KNOX. So that you were practically a clearing house of
information for the members of the American mission?
Mr. BULLITT. That is what I was supposed to be.
* * * * *
ORDERED TO RUSSIA
Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Russia, and when did you go?
Mr. BULLITT. I was ordered to go to Russia on the 18th of February. I
received the following order from Secretary Lansing [reading]:
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
18 February, 1919.
MR. WILLIAM C. BULLITT,
American Commission to Negotiate Peace.
SIR: You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia for the
purpose of studying conditions, political and economic,
therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners
plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all American
diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to
extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable
you to fulfill the duties of your mission.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.
[SEAL.]
Senator KNOX. What is the date of that?
Mr. BULLITT. February 18, 1919. I also received at the same time from
Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the secretary of the American commission, the
following [reading]:
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
18 February, 1919.
To whom it may concern:
I hereby certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been
authorized by the American commissioners plenipotentiary to
negotiate peace to proceed to Russia, for the purpose of
studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for
the benefit of the commission, and I bespeak for him the
proper courtesies and facilities in enabling him to fulfill
the duties of his mission.
J.C. GREW,
Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.
[SEAL.]
Senator KNOX. You say you started in February. What time in February?
Mr. BULLITT. I left on the 22d day of February.
Senator KNOX. Did you know at that time, or have you ascertained
since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from Paris,
that is, by the President himself; a man by the name of Buckler, who
went to Russia a few days before you did?
Mr. BULLITT. Mr. W.H. Buckler, Mr. Henry White's half brother. He was
an attache of the American embassy in London. He was ordered from
there to go, about the 1st of January, to Stockholm, to confer with
Litvinov, who had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Government to
London--the British had allowed him to stay there without actually
recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him.
Mr. Buckler there conferred with Litvinov, who made various
propositions and representations to him which Mr. Buckler at once
telegraphed back to Paris, and which were considered so important by
the President that the President read them in extenso to the council
of ten on the morning of January 21. I regret that I have no actual
copy of those proposals by Litvinov, or of Buckler's telegrams. At
that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to Russia
which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost
interest, in the council of ten. I happen to have the minutes of the
council for January 16, when this Russian question was taken up, which
I shall be glad to read, if the Senators should be interested, and
also the minutes of the council of ten on January 21, at which meeting
the Prinkipos proposal was decided upon. The Buckler meeting with
Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos,
the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. Lloyd George. No; that
is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that
representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should
be brought to Paris.
COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA
NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI
D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
SITUATION IN RUSSIA.
Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information
in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian
situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently
in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had
been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as
to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The
British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a
recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that
Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British
proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war
within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop
reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an
account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way
to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates
to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government
entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.
Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which
had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as
follows:
Firstly, the real facts are not known;
Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is
to adjudicate the question; and
Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general
mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is
obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik
Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact,
there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than
ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their
hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case
of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and
overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of
overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are
becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great
Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to
one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either
side.
Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible
policies:
1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki
movement is as dangerous to civilization as German
militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there
anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain
number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one
million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of
this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand
British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would
mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to
Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing
Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even
admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one
can conceive or understand to bring about order by force.
2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik
Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized
what this would mean. From the information furnished him
Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory
there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now
starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health
cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact,
the people who would die are just the people that the Allies
desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of
the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our
friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane
people, those present could not consider.
Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the
Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin,
Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people
to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had
received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to
fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that
while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone
over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse
of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any
of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand.
He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked
on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little
backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that
Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the
map, there was a great solid block of territory between
Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it
would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the
old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a
monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding
this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very
democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for
the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.
Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the
present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.
Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist
regime. This is not what one would call creating a new
world.
3. The third alternative was contained in the British
proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to
appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the
Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to
render an account of their actions.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used
that there were already here certain representatives of these
Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonov, who claims
to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sazonov can
not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan,
like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in
direct contact with the Government at Omsk.
It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for
bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and
leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in
flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of
themselves.
Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to
permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed
that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England
becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist
representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a
military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would
make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For
his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts
are known in England and the United States. The same applied to
Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always
trusted to turn down Bolshevism.
Under all circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than
to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their
conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of
themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference.
Mr. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the
French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to
appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present
his views on the Russian situation.
President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to
controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there
was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but
which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He
did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal
aspect of Bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of
large vested interests in the political and economic world. While it
might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow
reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown
impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He
stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests
in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and
desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference,
namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the
opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known.
Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are
not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to
physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful,
each of the other. Society can not go on that plane. On the one hand,
there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a
majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential
to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the
minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to
put trust and cooperation between these two.
President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by
this question before the Bolskeviki came into power. Seeds need soil,
and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them.
President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that
the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to
enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that
the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they
would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For
example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in
New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr.
Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States
would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience
exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the
President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World
are.
President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against
the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give
Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He
concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his
recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted.
President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George,
received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with
the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one
point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the
report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument
that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would
be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that
stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well
be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from
foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement.
President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of
destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and
that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were
adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from
Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from
reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive
representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to
come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their
problem.
He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions
that lead anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be
found out.
M. Pichon referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be
called before the meeting.
Mr. Balfour suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul,
lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the
anti-Bolshevik side.
Baron Sonnino suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark,
recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the
Russian situation.
Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what
these gentlemen might have to say.
Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about a letter that Buckler wrote
to the President in relation to his mission? Have you ever seen a copy
of his report in the form of a letter?
Mr. BULLITT. I have read a copy of his report, but I have not the
copy. The only reference I have to it that I find, in the short time I
have had to go over my papers since I came down from the woods, is in
a memorandum to Col. House in reference to the withdrawal of the
American troops from Archangel [reading]:
Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with
Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the Bolsheviki would agree to
an armistice on the Archangel front at any time; and, furthermore,
would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those Russians in and
about Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He,
furthermore, suggested that such Russians as did not care to trust
their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops.
Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about whether Litvinov communicated
directly with the President in reference to this Buckler mission?
Mr. BULLITT. Litvinov had written a letter to the President, which has
since been widely published, on December 24.
Senator KNOX. That is the letter I had in mind. I had seen some
references to that. Do you have a copy of that letter?
Mr. BULLITT. I do not know whether I have any copies of this
letter--that is, authentic. I think I have a newspaper copy some
place, but I have no actual copy of the letter.
Senator KNOX. Can you tell us anything more about the discussion in
reference to the withdrawal of troops from Russia that took place at
that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there?
Mr. BULLITT. There were very serious discussions, all the time.
Telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders
at Archangel, the American and the British notably, in regard to
conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and
discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. The
subject was very much in the air. I have, I will say, very few
references to that particular condition. I have here this memorandum
which takes up some of these subjects. I do not know if the committee
would care to hear it.